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DIO'S ROME

AN

HISTORICAL NARRATIVE ORIGINALLY COMPOSED IN GREEK DURING THE REIGNS OF SEPTIMIUS SEVERUS, GETA AND CARACALLA, MACRINUS, ELAGABALUS AND ALEXANDER SEVERUS:

AND

NOW PRESENTED IN ENGLISH FORM

BY

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DIO'S
ROMAN HISTORY
36

Metellus subdues Crete by force (chapters 1, 2).*

Mithridates and Tigranes renew the war (chapter 3).

Lucullus does not take advantage of his victory: a successor is appointed: he captures Tigranocerta (chapter 4).

Arsaces, the Parthian, lends aid to neither party (chapter 5).

Lucullus, after a rather disastrous conflict, besieges and captures Nisibis (chapters 6–8).

Meanwhile he loses the Armenias: Fabius is conquered (chapters 10, 11).

Triarius follows Mithridates to Comana: is afterwards overcome by him (chapters 12–15).

Uprising in Lucullus's army: Mithridates regains everything (chapters 16–19).

Insolence of the pirates (chapters 20–23).

The consequent war, in spite of opposition on the part of many, is by the Gabinian law entrusted to Pompey and is very quickly brought to an end (chapters 23–37).

Cornelian laws in regard to canvassing for office and edicts of prætors: the Roscian in regard to seats for the knights: the Manilian in regard to the voting of freedmen (chapters 38–42).

The Mithridatic war by the Manilian law is given in charge of Pompey (chapters 43, 44).

Pompey vanquishes Mithridates in a night battle (chapters 45–50).

Tigranes, the father, surrenders himself: his son is put in chains (chapters 51–53).

An attack of the Albani is repulsed (chapter 54).

DURATION OF TIME.

Q. Hortensius, Q. Cæcilius Metellus Creticus Coss. (B. C. 69 = a. u. 685.)

L. Cæcilius Metellus (dies,† then) Q. Marcius Rex alone. (B. C. 68 = a. u. 686.)

M.' Acilius Glabrio, C. Calpurnius Piso. (B. C. 67 = a. u. 687.)

L. Volcatius Tullus, M.' Æmilius Lepidus. (B. C. 66 = a. u. 688.)

* As far as chapter 20 this argument of Leunclavius will be found to follow a different division of Book Thirty-six from that adopted by Melber and employed in the present translation.

† His death occurred early in the year.

(BOOK 36, BOISSEVAIN.)

The beginning of this book is missing in the MSS. The gist of the lost portion may in all probability be gathered from the following sentences of Xiphilinus (p. 3, R. Steph.):

"When the consuls drew lots, Hortensius obtained the war against the Cretans. Because of his fondness, however, for residence in the capital, and because of the courts (in which his influence was only second to Cicero's) he voluntarily relinquished the campaign in favor of his colleague and himself remained at home. Metellus accordingly started for Crete . . .

"Lucius Lucullus at about this period worsted the lords of Asia,— Mithridates and Tigranes the Armenian,— in the war, and having compelled them to avoid a pitched battle proceeded to besiege Tigranocerta. The barbarians did him serious injury by means of their archery as well as by the naphtha which they poured over his engines. This chemical is full of bitumen and is so fiery that whatever it touches it is sure to burn to a cinder, and it can not be extinguished by any liquid. As a consequence Tigranes recovered courage and marched forth with an army of such huge proportions that he actually laughed heartily at the appearance of the Romans present there. He is said to have remarked that in cases where they came to make war only a few presented themselves, but when it was an embassy, many came. However, his amusement was of short duration, and he forthwith discovered how far courage and skill surpass any mere numbers. Relics of his subsequent flight were found by the soldiers in the shape of his tiara and the band that goes around it; and they gave them to Lucullus. In his fear that these marks might lead to his recognition and capture he had pulled them off and thrown them away."

—1—
B. C. 69
(*a. u.* 685)

. . . and because he had enjoyed the extremes of fortune in both respects, he allowed it. For after his many defeats and victories no fewer, he had a firm belief that he had in consequence become more versed in generalship. His foes accordingly busied themselves as if they were then for the first time beginning war, sending an embassy to their various neighbors, including among others Arsaces the Parthian, although he was hostile to Tigranes on account of some disputed territory. This they offered to vacate for him, and

B. C. 69 (*a. u.* 685) proceeded to malign the Romans, saying that the latter, should they conquer them while isolated, would immediately make a campaign against him. Every victorious force was inherently insatiable of success and put no bound to acquisition, and the Romans, who had won the mastery over many, would not choose to leave him alone.

—2— While they were so engaged, Lucullus did not follow up Tigranes, but allowed him to reach safety quite at leisure. Because of this he was charged by the citizens, as well as others, with refusing to end the war, in order that he might retain his command a longer time. Therefore they then restored the province of Asia to the prætors, and later, when he apparently acted in this way again, sent to him the consul of that year, to relieve him. Tigranocerta he did seize when the foreigners that dwelt with the natives revolted to the side of the Armenians. The most of these were Cilicians who had once been deported, and they let in the Romans during the night. Thereupon everything was laid waste except what belonged to the Cilicians; and many wives of the principal chiefs Lucullus held, when captured, free from outrage: by this action he won over their husbands also. He received further Antiochus, king of Commagene (the Syrian country near the Euphrates and the Taurus), and Alchaudonius, an Arabian chieftain, and others who had made proposals for peace.

—3— From them he learned of the embassy sent by Tigranes and Mithridates to Arsaces, and despatched to him, on his part, some of the allies with threats, in case he should aid the foe, and promises, if he should

espouse the Roman cause. Arsaces at that time (for he still nourished anger against Tigranes and felt no suspicion toward the Romans) sent a counter-embassy to Lucullus, and established friendship and alliance. Later, at sight of Secilius,[1] who had come to him, he began to suspect that the emissary was there to spy out the country and his power. It was for this cause, he thought, and not for the sake of the agreement which had already been made that a man distinguished in warfare had been sent. Hence he no longer rendered them any help. On the other hand, he made no opposition, but stood aloof from both parties, naturally wishing neither to grow strong. He decided that an evenly balanced contest between them would bring him the greatest safety. B. C. 69. (*a. u.* 685)

Besides these transactions Lucullus this year subdued many parts of Armenia. In the year of Quintus Marcius (Note by the author.— By this I mean that although he was not the only consul appointed, he was the only one that held office. Lucius Metellus, elected with him, died in the early part of the year, and the man chosen in his stead resigned before entering upon office, wherefore no one else was appointed.),— in this year, then, when summer was half way through (in the spring it was impossible to invade hostile territory by reason of the cold), Lucullus entered upon a campaign and devastated some land purposing to draw the barbarians, while defending it, imperceptibly into battle. As he could not rouse them for all that, he attacked. In this engagement the opposing cavalry gave the —4— B. C. 68 (*a. u.* 686) —5—

[1] This man's name is given as Sextilius by Plutarch (Life of Lucullus, chapter 25) and Appian (Mithridatic Wars, chapter 84).

B. C. 68 (*a. u.* 686) Roman cavalry hard work, but none of the foe approached the infantry; indeed, whenever the foot-soldiers of Lucullus assisted the horse, the adversaries of the Romans would turn to flight. Far from suffering harm, however, they shot backward at those pursuing them, killing some instantly and wounding great numbers. Such wounds were dangerous and hard to heal. This was because they used double arrow-points and furthermore poisoned them, so that the missiles, whether they stuck fast anywhere in the body or were drawn out, would quickly destroy it, since the second iron point, having no attachment, would be left within.

—6— Lucullus, since many were being wounded, some were dying, and some were being maimed, and provisions at the same time were failing them, retired from that place and marched against Nisibis. This city is built in the region called Mesopotamia (Author's note.—Mesopotamia is the name given to all the country between the Tigris and Euphrates.) and now belongs to us, being considered a colony of ours. But at that time Tigranes, who had seized it from the Parthians, had deposited in it his treasuries and most of his other possessions, and had stationed his brother as guard over it. Lucullus reached this city in summer time, and although he directed his attacks upon it in no half-hearted fashion, he effected nothing. For the walls being of brick, double and of great thickness, with a deep moat intervening, could be neither shaken down nor dug through and consequently Tigranes was not

—7— lending them assistance. When winter set in, and the

barbarians were behaving rather carelessly, inasmuch as they had the upper hand and were all but expecting to drive out the Romans, Lucullus waited for a night without a moon, when there was a violent storm of thunder and rain, so that the foe, not being able to see ahead or hear a sound, left the outer city (all but a few of them) and the intervening moat. He then assailed the wall at many points, ascending it without difficulty from the mounds, and easily slew the guards, not many in number, who had been left behind upon it. In this way he filled up a part of the moat — the barbarians had broken down the bridges in advance — and got across, since in the downpour neither archery nor fire could harm him. Immediately he captured nearly everything, for the inner circle was not very strong by reason of the confidence felt in the outer works beyond it. Among those that fled to the acropolis, whom he subsequently caused to capitulate, was the brother of Tigranes. He also obtained considerable money and passed the winter there. B. C. 68 (*a. u.* 686)

—8—

Nisibis, then, he overpowered as described, but many localities of Armenia and the other countries around Pontus he lost. Tigranes had not aided the town in question through the idea that it could not be captured, but had hurried to the aforementioned places to see if he could acquire them before Lucullus, while the latter was occupied near the other city. Despatching Mithridates to his native land, Tigranes himself entered his own district of Armenia. There he was opposed by Lucius Fannius, whom he cut off and besieged, how-

B. C. 68 (*a. u.* 686) —9— ever, until Lucullus ascertaining it sent assistance. Meanwhile Mithridates had invaded the other Armenia and surrounding neighborhood, where he fell upon and destroyed many of the Romans to whom he appeared unexpectedly as they were wandering about the country. Others he annihilated in battle, and thereby won back speedily most of the positions. For the men of that land were well disposed toward him because of kinship and because of his being hereditary monarch: they hated the Romans because the latter were foreigners and because they had been ill treated by those set over them. Consequently they sided with Mithridates and afterward conquered Marcus Fabius, leader of the Romans in that place. The Thracians, who had formerly been mercenaries under Mithridates, but were then with Fabius, and the slaves present in the Roman camp gave them vigorous assistance. Thracians sent ahead by Fabius to reconnoitre brought back to him no reliable report, and later, when Mithridates suddenly fell upon him as he was proceeding along in a rather unguarded fashion, they joined in the attack on the Romans. At the same instant the slaves (to whom the barbarians had proclaimed freedom) took a hand in the work. They would have crushed their adversaries, had not Mithridates while occupied with the enemy — although over seventy years old he was in the battle — been hit with a stone. This caused the barbarians to fear that he might die; and while they halted battle on this account, Fabius and the —10— others were able to escape to safety. The Roman gen-

eral was subsequently shut up and besieged in Cabira, but was rescued by Triarius. The latter was in that vicinity on his way from Asia to Lucullus. Having learned what had happened he collected as large a force as was possible with the resources at hand and in his advance so alarmed Mithridates (probably by the size of the Roman detachment) as to make him withdraw before Triarius came in view. At this the Romans took courage, and pursuing the enemy as far as Comana, whither he had retired, won a victory over him. Mithridates was in camp on the opposite side of the river from the point where the Romans approached, and was anxious to join battle while they were worn out from the march. Accordingly he himself met them first, and directed that at the crisis of the battle others should cross from another direction, by a bridge, to take part in the attack. But whereas he fought an equal conflict a long time he was deprived of reinforcements by the confusion on the bridge across which many were pushing at one time, crowded all together. B. C. 68 (*a. u.* 686)

Thereafter they both retreated to their own fortifications and rested, for it was now winter. Comana belongs to the present territory of Cappadocia and was reported to have preserved right through to that time the Tauric statue of Artemis and the race of Agamemnon. As to how these reached them or how remained there I can find no certain account, since there are various stories. But what I understand accurately I will state. There are two cities in Cappadocia not far —11—

B. C. 68 (*a. u.* 686) apart and of the same name which contend for the same honors. Their myths and the relics they exhibit are alike, and both treasure a sword, which is supposedly the very one connected with the story of Iphigenia.

—12— B. C. 67 (*a. u.* 687) To resume our narrative. The following year, in the consulship of Manius Acilius and Gaius Piso, Mithridates encamped against Triarius near Gaziura, trying to challenge and provoke him to battle; for incidentally he himself practiced watching the Romans and trained his army to do so. His hope was to engage and vanquish Triarius before Lucullus came up and thus get back the rest of the province. As he could not arouse him, he sent some men to Dadasa, a garrison where the Romans' baggage was deposited, in order that his opponent by defending it might be drawn into conflict. And so it was. Triarius for a time fearing the numbers of Mithridates and expecting Lucullus, whom he had sent for,[1] remained quiet. But when news came of the siege of Dadasa, and the soldiers in fear for the place got disturbed and kept threatening that if no one would lead them out they would go to the rescue at their own bidding, he reluctantly left his position. As he was now moving forward the barbarians fell upon him, surrounded and overwhelmed by their numbers those near at hand, and encompassed with cavalry and killed those who, not knowing that the river had been directed into the plain, had fled thither. They would have destroyed them utterly, had

—13—

[1] Cobet's *μετεπέπεμπτο* in place of Vat. A *μετεπέμπετο*.

not one of the Romans, pretending to come from the allies of Mithridates — no few of whom, as I have said, were along with the expedition on an equal footing with the Romans,— approached the leader, as if wishing to make some communication, and wounded him. To be sure, the fellow was immediately seized and put to death, but the barbarians were so disheartened in view of the occurrence that many of the Romans escaped. B. C. 67 (*a. u.* 687)

When Mithridates had had his wound cured, he suspected that there were some others, too, of the enemy in the camp. So he held a review of the soldiers as if with a different purpose, and gave the order that they should retire singly to their tents with speed. Then he despatched the Romans, who were thus left alone. At this juncture the arrival of Lucullus gave the idea —14— to some that he would conquer Mithridates easily, and soon recover all that had been let slip: however, he effected nothing. For his antagonist, entrenched on the high ground near Talaura, would not come out against him, and the other Mithridates from Media, son-in-law of Tigranes, fell upon the Romans while scattered, and killed many of them. Likewise the approach of Tigranes himself was announced.

Then there was mutiny in the army; for the Valerians,[1] who had been exempted from military service and afterward had started on a campaign again, had been restless even at Nisibis on account of the victory;

1 "Valerians" was a name given to the Twentieth Legion. (See Livy VI, 9.)

B. C. 67 (*a. u.* 687) and ensuing idleness, and also because they had had provisions in abundance and the bulk of the management, Lucullus being absent on many errands. But it was chiefly because a certain Publius Clodius (whom some called Claudius) under the influence of an innate love of revolution solidified the seditious element among them, though his sister was united in wedlock to Lucullus. They were especially wrought up at that time, moreover, through hearing that Acilius the consul, who had been sent out to relieve Lucullus for reasons mentioned, was drawing near. They held him in slight repute, regarding him as a mere private citi-

—15— zen. Lucullus was in a dilemma both for these reasons and because Marcius[1] (consul the year before Acilius), who was en route to Cilicia, the province he was destined to govern, had refused a request of his for aid. He hesitated to depart through a barren country and feared to stand his ground: hence he set out against Tigranes, to see if he could repulse the latter while off his guard and tired from the march, and thus put a stop, to a certain extent, to the mutiny of the soldiers. He attained neither object. The army accompanied him to a certain spot from which it was possible to turn aside into Cappadocia, and all with one consent without a word turned off in that direction. The Valerians, indeed, learning that they had been exempted from the campaign by the authorities at home, withdrew altogether.

—16— Let no one wonder that Lucullus, who had proved

[1] *Q. Marcius Rex.*

himself of all men most versed in warfare, and was the first Roman to cross the Taurus with an army and for hostile operations, who had vanquished two powerful kings and would have captured them if he had chosen to end the war quickly, was unable to rule his fellow-soldiers, and that they were always revolting and finally left him in the lurch. He required a great deal of them, was difficult of access, strict in his demands for labor, and inexorable in his punishments: he did not understand how to win over a man by argument, or to attach him to himself by kindliness, or to make a comrade of him by sharing honors or wealth,— all of which means are necessary, especially in a large body, and most of all in a body of soldiers. Hence the soldiers, as long as they prospered and got booty that was a fair return for their dangers, obeyed him: but when they encountered trouble and fell into fear instead of hopes, they no longer heeded him at all. The proof of this is that Pompey took these same men (he enrolled the Valerians again) and kept them without the slightest show of revolt. So much does man differ from man. B. C. 67 (*a. u.* 687)

After this action of the soldiers Mithridates won back almost all his domain and wrought dire devastation in Cappadocia, since neither Lucullus defended it, under the excuse that Acilius was near, nor Acilius himself. For the latter, who in the first place was hurrying on to rob Lucullus of the fruits of victory, now, when he learned what had taken place, did not come to the camp, but delayed in Bithynia. As for Marcius, —17—

B. C. 67 (*a. u.* 687) the pretext which he gave for not assisting Lucullus was that his soldiers refused to follow him. When he reached Cilicia he received one Menemachus, a deserter from Tigranes, and Clodius who had revolted under Lucullus, and, fearing a repetition of the doings at Nisibis, he put him in command of the fleet; for Marcius, too, had one of his sisters as wife. Now Clodius, after being captured by the pirates and released by them in consequence of their fear of Pompey, came to Antioch in Syria, declaring that he would be their ally against the Arabians, with whom the people were then at variance. There, likewise, he caused some to revolt, and his activity nearly cost him his life.

—18— . . . he spares.[1] In his eagerness for supremacy he assailed even the Cretans who had come to terms with him, and not heeding their objection that there was a state of truce he hastened to do them harm before Pompey came up. Octavius, who was there, had no troops and so kept quiet: in fact, he had not been sent to do any fighting, but to take charge of the cities. Cornelius Sisenna, the governor of Greece, did, to be

[1] The subject must be Quintus Caecilius Metellus. This is the point at which the Medicean manuscript (see Introduction) now begins, and between what goes before and what follows there is an obvious gap of some kind. A few details touching upon the close of the Cretan war may be found in Xiphilinus (p. 1, 12–20), as follows:

"And [Metellus] subjugated the entire island, albeit he was hindered and restrained by Pompey the Great, who was now lord of the whole sea and of the mainland for a three days' march from the coast; for Pompey asserted that the islands also belonged to him. Nevertheless, in spite of Pompey's opposition, Metellus put an end to the Cretan war, conducted a triumph in memory thereof, and was given the title of Creticus."

It should be noted in passing that J. Hilberg (Zeitschrift f. oest. Gymn., 1889, p. 213) thinks that the proper place for the chapter numbered 16 is after 17, instead of before it.

sure, when he heard the news, come to Crete and advise Metellus to spare the villages, but on failing to persuade him made no active opposition. Metellus, after many other outrages, captured by treachery the city Eleuthera and extorted money from it. The traitors had repeatedly at night saturated with vinegar a very large brick tower, most difficult of capture, so that it became brittle. Next he took by storm Lappa, in spite of Octavius's occupancy, and did the latter no harm, but put to death the Cilicians, his followers. Octavius, incensed at this, no longer remained quiet, but first used the army of Sisenna (that general had fallen sick and died) to aid here and there the victims of oppression, and then, when the detachment of Metellus had retired, proceeded to Aristion at Hieropydna, by whose side he fought. Aristion, on the retreat from Cydonia about that time, had conquered one Lucius Bassus who sailed out to oppose him, and had gained possession of Hieropydna. They held out for a while, but at the approach of Metellus left the fortification and put to sea. There they encountered a storm, and were driven ashore, losing many men. Henceforth Metellus was master of the entire island. B. C. 67 (*a. u.* 687) —61—

In this way the Cretans, who had been free through all preceding ages and had never owned a foreign lord, were enslaved; and from their subjugation Metellus obtained his title. He was, however, unable to have Panares and Lasthenes (whom he had also captured) march in his triumph. For Pompey had got them away beforehand by persuading one of the tribunes that it was to him they had submitted and not to Metellus.

—20— B. C. 67 (*a. u.* 687) I will now relate the progress of Pompey's career. The pirates, occupied in plundering, kept troubling continually those who sailed as well as the dwellers on land. There was never a time when piracy was not practiced, nor may it cease so long as the nature of mankind remains the same. But formerly plundering was limited to certain localities and small bands operating only during the regular season on sea and on land; whereas at this time, ever since war had been carried on continuously in many different places, and many cities had been uprooted, while sentences hung over the heads of all the fugitives even, and fear confronted men in everything, large numbers turned to plundering. Now the bandit organizations on the mainland, being rather in sight of towns, which could thus perceive a source of injury close by, proved not so very difficult to overwhelm and were somehow broken up with a fair degree of ease; but those on the sea had grown to the greatest proportions. While the Romans were busy with antagonists they flourished. They sailed about to many quarters, adding to their band all of like condition, and some of these, after the

—21— fashion of allies, assisted many others. How much they accomplished with the help of the outsiders has been told. When those nations were overthrown, instead of ceasing they did much serious damage alone by themselves to the Romans and Roman allies. They were no longer in small force, but were accustomed to sail in great expeditions; and they had generals, so that they had acquired a great reputation. They robbed and harried first and foremost sailors: for such

not even the winter season was any longer safe; the pirates through daring and through practice and through success were now showing absolute fearlessness in their seamanship. Second, they pillaged even craft lying in harbors. If any one ventured to put out against them, usually he was defeated and perished; but even if he conquered he would be unable to capture any of the enemy by reason of the speed of their ships. Accordingly, they would return after a little, as if victors, to ravage and set in flames not only farms and country districts, but also whole cities. But other places they conciliated, so as to gain apparently friendly naval stations and winter quarters. B. C. 67 (*a. u.* 687)

As they progressed by these means it became customary for them to go into the interior, and they did much mischief even among those who had no sea-traffic. This is the way they treated not only those outside of their body of allies, but the land of Italy itself. Believing that they would obtain greater gains from that quarter and that they would terrify all others still more, if they refused to hold their hands even from that country, they sailed into the very harbor of Ostia, and also of other cities in the vicinity, burned the ships and ravaged everything. Finally, as no setback occurred, they took up their abode on the land, disposing of whatever men they did not kill, and of the spoils they took quite fearlessly, as if in their own territory. And though some plundered in one region and others elsewhere,— it not being possible for the same persons to do harm the whole length of the sea,— they nevertheless showed such friendship one for another that they sent money and assistance even to those entirely un- —22—

B. C. 67 (*a. u.* 687) known, as if to nearest kin. One of the largest elements in their strength was that those who helped any of them all would honor, and those who came into collision with any of them all would despoil.

—23— To such an extent did the supremacy of the pirates grow that their hostility became a matter of moment, constant, admitting no precaution, implacable. The Romans, of course, from time to time heard and saw a little of what was going on, inasmuch as imports in general ceased coming in and the corn supply was shut off entirely; but they gave no serious attention to it when they ought. On the contrary, they would send out fleets and generals, according as they were stirred by individual reports, but effected nothing; instead, they caused their allies all the greater distress by these very means, until they were finally reduced to extremities. Then at last they came together and deliberated many days as to what steps must be taken. Wearied by the continued dangers and noting how great and far reaching was the war raised against them, and believing, too, that it was impossible to assail the pirates all at once or individually, because the latter gave mutual assistance and it was impracticable to drive them back everywhere at once, the people fell into a dilemma and into great despair of making any successful stroke. In the end one Aulus Gabinius, a tribune, set forth his plan: he was either prompted by Pompey or wished to do him some favor; certainly he was not impelled by any love of the common welfare, for he was the vilest of men: his plan was that they should choose from among the ex-consuls one general with full powers over all, who should command for three years and

have the use of a huge force, with many lieutenants. B. C. 67 (*a. u.* 687)
He did not actually utter the name of Pompey, but it was easy to see that if once the multitude should hear of any such proposition, they would choose him. So it —24— turned out. His motion was carried and immediately all save the senate began to favor Pompey. That body was in favor of enduring anything whatever at the hands of the freebooters rather than to put so great command into Pompey's hands. In fact they came near slaying Gabinius in the very halls of the senate, but he eluded them somehow. When the people learned the intention of the senators they raised an uproar, going to the point of making a rush at them as they sat assembled: and if the elders had not gotten out of the way, the populace would without doubt have killed them. They all scattered and secreted themselves except Gaius Piso the consul (it was in his year and Acilius's that these events took place), who was arrested and condemned to perish for the others; but Gabinius begged him off. After this the leading men themselves gladly held their peace on condition of being allowed to live, but used influence on the nine tribunes, to have them oppose Gabinius. All of the latter, however, except a Lucius Trebellius and Lucius Roscius, out of fear of the multitude would not say a word in opposition; and those two men, who had the courage, were unable to redeem any of their promises by either word or deed. For when the appointed day came on which the motion was to be ratified, things went as follows.

Pompey, who was thoroughly anxious to command, and already by reason of his own ambition and the

B. C. 67 (*a. u.* 687) zeal of the populace no longer so much regarded this commission as an honor as the failure to win it a disgrace, seeing the opposition of those in power had a wish to appear as if compulsion were being used. In general he was as little as possible in the habit of revealing his real desires, but still more on this occasion did he feign reluctance, because of the ensuing jealousy, should he of his own accord lay claim to the leadership, and because of the glory if he should be appointed unwillingly as the one most worthy to command.

—25— He now came forward and said: "Quirites, I rejoice at the honor laid upon me by you. All men naturally take pride in benefits conferred upon them by the citizens, and I, who have often enjoyed honors at your hands, scarcely know how to be worthily pleased at the present contingency. However, I do not think that you should be so insatiable with regard to my services, nor that I should incessantly be in some position of command. For I have labored since childhood, and as you know, you should be promoting others as well. Do you not recall how many toils I underwent in the war against Cinna, though I was the veriest youth, or how many labors in Sicily and in Africa before I had quite reached the age of iuvenis, or how many dangers I encountered in Spain, while I was not as yet a senator? I shall not say that you have shown yourselves ungrateful toward me for all these labors. How could I? Quite the reverse, in addition to the many other important favors of which you have deemed me worthy, the very fact that I was trusted to undertake the post

of general against Sertorius, when no one else was either willing or able, and that I held a triumph, contrary to custom, after resigning it, brought me the greatest honor. I only say that I have undergone many anxieties and many dangers, that I am worn out in body and wearied in soul. Do not keep reckoning that I am still young, nor calculate that I have lived just so many years. For if you count up the campaigns that I have made and the dangers I have faced, you will find them far more in number than my years, and by this means you will more readily believe that I can no longer withstand the anxieties and the hardships. B. C. 67 (*a. u.* 687)

"Some one might possibly reply: 'But you see that all such opportunities for toil are causes of jealousy and hatred.' This feature you hold in no account — you ought not properly even to pretend to regard it — but to me it would prove most grievous. And I must admit that I am not so much disturbed or troubled by any danger to be encountered in the midst of wars as by such exhibitions. For what person in his right mind could take pleasure in living among men who are jealous of him, and who would feel the heart to carry out any public enterprise, if destined in case of failure to submit to punishment and if successful to be the object of rancorous envy? In view of these and other considerations allow me to remain at peace and attend to my own business, so that now at last I may bestow some care upon my private affairs and not perish from exhaustion. Against the pirates elect somebody else. There are many who are both willing and able to serve as admirals, both younger and older men, so that your —26—

B. C. 67 (*a. u.* 687) choice from so numerous a company becomes easy. Of course I am not the only one who loves you, nor am I alone skilled in warfare, but — not seeming to favor any by mentioning names — equally so is A or B."

—27— At this point in his harangue Gabinius, interrupting, cried: "Pompey's behavior in this very matter, Quirites, is worthy of his character. He does not seek the leadership, nor does he accept it without thought when granted him. An upright man has no business, generally speaking, to desire the annoyances incident to office, and it is Pompey's way to undertake all tasks imposed upon him only with due consideration, in order that he may accomplish them with corresponding safety. Precipitation in promises and in action, more hasty than the occasion demands, causes the downfall of many; but exactitude at the start as well as in execution possesses a constant value and is to the advantage of all. You must choose not what would satisfy Pompey, but what is of benefit to the state. Not office-seekers, but those who have capacity should be appointed to the business in hand; the former exist in very large numbers, but any other such man as my candidate you will not find. You recall, further, how many reverses of a serious nature we endured in the war against Sertorius through lack of a general, and that we found no one else among young or old adapted to it except the man before you; and that we sent him to the field in place of both consuls, although at that time he had not yet reached a mature age and was not a member of the senate. I should be glad if we did have many able men, and if I ought to pray for such,

I would so pray: since, however, this ability does not depend on prayer or come of its own accord to any one, but a man has to be born with a natural bent for it, to learn what is pertinent and practice what is fitting and beyond everything to enjoy good fortune, which would very rarely fall to the lot of the same man, you must all unanimously, whenever such an one is found, both support him and make the fullest use of him even if he does not wish it. Such violence proves most noble both to him who exerts it and to him who suffers it,— to the former because he would be preserved by it, and to the latter because it would preserve the citizens, in whose behalf the excellent and patriotic man would most readily give up both body and soul. B. C. 67 (*a. u.* 687)

"Do you think that whereas this Pompey when a youth could conduct campaigns, be general, increase our possessions, preserve those of our allies, and acquire those of our adversaries, now, in the prime of life, when every man fairly surpasses himself, with a mass of additional experience gained from wars he could not prove most useful to you? Will you reject, now that he has reached man's estate, him whom while iuvenis you chose to lead? Will you not confide this campaign to the man, now become a member of the senate, to whom while still a knight you committed those wars? Will you not, now that you have most amply tested his mettle, commit the present emergency, no less pressing than former ones, to him for whom alone you asked in the face of those urgent dangers ere you had applied any accurate test at all? Will you not send out against the pirates one, now an ex-consul, —28—

B. C. 67 (*a. u.* 687) whom before he could yet properly hold office you elected against Sertorius? Rather, do not for a moment adopt any other course; and Pompey, do you heed your country, and me. By her you were borne, by her you were reared. You must be a slave to whatever is for her advantage, not shrinking from any hardship or danger to secure it. And should it become necessary for you to lose your life, you must in that case not await your fated day but embrace whatever death
—29— meets you. But truly I am ridiculous to give you this advice,— you who in so many great conflicts have exhibited both your bravery and your love for your country. Heed me, therefore, and these citizens here; do not fear because some are envious. Rather press on all the more for this very reason to a goal which is the friendship of the majority and the common advantage of us all, and scorn your traducers. Or, if you are willing to grieve them a little, take command for this very reason, that you may distress them by serving and winning glory contrary to their expectations, and that you may in person set an ending worthy of yourself beside your former accomplishments, by ridding us of many great evils."

—30— When Gabinius had thus expressed himself, Trebellius strove to make a dissenting speech; but as he did not receive leave to speak he proceeded to oppose the casting of a vote. Gabinius was incensed, and delayed the balloting regarding Pompey, but introduced a new motion concerning the same man. The first seventeen tribes to register an opinion decided that Trebellius was at fault and might be no longer tribune. And not until the eighteenth was on the point of voting the same

way, was he barely induced to maintain silence. Roscius, seeing this, did not dare utter a word, but by a gesture of his raised hand urged them to choose two men, so that he might by so doing cut off a little of Pompey's supremacy. At this gesticulation of his the crowd gave a great threatening shout, whereat a crow flying above their heads was so startled that it fell as if smitten by lightning. After that Roscius kept not only his tongue but his hand still. Catulus was for remaining silent, but Gabinius urged him to make some speech, inasmuch as he ranked among the foremost in the senate and it seemed likely that through his agency the rest might reach a harmonious decision; it was Gabinius's hope, likewise, that he would join in approving the general desire from the fact that he saw the tribunes in bad straits. Accordingly Catulus received permission to speak, since all respected and honored him as one who at all times spoke and acted for their advantage, and delivered an address about as follows: B. C. 67 (*a. u.* 687)

"That I have been exceedingly zealous, Quirites, in behalf of your body, all of you, doubtless, clearly understand. This being so, it is requisite for me to set forth in simple fashion and quite frankly what I know to be for the good of the State; and it is only fair for you to listen to it calmly and afterward to deliberate. For, if you raise an uproar, you will fail of obtaining some perhaps very useful suggestion which you might have heard, but if you pay attention to what is said you will be sure to discover definitely something to your advantage. I for my part assert in the first place most emphatically that it is not proper to confide to any one —31—

B. C. 67 (*a. u.* 687) man so many positions of command, one after another. This has been forbidden by law, and by test has been found to be most perilous. What made Marius such a monster was practically nothing else than being entrusted with so many wars in the briefest space of time and being made consul six times as rapidly as possible; and similarly the cause of Sulla's frenzy was that he held command of the armies so many years in succession, and later was appointed dictator, then consul. It does not lie in man's nature for a person, not necessarily young but mature quite as often, after exercise in authority for a considerable period to be willing to abide by ancestral customs. I do not say this in any spirit of condemnation of Pompey, but because it does not appear at all advantageous to you on general grounds, and further it is not permitted according to the laws. For if an enterprise brings honor to those deemed worthy of it, all whom that enterprise concerns ought to obtain honor; this is the principle of democracy: and if it brings labor, all ought to share that labor proportionately; this is mere equity.

—32—

"Again, in such an affair it is to your advantage for many individuals to have practice in exploits, so that as a result of trial your choice may be an easy one from among those who can be trusted for any urgent business; but if you take that other course it is quite inevitable that the scarcity should be great of those who will practice what they should, and to whom interests can be trusted. This is the chief reason why you were at a loss for a general in the war with Sertorius; previous to that time you were accustomed to employ

the same men for a long period. Consequently, even if in all other respects Pompey deserves to be elected against the pirates, still, inasmuch as he would be chosen contrary to the injunction of the laws and to the principles laid down by experience, it behooves both you and him most strongly that it be not done. B. C. 67 (*a. u.* 687)

"This is the first and most important point I have to mention. Second arises the consideration, that when consuls and prætors and those serving in their place can take offices and leaderships in a way prescribed by the laws it is neither decent nor advantageous for you to overlook them and introduce some new office. To what end do you elect the annual officials, if you are going to make no use of them for such businesses? Not, presumably, that they may stalk about in purple-bordered togas, nor that endued with the name alone of the office they may be deprived of its duties. How can you fail to alienate these and all the rest who have a purpose to enter politics at all, if you break down the ancient offices, and entrust nothing to those elected by law, but assign a strange and previously non-existent position of command to a private individual? If there should be any necessity of choosing, in addition to the annual officials, still another, there is for this, too, an ancient precedent,— I mean the dictator. However, because he held such power, our fathers did not appoint him on all occasions nor for a longer period than six months. Accordingly, if you need any such person, you may, without transgressing the laws or making light of the common welfare, designate either Pompey or any one else dictator,— on condition that he shall —33— —34—

B. C. 67 (*a. u.* 687) hold sway for not more than the time ordained, nor outside of Italy. You doubtless are not ignorant that this latter limitation, too, our fathers guarded scrupulously, and no instance would be found of a dictator chosen for any other country, except one sent to Sicily, and that without accomplishing anything. But if Italy needs no such person and you would no longer endure, apart from the functions of dictator, even the name (this is clear from your anger against Sulla), how would it be right for a new position of command to be created, and that, too, for three years and embracing practically all interests both in Italy and without? What disasters come to cities from such a course, and how many men on account of lawless lust for rule have often disturbed our populace and done themselves countless evils, you all alike understand.

—35— "About this, then, I shall say no more. Who can fail to know that on general principles it is neither decent nor advantageous to commit matters to any one man, or for any one man to be put in charge of all the blessings we own, even if he be the best man conceivable? Great honors and excessive powers excite and ruin even such persons. I ask you, however, to consider my next assertion,— that it is not possible for one man to preside over the entire sea and to manage the entire war properly. You must, if you shall in the least do what is needful, make war on them everywhere at once, so that they may neither unite, nor by finding a refuge among those not attacked, become hard to capture. Any one man who might be in command could by no manner of means accomplish this. For how on

about the same days could he fight in Italy and in Cilicia, Egypt and Syria, Greece and Spain, in the Ionian Sea and the islands? Consequently you need many soldiers and generals both, to take matters in hand, if they are going to be of any use to you. In case any one declares that even if you confide the entire war to some one person he will most certainly have plenty of admirals and lieutenants, my reply would be: 'Would it not be much juster and more advantageous for these men destined to serve under him to be chosen by you beforehand for the very purpose and to receive an independent command from you? What prevents such a course?' By this plan they will pay more heed to the war, since each of them is entrusted with his own particular share and cannot lay upon any one else the responsibility for neglect of it, and there will be keener rivalry among them because they are independent and will themselves get the glory for whatever they effect. By the other plan what man do you think, subordinate to some one else, will with equal readiness perform any duty, when the credit for his victory will belong not to himself but to another?

B. C. 67 (*a. u.* 687)

—36—

"Accordingly, that one man could not at one time carry on so great a war has been admitted on the part of Gabinius himself, in that he asks for many helpers to be given to whomever is elected. Our final consideration is whether actual commanders or assistants should be sent, and whether they should be despatched by the entire populace, or by the commandant alone for his assistance. Every one of you would agree that my proposition is more law-abiding in all respects, and

B. C. 67 (*a. u.* 687) not merely in reference to the case of the freebooters. Aside from that, notice how it looks for all our offices to be overthrown on the pretext of ' pirates ' and for no one of them either in Italy or in subject territory during this time . . .[1]

—37— . . . and of Italy in place of consul for three years, they assigned to him fifteen lieutenants and voted all the ships, money and armaments that he might wish to take. These measures as well as the others which the senate decided to be necessary to their effectiveness in any given case that body ratified even against its will. Its action was prompted more particularly by the fact that when Piso refused to allow the subordinate officers to hold enlistments in Gallia Narbonensis, of which he was governor, the populace was furiously enraged and would straightway have cast him out of office, had not Pompey begged him off. So after making preparations as the business and his judgment demanded he patrolled at one time the whole stretch of sea that the pirates were troubling, partly himself and partly through the agency of his under officers, and subdued the greater part of it that very year. For whereas the force that he directed was vast both in point of fleet and in point of heavy-armed infantry, so that he was irresistible both on sea and on land,

[1] A leaf is here torn out of the first quaternion of the Medicean MS. An idea of the matter omitted may be gained by comparing Xiphilinus (p. 5) :—

" Catulus, one of the foremost men, had said to the populace: ' If he fail after being sent out on this errand (as not infrequently happens in many contests, especially on the sea) whom else will you find in place of him for still more pressing business? ' Thereat the entire throng as if by previous agreement lifted their voices and exclaimed: ' You! ' Thus Pompey secured command of the sea and of the islands and of the mainland for four hundred stades inland from the sea."

his kindness to those who made terms with him was equally vast, so that he won over great numbers by such procedure. Persons defeated by his troops who made trial of his clemency went over to his side very readily. For besides other ways in which he took care of them he would give them any lands he saw vacant and cities that needed inhabitants, in order that they might never again through poverty fall into need of criminal exertions. Among the other cities settled in this way was the one called in commemoration Pompeiopolis. It is in the coast region of Cilicia and had been sacked by Tigranes. Soli was its original name. B. C. 67 (*a. u.* 687)

Besides these events in the year of Acilius and Piso, —38— an ordinance directed at men convicted of bribery regarding offices was framed by the consuls themselves, to the effect that no one of those involved should either hold office or be a senator, and should furthermore be subject to a fine. For now that the power of the tribunes had returned to its ancient state, and many of the persons whose names had been stricken off by the censors were aspiring to get back the rank of senator by one means or another, a great many political unions and combinations were formed aiming at all the offices. The consuls took this course not because they were angry at the affair — they themselves were shown to have been actively engaged, and Piso, who was indicted by several persons on this charge, escaped being brought to trial only by purchasing exemption — but because pressure had been exerted by the senate. The reason for this was that one Gaius Cornelius, while tribune, undertook to lay very severe penalties upon such unions, and the populace sided with him. The

B. C. 67 (*a. u.* 687) senate, being aware that an excessive punishment threatened has some deterrent force, but that men are then not easily found to accuse or condemn the guilty, since the latter will be in desperate danger, whereas moderation stimulates many to accusations and does not divert condemnations, was desirous of remodeling his proposition somehow, and bade the consuls frame

—39— it as a law. Now when the comitiæ had been announced in advance and accordingly no law could be enacted till they were held, the canvassers kept doing much evil in this intervening time, to such an extent that assassinations occurred. As a consequence the senators voted that the law should be introduced before the elections and a body-guard be given to the consuls. Cornelius, angry at this, submitted a proposal that the senators be not allowed to grant office to any one seeking it in a way not prescribed by law, nor to vote away any other prerogative of the people. This had been the law from very early times: it was not, however, being observed in practice. Thereupon arose a great uproar, since many of the senate and Piso in particular resisted; the crowd broke his staves to pieces and threatened to tear him limb from limb. Seeing the rush they made, Cornelius for the time being before calling for any vote dismissed the assembly: later he added to the law that the senate should invariably hold a preliminary consultation about these cases and that it be compulsory to have the preliminary degree ratified by the people. So he secured the

—40— passage of both that law and another now to be explained.

All the prætors themselves compiled and published

the principles according to which they intended to try cases; for all the decrees regarding contracts had not yet been laid down. Now since they were not in the habit of doing this once for all and did not observe the rules as written, but often made changes in them and incidentally a number of clauses naturally appeared in some one's favor or to some one's hurt, he moved that they should at the very start announce the principles they would use, and not swerve from them at all. In fine, the Romans took such good care about that time to have no bribery, that in addition to punishing those convicted they furthermore honored the accusers. For instance, when Marcus Cotta dismissed the quæstor Publius Oppius because of bribery and suspicion of conspiracy, though he himself had made great profit out of Bithynia, they exalted Gaius Carbo who thereupon accused Cotta, with consular honors, notwithstanding he had served as tribune merely. Subsequently the latter himself was governor of Bithynia and erred no less widely than Cotta; he was, in his turn, accused by his son and convicted. Some persons, of course, can more easily censure others than admonish themselves, and when it comes to their own case commit very readily deeds for which they think their neighbors deserving of punishment. Hence they can not, from the mere fact that they prosecute others, inspire confidence in their own detestation of the acts in question. B. C. 67 (*a. u.* 687)

As for Lucius Lucullus, he finished his term of office as city prætor, but on being chosen by lot thereafter to serve as governor of Sardinia he refused, detesting —41—

B. C. 67 (*a. u.* 687) the business because of the throng who were fostering corruption in foreign lands. That he was suited for the place he had given the fullest proof. Acilius once commanded the chair from which he had heard cases to be broken in pieces because Lucullus seeing Acilius pass by did not rise from his seat: yet the prætor did not give way to rage, and after that both he and his fellow officials tried cases standing up on account of the consul's action.

—42— Roscius likewise introduced a law, and so did Gaius Manilius, at the time when they were tribunes. The former received some praise for his,— for it consisted in marking off sharply the seats of the knights in theatres from the other locations,— but Manilius came near having to stand trial. He had granted the class of freedmen, some of whom he got together from the populace on the last day of the year and toward evening, the right to vote with those who had freed them. The senate learned of it immediately on the following day, the first of the month, the day on which Lucius Tullius and Æmilius Lepidus entered upon the B. C. 66 (*a. u.* 688) consulship, and rejected his law. He, then, in fear because the populace was terribly angry, at first ascribed the idea to Crassus and some others; as no one believed him, however, he paid court to Pompey even in the latter's absence, especially because he knew that Gabinius had the greatest influence with him. He went so far as to offer him command of the war against Tigranes and against Mithridates, and the governorship of Bithynia and Cilicia at the same time.

—43— Now irritation and opposition had developed even

then on the part of the nobles particularly because Marcius and Acilius were making peace before the period of their command had expired. And the populace, although a little earlier it had sent the men to establish a government over the conquered territory, regarding the war as at an end from the letters which Lucullus sent them, nevertheless voted to do as Manilius proposed. Those who urged them most to this course were Cæsar and Marcus Cicero. These men seconded the measure not because they thought it advantageous to the state nor because they wished to do Pompey a favor. Inasmuch, however, as things were certain to turn out that way, Cæsar cultivated the good will of the multitude: he saw, in the first place, how much stronger they were than the senate and further he paved the way for a similar vote some time to be passed for his own profit. Incidentally, too, he was willing to render Pompey more envied and invidious as a result of the honors conferred upon him, so that the people might get their fill of him more quickly. Cicero saw fit to play politics and was endeavoring to make it clear to both populace and nobles that to whichever side he should attach himself, he would substantially benefit them. He was accustomed to fill a double rôle and espoused now the cause of one party and again that of the other, to the end that he might be sought after by both. A little while before he had said that he chose the side of the optimates and for that reason wished to be ædile rather than tribune; but now he went over to the side of the rabble. Soon after, as a suit was instituted by the nobles against Manilius and the latter was striving to cause some delay about

B. C. 66 (*a. u.* 688)

—44—

B. C. 66 (*a. u.* 688) it, Cicero tried to thwart him, and only after obstinate objection did he put off his case till the following day, offering as an excuse that the year was drawing to a close. He was enabled to do this by the fact that he was prætor and president of the court. But since the crowd was still discontented he entered their assembly, presumably compelled thereto by the tribunes, where he inveighed against the senate and promised to speak in support of Manilius. For this he fell into ill repute generally, and was termed "deserter." [Probably spurious: "because Cæsar cultivated the populace from the beginning, whereas Cicero usually played a double part; sometimes he sided with the people, sometimes with the assembly, and for this reason he was termed 'deserter.'"—Mai, p. 552]: but a tumult that immediately arose prevented the court from being convened. Publius Pætus and Cornelius Sulla (a nephew of that great Sulla), who had been appointed consuls and then convicted of bribery, plotted to kill their accusers, Cotta and Torquatus, Lucii, especially after the latter had been convicted in turn. Among others who had been suborned were Gnæus Piso and Lucius Catiline, a man of great audacity; he had himself sought the office and was on this account inclined to anger. They were unable, however, to accomplish anything because the plot was announced beforehand and a body-guard given to Cotta and Torquatus by the senate. Indeed, a decree would have been pronounced against them, had not one of the tribunes opposed it. And since even so Piso showed signs of audacity, the senate being afraid he would cause some riot sent him straightway to

Spain on the pretext that he was to look after some disorder. He there met his death at the hands of natives whom he had wronged. B. C. 66 (*a. u.* 688) —45—

Pompey was at first making ready to sail to Crete and to Metellus, and when he learned the decrees that had been passed pretended to be annoyed as before, and charged the members of the opposite faction with always loading business upon him so that he might meet some reverse. In reality he received the news with the greatest joy, and no longer regarding as of any importance Crete or the other maritime points wherever anything had been left unsettled, he made preparations for the war with the barbarians.

Meanwhile, wishing to test the disposition of Mithridates, he sent Metrophanes bearing friendly proposals to him. Mithridates at that time held him in contempt; for Arsaces, king of the Parthians, having died about this period he expected to conciliate Phraates, his successor. But Pompey speedily contracted friendship with Phraates on the same terms and persuaded him to invade in advance the Armenia belonging to Tigranes. When Mithridates ascertained this he was alarmed and by means of an embassy immediately arranged a treaty. As for Pompey's command that he lay down his arms and deliver up the deserters, he had no chance to deliberate; for the large number of deserters who were in his camp hearing it and fearing they should be delivered up, and the barbarians fearing that they should be compelled to fight without them, raised an uproar. And they would have done some harm to the king, had he not by pretending

B. C. 66 (*a. u.* 688) falsely that he had sent the envoys not for the truce but to spy out the Roman troops, with difficulty kept them in check.

—46— Pompey, therefore, having decided that he must needs fight, in the course of his other preparations made an additional enlistment of the Valerians. When he was now in Galatia, Lucullus met him. The latter declared the whole conflict over, and said there was no further need of an expedition and that for this reason also the men sent by the senate for the administration of the districts had arrived. Failing to persuade him to retire Lucullus turned to abuse, stigmatizing him as officious, a lover of war, a lover of office, and so on. Pompey, paying him but slight attention, forbade every one any longer to obey his commands and pressed on against Mithridates, being in haste to join issue with him as quickly as possible.

—47— The king for a time kept fleeing, since he was inferior in numbers: he continually devastated the country before him, gave Pompey a long chase, and made him feel the want of provisions. But when the Roman invaded Armenia both for the above reasons and because he wanted to capture it while abandoned, Mithridates fearing it would be occupied before his advent also entered the country. He took possession of a strong hill opposite and there rested with his entire army, hoping to exhaust the Romans by lack of provisions, while he could get abundance from many quarters, being in a subject territory. He kept sending down some of his cavalry into the plain, which was bare, and injured considerably those who encountered

them; after such a movement he would receive large accessions of deserters. B. C. 66 (*a. u.* 688)

Pompey was not bold enough to assail them in that position, but he moved his camp to another spot where the surrounding country was wooded and he would be troubled less by the cavalry and bowmen of his adversaries, and there he set an ambuscade where an opportunity offered. Then with some few he openly approached the camp of the barbarians, threw them into disorder, and enticing them to the point he wished killed a large number. Encouraged by this, he sent some one way, some another, over the country after provisions.

When Pompey went on procuring these in safety and —48— through certain men's help had become master of the land of Anaitis, which belongs to Armenia and is dedicated to some god after whom it is named, and many others kept seceding to him, while the soldiers of Marcius were added to his force, Mithridates becoming frightened no longer kept his position, but immediately started unobserved in the night, and thereafter by night marches advanced into the Armenia of Tigranes. Pompey followed on, eager to secure a battle. This, however, he could not do by day, for they would not come out of their camp, and he did not venture the attempt by night, fearing his ignorance of the country, until they got near the frontier. Then, knowing that they would escape, he was compelled to have a night battle. Having decided on this course he started off before them at noontime, unobserved of the barbarians, by the road along which they were to march.

B. C. 66 (*a. u.* 688) Finding a sunken part of the road, between some low hills, he there stationed his army on the higher ground and awaited the enemy. When the enemy entered the sunken way, with confidence and without an advance guard (since they had suffered no injury previously and now at last were gaining safety, so that they expected that the Romans would no longer follow them), he fell upon them in the darkness. There was no illumination from heaven and they had no kind of light.

—49— The nature of the ensuing battle I will now describe. First, all the trumpeters together at a signal sounded the attack, next the soldiers and all the multitude raised a shout, some rattling their spears against their shields, and others stones against the bronze implements. The hollowed mountains took up and gave back their din with most frightful effect, so that the barbarians, hearing them suddenly in the night and the wilderness, were terribly alarmed, thinking they had encountered some supernatural phenomenon. Directly the Romans from the heights smote them at all points with stones, arrows, and javelins, inevitably wounding some by reason of their numbers, and reduced them to every extremity of evil. They were not drawn up in line of battle, but for marching, and both men and women were moving about in the same place with horses and camels and all sorts of implements; some were borne on coursers, others on chariots, covered wagons, and carts indiscriminately; and some getting wounded already and others expecting to be wounded caused confusion, in consequence of which they were more easily slain, since they kept becoming entangled one with another. This was what they endured while

they were still being struck from afar off. But when the Romans after exhausting their long-distance ammunition charged down upon them, the edges of the force were slaughtered, one blow sufficing for their death, since the majority were unarmed, and the center was crushed together, as all by reason of the encompassing fear fell toward it. So they perished, pushed about and trampled down by one another without being able to defend themselves or venture any movement against the enemy. For whereas they were strongest in cavalry and bowmen, they were unable to see before them in the darkness and unable to make any manœuvre in the defile. B. C. 66 (*a. u.* 688)

When the moon rose, some rejoiced, with the idea that in the light they could certainly ward off some one. And they would have been benefited a little, if the Romans had not had the moon behind them, and so produced much illusion both in sight and in action, while assailing them now on this side and now on that. For the attackers, being many in number and all in one body, casting the deepest imaginable shadow, baffled their opponents before they had yet come into conflict with them. The barbarians thinking them near would strike the empty air in vain and when they reached common ground would be wounded in the shadow where they were not expecting it. Thus numbers of them were killed and the captives were not fewer than the slain. Many also escaped, among them Mithridates.

—50— The latter's next move was to hasten to Tigranes. On sending couriers to him, however, he found no friendship awaiting him, because Tigranes' son had

B. C. 66 (*a. u.* 688) risen against him, and while holding the youth under guard[1] the father suspected that Mithridates, his grandfather, had been responsible for the quarrel. For this reason far from receiving him Tigranes even arrested and threw into prison the men sent ahead by him. Failing therefore of the hoped-for refuge he turned aside into Colchis, and thence on foot reached Mæotis and the Bosphorus, using persuasion with some and force with others. He recovered the territory, too, having terrified Machares, his son, who had espoused the cause of the Romans and was then ruling it, to such an extent that he would not even come into his presence. And him Mithridates caused to be killed through his associates to whom he promised to grant immunity and money.

In the course of these events Pompey sent men to pursue him: when, however, he outstripped them by fleeing across the Phasis, the Roman leader colonized a city in the territory where he had been victorious, bestowing it upon the wounded and the more elderly of his soldiers. Many of those living round about voluntarily joined the settlement and later generations of them are in existence even now, being called Nicopolitans[2] and paying tribute to the province of Cappadocia.

—51— While Pompey was thus engaged, Tigranes, the son of Tigranes, taking with him some of the foremost men because the father was not ruling to suit them, fled for refuge to Phraates; and, though the latter, in view of the agreements made with Pompey, stopped to consider what it was advisable to do, persuaded

[1] Some half dozen words are wanting at this point in the MS. Those most easily supplied afford the translation here given.
[2] I. e., "City of Victory."

him to invade Armenia. They came, actually, as far as the Artaxatians, subduing all the country before them, and assailed those men likewise. Tigranes the elder in fear of them had fled to the mountains. But since it seemed that time was required for the siege, Phraates left a part of the force with his own son and retired to his native country. Thereupon the father took the field against the young Tigranes, thus isolated, and conquered him. The latter, in his flight, set out at first for Mithridates, his grandfather; but when he learned that he had been defeated and was rather in need of aid than able to assist any one, he went over to the Romans. Pompey, employing him as a guide, made an expedition into Armenia and against his father. B. C. 66 (*a. u.* 688)

The latter, learning this, in fear immediately sent heralds to him for peace, and delivered up the envoys of Mithridates. When, on account of the opposition of his son, he could gain no moderate terms, and even as things were Pompey had crossed the Araxes and drawn near the Artaxatians, then at last Tigranes surrendered the town to him and came voluntarily into the midst of his camp. The old king had arrayed himself so far as possible in a way to indicate his former dignity and his present humbled condition, in order that he might seem to his enemy worthy of respect and pity. He had put off his tunic shot with white and the all-purple candys, but wore his tiara and headband. Pompey, however, sent an attendant and made him descend from his horse; for Tigranes was riding up as if to enter the very fortification, mounted on horseback according to the custom of his people. But when the —52—

B. C. 66 (*a. u.* 688) Roman general saw him entering actually on foot, with fillet cast off, and prostrate on the earth doing obeisance, he felt an impulse of pity; so starting up hastily he raised him, bound on the headband and seated him upon a chair close by, and he encouraged him, telling him among other things that he had not lost the kingdom of Armenia but had gained the friendship of the Romans. By these words Pompey restored his spirits, and then invited him to dinner.

—53— But the son, who sat on the other side of Pompey, did not rise at the approach of his father nor greet him in any other way, and furthermore, though invited to dinner, did not present himself. Wherefore he incurred Pompey's most cordial hatred. Now, on the following day, when the Roman heard the recitals of both, he restored to the elder all his ancestral domain. What he had acquired later, to be sure,— these were chiefly portions of Cappadocia and Syria, as well as Phœnicia and the large Sophanenian tract bordering on Armenia,— he took away, and demanded money of him besides. To the younger he assigned Sophanene only. And inasmuch as this was where the treasures were, the young man began a dispute about them, and not gaining his point — for Pompey had no other source from which to obtain the sums agreed upon — he became vexed and planned to escape by flight.

Pompey, being informed of this beforehand, kept the youth under surveillance without bonds and sent to those who were guarding the money, bidding them give it all to his father. But they would not obey, stating that it was necessary for the young man, to whom the country was now held to belong, to give them this com-

mand. Then Pompey sent him to the forts. He, finding them all locked up, approached close and reluctantly ordered that they be opened. When the keepers obeyed as little as before, asserting that he issued the command not of his own free will, but under compulsion, Pompey was irritated and put Tigranes in chains. B. C. 66 (*a. u.* 688)

Thus the elder secured the treasures, and Pompey passed the winter in the land of Anaitis and near the river Cyrnus, after dividing his army into three portions. From Tigranes he received plenty of everything and far more money than had been agreed upon. For this reason especially he shortly afterward enrolled the king among his friends and allies and brought the latter's son to Rome under guard.

—54—

The quiet of his winter quarters, however, was not unbroken. Orœses, king of the Albanians dwelling beyond the Cyrnus, made an expedition against them just at the time of the Saturnalia. He was impelled partly by a wish to do a favor to Tigranes the younger, who was a friend of his, but mostly by the fear that the Romans would invade Albania, and he cherished the idea that if he should fall upon them in the winter, when they were not expecting hostilities and were not encamped in one body, he would surely achieve some success. Orœses himself descended upon Metellus Celer, in whose charge Tigranes was, and sent others against Pompey and against Lucius Flaccus, the commander of the third division, in order that all might be thrown into confusion at once, and so not assist one another.

In spite of all, he accomplished nothing at any point. Celer vigorously repulsed Orœses. Flaccus, being

B. C. 66 (*a. u.* 688) unable to preserve the whole circuit of the ditch intact by reason of its size, constructed another within it. This fixed in his opponents' minds the impression that he was afraid, and so he enticed them within an outer ditch, where by a charge upon them when they were not looking for it he slaughtered many in close conflict and many in flight. Meanwhile Pompey, having received advance information of the attempt which the barbarians had made on the rest, to their surprise encountered beforehand the detachment that was proceeding against him, conquered it, and at once hurried on just as he was against Orœses. The latter, indeed, he did not overtake; for Orœses, after the repulse by Celer, had fled on being informed of the failures of the rest; many of the Albanians, however, he overwhelmed near the crossing of the Cyrnus and killed. After this he made a truce at their request. For although on general principles he was extremely anxious to make a return invasion of their country, he was glad to postpone the war because of the winter.

DIO'S
ROMAN HISTORY
37

The following is contained in the Thirty-seventh of Dio's Rome:

How Pompey fought against the Asiatic Iberians (chapters 1–7).

How Pompey annexed Pontus to Bithynia: how Pompey brought Syria and Phœnicia under his sway (chapters 8, 9).

How Mithridates died (chapters 10–14).

About the Jews (chapters 15–19).

How Pompey after settling affairs in Asia returned to Rome (chapters 20–23).

About Cicero and Catiline and their transactions (chapters 24–42).

About Cæsar and Pompey and Crassus and their sworn fellowship (chapters 43–58).

Duration of time, six years, in which there were the following magistrates, here enumerated:

L. Aurelius M. F. Cotta, L. Manlius L. F. (B. C. 65 = a. u. 689.)

L. Cæsar, C. Marcius C. F. Figulus. (B. C. 64 = a. u. 690.)

M. Tullius M. F. Cicero, C. Antonius M. F. (B. C. 63 = a. u. 691.)

Decimus Iunius M. F. Silanus, L. Licinius L. F. Murena. (B. C. 62 = a. u. 692.)

M. Pupius M. F. Piso, M. Valerius M. F. Messala Niger. (B. C. 61 = a. u. 693.)

L. Afranius A. F., C. Cæcilius C. F. Celer. (B. C. 60 = a. u. 694.)

—1—
B. C. 65
(*a. u.* 689)

The following year after these exploits and in the consulship of Lucius Cotta and Lucius Torquatus, he engaged in warfare against both the Albanians and the Iberians. With the latter of these he was compelled to become embroiled quite contrary to his plan. The Iberians dwell on both sides of the Cyrnus, adjoining on the one hand the Albanians and on the other the Armenians. Arthoces, their king, fearing that Pompey would direct his steps against him, too, sent envoys to him on a pretence of peace, but prepared to attack the invader at a time when, feeling secure, he should be therefore off his guard. Pompey learning of this betimes was in good season in making an incursion into the territory of Arthoces, ere the latter had made ready sufficiently or had occupied the pass on the frontier, which was well nigh impregnable. He marched on, indeed, to the city called Acropolis,[1] before Arthoces ascertained that he was at hand. At that moment he was right at the narrowest point, where the Cyrnus[2] flows on the one side and the Caucasus extends on the other, and had fortified the mountain in order to guard the pass. Arthoces, panic-stricken, had no chance to array his forces, but crossed the river, burning down the bridge; and those within the wall, in view of his flight and a defeat they had sustained in battle, surrendered. Pompey made himself master of the

1 Harmastica (= arx dei Armazi) is meant.

2 The words τοῦ Κύρνου παραρρέοντος, ἔνθεν δὲ, required to fill a gap in the sense, are supplied by Bekker on the basis of a previous suggestion by Reiske.

B. C. 65 (*a. u.* 689)

thoroughfares, left a garrison in charge of them, and advancing from that point subjugated all the territory

—2— within the river boundary. But when he was on the point of crossing the Cyrnus also, Arthoces sent to him requesting peace and promising voluntarily to furnish him control of the bridge and provisions. Both of these promises the king fulfilled as if he intended to come to terms, but terrified when he saw his adversary already across he fled away to the Pelorus, another river that flowed through his dominions. The man that he might have hindered from crossing he avoided by running away after drawing him on.

Pompey, seeing this, pursued after, overtook and conquered him. By a charge he got into close quarters with the enemy's bowmen before they could show their skill, and in the briefest time routed them. When things took this turn, Arthoces crossed the Pelorus and fled, burning the bridge over that stream too: of the rest some were killed in hand-to-hand fights, and some while fording the river on foot. Many, also, scattered through the woods, survived for a few days by shooting from the trees, which were exceedingly tall, but soon the trees were cut down at the base and they also were destroyed. Under these conditions Arthoces again sent a herald to Pompey for peace, and forwarded gifts. These the other accepted, in order that the king in his hope to secure a truce might not proceed farther in any direction; but he did not agree to grant peace till the petitioner should first convey to him his children as hostages. Thus Pompey waited for a time until in the course of the summer the Pelorus became fordable in places, and then the Romans crossed over;

their passage was especially easy as they met no one to hinder them. Then Arthoces sent his children to him and finally concluded a treaty. B. C. 65 (*a. u.* 689)

—3— Pompey, learning directly that the Phasis was not distant, decided to descend along its course to Colchis and thence to march to the Bosphorus against Mithridates. He advanced as planned, traversing the territory of the Colchians and their neighbors, using persuasion in some quarters and inspiring fear in others. There perceiving that his route on land led through many unknown and hostile tribes, and that the sea journey was rather difficult on account of the country's having no harbors and on account of the people inhabiting the region, he ordered the fleet to blockade Mithridates so as to watch that the latter did not set sail in any direction and to cut off his importation of provisions, while he himself turned his steps against the Albanians. He took what was not the shortest path, but went inland to Armenia in order that such action, coupled with the truce, might enable him to find them not expecting him. And the Cyrnus, too, he crossed at a point where it had become passable because of summer, ordering the cavalry to cross down stream with the baggage animals next, and the infantry afterward. The object was that the horses should break the violence of the current with their bodies, and if even so any one of the pack animals should be swept off its feet it might collide with the men going alongside and not be carried further down. From there he marched to Cambyse without suffering any injury at the hands of the enemy, but through the influence of the scorching heat and consequent thirst he in com-

B. C. 65 (*a. u.* 689) mon with the whole army experienced hardship in his progress even at night over the greater part of the road. Their guides, being some of the captives, did not lead them by the most suitable route, and the river was of no advantage to them; for the water, of which they drank great quantities, was very cold and made a number sick.

When no resistance to them developed at this place either, they marched on to the Abas, carrying supplies of water only; everything else they received by the free gift of the natives, and for this reason they committed no depredations.

—4— After they had already got across the river, Orœses was announced as coming up. Pompey was anxious to lead him into conflict somehow before he should find out the number of the Romans, for fear that when he learned it he might retreat. Accordingly he marshaled his cavalry first, giving them notice beforehand what they should do; and keeping the rest behind them in a kneeling position and covered with their shields he made these last remain motionless, so that Orœses should not ascertain their presence until he came close up. Thereupon the latter, in contempt for the cavalry who were alone, as he thought, joined battle with them, and when after a little they purposely turned to flight, pursued them at full speed. Then the infantry suddenly rising stood apart to furnish their own men a safe means of escape through their midst, but received the enemy, who were heedlessly bent on pursuit, and surrounded a number of them. So these soldiers cut down those caught inside the circle; and the cavalry, some of whom went round on the right

and some on the other side of them, assailed in the rear those outside. Each of these bodies slaughtered many in that place and others who had fled into the woods they burned to death, and they cried out, "Ha! ha! the Saturnalia!" with reference to the attack made at that festival by the Albanians. B. C. 65 (*a. u.* 689)

After accomplishing this and overrunning the country, Pompey granted peace to the Albanians, and on the arrival of heralds concluded a truce with some of the other tribes that dwell along the Caucasus as far as the Caspian Sea, where the mountains, which begin at the Pontus, come to an end. Phraates likewise sent to him, wishing to renew the covenants. The sight of Pompey's onward rush and the fact that his lieutenants were also subjugating the rest of Armenia and that region of Pontus and that Gabinius had advanced across the Euphrates as far as the Tigris filled him with fear of them, and he was anxious to confirm the agreement. He effected nothing, however. Pompey, in view of the existing conditions and the hopes which they inspired, held him in contempt and replied scornfully to the ambassadors, among other things demanding back the territory of Corduene, concerning which Phraates was having a dispute with Tigranes. When the envoys made no answer, inasmuch as they had received no instructions on this point, he wrote a few words to Phraates, but instead of waiting for any answer suddenly despatched Afranius into the territory, and having occupied it without a battle gave it to Tigranes. —5—

Afranius, returning through Mesopotamia to Syria, contrary to the agreement made with the Parthian,

B. C. 65 (*a. u.* 689) wandered from the way and endured much evil by reason of the winter and lack of supplies. Indeed, he would have perished, had not Carræans, colonists of the Macedonians who dwelt somewhere in that vicinity, supported him and helped him forward.

—6— This was the treatment that Pompey[1] out of the fullness of his power accorded Phraates, thereby indicating very clearly to those desiring personal profit that everything depends on armed force, and he who is victorious by its aid wins inevitably the right to lay down what laws he pleases. Furthermore, he did violence to the title of that ruler, in which Phraates delighted before all the world and before the Romans themselves, and by which the latter had always addressed him. For whereas he was called "king of kings," Pompey clipped off the phrase "of kings" and wrote "to the king," with merely that direction, in spite of the fact that he had given this title to the captive Tigranes even contrary to their custom when he celebrated the triumph over him in Rome. Phraates, consequently, although he feared and was subservient to him, was vexed at this, feeling that he had been deprived of the kingdom; and he sent ambassadors, reproaching him with all the injustice he had done, and forbade him to cross the Euphrates.

—7— As Pompey made no reasonable reply, the other immediately instituted a campaign in the spring against Tigranes, being accompanied by the latter's son, to whom he had given his daughter in marriage. This was in the consulship of Lucius Cæsar and Gaius Figu-

B. C. 64 (*a. u.* 690)

[1] The words *ὁ δὲ Πομπήϊος* at the opening of chapter 6 were supplied by Bekker.

lus. In the first battle Phraates was beaten, but later was victorious in his turn. And when Tigranes invoked the assistance of Pompey, who was in Syria, he sent ambassadors to the Roman commander, making many accusations and throwing out numerous hints against the Romans, so that Pompey was both ashamed and alarmed. As a result the latter lent no aid to Tigranes and took no hostile measures against Phraates, giving as an excuse that no such expedition had been assigned to him and that Mithridates was still in arms. He declared himself satisfied with what had been effected and said that he feared in striving for additional results he might meet with reverses, as had Lucullus. B. C. 64 (*a. u.* 690)

Such was the trend of his philosophy: he maintained that to make personal gains was outrageous and to aim at the possessions of others unjust, as soon as he was no longer able to use them. Through dread of the forces of the Parthian, therefore, and fear of the unsettled state of affairs he did not take up this war in spite of many solicitations. As for the barbarians' complaints, he disparaged them, offering no counter-argument, but asserting that the dispute which the prince had with Tigranes concerned some boundaries, and that three men should decide the case for them. These he actually sent, and they were enrolled as arbitrators by the two kings, who then settled all their mutual complaints. For Tigranes was angry at not having obtained assistance, and Phraates wished the Armenian ruler to survive, so that in case of need he might some day have him as an ally against the Romans. They both understood well that whichever of them should conquer the other would simply help

B. C. 64 (*a. u.* 690) on matters for the Romans and would himself become easier for them to subdue. For these reasons, then, they were reconciled.

Pompey passed the winter in Aspis, winning over the sections that were still resisting, and took Symphorion,[1] a fort which Stratonice betrayed to him. She was the wife of Mithridates, and in anger toward him because she had been abandoned sent the garrison out pretendedly to collect supplies and let the Romans in, although her child was with[2] . . . . . .

—8— . . . . . [not (?)] for this alone B. C. 65 (*a. u.* 689) in his ædileship he (C. Jul. Cæsar) received praise, but because he had also conducted both the Roman and the Megalesian games on the most expensive scale and had further arranged contests of gladiators in the most magnificent manner. Of the sums expended on them a portion was raised by him in conjunction with his colleague Marcus Bibulus, but another portion by him privately; and his individual expenditure on the spec-

1 Properly called Sinoria.

2 A gap exists in the Medicean MS. because the first leaf in the third quaternion is lacking. The omission may be partly filled out from Xiphilinus (p. 7):

"He returned from Armenia and arbitrated disputes besides conducting other business for kings and potentates who came to him. He confirmed some in possession of their kingdoms, added to the principalities of others, and curtailed and humbled the excessive powers of a few. Hollow Syria and Phœnicia which had lately ridden themselves of their rulers and had been made the prey of the Arabians and Tigranes were united. Antiochus had dared to ask them back, but he did not secure them. Instead, they were combined into one province and received laws so that their government was carried on in the Roman fashion."

As to the words at the end of chapter 7, "although her child was with," an inkling of their significance may be had from Appian, Mithridates, chapter 107. Stratonice had betrayed to Pompey a treasure-house on the sole condition that if he should capture Xiphares, a favorite son of hers, he should spare him. This disloyalty to Mithridates enraged the latter, who gained possession of the youth and slew him, while the mother beheld the deed of revenge from a distance.

tacles so much surpassed, that he appropriated to himself the glory for them, and was thought to have taken the whole cost on himself. Even Bibulus joked about it, saying that he had suffered the same fate as Pollux: for, although that hero possessed a temple in common with his brother Castor, it was named only for the latter. B. C. 65 (*a. u.* 689)

All this contributed to the Romans' joy, but they were quite disturbed at the portents of that year. On the Capitol many statues were melted by thunderbolts, among other images one of Jupiter, set upon a pillar, and a likeness of the she-wolf with Romulus and Remus, mounted on a pedestal, fell down; also the letters of the tablets on which the laws were inscribed ran together and became indistinct. Accordingly, on the advice of the soothsayers, they offered many expiatory sacrifices and voted that a larger statue of Jupiter should be set up, looking toward the east and the Forum, in order that the conspiracies by which they were distraught might dissolve. —9—

Such were the occurrences of that year. The censors also became involved in a dispute regarding the dwellers beyond the Po: one thought it wise to admit them to citizenship, and another not; so they did not perform any of their duties, but resigned their office. Their successors, too, did nothing in the following year, for the reason that the tribunes hindered them in regard to the list of the senate, in fear lest they themselves should be dropped from that assembly. Meantime all those who were resident aliens in Rome, except those who dwelt in what is now Italy, were banished on the motion of one Gaius Papius, a tribune, because they

B. C. 65 (*a. u.* 689) were getting to be in the majority and were not thought fit persons to dwell among the citizens.

—10— B. C. 64 (*a. u.* 690) In the ensuing year, with Figulus and Lucius Cæsar in office, notable events were few, but worthy of remembrance in view of the contradictions in human affairs. For the man[1] who had slain Lucretius at the instance of Sulla and another[2] who had murdered many of the persons proscribed by him were tried for the slaughter and punished,— Julius Cæsar being most instrumental in bringing this about. Thus the changes of affairs often render those once thoroughly powerful exceedingly weak. But though this matter went contrary to the expectation of the majority, they were equally surprised that Catiline, who had incurred guilt on those same grounds (for he, too, had put out of the way many similar persons), was acquitted. The result was that he became far worse and for that reason also perished. For, when Marcus Cicero was consul with Gaius Antonius, and Mithridates no longer inflicted any injury upon the Romans but had destroyed his own self, Catiline undertook to set up a new government, and by banding together the allies against the state threw the people into fear of a mighty conflict. Now each of these occurrences came about as follows.

B. C. 63 (*a. u.* 691)

—11— Mithridates himself did not give way under his disasters, but trusting more in his will than in his power, especially while Pompey was lingering in Syria, planned to reach the Ister through Scythia, and from that point to invade Italy. As he was by nature given to great projects and had experienced many failures

[1] *L. Annius Bellienus.*
[2] *L. Luscius.*

and many successes, he regarded nothing as beyond his ability to venture or to hope. If he missed he preferred to perish conjointly with his kingdom, with pride unblemished, rather than to live deprived of it in inglorious humility. On this idea he grew strong. For in proportion as he wasted away through weakness of body, the more steadfast did he grow in strength of mind, so that he even revived the infirmity of the former by the reasonings of the latter. B. C. 63 (*a. u.* 691)

The rest who were his associates, as the position of the Romans kept getting always more secure and that of Mithridates weaker,— among other things the greatest earthquake that had ever occurred destroyed many of their cities — became estranged; the military also mutinied and unknown persons kidnapped some of his children, whom they conveyed to Pompey.

—12—

Thereupon he detected and punished some; others he chastised from mere suspicion: no one could any longer trust him; of his remaining children, even, he put to death one of whom he grew suspicious. Seeing this, one of his sons, Pharnaces, impelled at once by fear of the king and an expectation that he would get the kingdom from the Romans, being now of man's estate, plotted against him. He was detected, for many both openly and secretly meddled constantly with all he was doing; and if the body-guard had had even the slightest good will toward their aged sovereign, the conspirator would immediately have met his just deserts. As it was, Mithridates, who had proved himself most wise in all matters pertaining to a king, did not recognize the fact that neither arms nor multitude of subjects are of any value to any one, without friendship on the part of

B. C. 63 (*a. u.* 691) the people; nay, the more dependents a person has (unless he holds them faithful to him) the greater burden they are to him. At any rate Pharnaces, followed both by the men he had made ready in advance, and by those whom his father had sent to arrest him (and these he very easily made his own) hastened straight on against the father himself. The old king was in Panticapæum when he learned this, and sent ahead some soldiers against his son, saying that he himself would soon follow them. These also Pharnaces quickly diverted from their purpose, inasmuch as they did not love Mithridates either, and after receiving the voluntary submission of the city, put to death his father, who had fled for refuge into the palace.

—13— The latter had tried to make way with himself, and after removing beforehand by poison his wives and remaining children, he had swallowed what was left to the last drop. Neither by that means nor by the sword was he able to induce death with his own hands. For the poison, although deadly, did not prevail over him, since he had inured his constitution to it, taking every day precautionary antidotes in large doses: and the force of the sword blow was lessened on account of the weakness of his hand, caused by his age and the interference of those around him, and on account of the effect of the poison, of whatever sort it was. When, therefore, he failed to pour out his life through his own efforts and seemed to linger beyond the proper time, those whom he had sent against his son fell upon him and hastened his end with swords and spear points. Mithridates, who had experienced the most varied and tremendous fortune, found the close of his life equally

far from being simple. He desired to die against his will, and though anxious to kill himself was not able; but first by poison and then by the sword at once became a suicide and was slain by his foes. B. C. 63 (*a. u.* 691)

—14— Pharnaces embalmed his body and sent it to Pompey as a proof of what had been done, and surrendered himself and his dominions. The Roman showed Mithridates no indignity, on the contrary commanding that he be buried among the graves of his ancestors; for, feeling that his hostility had been extinguished with his life, he indulged in no vain anger against the dead body. The kingdom of Bosporus, however, he granted to Pharnaces as the wages of his bloody deed, and enrolled him among his friends and allies.

After the death of Mithridates all portions of his dominions, except a few, were subjugated. Garrisons which at that date were still holding a few fortifications outside of Bosporus, did not immediately come to terms,—not so much because they were minded to resist him as because they were afraid that some persons might confiscate beforehand the money which they were guarding and lay the blame upon them: hence they waited, wishing to exhibit everything to Pompey himself. When, then, the regions in that —15— quarter had been subdued, and Phraates remained quiet, while Syria and Phœnicia were in a state of calm, the conqueror turned against Aretas. The latter was king of the Arabians, now slaves to the Romans as far as the Red Sea. Previously he had done the greatest injury to Syria and had on this account become involved in a battle with the Romans who were defending it: he was defeated by them, but neverthe-

B. C. 63 (*a. u.* 691)

less continued hostile at that time. Upon him and his neighbors Pompey made a descent, overcame them without effort, and handed them over to a garrison. Thence he proceeded against Palestine, in Syria, because its inhabitants were harming Phœnicia. Their rulers were two brothers, Hyrcanus and Aristobulus, who[1] were themselves quarreling, as it chanced, and stirring up the cities concerning the priesthood (for so they called their kingdom) of their God, whoever he is.

Pompey immediately brought to his side without a battle Hyrcanus, who had no force worthy of note, and by confining Aristobulus in a certain spot compelled him to come to terms. And when he would surrender neither money nor garrison,[2] Pompey threw him into prison. After this he more easily overcame the rest, but in the siege of Jerusalem found trouble. Most of

—16—

the city he took without exertion, as he was received by the party of Hyrcanus, but the temple itself, which the others had occupied in advance, he did not capture without labor. It was on high ground and strengthened by its own defences, and if they had continued defending it on all days alike, he could not have got possession of it. As it was, they made an exception of what were called the days of Saturn,[3] and by doing no work at all on them offered the Romans an opportunity in this vacant interval to batter down the wall. The latter on learning this superstition of theirs, made no serious attempt the rest of the time, but on those days, when they came around in succession, assaulted

1 Or "and these were" (according to the MS. reading selected).
2 Xiphilinus adds: "after approaching and offering him this."
3 I. e., Jehovah.

most vigorously. Thus the holders were captured on the day of Saturn, making no defence, and all the money was plundered. The kingdom was given to Hyrcanus, and Aristobulus was carried back to Rome. B. C. 63 (*a. u.* 691)

This was the course of events at that time in Palestine. That is the name that has been applied from of old to the whole race, which extends from Phœnicia to Egypt along the inner sea. They have also another name that has been acquired,— i. e., the country has been called Judæa, and the people themselves Jews. I —17— do not know from what source this title was first given them, but it applies also to all the rest of mankind, although of foreign race, who cherish their customs. This nation exists among the Romans also, and though often diminished has increased to a very great extent and has won its way to the right of freedom in its observances. They are distinguished from the rest of mankind in every detail of life, so to speak, and especially by the fact that they do not honor any of the usual gods, but reverence mightily one particular divinity. They never had any statue in Jerusalem itself, but believing him to be inexpressible, invisible, they worship him in the most extravagant fashion on earth. They built to him a temple that was extremely large and beautiful, except in so far as it was void and roofless, and dedicated the day called the day of Saturn, on which, among many other most peculiar actions, they undertake no serious occupation.

Now as for him, who he is and why he has been so honored, and how they got their superstition about him, accounts have been given by many, no one of which pertains to this history.

—18— B. C. 63 (*a. u.* 691) The custom of referring the days to the seven stars called planets was established by the Egyptians, but has spread to all men, though it was instituted comparatively not long ago. At any rate the original Greeks in no case understood it, so far as I am aware. But since it is becoming quite habitual to all the rest of mankind and to the Romans themselves, and this is to them already in a way an hereditary possession, I wish to make a few brief statements about it, telling how and in what way it has been so arranged.

I have heard two accounts, in general not difficult of comprehension, and containing some one's theories. If one apply the so-called "principle of the tetrachord" (which is believed to constitute the basis of music) in order to these stars, by which the whole universe of heaven is divided into regular intervals, as each one of them revolves, and beginning at the outer orbit assigned to Saturn, then omitting the next two name the master of the fourth, and after him passing over two others reach the seventh, and in the return cycle approach them and the presiding gods in this same way calling them by the names of the days, one will find all the days to be in a kind of musical connection with the arrangement of the heavens.

—19— This is one of the accounts: the other is as follows. If you begin at the first one to count the hours of the day and of the night, assigning the first to Saturn, the next to Jupiter, the third to Mars, the fourth to Sol,[1] the fifth to Venus, the sixth to Mercury, and the seventh to Luna,[1] according to the order of the cycles

[1] Sol and Luna: or, the sun and moon. The words appear in the text without any article and may be personified.

which the Egyptians observe in their system, and if you repeat the process, covering thus the twenty-four hours, you will find that the first hour of the following day comes to the sun. And if you carry on the operation throughout the next twenty-four hours, by the same method as outlined above, you will consecrate the first hour of the third day to the moon, and if you proceed similarly through the rest, each day will receive the god that appertains to it. This, then, is the tradition.[1] B. C. 63 (*a. u.* 691)

Pompey, when he had accomplished what has been related, went again to the Pontus and after taking charge of the forts returned to Asia and thence to Greece and Italy. He had won many battles; had brought into subjection many potentates and kings, some by going to war with them and some by treaty, he had colonized eight cities, had created many lands and sources of revenue for the Romans, and had established and organized most of the nations in the continent of Asia then belonging to them with their own laws and governments, so that even to this day they use the laws that he laid down. —20—

1 Dio attempts in chapters 18 and 19 to explain why the days of the week are associated with the names of the planets. It should be borne in mind that the order of the planets with reference to their distance from the earth (counting from farthest to nearest) is as follows: Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Sun, Venus, Mercury, Moon. The custom of naming the days may then have arisen, he says, (1) by regarding the gods as originally presiding over separate *days* assigned by the principle of the tetrachord (i. e., skipping two stars in your count each time as you go over the list) so that you get this order: the day of Saturn, of the Sun, of the Moon, of Mars, of Mercury, of Jupiter, of Venus (Saturday to Friday, inclusive); or (2) by regarding the gods as properly gods of the *hours*, which are assigned in order, beginning with Saturn, as in the list above,— and allowing it to be understood that that god who is found by this system to preside over the *first hour* shall also give his name to the day in question.

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(*a. u.* 691)

But although these achievements were great and had been equaled by no earlier Roman, one might ascribe them both to good fortune and to his fellow campaigners. The performance for which credit particularly attaches to Pompey himself, which is forever worthy of admiration, I will now proceed to set forth.

He had enormous power both on sea and on land; he had supplied himself with vast sums of money from captives; he had made friends with numerous potentates and kings; and he had kept practically all the communities which he ruled well disposed through benefits bestowed. And although by these means he might have occupied Italy and have taken possession of the whole Roman sway, since the majority would have accepted him voluntarily, and if any had resisted they would certainly have capitulated through weakness, yet he did not choose to do this. Instead, as soon as he had crossed to Brundusium he gave up of his own accord all his powers, without waiting for any vote to be passed concerning the matter by the senate or the people, not troubling himself even about using them in the course of the triumph. For since he understood that the careers of Marius and Sulla were held in abomination by all mankind, he did not wish to cause them any fear even for a few days that they should undergo any similar experiences. Consequently he did not so much as acquire any name from his exploits, although he might have taken many.

—21—

As for the triumphal celebration,— I mean that one which is considered the chief,— although according to most ancient precedents it is not lawful that it be held

without those who aided the victory, he nevertheless accepted it, as it had been voted to him. He conducted the procession in honor of all his wars at once, including in it many trophies beautifully arrayed to represent each of his deeds, even the smallest: and after them all came one huge one, arrayed in costly fashion and bearing an inscription to the effect that it was a World Trophy. He did not, however, add any other title to his name, but was satisfied with that of Magnus only, which, as is known, he had gained even before these achievements. Nor did he get any other extravagant privilege awarded him: only he did use once such as had been voted him in absence. These were that he should wear the laurel wreath on the occasion of all meetings at any time, and should be clad in the robe of office at all of them, as well as in the triumphal garb at the horse-races. They were granted him chiefly through the coöperation of Cæsar, and contrary to the judgment of Marcus Cato. B. C. 63 (*a. u.* 691)

—22—

Regarding the former a statement has already been made as to who he was, and it has been related[1] that he cultivated the common people, and while generally striving to depose Pompey from his high position, still made a friend of him in cases where he was sure of pleasing the populace and gaining influence himself. But this Cato belonged to the family of the Porcii and emulated the great Cato, except that he had enjoyed a better Greek education than the former. He promoted assiduously the interests of the multitude and

1 See Book Thirty-six, chapter 43.

B. C. 63 (*a. u.* 691) admired no one man, being excessively devoted to the common weal; suspicious of sovereignty, he hated everything that had grown above its fellows, but loved everything mediocre through pity for its weakness. He showed himself a passionate adherent of the populace as did no one else, and indulged in outspokenness beyond the limits of propriety, even when it involved danger. All this he did not with a view to power or glory or any honor, but solely for the sake of a life of independence, free from the dictation of tyrants. Such was the nature of the man who now for the first time came forward before the people and opposed the measures under consideration, not out of any hostility to Pompey, but because they transgressed time-honored customs.

—23— These honors, then, they granted Pompey in his absence, but none when he had come home, though they would certainly have added others, had he wished it; upon some other men, indeed, who had been less successful than he, they often bestowed many extravagant distinctions. That they did so unwillingly, however, is clear.

Pompey knew well that all the gifts granted by the common people to those who have any influence and are in positions of authority contain the suggestion, no matter how willingly they are voted, of having been granted through force applied out of the resources of the strong. He knew that such honors bring no glory to those who receive them, because it is believed that they were obtained not from willing donors, but under

compulsion, and not from good will, but as a result of flattery. Hence he did not permit any one to propose any measure whatever. This course he declared far better than to reject what has been voted to one. The latter method brought hatred for the high position that led to such measures being passed, and connoted arrogance and insolence in not accepting what is granted by your superiors or at all events by your peers. By the former method you possessed in very fact the democratic name and behavior both, not indicated but existent. For having received almost all the offices and positions of command contrary to ancient precedent, he refused to accept all such others as were destined to bring him only envy and hatred even from the very givers, without enabling him to benefit any one or be benefited. B. C. 63 (*a. u.* 691)

All this took place in course of time. Temporarily the Romans had a respite from war for the remainder of the year, so that they even held the so-called *augurium salutis* after a long interval. This is a kind of augury, which consists of an enquiry whether the god allows them to request welfare for the State, as if it were unholy even to make a request for it until the action received sanction. That day of the year was observed on which no army went out to war, or was taking defensive measures against any, or was fighting a battle. For this reason, amid the constant perils (especially those of a civil nature), it was not held. In general it was very difficult for them to secure exactly the day which should be free from all those disturb- —24—

B. C. 63 (*a. u.* 691)

ances, and furthermore it was most ridiculous, when they were voluntarily causing one another unspeakable woes through factional conflicts and were destined to suffer ills whether they were beaten or victorious, that they should still ask safety from the divine power.

—25— Notwithstanding, it was in some way possible at that time for the divination to be held, but it did not prove to be pure. Some strange birds flew up and made the augury of no effect. Other unlucky omens, too, developed. Many thunderbolts fell from a clear sky, the earth was mightily shaken, and human apparitions were visible in many places, and in the West flashes ran up into heaven, so that any one, even an ignorant fellow, was bound to know in advance what was signified by them. For the tribunes united with Antonius, the consul, who was much like themselves in character, and some one of them supported for office the children of those exiled by Sulla, while a second was for granting to Publius Pætus and to Cornelius Sulla, who had been convicted with him, the right to be members of the senate and to hold office. Another made a motion for a cancellation of debts, and for allotments of land to be made both in Italy and in the subject territory. These motions were taken in hand betimes by Cicero and those who were of the same mind as he, and were quashed before any action resulted from them.

—26— Titus Labienus, however, by indicting Gaius Rabirius for the murder of Saturninus caused them the greatest disorder. For Saturninus had been killed some thirty-six years earlier, and the steps taken

against him by the consuls of the period had been at the direction of the senate: as a result of the present action the senate was likely to lose authority over its votes. Consequently the whole system of government was stirred up. Rabirius did not admit the murder, but denied it. The tribunes were eager to overthrow completely the power and the reputation of the senate and were preparing for themselves in advance authority to do whatever they pleased. For the calling to account of acts that had received the approval of the senate and had been committed so many years before tended to give immunity to those who were undertaking anything similar, and curtailed the punishments they could inflict. Now the senate in general thought it shocking for a man of senatorial rank who was guilty of no crime and now well advanced in years to perish, and were all the more enraged because the dignity of the government was being attacked, and control of affairs was being entrusted to the vilest men. Hence arose turbulent exhibitions of partisanship and contentions about the court, the one party demanding that it should not be convened and the other that it should sit. When the latter party won, because of Cæsar and some others, there was strife again regarding the trial. Cæsar himself was judge with Lucius Cæsar; for the charge against Rabirius was not a simple one, but the so-called *perduellio:* — and they condemned him, although they had not been chosen according to precedent by the people, but by the prætor himself, which was not permitted. Rabirius yielded, and would cer-

B. C. 63 (*a. u.* 691)

— 27 —

B. C. 63 (*a. u.* 691) tainly have been convicted before the popular court also, had not Metellus Celer who was an augur and prætor hindered it. For since nothing else would make them heed him and they were unconcerned that the trial had been held in a manner contrary to custom, he ran up to Janiculum before they had cast any vote whatever, and pulled down the military signal, so that it was no longer lawful for them to reach a decision.

—28— Now this matter of the signal is about as follows. In old times there were many enemies dwelling near the city, and the Romans (according to the account) fearing that while they were holding an assembly foes might occupy Janiculum to attack the city decided that not all should vote at once, but that some men under arms should by turns always guard that spot. So they garrisoned it as long as the assembly lasted, but when it was about to be dissolved, the signal was pulled down and the guards departed. Regularly no business was any longer allowed to be transacted unless the post were garrisoned. It was permissible only in the case of assemblies which collected by companies, for these were outside the wall and all who had arms were obliged to attend them. Even to this day it is done from religious grounds.

So on that occasion, when the signal was pulled down, the assembly was dissolved and Rabirius saved. Labienus, indeed, had the right to go to court again, but he did not do this.

—29— As for Catiline, his ruin was accomplished in the following way and for the reasons which I shall nar-

rate. He had been seeking the consulship even then, B. C. 63 (*a. u.* 691) and contriving every conceivable way to get appointed, when the senate decreed, chiefly at the instance of Cicero, that a banishment of ten years should be added by law to the penalties imposed for bribery. Catiline thought, as was doubtless true, that this ruling had been made on his account, and planned, by collecting a small band, to slay Cicero and some other foremost men on the very day of the election, in order that he might immediately be chosen consul. This project he was unable, however, to carry out. Cicero learned of the plot beforehand, informed the senate of it, and delivered a long accusation against him. Being unsuccessful, however, in persuading them to vote any of the measures he asked — this was because his announcement was not regarded as credible and he was suspected of having uttered false charges against the men on account of personal enmity — Cicero became frightened, seeing that he had given Catiline additional provocation, and he did not venture to enter the assembly alone, as had been his custom, but he took his friends along prepared to defend him if any danger threatened; and he wore for his own safety and because of their hostility a breastplate beneath his clothing, which he would purposely uncover. For this reason and because anyway some report had been spread of a plot against him, the populace was furiously angry and the fellow conspirators of Catiline through fear of him became quiet.

In this way new consuls were chosen, and Catiline no —30—

B. C. 63 (*a. u.* 691) longer directed his plot in secret or against Cicero and his adherents only, but against the whole commonwealth. He assembled from Rome itself the lowest characters and such as were always eager for a revolution and as many as possible of the allies, by promising them cancellation of debts, redistribution of lands, and everything else by which he was most likely to allure them. Upon the foremost and most powerful of them (of whose number was Antonius the consul) he imposed the obligation of taking the oath in an unholy manner. He sacrificed a boy, and after administering the oath over his entrails, tasted the inwards in company with the rest. Those who coöperated with him most were: In Rome, the consul and Publius Lentulus, who, after his consulship, had been expelled from the senate (he was now acting as prætor, in order to gain senatorial rank again); at Fæsulæ, where the men of his party were collecting, one Gaius Mallius, who was most experienced in military matters (he had served with Sulla's centurions) and the greatest possible spendthrift. Everything that he had gained at that epoch, although a vast sum, he had consumed by evil practices, and was eager for other similar exploits.

—31— While they were making these preparations, information came to Cicero, first of what was occurring in the city, through some letters which did not indicate the writer but were given to Crassus and some other influential men. On their publication a decree was passed that a state of disorder existed and that a search should be made for those responsible for it. Next came

the news from Etruria, whereupon they voted to the consuls in addition the guardianship of the city and of all its interests, as they had been accustomed to have: for to this decree was subjoined the command that they should take care that no injury happen to the republic. When this had been done and a garrison stationed at many points, there was no further sign of revolution in the city, insomuch that Cicero was even falsely charged with sycophancy; but messages from the Etruscans confirmed the accusation, and thereupon he prepared an indictment for violence against Catiline. B. C. 63 (*a. u.* 691)

The latter at first accepted it with entire readiness as if supported by a good conscience, and made ready for the trial, even offering to surrender himself to Cicero so that the latter could watch and see that he did not escape anywhere. As Cicero, however, refused to take charge of him, he voluntarily took up his residence at the house of Metellus the prætor, in order that he might be as free as possible from the suspicion of promoting a revolution until he should gain some additional strength from the conspirators in that very town. But he made no headway at all, because Antonius through fear shrank back and Lentulus was anything but an energetic sort of person. Accordingly, he gave them notice to assemble by night in a particular house, where he met them without Metellus's knowledge and upbraided them for their timorousness and weakness. Next he set forth in detail how great punishments they would suffer if they were detected and how many desirable things they would obtain if successful, and by this means so encouraged and incited them, that two —32—

B. C. 63 (*a. u.* 691) men promised to rush into Cicero's house at daybreak and murder him there.

—33— Information of this, too, was given in advance: for Cicero, being a man of influence, had through his speeches by either conciliation or intimidation gained many followers, who reported such occurrences to him: and the senate voted that Catiline should leave the city. The latter was glad enough to withdraw on this excuse and went to Fæsulæ, where he prepared an out and out war. He took the consular name and dress and proceeded to organize the men previously collected by Mallius, meanwhile gaining accessions first of freemen, and second of slaves.

The Romans consequently condemned him for violence, ordered Antonius to the war (being ignorant, of course, of their conspiracy), and themselves changed their apparel. The crisis kept Cicero likewise where he was. The government of Macedonia had fallen to him by lot, but he did not set out for that country,— retiring in favor of his colleague on account of his occupation in the prosecutions,— nor for Hither Gaul, which he had obtained in its place, on account of the immediate situation. Instead, he charged himself with the protection of the city, but sent Metellus to Gaul to prevent Catiline from alienating it.

—34— It was extremely well for the Romans that he remained. For Lentulus made preparations to burn down the city and commit wholesale slaughter with the aid of his fellow conspirators and of Allobroges, who chanced to be there on an embassy: these also he

persuaded to join him[1] and the others implicated in the revolution in their undertaking. The consul learning of their purpose arrested the men sent to carry it out and brought them with their letter into the senate-chamber, where, by granting them immunity, he proved all the conspiracy. As a consequence Lentulus was forced by the senate to resign the prætorship, and was kept under guard along with the others arrested while the remnant of the society was being sought for. These measures pleased the populace equally: especially so, when, during a speech of Cicero's on the subject, the statue of Jupiter was set up on the Capitol at the very time of the assembly, and by instructions of the soothsayers was placed so as to face the East and the Forum. For these prophets had decided that some conspiracy would be brought to light by the erection of the statue, and when its setting up coincided with the time of the conspirators' arrest, the people magnified the divine power and were the more angry at those charged with the disturbance. B. C. 63 (*a. u.* 691)

A report went abroad that Crassus was also among them, and one of the men arrested, too, gave this information; still, not many believed it. Some, in the first place, thought they had no business to suspect him of such a thing; others regarded it as a trumped-up charge emanating from the guilty parties, in order that the latter might thereby get some help from him, because he possessed the greatest influence. And if it did seem credible to any persons, at least they did not —35—

1 After "join him" there is a gap in the MS. The words necessary to complete this sentence and to begin the next were supplied by Reiske.

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(*a. u.* 691)

see fit to ruin a man who was foremost among them and to disquiet the city still more. Consequently this charge fell through utterly.

Now many slaves, and freemen as well, some through fear and others for pity of Lentulus and the rest, made preparations to deliver them all forcibly and rescue them from death. Cicero learned of this beforehand and occupied the Capitol and Forum betimes by night with a garrison. At dawn he received from above an inspiration to hope for the best: for in the course of sacrifices conducted in his house by the Vestals in behalf of the populace, the fire, contrary to custom, shot up in a tongue of great length. Accordingly, he ordered the prætors to administer an oath to the populace and have them enlisted, in case there should be any need of soldiers, and meanwhile himself convened the senate: then, by throwing them into agitation and fright, he persuaded them to condemn to death the persons held under arrest.

—36—

At first the senators had been at variance, and came near setting them free. For while all before Cæsar had voted that they should be put to death, he gave his decision that they should be imprisoned and deported to various cities after having their property confiscated, with the condition that there should be no further deliberation about immunity for them, and if any one of them should run away, he should be considered among the enemies of that city from which he fled. Then all who subsequently made known their opinions, until it came to Cato, cast this vote, so that some of the first also changed their minds. But the fact that Cato

himself gave a sentence of death against them caused all the rest to vote similarly. So the conspirators were punished by the decision of the majority and a sacrifice and period of festival over them was decreed,— something that had never before happened from any such cause. Others, also, against whom information was lodged, were sought out and some incurred suspicion and were held to account for merely intending to join that party. The consuls managed most of the investigations, but Aulus Fulvius, a senator, was slain by his own father; and some think that the latter was not the only private individual who did this. There were many others, that is, not only consuls but persons in private life, who killed their children. This was the course of affairs at that time. B. C. 63 (*a. u.* 691) —37—

The priestly elections, on motion of Labienus supported by Cæsar, were again referred by the people to popular vote, contrary to the law of Sulla, but in renewal of the law of Domitius. Cæsar at the death of Metellus Pius was eager for his priesthood, although young and not having served as prætor. Resting his hopes of it upon the multitude, therefore, especially because he had helped Labienus against Rabirius and had not voted for the death of Lentulus, he took the above course. And he was appointed pontifex maximus, in spite of the fact that many others, Catulus most of all, were his rivals for the honor. This was because he showed himself perfectly ready to serve and flatter every one, even ordinary persons, and he spared no speech or action for getting possession of the objects for which he strove. He paid no heed to

B. C. 63 (*a. u.* 691) temporary groveling when weighed against subsequent power, and he cringed as before superiors to those men whom he was planning to dominate.

—38— Toward Cæsar, accordingly, for these reasons, the masses were well disposed, but their anger was directed against Cicero for the death of the citizens, and they displayed their enmity in many ways. Finally, when on the last day of his office he desired to give a defence and account of all that had been done in his consulship, — for he took great pleasure not only in being praised by others, but also in extolling himself,— they made him keep silence and did not allow him to utter a word outside of his oath; in this they had Metellus Nepos, the tribune, to aid them. Only Cicero, in violent protestation, did take an additional oath that he had saved the city. For that he incurred all the greater hatred.

—39— B. C. 62 (*a. u.* 692) Catiline met his doom at the very opening of the year in which Junius Silanus and Lucius Licinius held office. For a while, although he had no small force, he watched the movements of Lentulus and delayed, in the hope that if Cicero and his adherents should be slain in good season he could easily execute his remaining designs. But when he ascertained that Lentulus had perished and that many of his followers had deserted for that reason, he was compelled to risk the uttermost, especially as Antonius and Metellus Celer, who were besieging Fæsulæ, did not allow him to advance in any direction. He proceeded, therefore, against Antonius — the two were separately encamped — although the latter had greater renown than Metellus and was invested with greater power. The reason

was that Catiline had hopes of his letting himself be beaten in order to fulfill the demands of his oath. B. C. 62 (*a. u.* 692)

The latter, who suspected this, no longer felt kindly toward Catiline, because he was weak; for most men form both friendships and enmities with reference to persons' influence and to individual advantage. Furthermore, being afraid that the arch-conspirator, when he saw them fighting earnestly, might utter some reproach and bring to light things that should not be mentioned, he pretended to be sick and confided the conduct of the battle to Marcus Petreius. This commander —40— joined battle with them and not without bloodshed cut down Catiline and three thousand others while fighting most valiantly. No one of them fled, but every man fell at his post. Even the victors mourned their common loss, inasmuch as they had destroyed (no matter how justly) so many and such brave men, who were citizens and allies. His head Antonius sent to the city in order that its inhabitants might believe in his death and have no further fear. He himself was named imperator for the victory, although the number of the slaughtered was smaller than usual. Sacrifices of oxen were also voted, and the people changed their raiment to signify their deliverance from all dangers.

Nevertheless, the allies who had shared the under- —41— taking with Catiline and still survived after that did not remain quiet, but through fear of punishment created disturbances. Against each division of them prætors were sent, overcame them in season, while still in a way scattered, and punished them. Others that

B. C. 62 (*a. u.* 692) were avoiding observation were convicted and condemned on information from Lucius Vettius, a knight, who had taken part in the conspiracy but now on promise of immunity revealed them. This went on until, after having impeached some men and written their names on a tablet, he desired the privilege of writing in others. The senators suspected that he was not dealing fair and would not give him the document again for fear he should erase some names, but had him mention orally all he had omitted. Then in shame and fear he made known only a few others.

Since even under these circumstances disquietude prevailed in the city and among the allies through ignorance of the persons named, and some were needlessly troubled about themselves, while some incorrectly suspected others, the senate decreed that the names be published. As a result the innocent regained composure and judgments were pronounced upon those called to account. Some were present to be condemned and others let their cases go by default.

—42— Such was the career of Catiline and his downfall which, owing to the reputation of Cicero and the speeches delivered against him, brought him a greater name than his deeds deserved. Cicero came near being tried immediately for the killing of Lentulus and the other prisoners. This complaint, though technically brought against him, was really directed against the senate. For among the populace its members were subject to denunciations of the utmost virulence voiced by Metellus Nepos, to the effect that they had no right to condemn any citizen to death without the consent of

the people. But Cicero had no trouble at that time. The senate had granted immunity to all those who administered affairs during that period and had further proclaimed that if any one should dare to call any one of them to account again, he should be in the category of a personal and public enemy; so that Nepos was afraid and aroused no further tumult. B. C. 62 (*a. u.* 692)

This was not the senate's only victory. Nepos had moved that Pompey be summoned with his army (he was still in Asia), pretendedly for the purpose of bringing calm to the existing conditions, but really in hope that he himself might through him get power in the disturbances he was causing, because Pompey favored the multitude: this plan the senators prevented from being ratified. For, to begin with, Cato and Quintus Minucius in their capacity as tribunes vetoed the proposition and stopped the clerk who was reading the motion. Nepos took the document to read it himself, but they snatched it away, and when even so he undertook to make some oral remarks they laid hold of his mouth. The result was that a battle with sticks and stones and even swords took place between them, in which some others joined who assisted both sides. Therefore the senators convened in session that very day, changed their togas and gave the consuls charge of the city, "that it suffer no injury." Then even Nepos was afraid and retired immediately from their midst: subsequently, after publishing some piece of writing against the senate, he set out to join Pompey, although he had no right to be absent from the city a single night. —43—

—44—
B. C. 62
(*a. u.* 692)

After this occurrence Cæsar, who was now prætor, likewise showed no further revolutionary tendencies. He effected the removal of the name of Catulus from the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus — he was calling him to account for theft and was demanding an account of the money he had spent — and the entrusting to Pompey of the construction of the remainder of the edifice. For many details, considering the size and character of the work, were but half finished. Or else Cæsar pretended it was so, in order that Pompey might gain the glory for its completion and inscribe his name instead. He was not, to be sure, so ready to do him a favor as to submit to having passed concerning himself some decrees similar to that regarding Nepos. He did not, in fact, act thus for Pompey's sake, but in order that he might ingratiate himself with the populace. Still, as it was, all feared Pompey to such an extent, seeing that it was not yet clear whether he would give up his legions, that when he sent ahead Marcus Piso, his lieutenant, to seek the consulship, they postponed the elections in order that the latter might attend them, and on his arrival elected him unanimously. For Pompey had recommended the man not only to his friends, but also to his enemies.

—45—

It was at this time that Publius Clodius debauched Cæsar's wife in her house and during the performance of the secret rites which according to ancestral precedent the Vestals carried out at the residences of consuls and prætors in behalf of the whole male population. Cæsar brought no charge against him, understanding well that on account of his connections he

would not be convicted, but divorced his wife, telling her that he did not really believe the story but that he could no longer live with her inasmuch as she had been suspected of committing adultery at all: a chaste woman must not only not err, but not even incur any evil suspicion. B. C. 62 (*a. u.* 692)

Following these events the stone bridge, called the Fabrician, leading to the little island in the Tiber was constructed. The next year in the consulship of Piso and Marcus Messala, the men in power showed their hatred of Clodius and at the same time made expiation for his pollution by delivering him to the court, after the pontifices had decided that the rites because of his act had not been duly performed and should be annulled. He was accused of adultery, in spite of Cæsar's silence, and of desertion at Nisibis and furthermore of having had guilty relations with his sister: yet he was acquitted, although the juries had requested and obtained of the senate a guard to prevent their suffering any harm at his hands. Regarding this Catulus said jestingly that they had asked for the guard not in order to condemn Clodius with safety, but in order to preserve for themselves the money which they had received in bribes.[1] The author of this speech died shortly after,— a man who had always, more conspicuously than his predecessors, held democracy in honor above everything. That year the censors enrolled in the senatorial body all who had attained office, even beyond the proper number. Until then, too, the popu- —46— B. C. 61 (*a. u.* 693)

[1] Cobet (Mnemosyne N. S., X, p. 195) thinks that there is here a reminiscence of Cicero, *Ad Atticum*, I, 16, 5.

B. C. 61 (*a. u.* 693) lace had watched unbroken series of armed combats, but now they introduced the custom of going out to take lunch in the course of the entertainment. This practice which began at that time continues even now, when the person in authority exhibits games.

—47— This was the course of affairs in the city. Gaul in the vicinity of Narbo was being devastated by the Allobroges, and Gaius Pomptinus, its governor, sent his lieutenants against the enemy, but himself made a stand at a convenient spot from which he could keep watch of what occurred; this would enable him to give them opportune advice and assistance, as their advantage might from time to time dictate.

Manlius Lentinus made a campaign against the city of Valentia and terrified the inhabitants so, that the majority ran away and the rest sent ambassadors for peace. Just then the country population coming to their aid suddenly fell upon him; and he was repulsed from the wall, but ravaged the land with impunity until Catugnatus, the commander of their whole tribe, and some others of the dwellers across the Isar brought them help. For the time being he did not dare to hinder them from crossing, by reason of the number of the boats, for fear they might gather in a body on seeing the Romans arrayed against them. As the country was wooded, however, right down to the river bank, he planted ambuscades in it, and captured and destroyed them as fast as they crossed. While following up some fugitives he fell in with Catugnatus himself, and would have perished with all his force, had not the advent of

a violent storm detained the barbarians from pursuit. Later, when Catugnatus had gone away to some distant place, Lentinus overran the country again, and seized and razed to the ground the wall where he had met with mishap. Also, Lucius Marius and Servius Galba crossed the Rhone and after damaging the possessions of the Allobroges finally reached the city of Solonium[1] and occupied a strong position commanding it. In the battle they conquered their opponents and set fire to the fortification, a portion of which was of wood: they did not, however, capture it, being hindered by the appearance of Catugnatus. Pomptinus, on receipt of this news, proceeded against him with his entire force, and besieged and got possession of the inhabitants all except Catugnatus. After that he more easily subjugated the remaining portions.

B. C. 61 (*a. u.* 693)
— 48 —

— 49 —
B. C. 60 (*a. u.* 694)

At this juncture Pompey entered Italy and had Lucius Afranius and Metellus Celer appointed consuls, vainly hoping that through them he could effect whatever he desired. Among his chief wishes was to have some land given to him for the comrades of his campaigns and to have all his acts approved; but he failed of these objects at that time, because those in power, who were formerly not pleased with him, prevented the questions being brought to vote. And of the consuls themselves Afranius (who understood how to dance better than to transact any business) did not unite with him for any purpose, and Metellus, in anger that Pom-

1 Or *Solo* (according to the Epitome of the one hundred and third Book of Livy).

B. C. 60 (*a. u.* 694) pey had divorced his sister in spite of having had children by her, consistently opposed him in everything. Moreover, Lucius Lucullus whom Pompey had once treated contemptuously at a chance meeting in Gaul was greatly incensed against him, bidding him give an account individually and separately of everything he had done instead of demanding a ratification for all of his acts at once. He said it was only fair to refuse to let absolutely everything that Pompey had done, as to the character of which no one knew anything, be confirmed; it was unjust to treat them like deeds performed by some master. When he (Lucullus) had finished any of his own undertakings, he was accustomed to ask that an investigation of each one be made in the senate, in order that the senators might ratify whichever suited them. Lucullus was strongly supported by Cato and Metellus and the rest who had the same wishes as they.

—50— Accordingly, when the tribune who moved that land be assigned to the adherents of Pompey added to the proposition (in order that they might more readily vote this particular measure and ratify his acts) that the same opportunity be afforded all the citizens as well, Metellus contested every point with him and attacked the tribune to such an extent that the latter had him put in a cell. Then Metellus wished to assemble the senate there. When the other — his name was Lucius Flavius — set the tribune's bench at the very entrance of the cell and sitting there became an obstacle to any one's entrance, Metellus ordered the wall of the prison to be cut through so that the senate might

have an entrance through it, and made preparations to pass the night where he was. Pompey, on learning of this, in shame and some fear that the populace might take offence, directed Flavius to withdraw. He spoke as if this were a request from Metellus, but was not believed: for the latter's pride was well known to all. Indeed, Metellus would not give his consent when the other tribunes wished to set him free. He would not even yield when Flavius threatened him again that he would not allow him to go out to the province which he had obtained by lot unless he should assist the tribune in putting the law through: on the contrary he was very glad to remain in the city. B. C. 60 (*a. u.* 694)

Pompey, therefore, since he could accomplish nothing because of Metellus and the rest, said that they were jealous of him and that he would let the people know of this. Fearing, however, that he should miss their support as well, and so be subjected to still greater shame, he abandoned his original aims. Thus he learned that he had no power in reality, but only the reputation and envy resulting from his former authority, which on the other hand afforded him no actual benefit; and he repented of having let his legions go and of having delivered himself to his enemies.

—51—

Clodius's hatred[1] of the influential men led him after the trial to desire to be tribune, and he induced some of those who held that office to move that a share in it be given to the patricians also. As he could not bring this about, he abjured his noble rank and changing his

[1] Supplying τὸ μισεῖν (as v. Herwerden, Boissevain).

B. C. 60 (*a. u.* 694) tactics set out to obtain the prerogatives of the populace, and was even enrolled in their list. Immediately he sought the tribuneship but was not appointed, owing to the opposition of Metellus, who was related to him and did not like his actions. The excuse that Metellus gave was that the transference of Clodius had not been in accord with tradition; this change had been permitted only at the time when the lex curiata was introduced. Thus ended this episode.

Since now the taxes were a great oppression to the city and the rest of Italy, the law that abolished them caused pleasure to all. The senators, however, were angry at the prætor who proposed it (Metellus Nepos was the man) and wished to erase his name from the law, entering another one instead. Although this plan was not carried out, it was still made clear to all that they received not even benefits gladly from inferior men. About this same time Faustus, son of Sulla, gave a gladiatorial combat in memory of his father and entertained the people brilliantly, furnishing them with baths and oil gratis.

—52— While this happened in the city, Cæsar had obtained the government of Lusitania after his prætorship: and though he might without any great labor have cleared the land of brigandage (which probably always existed there) and then have kept quiet, he refused to do so. He was eager for glory, emulating Pompey and his other predecessors who at one time had held great power, and he harbored no small designs; it was his hope, in case he should at that time accomplish anything, to be immediately chosen consul and show the

people deeds of magnitude. That hope was based more especially upon the fact that in Gades, when he was prætor, he had dreamed of intercourse with his mother, and had learned from the seers that he should come to great power. Hence, on beholding there a likeness of Alexander dedicated in the temple of Hercules he had given a groan, lamenting that he had performed no great work as yet. B. C. 60 (*a. u.* 694)

Accordingly, though he might, as I have said, have been at peace, he took his way to Mount Herminium and ordered the dwellers on it to move into the plain, pretendedly that they might not rush down from their strongholds and plunder, but really because he well knew that they would never do what he asked, and that as a result he should get a cause for war. This also happened. After these men, then, had taken up arms he proceeded to draw them on. When some of the neighbors, fearing that he would betake himself against them too, carried off their children and wives and most valuable possessions out of the way across the Dorius, he first occupied their cities, where these measures were being taken, and next joined battle with the men themselves. They put their flocks in front of them, so that the Romans might scatter to seize the cattle, whereupon they would attack them. But Cæsar, neglecting the quadrupeds, took the men by surprise and conquered them. Meanwhile he learned that the inhabitants of Herminium had withdrawn and were intending to ambuscade him as he returned. So for the time being he returned by another road, but again made an attempt upon them in which he was victorious and pur- —53—

B. C. 60 (*a. u.* 694) sued them in flight to the ocean. When, however, they abandoned the mainland and crossed over to an island, he stayed where he was, for his supply of boats was not large. He did put together some rafts, by means of which he sent on a part of his army, and lost numerous men. The person in command of them had advanced to a breakwater which was near the island and had disembarked the troops with a view to their crossing over on foot, when he was forced off by the flood tide and put out to sea, leaving them in the lurch. All of them died bravely defending themselves save Publius Scæfius, the only one to survive. Deprived of his shield and wounded in many places he leaped into the water and escaped by swimming. These events occurred all at one time. Later, Cæsar sent for boats from Gades, crossed over to the island with his whole army and overcame the dwellers there without a blow, as they were in poor condition from lack of food. Thence he sailed along to Brigantium, a city of Gallæcia, alarmed the people (who had never before seen a vessel) by the breakers which his approach to land caused, and subjugated them.

—54— On accomplishing this he thought he had gained a sufficient means of access to the consulship and set out hastily, even before his successor arrived, to the elections. He decided to seek the position even before asking for a triumph, since it was not possible to hold a festival beforehand. He was refused the triumph, for Cato opposed him with might and main. However, he let that go, hoping to perform many more and greater exploits and celebrate corresponding triumphs,

if elected consul. Besides the omens previously recited, on which he at all times greatly prided himself, was the fact that a horse of his had been born with clefts in the hoofs of its front feet, and bore him proudly, whereas it would not endure any other rider. Consequently his expectations were of no small character, so that he willingly resigned the triumphal celebration and entered the city to canvass for office. Here he courted Pompey and Crassus and the rest so skillfully that though they were still at enmity with each other, and their political clubs were likewise, and though each opposed everything that he learned the other wished, he won them over and was unanimously appointed by them all. This evidences his cleverness in the greatest degree that he should have known and arranged the occasions and the amount of his services so well as to attach them both to him when they were working against each other. B. C. 60 (*a. u.* 694)

—55— He was not even satisfied with this, but actually reconciled them, not because he was desirous of having them agree, but because he saw that they were the most powerful persons. And he understood well that without the aid of both or of one he could never come to any great power; but if he should make a friend of merely either one of them, he should by that fact find the other his antagonist and should suffer more reverses through him than he would win success by the support of the other. For, on the one hand, it seemed to him that all men work more strenuously against their enemies than they coöperate with their friends, not merely as a corollary of the fact that anger and hate

B. C. 60 (*a. u.* 694)

impel more earnest endeavor than any friendship, but also because, when one man works for himself, and a second for another, success does not hold a like amount of pleasure or failure of pain in the two cases. Per contra he reflected that it was handier to get in people's way and prevent their reaching any prominence than to be willing to lead them to great heights. The chief reason for this was that he who keeps another from attaining magnitude pleases others as well as himself, whereas he who exalts another renders him burdensome to both those parties.

—56—

These reasons led Cæsar at that time to insinuate himself into their good graces, and subsequently he reconciled them with each other. He did not believe that without them he could either attain permanent power or fail to offend one of them some time, and had equally little fear of their harmonizing their plans and so becoming stronger than he. For he understood perfectly that he should master other people immediately through their friendship, and a little later master them through the agency of each other. And so it was.[1] Pompey and Crassus, the moment they entered into his plan, themselves made peace each with the other as if of their own accord, and took Cæsar into partnership respecting their designs. Pompey, on his side, was not so strong as he had hoped to be, and seeing that Crassus was in power and that Cæsar's influence was growing feared that he should be utterly overthrown

[1] The following sentence: "For these reasons, then, he had both united them and won them over" is probably an explanatory insertion, made by some copyist. (So Bekker.)

by them; but he had the additional hope that if he made them sharers in present advantages, he should win back his old authority through them. Crassus thought that he should properly surpass them all by reason of his family as well as his wealth; and since he was far inferior to Pompey and thought that Cæsar would rise to great heights, he desired to set them in opposition one to the other, in order that neither of them should have the upper hand. He expected that they would be evenly matched antagonists and in this event he would get the benefit of the friendship of each and gain honors beyond both of them. For without supporting in all respects either the policy of the populace or that of the senate he did everything to advance his own supremacy. Thus it happened that he did both of them equal services and avoided the enmity of either, promoting on occasion whatever measures pleased both to such an extent as was likely to give him the credit for everything that went to the liking of the two, without any share in more unpleasant issues. B. C. 60 (*a. u.* 694)

Thus the three for these reasons cemented friendship, ratified it with oaths, and managed public affairs by their own influence. Next they gave and received in turn, one from another, whatever they set their hearts on and was in view of the circumstances suitable to be carried out by them. Their harmony caused an agreement also on the part of their political followers: these, too, did with impunity whatever they wished, enjoying the leadership of their superiors toward any ends, so that few traces of moderation re- —57—

B. C. 60 (*a. u.* 694) mained and those only in Cato and in any one else who wished to seem to hold the same opinions as did he. No one in that generation took part in politics from pure motives and without any individual desire of gain except Cato. Some were ashamed of the acts committed and others who strove to imitate him took a hand in affairs in places, and manifested something of the same spirit: they were not persevering, however, inasmuch as their efforts sprang from cultivation of an attitude and not from innate virtue.

—58— This was the condition into which these men brought the affairs of Rome at that time while they concealed their sworn fellowship as much as possible. They did whatever had approved itself to them, but fabricated and put forth the most opposite motives, in order that they might still lie concealed for a very long time till their preparations should be sufficiently made.

Yet Heaven was not ignorant of their doings, and it straightway revealed plainly to those who could understand any such signs all that would later result from their domination. For of a sudden such a storm came down upon the whole city and all the land that quantities of trees were torn up by the roots, many houses were shattered, the boats moored in the Tiber both near the city and at its mouth were sunk, and the wooden bridge destroyed, and a small theatre built of timbers for some assembly was overturned, and in the midst of all this great numbers of human beings perished. These portents appeared in advance,— an image, as it were, of what should befall the people both on land and on water.

DIO'S
ROMAN HISTORY
38

The following is contained in the Thirty-eighth of Dio's Rome:

How Cæsar and Bibulus fell to quarreling (chapters 1–8).

How Cicero was exiled (chapters 9–17).

How Philiscus consoled Cicero in the matter of his exile (chapters 18–30).

How Cæsar fought the Helvetii and Ariovistus (chapters 31–50).

Duration of time, two years, in which there were the following magistrates, here enumerated:

C. Iulius C. f. Cæsar, M. Calpurnius|| C. f. Bibulus||. (B. C. 59 = a. u. 695.)

||L. Calpurnius|| L. f. Piso, A. Gabinius A. f. (B. C. 58 = a. u. 696.)

The names within the parallel lines are lacking in the MSS., but were inserted by Palmer (and Boissevain).

—1—
B. C. 59
(a. u. 695)

The following year Cæsar wished to court the favor of the entire multitude, that he might make them his own to an even greater degree. But since he was anxious to seem to be advancing also the interests of the leading classes, so as to avoid getting into enmity with them, he often told them that he would propose no measure which would not advantage them also. Now there was a certain proposition about the land which he was for assigning to the whole populace, that he had framed in such a way as to incur no little censure for it. However, he pretended he would not introduce this measure, either, unless it should be according to their wishes. So far as the law went, indeed, no one could find fault with him. The mass of the citizens, which was unwieldly (a feature which more than any other accounted for their tendency to riot), was thus turning in the direction of work and agriculture; and most of the desolated sections of Italy were being colonized afresh, so that not only those who had been worn out in the campaigns, but also all of the rest should have subsistence a plenty, and that without any individual expense on the part of the city or any assessment of the chief men; rather it included the conferring of both rank and office upon many. He wanted to distribute all the public land except Campania — this he advised their keeping distinct as a public possession, because of its excellence — and the rest he urged them to buy

B. C. 59 (*a. u.* 695)

not from any one who was unwilling to sell nor again for so large a price as the settlers might wish, but first from people who were willing to dispose of their holdings and second for as large a price as it had been valued at in the tax-lists. They had a great deal of surplus money, he asserted, as a result of the booty which Pompey had captured, as well as from the new[1] tributes and taxes just established, and they ought, inasmuch as it had been provided by the dangers that citizens had incurred, to expend it upon those very persons. Furthermore he was for constituting the land commissioners not a small body, to seem like an oligarchy, nor composed of men who were laboring under any legal indictment,[2] lest somebody might be displeased, but twenty to begin with, so that many might share the honor, and next those who were most suitable, except himself. This point he quite insisted should be settled in advance, that it might not be thought that he was making a motion on his own account. He himself was satisfied with the conception and proposal of the matter; at least he said so, but clearly he was doing a favor to Pompey and Crassus and the rest.

—2— So far as the motion went, then, he escaped censure, so that no one, indeed, ventured to open his mouth in opposition: for he had read it aloud beforehand in the senate, and calling upon each one of the senators by name had enquired his opinion, for fear that some one

1 Reading προσχαταστάντων (as Boissevain).

2 The reading here has been subjected to criticism (compare Naber in Mnemosyne, XVI, p. 109), but see Cicero, *De Lege Agraria* 2, 9, 24 and Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*, I², 468, 3.

might have some fault to find; and he promised to frame differently or even erase entirely any clause which might not please any person. Still on the whole quite all the foremost men who were outside the plot were irritated. And this very fact troubled them most, that Cæsar had compiled such a document that not one could raise a criticism and yet they were all cast down. They suspected the purpose with which it was being done,— that he would bind the multitude to him as a result of it, and have reputation and power over all men. For this reason even if no one spoke against him, no one expressed approval, either. This sufficed for the majority and they kept promising him that they would pass the decree: but they did nothing; on the contrary, fruitless delays and postponements kept arising. As for Marcus Cato, who was in general an upright man and displeased with any innovation but was able to exert no influence either by nature or by education, he did not himself make any complaint against the motion, but without going into particulars urged them to abide by the existing system and take no steps beyond it. At this Cæsar was on the point of dragging Cato out of the very senate-house and casting him into prison. The latter gave himself up quite readily to be led away and not a few of the rest followed him; one of them, Marcus Petreius, being rebuked by Cæsar because he was taking his departure before the senate was yet dismissed, replied: "I prefer to be with Cato in his cell rather than here with you." Abashed at this speech Cæsar let Cato go and adjourned the senate,

B. C. 59 (*a. u.* 695)

—3—

B. C. 59 (*a. u.* 695) saying only this much in passing: "I have made you judges and lords of the law so that if anything should not suit you, it need not be brought into the public assembly; but since you are not willing to pass a decree, that body itself shall decide."

—4— Thereafter he communicated to the senate nothing further under this head but brought directly before the people whatever he desired. However, as he wished even under these circumstances to secure as sympathizers some of the foremost men in the assembly, hoping that they had now changed their minds and would be a little afraid of the populace, he began with his colleague and asked him if he criticised the provisions of the law. When the latter made no answer save that he would endure no innovations in his own office, Cæsar proceeded to supplicate him and persuaded the multitude to join him in his request, saying: "You shall have the law if only he wishes it."

Bibulus with a great shout replied: "You shall not have this law this year, even if all of you wish it." And having spoken thus he took his departure.

Cæsar did not address any further enquiries to persons in office, fearing that some one of them might also oppose him; but he held a conference with Pompey and Crassus, though they were private citizens, and bade them make known their views about the proposition. This was not because he failed to understand their attitude, for all their undertakings were in common; but he purposed to honor these men in that he called them in as advisers about the law when they were holding

no office, and also to stir terror in the rest by securing the adherence of men who were admittedly the foremost in the city at that time and had the greatest influence with all. By this very move, also, he would please the multitude, by giving proof that they were not striving for any unusual or unjust end, but for objects which those great men were willing both to scrutinize and to approve. B. C. 59 (*a. u.* 695)

Pompey, accordingly, very gladly addressed them as follows: "Not I alone, Quirites, sanction the proposition, but all the rest of the senate as well, seeing that it has voted for land to be given, aside from the partners of my campaign, to those who formerly followed Metellus. At that time, indeed, since the treasury had no great means, the granting of the land was naturally postponed; but at present, since it has become exceedingly rich through my efforts, it behooves the senators to redeem their promise and the rest to reap the fruit of the common toils." After these remarks he went over in detail every feature of the proposition and approved them all, so that the crowd was mightily pleased. Seeing this, Cæsar asked him if he would willingly lend assistance against those who took the opposite side, and advised the multitude to ask his aid similarly for this end. When this was done Pompey was elated because both the consul and the multitude had petitioned his help, although he was holding no position of command. So, with an added opinion of his own value and assuming much dignity he spoke at some length, finally declaring "if any one dares to raise a —5—

B. C. 59 (*a. u.* 695) sword, I, too, will oppose to him my shield." These utterances of Pompey Crassus, too, approved. Consequently even if some of the rest were not pleased, most became very eager for the ratification of the law when these[1] men whose reputations were in general excellent and who were, according to common opinion, inimical to Cæsar (their reconciliation was not yet manifest) joined in the approbation of his measure.

—6— Bibulus, notwithstanding, would not yield and with three tribunes to support him continued to hinder the enactment of the law. Finally, when no excuse for delay was any longer left him, he proclaimed a sacred period for all the remaining days of the year alike, during which people could not, in accordance with the laws, come together for a meeting.[2] Cæsar paid slight attention to him and announced an appointed day on which they should pass the law. When the multitude by night had already occupied the Forum, Bibulus appeared with the force at his disposal and made his way to the temple of the Dioscuri from which Cæsar was delivering his harangue. The men fell back before him partly out of respect and partly because they thought he would not actually oppose them. But when he reached an elevated place and attempted to dispute with Cæsar, he was thrust down the steps, his staves were broken to pieces, and the tribunes as well as the others received blows and wounds.

1 The words ἐπειδὴ οὗτοι are supplied here by Reiske.

2 In regard to this matter see Mnemosynē N. S. XIX, p. 106, note 2. The article in question is by I. M. J. Valeton, who agrees with Mommsen's conclusions (*Staatsrecht*, III, p. 1058, note 2).

Thus the law was ratified. Bibulus was for the moment satisfied to save his life, but on the following day tried in the senate to annul the act; however, he effected nothing, for all, subservient to the will of the multitude, remained quiet. Accordingly he retired to his home and did not again so much as once appear in public until the last day of the year. Instead he remained in his house, notifying Cæsar through his assistants on the introduction of every new measure that it was a sacred period and by the laws he could rightfully take no action during it. Publius Vatinius, a tribune, indeed undertook to place Bibulus in a cell for this, but was prevented from confining him by the opposition of his associates in office. However, Bibulus in this way put himself out of politics and the tribunes belonging to his party likewise were never again entrusted with any public duty. B. C. 59 (*a. u.* 695)

It should be said that Metellus Celer and Cato and through him one Marcus Favonius, who imitated him in all points, for a while would not take the oath of obedience to the law. (This custom once[1] begun, as I have stated, became the regular practice in the case of other unusual measures also.) A number besides Metellus, who referred to his title of Numidicus, flatly declared they would never join in approving it. When, however, the day came[2] on which they were to incur the —7—

1 Reading ποτε, with Boissevain. There is apparently a reference to the year B. C. 100, and to the refusal of Metellus Numidicus to swear to the *lex Appuleia.*

2 Following Reiske's arrangement: ὡς μέντοι ἡ ἡμέρα ἦκεν, ἐν ᾗ ἔμελλον. . . .

B. C. 59 (*a. u.* 695) stated penalties, they took the oath, either as a result of the human trait according to which many persons utter promises and threats more easily than they put anything into execution, or else because they were going to be fined to no purpose, without helping the commonwealth at all by their obstinacy. So the law was ratified, and furthermore the land of Campania was given to those having three or more children. For this reason Capua was then for the first time considered a Roman colony.

By this means Cæsar attached to his cause the people, and he won the knights, as well, by allowing them a third part of the taxes which they had hired. All the collections were made through them and though they had often asked the senate to grant them some satisfactory schedule, they had not gained it, because Cato and the others worked against them. When, then, he had conciliated this class also without any protest, he first ratified all the acts of Pompey — and in this he met no opposition from Lucullus or any one else,— and next he put through many other measures while no one opposed him. There was no gainsaying even from Cato, although in the prætorship which he soon after held, he would never mention the title of the other's laws, which were called the "Julian." While he followed their provisions in alloting the courts he most ridiculously concealed their names.

These, then, because they are very many in number and offer no contribution to this history, I will leave —8— aside.— Quintus Fufius Calenus, finding that the

votes of all in party contests were promiscuously mingled,— each of the classes attributing the superior measures to itself and referring the less sensible to the others — passed when prætor a law that each should cast its votes separately: his purpose was that even if their individual opinions could not be revealed, by reason of doing this secretly, yet the views of the classes at least might be made known. B. C. 59 (*a. u.* 695)

As for the rest, Cæsar himself proposed, advised and arranged everything in the city once for all as if he were its sole ruler. Hence some facetious persons hid the name of Bibulus in silence altogether and named Cæsar twice, and in writing would mention Gaius Cæsar and Julius Cæsar as being the consuls. But in matters that concerned himself he managed through others, for he guarded most strenuously against the contingency of presenting anything to himself. By this means he more easily effected everything that he desired. He himself declared that he needed nothing more and strongly protested that he was satisfied with his present possessions. Others, believing him a necessary and useful factor in affairs proposed whatever he wished and had it ratified, not only before the populace but in the senate itself. For whereas the multitude granted him the government of Illyricum and of Gaul this side of the Alps with three legions for five years, the senate entrusted him in addition with Gaul beyond the mountains and another legion. Even so, in —9— fear that Pompey in his absence (during which Aulus Gabinius was to be consul) might lead some revolt, he

B. C. 59 (*a. u.* 695) attached to his cause both Pompey and the other consul, Lucius Piso, by the bond of kinship: upon the former he bestowed his daughter, in spite of having betrothed her to another man, and he himself married Piso's daughter. Thus he fortified himself on all sides. But Cicero and Lucullus, little pleased at this, undertook to kill both Cæsar and Pompey through the medium of one Lucius Vettius; they failed of their attempt, however, and all but perished themselves as well. For Vettius, being informed against and arrested before he had acted, denounced them; and had he not charged Bibulus also with being in the plot against the two, they would have certainly met some evil fate. As it was, inasmuch as in his defence he accused the man who had revealed the project to Pompey, he was suspected of not speaking the truth on other points either, but created the impression that the matter had been somehow purposely contrived with a view to calumniating the opposite party. About these details some spread one report and others another, but nothing was definitely proven. Vettius was brought before the populace and after naming only those whom I have mentioned was thrown into prison, where not much later he was treacherously murdered.

—10— In consequence of this Cicero became an object of suspicion on the part of Cæsar and Pompey, and he strengthened their conjecture in his defence of Antonius. The latter, in his governorship of Macedonia, had committed many outrages upon the subject territory as well as the section that was under truce, and

had been well chastised in return. He ravaged the possessions of the Dardani and their neighbors and then did not dare to withstand their attack, but pretending to retire with his cavalry for some other purpose took to flight; in this way the enemy surrounded his infantry and drove them out of the country with violence, taking away their plunder from them besides. When he tried the same tactics on the allies in Mœsia he was defeated near the city of the Istrianians by the Bastarnian Scythians who came to their aid; and thereupon he decamped. It was not for this conduct, however, that he was accused, but he was indicted for conspiracy with Catiline; yet he was convicted on the former charge, so that it was his fate to be found not guilty of the crime for which he was being tried, but to be punished for something of which he was not accused. That was the way he finally came off; but at the time Cicero in the character of his advocate, because Antonius was his colleague, made a most bitter assault upon Cæsar as responsible for the suit against the man, and heaped some abuse upon him in addition. B. C. 59 (*a. u.* 695)

Cæsar was naturally indignant at it, but, although consul, refused to be the author of any insolent speech or act against him. He said that the rabble purposely cast out[1] many idle slurs upon their superiors, trying to entice them into strife, so that the commoners might seem to be equal and of like importance, in case they should get anything similar said of themselves. Hence he did not see fit to put any person on an equal footing —11—

[1] The verb is supplied by Reiske.

B. C. 59 (*a. u.* 695)

with himself. It had been his custom, therefore, to conduct himself thus toward others who insulted him at all, and now seeing that Cicero was not so anxious about abusing him as about obtaining similar abuse in return and was merely desirous of being put on an equality with him, he paid little heed to his traducer, acting as if nothing had been said; indeed, he allowed him to employ vilifications unstintedly, as if they were praises showered upon him. Still, he did not disregard him entirely. Cæsar possessed in reality a rather decent nature, and was not easily moved to anger. Accordingly, though punishing many, since his interests were of such magnitude, yet his action was not due to anger nor was it altogether immediate. He did not indulge wrath at all, but watched his opportunity and his vengeance dogged the steps of the majority of culprits without their knowing it. He did not take measures so as to seem to defend himself against anybody, but so as to arrange everything to his own advantage while creating the least odium. Therefore he visited retribution secretly and in places where one would least have expected it,— both for the sake of his reputation, to avoid seeming to be of a wrathful disposition, and to the end that no one through premonition should be on his guard in advance, or try to inflict some dangerous injury upon his persecutor before being injured. For he was not more concerned about what had already occurred than that[1] (future attacks) should be hindered. As a result he would pardon many of those, even, who

[1] Following Reiske's reading: ἢ ἵνα τὰ μέλλοντα κωλυθείη.

had harmed him greatly, or pursue them only a little way, because he believed they would do no further injury; whereas upon many others, even more than was right, he took vengeance looking to his safety, and said that[1] what was done he could never make undone,[1] but because of the extreme punishment he would[1] for the future at least suffer[1] no calamity. B. C. 59 (*a. u.* 695)

These calculations induced him to remain quiet on this occasion, too; but when he ascertained that Clodius was willing to do him a favor in return, because he had not accused him of adultery, he set the man secretly against Cicero. In the first place, in order that he might be lawfully excluded from the patricians, he transferred him with Pompey's coöperation again to the plebian rank, and then immediately had him appointed tribune. This Clodius, then, muzzled Bibulus, who had entered the Forum at the expiration of his office and intended in the course of taking the oath to deliver a speech about present conditions, and after that attacked Cicero also. He soon decided that it was not easy to overthrow a man who, on account of his skill in speaking, had very great influence in politics, and so proceeded to conciliate not only the populace, but also the knights and the senate with whom Cicero was most held in regard. His hope was that if he could make these men his own, he might easily cause the downfall of the orator, whose great strength lay rather in the fear than in the good-will which he inspired. For Cicero annoyed great numbers by his words, and —12— B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696)

[1] Gaps in the text supplied by Reiske.

B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696)

those who were won to him by benefits conferred were not so numerous as those alienated by injuries done them. Not only did it hold true in his case that the majority of mankind are more ready to feel irritation at what displeases them than to feel grateful to any one for good treatment, and think that they have paid their advocates in full with wages, whereas they are determined to give those who oppose them at law a perceptible setback: but furthermore he invited very bitter enemies by always striving to get the better of even the strongest men and by always employing an unbridled and excessive frankness of speech to all alike; he was in desperate pursuit of a reputation for being able to comprehend and speak as no one else could, and before all wanted to be thought a valuable citizen. As a result of this and because he was the greatest boaster alive and thought no one equal to himself, but in his words and life alike looked down on all and would not live as any one else did, he was wearisome and burdensome, and was consequently both envied and hated even by those very persons whom he pleased.

—13— Clodius therefore hoped that for these reasons, if he should prepare the minds of the senate and the knights and the populace in advance, he could quickly make way with him. So he straightway[1] distributed free corn gratis (he had already in the consulship of Gabinius and Piso introduced a motion that it be measured out to those who lacked), and revived the associations called *collegia* in the native language, which

[1] The suggestion of Boissevain (*εὐθύς*) or of Mommsen (*αὐτίκα*) is here adopted in preference to the MS. *αὖθις* (evidently erroneous).

had existed anciently but had been abolished for some time. The tribunes he forbade to depose a person from any office or disfranchise him, save if a man should be tried and convicted in presence of them both. After enticing the citizens by these means he proposed another law, concerning which it is necessary to speak at some length, so that it may become clearer to most persons. B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696)

Public divination was obtained from the sky and from some other sources, as I said, but that of the sky carried the greatest weight,— so much so that whereas the other auguries held were many in number and for each action, this one was held but once and for the whole day. Besides this most peculiar feature it was noticeable that whereas in reference to all other matters sky-divination either allowed things to be done and they were carried out without consulting any individual augury further, or else it would prevent and hinder something, it restrained the balloting of the populace altogether and was always a portent to check them, whether it was of a favorable or ill-boding nature. Now the cause of this custom I am unable to state, but I set down the common report. Accordingly, many persons who wished to obstruct either the proposal of laws or official appointments that came before the popular assembly were in the habit of announcing that they would use the divination from the sky for that day, so that the people could ratify nothing during the period. Clodius was afraid that if he indicted Cicero some person by such means might interpose a post-

B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696) ponement or delay the trial, and so introduced the measure that no one of the officials should, on the days when it was necessary for the people to vote on anything, observe the signs from heaven.

—14— Such was the nature of the indictment which he then drew up against Cicero. The latter understood what was going on and induced Lucius Ninnius Quadratus, a tribune, to oppose it all: then Clodius, in fear lest a tumult and delay of some kind should arise as a result, outwitted him by deceit. He made arrangements with Cicero beforehand to bring no indictment against him, if he, in turn, would not interfere with any of the measures under consideration; whereupon, while the latter and Ninnius were quiet, he secured the passage of the laws, and next proceeded against the orator. Thus was the latter, who thought himself extremely wise, deceived on that occasion by Clodius,— if we ought to say Clodius and not Cæsar and his party. For the law that Clodius proposed after this trick was not on its face enacted against Cicero (i. e. it did not contain his name), but against all those simply who put to death or had put to death any citizen without the condemnation of the populace; yet in fact it was drawn up as strongly as possible against that one man.

It brought within its scope, indeed, all the senate, because they had charged the consuls with the protection of the city, by which act it was permitted the latter to take such steps, and subsequently had voted to condemn Lentulus and the rest who at that time suffered the death penalty. Cicero, however, incurred the re-

sponsibility alone or most of all, because he had laid information against them and had each time made the proposition and put the vote and had finally seen to their execution by the agents entrusted with such business. For this reason he took vigorous retaliatory measures, and discarding senatorial dress went about in the garb of the knights, paying court meanwhile, as he went back and forth, day and night alike to all who had any influence, not only of his friends but also of his opponents, and especially to Pompey and Cæsar, inasmuch as they did not show their enmity toward him. In their anxiety not to appear by their own action to have set Clodius on or to be pleased with his measures, they devised the following way, which suited them admirably and was obscure to their foe, for deceiving Cicero. Cæsar advised him to yield, for fear he might perish if he remained where he was: and in order to have it believed the more readily that he was doing this through good will, he promised that the other should employ him as helper, so that he might retire from Clodius's path not with reproach and as if under examination, but in command and with honor. B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696) —15—

Pompey, however, turned him aside from this course, calling the act outright desertion, and uttering insinuations against Cæsar to the effect that through enmity he was not giving sound advice; for his own counsel, as expressed, was for Cicero to remain and come to the aid of the senate and himself with outspokenness, and to defend himself immediately against Clodius: the latter, he declared, would not be able to accomplish

B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696) anything with the orator present and confronting him and would furthermore meet his deserts, and he, Pompey, would coöperate to this end. After these speeches from them, modeled in such a way not because the views of the two were opposed, but for the purpose of deceiving the man without arousing his suspicion, Cicero attached himself to Pompey. Of him he had no previous suspicion and was thoroughly confident of being rescued by his assistance. Many men respected and honored him, for numerous persons in trouble were saved some from the judges and others from their very accusers. Also, since Clodius had been a relative of Pompey's and a partner of his campaigns for a long period, it seemed likely that he would do nothing that failed to accord with his wishes. As for Gabinius, Cicero expected that he could count on him absolutely as an adherent, being a good friend of his, and equally on Piso because of his regard for right

—16— and his kinship with Cæsar. On the basis of these calculations, then, he hoped to win (for he was confident beyond reason even as he had been terrified without investigating), and in fear lest his withdrawal from town should seem to have been the result of a bad conscience, he paid heed to Pompey, while stating to Cæsar that he was considerably obliged to him.

Thus it came about that the victim of the deceit continued his preparations to administer a stinging defeat to his enemies. For, in addition to the encouraging circumstances already mentioned, the knights in convention sent to the consuls and senate on the Capitol

envoys in his behalf from their own number, and also the senators Quintus Hortensius and Gaius Curio. One of the many ways in which Ninnius, too, assisted him was to urge the populace to change their garb, as if for a universal disaster. And many even of the senators did[1] this and would not change back until the consuls by edict rebuked them. B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696)

The forces of his adversaries were more powerful, however. Clodius would not allow Ninnius to take any action in his behalf, and Gabinius would not grant the knights access to the senate; on the contrary, he drove one of them, who was very insistent, out of the city and chided Hortensius and Curio for having come before them when they were assembled and having undertaken the embassy. Moreover Clodius led them before the populace where they were well thrashed and beaten for their embassy by some appointed agents. After this Piso, though he seemed well disposed toward Cicero and had advised him to slip away beforehand on seeing that it was impossible for him to attain safety by other means, nevertheless, when the orator took offence at this counsel, came before the assembly at the first opportunity — he was too feeble most of the time —and to the question of Clodius as to what opinion he held regarding the proposed measure said: "No deed of cruelty or sadness pleases me." Gabinius, too, on being asked the same question, not only praised Clodius but indulged in invectives against the knights and the senate.

[1] Verb supplied by Xylander.

—17—
B. C. 58
(*a. u.* 696)

Cæsar, however (whom since he had taken the field Clodius could make arbiter of the proposition only by assembling the throng outside the walls), condemned the lawlessness of the action taken in regard to Lentulus, but still did not approve the punishment proposed for it. Every one knew, he said, all that had been in his mind concerning the events of that time — he had cast his vote for letting the men live — but it was not fitting for any such law to be drawn up touching events now past. This was Cæsar's statement; Crassus showed some favor to Cicero through his son but himself took the side of the multitude. Pompey kept promising the orator assistance, but by making various excuses at different times and arranging purposely many journeys out of town failed to defend him.

Cicero seeing this was frightened and again undertook to resort to arms,— among other things he did was to abuse Pompey openly with insults — but was prevented by Cato and Hortensius, for fear a civil war might result. Then at last, against his will, with shame and the ill-repute of having gone into exile voluntarily, as if conscience-stricken, he departed. Before leaving he ascended the Capitol and dedicated a little image of Minerva, whom he styled "protectress." It was to Sicily that he secretely betook himself. He had once been governor there, and entertained a lively hope that he would be honored among its towns and private citizens and by its rulers.

On his departure the law took effect; so far from meeting with any opposition, it was supported, as soon

as he was once out of the way, by those very persons (among others) who were thought to be the foremost movers in Cicero's behalf. His property was confiscated, his house was razed to the ground, as though it had been an enemy's, and its foundation was dedicated for a temple of Liberty. Upon the orator himself exile was imposed, and a continued stay in Sicily was forbidden him: he was banished three thousand seven hundred and fifty stadia[1] from Rome, and it was further proclaimed that if he should ever appear within those limits, both he and those who harbored him might be killed with impunity. B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696)

He, accordingly, went over to Macedonia and was living in the depths of grief. But there met him a man named Philiscus, who had made his acquaintance in Athens and now by chance fell in with him again. —18—

"Are you not ashamed, Cicero," said this person, " to be weeping and behaving like a woman? Really, I should never have expected that you, who have partaken of much education of every kind, who have acted as advocate to many, would grow so faint-hearted."

"Ah," replied the other, " it's not the same thing, Philiscus, to speak for others as to advise one's own self. The words spoken in others' behalf, proceeding from a mind that stands erect, undeteriorated, have the greatest possible effect. But when some affliction overwhelms the spirit, it is made turbid and dark and can not think out anything appropriate. Wherefore, I

[1] Or five hundred miles, since Dio reckons a mile as equivalent to seven and one-half instead of eight stades.

B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696) suppose, it has well been said that it is easier to counsel others than one's self to be strong under suffering."

"Yours is a very human objection," rejoined Philiscus. "I did not think, however, that you, who have shown so much wisdom and have trained yourself in so much learning, had failed to prepare yourself for all human possibilities, so that if any unexpected accident should happen to you, it would not find you unfortified. Since, notwithstanding, you are in this plight, why I might benefit you by rehearsing what is good for you. Thus, just as men who put a hand to people's burdens relieve them, so I might lighten this misfortune of yours, and the more easily than they inasmuch as I shall take upon myself the smallest share of it. You will not deem it unworthy, I trust, to receive some encouragement from another. If you were sufficient for your own self, we should have no need of these words. As it is, you are in a like case to Hippocrates or Democedes or any other of the great physicians, if one of them should fall a victim to a disease hard to cure and should need another's hand to bring about his own recovery."

—19— "Indeed," said Cicero, "if you have any such train of reasoning as will dispel this mist from my soul and restore me to the light of old, I am most ready to listen. For of words, as of drugs, there are many varieties and diverse potencies, so that it will not be surprising if you should be able to steep in some mixture of philosophy even me, the shining light of senate, assembly, and law-courts."

"Come then," continued Philiscus, "since you are ready to listen, let us consider first whether these conditions that surround you are actually bad, and next in what way we may cure them. First of all, now, I see you are in good physical health and quite vigorous, — a state which is by nature a blessing to mankind,— and next that you have provisions in sufficiency so as not to hunger or thirst or be cold or endure any other unpleasant experience through lack of means, a second circumstance which any one might naturally set down as good for man's nature. For when one's physical constitution is good and one can live along without worry every accessory to happiness is enjoyed." B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696)

To this Cicero replied: "No, not one of such accessories is of use when some grief is preying upon one's spirit. The reflections of the soul distress one far more than bodily comforts can cause delight. Even so I at present set no value on my physical health because I am suffering in mind, nor yet in the abundance of necessaries; for the deprivations I have endured are many." —20—

Said the other: "And does this grieve you? Now if you were going to be in want of things needful, there would be some reason for your being annoyed at your loss. But since you have all the necessaries in full measure, why do you harass yourself because you do not possess more? All that belongs to one beyond one's needs is in excess and its nature is the same whether present or absent, for you are aware that even formerly you did not make use of what was not neces-

B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696)

sary: hence suppose that at that time the things which you did not need were non-existent or else that those of which you are not in want are now here. Most of them were not yours by inheritance that you should be particularly exercised about them, but were furnished you by your own tongue and by your words,— the same causes that effected their loss. Accordingly, you should not take it hard that just as things were acquired, so they have been lost. Sea-captains are not greatly disturbed when they suffer great reverses. They understand, I think, how to look at it sensibly,— that the sea which gives them wealth takes it away again.

—21— "This is enough on one point. I think it should be enough for a man's happiness to possess a sufficiency and to lack nothing that the body requires, and I hold that everything in excess brings anxieties and trouble and jealousies. But as for your saying there is no enjoyment in physical blessings unless one have corresponding spiritual advantages, the statement is true: it is impossible if the spirit is in poor condition that the body should fail to partake of the sickness. However, I think it much easier for one to care for mental than for physical vigor. The body, being of flesh, contains many paradoxical possibilities and requires much assistance from the higher power: the intellect, of a nature more divine, can be easily trained and prompted. Let us look to this, therefore, to discover what spiritual blessing has abandoned you and what evil has come upon you that you cannot shake off.

—22— "First, then, I see that you are a man of the great-

est intellectual gifts. The proof is that you nearly always persuaded both the senate and the people in cases where you gave them any advice and helped private citizens very greatly in cases where you acted as their advocate. And second that you are a most just man. Indeed you have contended everywhere for your country and for your friends and have arrayed yourself against those who plotted against them. Yes, this very misfortune which you have suffered has befallen you for no other reason than that you continued to speak and act in everything for the laws and for the government. Again, that you have attained the highest degree of temperance is shown by your very habits. It is not possible for a man who is a slave to sensual pleasures to appear constantly in public and to go to and fro in the Forum, making his deeds by day witnesses of those by night. And because this is so I thought you were the bravest of men, enjoying, as you did, so great strength of intellect, so great power in speaking. But it seems that you, startled out of yourself by having failed contrary to your hope and deserts, have been drawn back a little from the goal of real bravery. This loss, however, you will recover immediately, and as your circumstances are such, with a good physical state and a good spiritual, I cannot see what there is to distress you."

B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696)

—23—

At the end of this speech of his Cicero rejoined:— "There seems to you, then, to be no great evil in dishonor and exile and not living at home nor being with your friends, but instead being expelled with violence

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(*a. u.* 696)

from your country, existing in a foreign land, and wandering about with the name of exile, causing laughter to your enemies and disgrace to your connections."

"Not a trace of evil, so far as I can see," declared Philiscus. "There are two elements of which we are constituted,— soul and body,— and definite blessings and evils are given to each of the two by Nature herself. Now if there should be any failure in these details, it might properly be considered hurtful and base, but if all should be right it would be advantageous rather. This, at the outset, is your condition. Those things which you mentioned, cases of dishonor among them, and everything else of the sort are disgraceful and evil only through law and a kind of notion, and work no injury to either body or soul. What body could you cite that has fallen sick or perished and what spirit that has grown wickeder or even more ignorant through dishonor and exile and anything of that sort? I see none. And the reason is that no one of these accidents is by nature evil, just as neither honorable position nor residence in one's country is by nature excellent, but whatever opinion each one of us holds about them, such they seem to be. For instance, mankind do not universally apply the term 'dishonor' to the same conditions, but certain deeds which are reprehensible in some regions are praised in others and various actions honored by this people are punishable by that. Some do not so much as know the name, nor the fact which it implies. This is quite natural. For whatever

does not touch what belongs to man's nature is thought to have no bearing upon him. Just exactly as it would be most ridiculous, surely, if some judgment or decree were delivered that so-and-so is sick or so-and-so is base, so does the case stand regarding dishonor. B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696)

"The same thing I find to be true in regard to exile. —24— Living abroad is somehow in a way dishonorable, so that if dishonor pure and simple contains no evil, surely an evil reputation can not be attached to exile either. You know at any rate that many live abroad the longest possible time, some unwillingly and others willingly; and some even spend their whole life traveling about, just as if they were expelled from every place: and yet they do not regard themselves as being injured in doing so. It makes no difference whether a man does it voluntarily or not. The person who trains unwillingly gets no less strong than he who is willing about it, and the person who navigates unwillingly obtains no less benefit than the other. And as for this very element of unwillingness, I do not see how it can encounter a man of sense. If the difference between being well and badly off is that some things we readily volunteer to do and others we are unwilling and grudge to perform, the trouble can be easily mended. For if we endure willingly all necessary things and show the white feather before none of them, all those matters in which one might assume unwillingness have been abolished. There is, indeed, an old saying and a very good one, to the effect that we ought not to think it requisite for whatever we wish to come to pass, but to wish for whatever does come to pass as the result of

B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696) any necessity. We neither have free choice in our course of life nor is it on ourselves that we are dependent; but according as it may suit Fortune, and according to the character of the Divinity granted each one of us for the fulfillment of what is ordained, must we —25— also regard our life. Such is the nature of the case whether we like it or not.

"If, now, it is not mere dishonor or mere exile that troubles you, but the fact that not only without having done your country any hurt, but after having benefited her greatly you were dishonored and expelled, look at it in this way,— that once it was destined for you to have such an experience, it has been the noblest and the best fortune that could befall you to be despitefully used without having committed any wrong. You advised and performed all that was proper for the citizens, not as individual but as consul, not meddling officiously in a private capacity but obeying the decree of the senate, not as a party measure but for the best ends. This or that other person, on the contrary, out of his superior power and insolence had devised everything against you, wherefore disasters and grief belong to him for his injustice, but for you it is noble as well as necessary to bear bravely what the Divinity has determined. Surely you would not have preferred to coöperate with Catiline and to conspire with Lentulus, to give your country the exact opposite of advantageous counsel, to discharge none of the duties laid upon you by it, and thus to remain at home under a burden of wickedness instead of displaying uprightness and being ex-

iled. Accordingly, if you have any care for reputation, it is far preferable for you to have been driven out, guilty of no wrong, than to have remained at home by executing some villainy; for, among other considerations, shame attaches to the men who have unjustly cast one forth, but not to the man who is wantonly expelled. B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696)

"Moreover, the story as I heard it was that you did not depart unwillingly nor after conviction, but of your own accord; that you hated to live with them, seeing that you could not make them better and would not endure to perish with them, and that you were exiled not from your country but from those who were plotting against her. Consequently they would be the ones dishonored and banished, having cast out all that is good from their souls, but you would be honored and fortunate, as being nobody's slave in unseemly fashion and possessing all fitting qualities, whether you choose to live in Sicily, in Macedonia, or anywhere else in the world. Surely it is not localities that give either good fortune or unhappiness of any sort, but each man makes for himself both country and happiness always and everywhere. This is what Camillus had in mind when he was glad to dwell in Ardea; this is the way Scipio reckoned when he lived his life out without grieving in Liternum. What need is there to mention Aristides or to cite Themistocles, men whom exile rendered more esteemed, or Anni[1] . . . or Solon, who of his own accord left home for ten years? —26—

"Therefore do you likewise cease to consider irk-

[1] The MS. is corrupt. Perhaps Hannibal is meant, perhaps Æneas.

B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696) some any such thing as pertains neither to our physical nor to our spiritual nature, and do not vex yourself at what has happened. For to us belongs no choice, as I told you, of living as we please, but it is quite requisite for us to endure what the Divinity determines. If we do this voluntarily, we shall not be grieved: if involuntarily, we shall not escape at all what is fated and we shall lay upon ourselves besides the greatest of ills,— distressing our hearts to no purpose. The proof of it is that men who bear good-naturedly the most outrageous fortunes do not regard themselves as being in any very dreadful circumstances, while those that are disturbed at the lightest disappointments feel as if all human ills were theirs. And, among people in general, some who handle fair conditions badly and others who handle unfavorable conditions well make their good or ill fortune appear even in the eyes of others to be of precisely the same nature as they figure
—27— it to themselves. Bear this in mind, then, and be not cast down by your present state, nor grieve if you learn that the men who exiled you are flourishing. In general the successes of men are vain and ephemeral, and the higher a man climbs as a result of them the more easily, like a breath, does he fall, especially in partisan conflicts. Borne along in a tumultuous and unstable medium they differ little, or rather not at all, from ships in a storm, but are carried up and then down, now hither, now yon; and if they make the slightest error, they sink altogether. Not to mention Drusus or Scipio or the Gracchi or some others, remember how

Camillus the exile later came off better than Capitolinus, and remember how much Aristides subsequently surpassed Themistocles. B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696)

"Do you, then, as well, entertain a strong hope that you will be restored; for you have not been expelled on account of wrong doing, and the very ones who drove you forth will, as I take it, seek for you, while all will miss you. But if you continue in your present state, —28— give yourself no care about it, even so. For if you lean to my way of thinking you will be quite satisfied to pick out a little estate on the coast and there carry on at the same time farming and some historical writing, like Xenophon, like Thucydides. This form of learning is most lasting and most adaptable to every man, every government, and exile brings a leisure in some respects more productive. If, then, you wish to become really immortal, like those historians, imitate them. Necessities you have in sufficiency and you lack no measure of esteem. And, if there is any virtue in it, you have been consul. Nothing more belongs to those who have held office a second, a third, or a fourth time, except an array of idle letters which benefit no man, living or dead. Hence you would not choose to be Corvinus or Marius, the seven times consul, rather than Cicero. Nor, again, are you anxious for any position of command, seeing that you withdrew from one bestowed upon you because you scorned the gains to be had from it and scorned a brief authority that was subject to the scrutiny of all who chose to practice sycophancy. These matters I have mentioned not because any one

B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696) of them is requisite for happiness, but because, since it was best, you have been engaged in politics enough to learn from it the difference in lives and to choose the one but reject the other, to pursue the one but avoid the other.

"Our life is but short and you ought not to live all of it for others, but by this time to grant a little to yourself. Consider how much quiet is better than disturbance and a placid life than tumults, freedom than slavery, and safety than dangers, that you may feel a desire to live as I am urging you to do. In this way you will be happy, and your name because of it shall be great,— yes, always, whether you are alive or dead.

—29— "If, however, you are eager for a return and hold in esteem a brilliant political career,— I do not wish to say anything unpleasant, but I fear, as I cast my eyes on the case and call to mind your freedom of speech, and behold the power and numbers of your adversaries, that you may meet defeat once again. If then you should encounter exile, you can merely change your mind, but if you should incur some fatal punishment you will be unable to repent. Is it not assuredly a dreadful, a disgraceful thing to have one's head cut off and set up in the Forum, if it so happen, for any one, man or woman, to insult? Do not hate me as one foreboding evil to you: I but give you warning; be on your guard. Do not let the fact that you have certain friends among the influential men deceive you. You will get no help against those hostilely disposed from the men who seem to love you; this you probably know by ex-

perience. Those who have a passion for domination regard everything else as nothing in comparison with obtaining what they desire: they often give up their dearest friends and closest kin in exchange for their bitterest foes."

B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696)

On hearing this Cicero grew just a little easier in mind. His exile did not, in fact, last long. He was recalled by Pompey himself, who was most responsible for his expulsion. The reason was this.

—30—

Clodius had taken a bribe to deliver Tigranes the younger, who was even then still in confinement at the abode of Lucius Flavius, and had let him go. He outrageously insulted Pompey and Gabinius who had been incensed at the proceeding, inflicted blows and wounds upon their followers, broke to pieces the consul's rods, and dedicated his property. Pompey, enraged by this and particularly because the authority which he himself had restored to the tribunes Clodius had used against him, was willing to recall Cicero, and immediately began through the agency of Ninnius to negotiate for his return.

The latter watched for Clodius to be absent and then introduced in the senate the motion in Cicero's behalf. When another one of the tribunes opposed him, he not only went into the matter at some length, intimating that he should communicate it also to the people, but he furthermore opposed Clodius once for all at every point. From this ensued disputes and many consequent woundings on both sides. But before matters reached that point Clodius felt anxious to get Cato

B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696) out of the way so that he might the more easily be successful in the business he had in hand, and likewise to take measures against Ptolemy who then held Cyprus, because the latter had failed to ransom him from the pirates. Hence he made the island public property and despatched Cato, very loath, to attend to its administration.

—31— While this went on in the city, Cæsar found no hostility in Gaul: everything was absolutely quiet. The state of peace, however, did not continue, but to one war which at first arose against him another was added, so that his greatest wish was fulfilled of making war against and setting right everything at once.

The Helvetians, who abounded in numbers and had not land sufficient for their populous condition, refused to send out a part to form a colony for fear that separated they might be more subject to plots on the part of the tribes whom they had once injured. They decided all to leave their homes, with the intention of transferring their dwelling-place to some other larger and better country, and burned all their villages and cities so as to prevent any one's regretting the migration. After adding to their numbers some others who wanted the same changes, they started off with Orgetorix as leader,— their intention being to cross the Rhone and settle somewhere near the Alps.

When Cæsar severed the bridge and made other preparations to hinder them from crossing, they sent to him to ask a right of way and promised in addition to do no harm to Roman territory. And though he had

the greatest distrust of them and had not the slightest idea of allowing them to proceed, yet, because he was still poorly equipped he answered that he wished to consult his lieutenants about their requests and would give them their reply on a stated day. In fact he offered some little hope of his granting them the passage. Meanwhile he dug ditches and erected walls in commanding positions, so that their road was made impassable. B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696)

Accordingly the barbarians waited a little time, and then, when they heard nothing as agreed, they broke camp and proceeded through the Allobroges's country, as they had started. Encountering the obstacles they turned aside into Sequanian territory and passed through their land and that of the Ædui, who gave them a free passage on condition that they do no harm. Not abiding by their covenant, however, they plundered the Æduans' country. Then the Sequani and Ædui sent to Cæsar to ask assistance, and begged him not to let them perish. —32—

Though their statements did not correspond with their deeds, they nevertheless obtained what they requested. Cæsar was afraid the Helvetians might turn also against Tolosa and chose to drive them back with the help of the other tribes rather than to fight them after they had effected a reconciliation,— which, it was clear, would otherwise be the issue. For these reasons he fell upon the Helvetians as they were crossing the Arar, annihilated in the very passage the last of the procession and alarmed those that had gone

B. C. 53 (*a. u.* 696)
—33—

ahead so much by the suddenness and swiftness of the pursuit and the report of their loss, that they desired to come to some agreement guaranteeing land. They did not, however, reach any terms; for when they were asked for hostages they became offended, not because they were distrusted but because they disliked to give hostages to any one. So they disdained a truce and went forward again.

Cæsar's cavalry had galloped far ahead of the infantry and was harassing, incidentally, their rear guards, when they faced about with their horse and conquered it. As a result they were filled with pride, and thinking that he had fled, both because of the defeat and because owing to a lack of provisions he was turning aside to a city that was off the road, they abandoned further progress to pursue after him. Cæsar saw this, and fearing their impetus and numbers hurried with his infantry to some higher ground but sent forward his horsemen to engage the enemy till he should have marshaled his forces in a suitable place. The barbarians routed them a second time and were making a spirited rush up the hill when Cæsar with forces drawn up dashed down upon them suddenly from his commanding position and without difficulty repulsed them, while they were scattered. After these had been routed some others who had not joined in the conflict — and owing to their multitude and eagerness not all had been there at once — took the pursuers in the rear and threw them into some confusion, but effected nothing further. For Cæsar after assigning

the fugitives to the care of his cavalry himself with his heavy-armed force turned his attention to the others. He was victorious and followed to the wagons both bodies, mingled in their flight; and there, though from these vehicles they made a vigorous defence, he vanquished them. After this reverse the barbarians were divided into two parties. The one came to terms with him, went back again to their native land whence they had set out, and there built up again the cities to live in. The other refused to surrender arms, and, with the idea that they could get back again to their primeval dwelling-place, set out for the Rhine. Being few in numbers and laboring under a defeat they were easily annihilated by the allies of the Romans through whose country they were passing. B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696)

So went the first war that Cæsar fought; but he did not remain quiet after this beginning. Instead, he at the same time satisfied his own desire and did his allies a favor. The Sequani and Ædui had marked the trend of his wishes[1] and had noticed that his deeds corresponded with his hopes: consequently they were willing at one stroke to bestow a benefit upon him and to take vengeance upon the Celts that were their neighbors. The latter had at some time in the past crossed the Rhine, cut off portions of their territory, and, holding hostages of theirs, had rendered them tributaries. And because they happened to be asking what Cæsar was yearning for, they easily persuaded him to assist them. —34—

1 Reading ἐπιθυμίαν (with Boissevain).

B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696) Now Ariovistus was the ruler of those Celts: his dominion had been ratified by action of the Romans and he had been registered among their friends and allies by Cæsar himself, in his consulship. In comparison, however, with the glory to be derived from the war and the power which that glory would bring, the Roman general heeded none of these considerations, except in so far as he wished to get some excuse for the quarrel from the barbarian so that it should not be thought that there was any grievance against him at the start. Therefore he sent for him, pretending that he wanted to hold some conversation with him. Ariovistus, instead of obeying, replied: "If Cæsar wishes to tell me anything, let him come himself to me. I am not in any way inferior to him, and a man who has need of any one must always go to that person." At this the other showed anger on the ground that he had insulted all the Romans, and he immediately demanded of him the hostages of the allies and forbade him either to set foot on their land or to bring against them any auxiliary force from home. This he did not with the idea of scaring him but because he hoped to make him furious and by that means to gain a great and fitting pretext for the war. What was expected took place. The barbarian, enraged at the injunctions, made a long and outrageous reply, so that Cæsar no longer bandied words with him but straightway, before any one was aware of his intentions, seized on Vesontio, the city of the Sequani, in advance.

—35— Meanwhile reports reached the soldiers. "Ariovis-

tus is making vigorous preparations," was one. B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696)
"There are many other Celts, some of whom have already crossed the Rhine undoubtedly to assist him, while others have collected on the very bank of the river to attack us suddenly," was another. Hence they fell into deep dejection. Alarmed by the stature of their enemies, by their numbers, their boldness, and consequent ready threats, they were in such a mood as to feel that they were going to contend not against men, but against uncanny and ferocious beasts. And the talk was that they were undertaking a war which was none of their business and had not been decreed, merely on account of Cæsar's personal ambition; and they threatened, also, to leave him in the lurch if he should not change his course. He, when he heard of it, did not make any address to the body of soldiers. It was not a good plan, he thought, to discuss such matters before the multitude, especially when his words would reach the enemy; and he was afraid that they might by refusing obedience somehow raise a tumult and do some harm. Therefore he assembled his lieutenants and the subalterns, before whom he spoke as follows.

—36—

"My friends, we must not, I think, deliberate about public interests in the same way as about private. In fact, I do not see that the same mark is set up for each man privately as for all together publicly. For ourselves it is proper both to plan and to perform what looks best and what is safest, but for the public what is most advantageous. In private matters we must be

B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696)

energetic: so only can a good appearance be preserved. Again, a man who is freest from outside entanglements is thought to be also safest. Yet a state, especially if holding sovereignty, would be very rapidly overthrown by such a course. These laws, not drawn up by man but enacted by nature herself, always did exist, do exist, and will exist so long as the race of mortals endures.

"This being so, no one of you at this juncture should have an eye to what is privately pleasant and safe rather than to what is suitable and beneficial for the whole body of Romans. For besides many other considerations that might naturally arise, reflect that we who are so many and of such rank (members of the senate and knights) have come here accompanied by a great mass of soldiers and with money in abundance not to be idle or careless, but for the purpose of managing rightly the affairs of our subjects, preserving in safety the property of those bound by treaty, repelling any who undertake to do them wrong, and increasing our own possessions. If we have not come with this in mind, why in the world did we take the field at all instead of staying at home with some occupation or other and on our private domains? Surely it were better not to have undertaken the campaign than when assigned to it to throw it over. If, however, some of us are here because compelled by the laws to do what our country ordains, and the greater number voluntarily on account of the honors and rewards that come from wars, how could we either decently or without sin

be false at once to the hopes of the men that sent us forth and to our own? Not one person could grow so prosperous as a private citizen as not to be ruined with the commonwealth, if it fell. But if the republic succeeds, it lifts all fortunes and each one individually. B. C. 53 (*a. u.* 696)

"I am not saying this with reference to you, my comrades and friends who are here: you are not in general ignorant of the facts, that you should need to learn them, nor do you assume an attitude of contempt toward them, that you should require exhortation. I am saying it because I have ascertained that there are some of the soldiers who themselves are talking to the effect that the war we have taken up is none of our business, and are stirring up the rest to sedition. My purpose is that you yourselves may as a result of my words show a more ardent zeal for your country and teach them all they should know. They would be apt to receive greater benefit in hearing it from you privately and often than in learning it but once from my lips. Tell them, then, that it was not by staying at home or shirking campaigns or avoiding wars or pursuing idleness that our ancestors made the State so great, but it was by bringing their minds to venture readily everything that they ought and by working eagerly to the bitter end with bodily labor for everything that pleased them, by regarding their own things as belonging to others but acquiring readily the possessions of their neighbors as their own, while they saw happiness in nothing else than in doing what was required of them and held nothing else to be ill fortune —37—

B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696) than resting inactive. Accordingly, as a result of this policy those men, who had been at the start very few and possessed at first a city than which none was more diminutive, conquered the Latins, conquered the Sabines, mastered the Etruscans, Volsci, Opici, Leucanians and Samnites, in one word subjugated the whole land bounded by the Alps and repulsed all the alien tribes that came against them.

—38— "The later Romans, likewise, and our own fathers imitated them, not being satisfied with their temporary fortune nor content with what they had inherited, and they regarded sloth as their sure destruction but exertion as their certain safety. They feared that if their treasures remained unaugmented they would be consumed and worn away by age, and were ashamed after receiving so rich a heritage to make no further additions: thus they performed greater and more numerous exploits.

"Why should one name individually Sardinia, Sicily, Macedonia, Illyricum, Greece, Ionic Asia, the Bithynians, Spaniards, Africans? I tell you the Carthaginians would have given them plenty of money to stop sailing against that city, and so would Philip and Perseus to stop making campaigns against them; Antiochus would have given much, his children and descendants would have given much to let them remain on European soil. But those men in view of the glory and the greatness of the empire did not choose to be ignobly idle or to enjoy their wealth in confidence, nor did the elders of our own generation who even now are still alive.

They knew well that the same practices as acquire good things serve also to preserve them: hence they made sure many of their original belongings and acquired many new ones. What need is there here to catalogue in detail Crete, Pontus, Cyprus, Asiatic Iberia, Farther Albania, both Syrian nations, each of the two Armenias, the Arabians, the Palestinians? We did not even know their names accurately in the old days: yet now we lord it over some ourselves and others we have bestowed upon various persons, insomuch that we have gained from them income and powers and honors and alliances. B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696)

"With such examples before you, then, do not bring shame upon our fathers' deeds nor let slip that empire which is now the greatest. We cannot deliberate in like manner with the rest of mankind who possess no similar advantages. For them it suffices to live in ease and, with safety guaranteed, to be subservient to others, but for us it is inevitable to toil and march and amid dangers to preserve our existing prosperity. Against this prosperity many are plotting. Every object which surpasses others attracts both emulation and jealousy; and consequently an eternal war is waged by all inferiors against those who excel them in any respect. Hence we either ought not from the first to have increased, thus differing from other men, or else, since we have grown so great and have gained so many possessions, it has been fated that we should either rule these firmly or ourselves perish utterly. For it is impossible for men who have advanced to so great —39—

B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696) reputation and such vast power to live apart and without danger. Let us therefore obey Fortune and not repel her, seeing that she voluntarily and self-invited belonged to our fathers and now abides with us. This result will not be reached if we cast away our arms and desert the ranks and sit idly at home or wander among our allies. It will be reached if we keep our arms constantly in hand — this is the only way to preserve peace — and practice warlike deeds in the midst of dangers — this is the only way we shall avoid fighting forever — and aid promptly those allies that ask us — in this way we shall get more — and do not indulge those enemies who are always turbulent — in this way no one will any longer care to wrong us.

— 40 — "For if some god had actually become our sponsor that, even if we should fail to do this, no one would plot against us and we should forever enjoy in safety all that we have won, it would still be disgraceful to say that we ought to keep quiet; yet those who are willing to do nothing that is requisite would have some show of excuse. But, as a fact, it is inevitable that men who possess anything should be plotted against by many, and it behooves us to anticipate their attacks. One class that holds quietly to its own possessions incurs danger even for these, while another without any compulsion employs war to acquire the possessions of others and keeps them. No one who is in terror regarding his own goods longs for those of his neighbors; for the fear concerning what he already has effectually deters him from meddling in what does not belong to

him. Why then does any man say such a thing as this, — that we must not all the time be gaining something more? B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696)

"Do you not recall, partly from hearsay and partly from observation, that none of the Italian races refrained from plotting against our country until our ancestors brought war into their territories, nor did the Epirots until they crossed over into Greece? Philip did not refrain, but intended to make a campaign against Italy until they wrought harm to his land in advance. Nor was there hesitation on the part of Perseus, of Antiochus, of Mithridates, until they were subjected to the same treatment. And why must one mention the remaining cases? For a while the Carthaginians suffered no damage at our hands in Africa, and crossed into Italy, where they overran the country, sacked the towns and almost captured the City itself; but when war began to be made against them they decamped altogether from our land. One might instance this same course of events in regard to the Gauls and Celts. For these people while we remained on this side of the Alps often crossed them and ravaged a large part of Italy. But when we ventured at last to make a campaign beyond the mountains and to surround them with war, and actually detached a portion of their territory, we never again saw any war begun by them in Italy except once. When, accordingly, in the face of these facts anybody says that we ought not to make war he simply says that we ought not to be rich, ought not to rule others, ought not to be free, to be Romans. Just as you would not endure it if a man should say

B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696) any of these things, but would kill him even as he stood before you, so now also, my comrades, assume a like attitude toward those who utter the other form of statement, judging their disposition not by their words but by their acts.

—41— "Now no one of you would contend, I think, that these are not the right kind of ideas to entertain. If, however, any one thinks that the fact of no investigation having been made about this war before the senate and of no vote having been passed in presence of the assembly is a reason why we need be less eager, let him reflect that of all the wars which have ever fallen to our lot some, to be sure, have come about as a result of preparation and previous announcement, but others equally on the spur of the moment. For this reason all uprisings that are made while we are staying at home and keeping quiet and in which the beginning of the complaints arises from some embassy both need and demand an enquiry into their nature and the introduction of a vote, after which the consuls and prætors must be assigned to them and the forces sent out: but all that come to light after persons have already gone forth and taken the field are no longer to be brought up for decision, but to be taken hold of in advance, before they increase, as matters decreed and ratified by Necessity herself.

"Else for what reason did the people despatch you to this point, for what reason did they send me immediately after my consulship? Why did they, on the one hand, elect me to hold command for five years at one time, as had never been done before, and on the other

hand equip me with four legions, unless they believed that we should certainly be required to fight, besides? Surely it was not that we might be supported in idleness, or traveling about to allied cities and subject territory prove a worse bane to them than an enemy. Not a man would make this assertion. It was rather that we might keep our own land, ravage that of the enemy, and accomplish something worthy both of our numbers and our expenditures. Therefore with this understanding both this war and every other whatsoever has been entrusted, has been delivered to us. They acted very sensibly in leaving in our hands the decision as to whom we should fight against, instead of voting for the war themselves. For they would not have been able to understand thoroughly the affairs of our allies, being at such a distance from them, and would not have taken measures against known and prepared enemies at an equally fitting moment. So we, to whom is left at once the decision and the execution of the war, by turning our weapons immediately against foes that are actually in the field shall not be acting in an unauthorized or unjust or incautious manner. B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696)

"But suppose some one of you interrupts me with the following objection: 'What has Ariovistus done so far out of the way as to become an enemy of ours in place of a friend and ally?' Let any such man consider the fact that one has to defend one's self against those who are undertaking to do any wrong not only on the basis of what they do, but also on the basis of what they intend, and has to check their growth in advance, before suffering some hurt, instead of waiting to have some real injury inflicted and then taking —42—

B. C. 58
(*a. u.* 696)

vengeance. Now how could he better be proven to be hostile, yes, most hostile toward us than from what he has done? I sent to him in a friendly way to have him come to me and deliberate in my company about present conditions, and he neither came nor promised that he would appear. And yet what did I do that was unfair or unfitting or arrogant in summoning him as a friend and ally? What insolence and wantonness, rather, has he omitted in refusing to come? Is it not inevitable that he did this from one of two reasons, either that he suspected he should suffer some harm or that he felt contempt for me? Well, if he had any suspicions he convicted himself most clearly of conspiring against us. For no one that has not endured any injury is suspicious toward us nor does one become so as a result of an upright and guileless mind: no, it is those who have prepared to wrong others that are ready to be suspicious of them because of their own conscience. If, again, nothing of this sort was at the bottom of his action, but he merely looked down on us and insulted us with overweening words, what must we expect him to do when he lays hold of some real project? For when a man has shown such disdain in matters where he was not going to gain anything, how has he not been convicted of entire injustice in intention and in performance?

"Still, he was not satisfied with this, but further bade me come to him, if I wanted anything of him.

—43—

Do not, I beg of you, regard this addition as slight. It is really a good indication of his disposition. That he should have refused to visit me a person speaking

in his defence might refer to shrinking and sickness and fear. But that he should send a summons to me admits of no excuse, and furthermore proves him to have acted from no other impulse than a readiness to yield me obedience in no point and a determination to impose corresponding demands in every case. With how much insolence and abuse does this very course of his teem! The proconsul of the Romans summons a man and the latter does not come: then one of the Allobroges [*sic*] summons the proconsul of the Romans. Do not think this a small matter and of little moment in that it was I, Cæsar, whom he failed to obey, or because he called me Cæsar. It was not I that summoned him, but the Roman, the proconsul, the rods, the dignity, the legions: it was not I that was summoned by him, but all of these. Privately I have no dealings with him, but in common we have all spoken and acted, received his retort and suffered. B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696)

"Therefore the more that anybody asserts that he has been registered among our friends and among our allies, the more he will prove him to deserve our hatred. Why? Because acts such as not even any of our admittedly bitterest foes has ever ventured to perform have been committed by Ariovistus under the titles of friendship and of alliance; it looks as though he had secured them for the very purpose of having a chance to wrong us with impunity. On the other hand, our former treaty with him was not made with the idea of being insulted and plotted against, nor will it now be we who break the truce. For we sent envoys to him —44—

B. C. 58 (a. u. 696) as to one who was still a friend and ally, but he — well, you see how he has used us. Accordingly just as when he chose to benefit us and desired to be well treated in return he justly obtained his wishes, so now, too, when he does the opposite of that in everything, with thorough justice would he be held in the position of a foe. Do not be surprised that whereas once upon a time I myself did some little business in his behalf both in the senate and before the people I now speak in this way. So far as I am concerned my sentiments are the same now as then: I am not changing front. And what are they? To honor and reward the good and faithful, but to dishonor and punish the evil and unfaithful. It is he that is changing front, in that he makes an unfair and improper use of the privileges bestowed by us.

— 45 — "As to its being most just, then, for us to fight against him no one, I think, will have any contention to make. And that he is neither invincible nor even a difficult adversary you can see from the other members of his race whom you have often conquered before and have recently conquered very easily, and you can calculate further from what we learn about the man himself. For in general he has no native force that is united and welded together, and at present, since he is expecting no reverse, he utterly lacks preparation. Again, not one of his countrymen would readily aid him, not even if he makes most tempting offers. Who would choose to be his ally and fight against us before receiving any injury at our hands? Is it not rather likely that all would coöperate with us, instead of

with him,— from a desire to overthrow his principality, which joins theirs, and obtain from us some share of his territory? B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696)

" Even if some should band together, they would not prove at all superior to us. For, to omit the rest,— our numbers, our age, our experience, our deeds,— who is there ignorant of the fact that we have armor over all our body alike, whereas they are for the most part naked, and that we employ both plan and arrangement, whereas they, unorganized, rush at everything in a rage. Be sure not to dread their charge nor the greatness of either their bodies or their shout. For voice never yet killed any man, and their bodies, having the same hands as we, can accomplish no more, but will be capable of much greater damage through being both big and naked. And though their charge is tremendous and headlong at first, it is easily exhausted and lasts but a short time. To you who have doubtless —46— experienced what I mention and have conquered men like them I make these suggestions so that you need not appear to have been influenced by my talk and may really feel a most steadfast hope of victory as a result of what has already been accomplished. However, a great many of the very Gauls who are like them will be our allies, so that even if these nations did have anything terrible about them, it will belong to us as well as to the others.

" Do you, then, look at matters in this way and instruct the rest. I might as well tell you that even if some of you do hold opposite views, I, for my part, will fight just as I am and will never abandon the posi-

B C. 58 (*a. u.* 696) tion to which I was assigned by my country. The tenth legion will be enough for me. I am sure that they, even if there should be need of going through fire, would readily go through it naked. The rest of you be off the quicker the better and cease consuming supplies here to no purpose, recklessly spending the public money, laying claim to other men's labors, and appropriating the plunder gathered by others."

—47— At the end of this speech of Cæsar's not only did no one raise an objection, even if some thought altogether the opposite, but they all approved his words, especially those who were suspected by him of spreading the talk they had heard mentioned. The soldiers they had no difficulty in persuading to yield obedience: some had of their own free will previously decided to do so and the rest were led to that course through emulation of them. He had made an exception of the tenth legion because for some reason he always felt kindly toward it. This was the way the government troops were named, according to the arrangement of the lists; whence those of the present day have similar titles.

When they had been thus united, Cæsar, for fear that by delay they might again become indifferent, no longer remained stationary, but immediately set out and pressed forward against Ariovistus. By the suddenness of his approach he so alarmed the latter that he forced him to hold a conference with him regarding peace. They did not come to terms, however, since Cæsar wished to impose all commands and Ariovistus refused to obey at all.

War consequently broke forth; and not only were the

two chief parties interested on the alert, but so were also all the allies and enemies of both sides in that region; for they felt sure that the battle between them would take place in the shortest possible time and that they themselves should have to serve in every way those who once conquered. The barbarians had the superiority in numbers and in size of bodies, but the Romans in experience and armor. To some extent also Cæsar's skill in planning was found to counterbalance the fiery spirit of the Celts and their disorderly, headlong charge. As a result, then, of their being evenly matched, their hopes and consequent zeal were in perfect equipoise. B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696)

—48—

While they were encamped opposite each other the women on the barbarian side after divination forbade the men to engage in any battle before the new moon. For this reason Ariovistus, who already paid great heed to them whenever they took any such action, did not join in conflict with his entire force immediately, although the Romans were challenging him to come out. Instead, he sent out the cavalry together with the foot soldiers assigned to them and did the other side severe injury. Scornfully elated by his success he undertook to occupy a position beyond the line of their trench. Of this he held possession, while his opponents occupied in turn another. Then, although Cæsar kept his army drawn up outside until afternoon, he would not proceed to battle, but when his foe toward evening retired he suddenly came after them and all but captured their palisade. Since his affairs progressed so well

B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696) he recked little any longer of the women, and on the following day when, according to their daily custom, the Romans were marshaled, he led out his forces against them.

—49— The Romans, seeing them advancing from their quarters, did not remain motionless, but made a forward dash which gave their opponents no chance to get carefully ordered, and by attacking with a charge and shout intercepted their javelins in which they had especial confidence. In fact, they got into such close quarters with them that the enemy could not employ their pikes or long swords. So the latter used their bodies in shoving oftener than weapons in fighting and struggled to overturn whoever they encountered and to knock down whoever withstood them. Many deprived even of the use of the short swords fought with hands and mouths instead, dragging down their adversaries, biting, tearing, since they far surpassed them in the size of their bodies. The Romans, however, did not suffer any great bodily injuries in consequence: they closed with their foes and by their armor and skill somehow proved a match. Finally, after carrying on that sort of battle for a very long time, late in the day they prevailed. For their daggers, which were smaller than those of the Gauls and had steel blades, proved very useful to them: moreover, the men themselves, constrained thereto by the very labor, lasted better than the barbarians because the endurance of the latter was not of like quality with the vehemence of their attacks. The Gauls for these reasons were defeated: they were not routed, merely because they

were unable, through confusion and feebleness, to flee, and not because they lacked the wish. Three hundred therefore, more or less, gathered in a body, opposed their shields on all sides of them and standing upright, apart from the press, proved hard to move by reason of their solidity: so that they neither accomplished aught nor suffered aught. B. C. 58 (*a. u.* 696)

The Romans, when their warriors neither advanced against them nor fled but stood quietly in the same spot as if on towers, likewise laid aside first of all their short spears which could not be used: and as they could not with their swords fight in close combat nor reach the others' heads, where alone the latter, fighting with them exposed, were vulnerable, they threw down their shields and made an attack. Some by a long run and others from close at hand leaped upon[1] the foes in some way and struck them. At this many fell immediately, beneath a single blow, and many did not fall till after they were dead. They were kept upright even when dead by the closeness of their formation. In this way most of the infantry perished either there or near the wagons, according to how far they were pushed out of line toward them, with wives and children. Ariovistus with fifty horsemen straightway left the country and started for the Rhine. He was pursued, but not overtaken, and escaped on a boat ahead of his followers. Of the rest the Romans entered the river to kill some, and others the chief himself took up and brought away. —50—

1 Reading *ἐνήλλοντο*, proposed in Mnemosyne N.S. X, p. 196, by Cobet, who compares Cæsar's Gallic War I, 52, 5; and adopted by Boissevain.

DIO'S
ROMAN HISTORY
39

The following is contained in the Thirty-ninth of Dio's Rome.

How Cæsar fought the Belgæ (chapters 1–5).

How Cicero came back from exile (chapters 6–11).

How Ptolemy, expelled from Egypt, sought refuge in Rome (chapters 12–16).

How Cato settled matters in Cyprus (chapters 17–23).

How Pompey and Crassus were chosen consuls (chapters 24–37).

How Pompey's Theatre was dedicated (chapters 38, 39).

How Decimus Brutus, Cæsar's lieutenant, conquered the Veneti in a sea-fight (chapters 40–43).

How Publius Crassus, Cæsar's lieutenant, fought the Aquitani (chapters 44–46).

How Cæsar after fighting with some of the Celtæ crossed the Rhine: and about the Rhine (chapters 47–49).

How Cæsar crossed over into Britain: and about the island (chapters 50–54).

How Ptolemy was restored to Egypt by Gabinius, and how Gabinius was brought to trial for it (chapters 55–65).

Duration of time, four years, in which there were the following magistrates, here enumerated.

P. Cornelius P. F. Lentulus Spinther, C. Cæcilius C. F. Metellus Nepos. (B. C. 57 = a. u. 697.)

Cn. Cornelius P. F. Lentulus Marcellinus, L. Marcius L. F. Philippus. (B. C. 56 = a. u. 698.)

Cn. Pompeius Cn. F. Magnus (II), M. Licinius P. F. Crassus (II). (B. C. 55 = a. u. 699.)

L. Domitius Cn. F. Ahenobarbus, Appius Claudius Appi F. Pulcher. (B. C. 54 = a. u. 700.)

Such was the end of these wars. After this, when —1— B. C. 57 (a. u. 697)
the winter had passed in which Cornelius Spinther and Metellus Nepos began their consulship, a third war burst upon them. The Belgæ, dwelling near the Rhine with many mingled tribes and extending to the ocean opposite Britain, had been during the previous epoch at peace with the Romans so far as concerned a part of their nation, while the rest paid no heed to them: but now, noting Cæsar's prosperity and fearing that he might advance against them, they made a change of front and by common agreement (except on the part of the Remi) took counsel against the Romans and conspired, making Galba their head.

Cæsar learned this from the Remi and was on his guard against them: subsequently he encamped at the river Axona, collected his soldiers all together and exercised them. He did not venture to come into close quarters with the enemy, though they were overrunning Roman territory, until they felt contempt for him, thinking him afraid, and undertook to destroy the bridge and put a stop to the conveyance of grain, which the allies brought across it. He was made aware beforehand by deserters that this was to be done, and by night sent against the foe the light-armed troops and the cavalry. So they, unexpectedly assaulting the —2— barbarians, killed many of them, so that the following night they all withdrew thence to their own land, especially since the Æduans were reported to have in-

B. C. 57 (*a. u.* 697) vaded it. Cæsar perceived what was going on, but through ignorance of the country did not dare to pursue them immediately. At daybreak, however, he took the cavalry, bade the infantry follow behind, and came up with the fugitives. They proceeded to give battle, for he was thought to have come with his cavalry alone, and he delayed them until the infantry arrived. In this way he surrounded them with his whole force, cut down the majority, and made terms with the survivors. Later he brought into allegiance some of the peoples without fighting and some by war.

—3— The Nervii voluntarily retired before him from their plain country,— for they were not a match for his forces,— but betook themselves into the wooded parts of the mountains, and then, when they saw him settled in camp,[1] they came charging down unexpectedly. Opposite Cæsar himself they soon turned to flight, but got the better of the major part of his army, capturing the camp without striking a blow. When Cæsar became aware of this,— he had advanced a little way in pursuit of those he had routed,— he turned back and came upon them engaged in pillage within the fortification, where he ensnared and slaughtered them. After accomplishing this he found no difficulty in subduing the rest of the Nervii.

—4— Meanwhile the Aduatuci, near neighbors of theirs, sprung from the Cimbri and possessing their spirit, started out as if to assist them but were overpowered before they effected anything, whereupon they withdrew, and leaving all their other sites established

[1] Two words to fill a gap are suggested by Bekker.

themselves in one fort, the strongest. Cæsar assaulted it but was for many days repulsed, until he turned to the making of engines. Then for a time they gazed at the Romans cutting wood and constructing the machines and through their inexperience laughed at what was taking place. But when the things were finished and heavy-armed soldiers upon them approached from all sides, they were panic-stricken because never before had they seen such an affair; so they sent the heralds for peace, supplied the soldiers with provisions, and threw some of their weapons from the wall. When, however, they saw the machines stripped of men again, and noticed the latter, as after a victory, following their own hearts' desires, they changed their minds and recovering courage made a sally by night to cut them down unawares. But Cæsar was carefully managing everything every moment, and when they fell on the outposts from every side they were beaten back. Not one of the survivors could any longer obtain pardon, and they were all sold. B. C. 57 (*a. u.* 697)

When these had been subjugated and others, too, some by him and many by his lieutenants, winter set in and he retired to winter-quarters. The Romans at home heard of this and were astonished that he had seized so many nations, whose names they had known but imperfectly before, and voted a sacrifice of fifteen days for his deeds,— something that had never before occurred. —5—

During the same period Servius Galba, acting as his lieutenant, had, while the season lasted and the army remained a unit, brought to terms the Varagri, dwelling beside Lake Lemannus and beside the Allobroges

B. C. 57 (*a. u.* 697) as far as the Alps: some he had mastered by force and others by capitulation, so that he was even preparing to winter where he was. When, however, the majority of the soldiers had departed, some on furloughs because they were not far from Italy, and others elsewhere to their own possessions, the natives took advantage of this fact and unexpectedly attacked him. Then he was led by despair to a kind of frenzy and suddenly dashing out of the winter camp astounded those attacking him by the strangeness of the move and passing through them gained the heights. On reaching safety he fought them off and later enslaved them: he did not winter there, however, but transferred his quarters to the Allobroges.

—6— These were the events in Gaul. Pompey meanwhile had brought about a vote for the recall of Cicero. The man that he had expelled through the agency of Clodius he now brought back to help him against that very person. So prone is human nature to change and in such wise do persons select in turn the very opposite things as likely to cause them benefit or injury. His helpers among the prætors and tribunes were Titus Annius Milo and the rest, who brought the proposition before the populace. Spinther the consul was zealous[1] for Cicero partly as a favor to Pompey and partly to damage Clodius, by reason of a private enmity which had led him as judge to condemn the man for incest: Clodius was supported by various men in public office, by Appius Claudius, his brother, who was prætor, and by Nepos the consul who hated Cicero for some reason of

[1] Four words to fill a gap supplied by Reiske.

his own. These parties, accordingly, with the consuls as leaders made more noise than before, and so did the rest in the city, championing one side or the other. Many disorderly proceedings were the result, chiefest of which was that during the very casting of the vote on the subject Clodius, knowing that the masses would be for Cicero, took the gladiators that his brother held in readiness for the funeral games in honor of Marcus his relative, leaped into the assemblage, wounded many and killed many more. Consequently no decision was reached and the perpetrator, as the companion of armed champions, was dreaded in general by all: he then stood for the ædileship, with a view to escaping the penalty for his violence by being elected. Milo had indicted him but did not succeed in bringing him to court, for the quæstors, by whom the allotment of jurors had to be made, had not been elected, and Nepos forbade the prætor to allow any case before their allotment. Now it was proper for the ædiles to be chosen before the quæstors, and this proved the principal cause of delay. Much disturbance was created by the contest over this very point, and at last Milo himself collected some gladiators and others who desired the same objects as he did and kept continually coming to blows with Clodius, so that fatal conflicts took place throughout practically the entire city. Nepos now, inspired with fear by his colleague and by Pompey and by the other prominent men, changed his attitude, and as the senate decreed, on motion of Spinther, that Cicero should be restored, and the populace on the motion of both consuls voted it, Clodius, to be sure, spoke against it to

—7— B. C. 57 (*a. u.* 697)

—8—

B. C. 57 (*a. u.* 697) them, but he had Milo as an opponent so that he could commit no violence, and Pompey, among others, spoke in favor of the enactment, so that that party proved much the stronger.

—9— Cicero accordingly came home from exile and expressed his gratitude to both senate and people,— the consuls affording him an opportunity,— in their respective assemblies. He laid aside his hatred of Pompey for his banishment, became reconciled with him, and immediately repaid his kindness. A sore famine had arisen in the city and the entire populace rushed into the theatre (the kind of theatre that they were then still using for public gatherings) and from there to the Capitol where the senators were in session, threatening first to slay them with their own hands and later to burn them alive, temple and all. It was then that Cicero persuaded them to elect Pompey as commissioner of the grain supply and to give him consequently the office of proconsul for five years both within Italy and without. So he now, as previously in the case of the pirates, was to hold sway over the entire world at that time under Roman power.

—10— Cæsar and Crassus really disliked Cicero, but paid some attention to him when they perceived that he would return in any case, Cæsar even while absent displaying some good-will toward him; they received, however, no thanks for their pains. Cicero knew that they had not acted according to their real inclination and regarded them as having been most to blame for his banishment. And though he was not quite bold enough to oppose them openly, since he had recently

tasted the fruits of unrestrained free speech, nevertheless he composed secretly a little book and inscribed upon it that it contained a kind of defence of his policy. In it he heaped together masses of denunciation against them and others, which led him to such fear of these statements getting out in his lifetime that he sealed up the volume and delivered it to his son with the injunction not to read nor to publish what was written, until his father should have departed from life. B. C. 57 (*a. u.* 697)

Cicero, accordingly, took root anew and got back his property and likewise the foundation of his home, although the latter had been given up to Liberty and Clodius both called the gods to witness and interposed religious scruples against its desecration. But Cicero found a flaw in the enactment of the lex curiata by the provisions of which his rival had been taken from the nobles into the rank of the people, on the ground that it had not been proposed within the limit of days set by ancestral custom. Thus he tried to make null and void the entire tribuneship of Clodius (in which also the decree regarding his house had been passed), saying that inasmuch as the transference of the latter to the common people had taken place unlawfully, it was not possible for any one of his acts while in office to be considered binding. By this means he persuaded the pontifices to give back to him the foundation as properly his and unconsecrated. So he obtained that and money for the construction of his house, and whatever else of his property had been damaged. —11—

After this there was further trouble on account of King Ptolemy. He had spent much money upon some —12—

B. C. 57 (*a. u.* 697) of the Romans, some of his own income and some borrowed, in order to strengthen his kingdom and receive the name of friend and ally. He was collecting this sum forcibly from the Egyptians and was irritated at the difficulty he encountered as well as at their bidding him demand back Cyprus from the Romans or else renounce his friendship for the foreigners,— neither of which demands suited his wishes. Since he could neither persuade them to be quiet nor yet force them, as he had no foreign troops, he made his escape from Egypt, went to Rome, and accused them of having expelled him from his kingdom: he obtained the right to be restored by Spinther, to whom Cilicia had been entrusted.

—13— While this was going on, the people of Alexandria, who for a while did not know that he had departed for Italy or supposed he was dead, placed Berenice his daughter on the throne in his place. Then, learning the truth, they sent a hundred men to Rome to defend themselves against his complaints and to bring counter charges of all the wrongs they had suffered. He heard of it in advance (he was still in Rome) and lay in wait for the envoys, by sending various men in different directions, before their arrival. The majority of them perished on the road, and of the survivors he slew some in the city itself and others he either terrified by what had happened or by administering bribes persuaded them neither to touch upon the matters regarding which they had been sent, nor to make any mention at

—14— all of those who had been killed. The affair, however, became so noised abroad that even the senate was mightily displeased, being urged on to action chiefly by

Marcus Favonius, who assigned two causes for his indignation,— first, that many envoys sent by allies had perished by violence, and second, that numerous Romans also on this occasion had taken bribes. So they summoned Dio, the presiding officer of the envoys (for he had survived) in order to learn the truth from him. But this time, too, Ptolemy gained such a victory by money that neither did Dio enter the assemblage, nor was any mention made of the murder of the dead men, so long as Ptolemy was on the ground.[1] Furthermore, when Dio was subsequently treacherously slain, he paid no penalty for that deed, either. This was chiefly due to the fact that Pompey had entertained him in his house and continued to render him powerful assistance. Of the other abuses that sprang from this source many were accused at a later time, but few convicted. For bribery was rampant and each coöperated with the other because of his own fear. B. C. 57 (*a. u.* 697)

—15—

While mortals were being influenced by money to behave themselves so, Heaven at the very beginning of the next year by striking with a thunderbolt the statue of Jupiter erected on the Alban hill, delayed the return of Ptolemy some little time. For when they had recourse to the Sibylline verses they found written in them this very passage: "If the king of Egypt come requesting some aid, refuse him not friendship altogether, nor yet succor him with any great force: otherwise, you will have both toils and dangers." Thereupon, amazed at the coincidence between the verses and the events of the time, they were persuaded by Gaius

[1] Reading παρῆν (as Boissevain).

B. C. 57 (*a. u.* 697) Cato the tribune to rescind all their decisions in the case. This was the way the oracle was given, and it was made public by Cato (for it was forbidden to announce to the populace any of the Sibylline statements, unless the senate voted it). Yet as soon as the sense of the verses, as usually happens, began to be talked about, he was afraid that it might be concealed, led the priests before the populace and there compelled them to utter the oracle before the senate had given them any instructions. The more scruples they had against doing so, the more insistent[1] was the multitude.

—16— Cato's wish prevailed; it was written in the Latin tongue and proclaimed. After this they gave their opinions: some were for assigning the restoration of Ptolemy to Spinther without an army and others urged that Pompey with two lictors should escort him home (Ptolemy, on learning of the oracle, had preferred this latter request and his letter was read in public by Aulus Plautius, the tribune). The senators then, fearing that Pompey would by this means obtain still greater power, opposed it, using the matter of the grain as an excuse.

All this happened in the consulship of Lucius Philippus and Gnæus Marcellinus. Ptolemy, when he heard of it, refused the favor of restoration, went to Ephesus, and passed his time in the temple of the goddess.——

—17— The year before a peculiar incident, which still has some bearing upon history, had taken place. It was this. The law expressly forbids any two persons of the same

[1] Words equivalent to "the more insistent" are easily supplied from the context, as suggested by v. Herwerden, Wagner, and Leunclavius.

clan to hold the same priesthood at the same time. B. C. 57 (*a. u.* 697) Now Spinther the consul was anxious to place his son Cornelius Spinther among the augurs, and when Faustus, the son of Sulla, of the Cornelian gens had been enrolled before him, took his son out of the clan and put him in that of Manlius Torquatus, and thus though the letter of the law was preserved, its spirit was broken.

—18— B. C. 56 (*a. u.* 698) Clodius had now come to the office of ædile, in the year of Philippus and Marcellinus; being anxious to avoid the lawsuit he had got himself elected by a political combination. He immediately instituted proceedings against Milo for procuring gladiators: what he was doing himself and was likely to be brought to trial for he brought as a charge against his rival. He did this not really in the expectation of convicting Milo,— for the latter had many strong champions, among them Cicero and Pompey,— but in order that under this pretext he might carry on a campaign against Milo and harass his helpers. The following was one of his —19— numerous devices. He had instructed his clique that whenever he should ask them in the assemblies: "Who was it that did or said so-and-so?" they should all cry out: "Pompey!" Then on several occasions he would suddenly ask about everything that could be taken amiss in Pompey, either in physical peculiarities or any other respect, taking up various small topics, one at a time, as if he were not speaking of him particularly. Thereupon, as usually happens in such cases, some would start off and others join in the refrain, saying "Pompey!" and there was considerable jeering. The

B. C. 56 (*a. u.* 698) man attacked could not control himself and keep quiet, nor would he stoop to a trick like Clodius's, so that he grew exceedingly angry, yet could not stir: thus nominally Milo was condemned, but in reality Pompey was convicted without even making a defence. For Clodius went one step farther and would not allow the lex curiata to be brought up for discussion; and until that was enacted no other serious business could be transacted in the commonwealth or any suit introduced.

—20— For a season Milo served as a shield for their abuses and assassinations, but about this time some portents occurred. In Albanum a small temple of Juno, set on a kind of table facing the east, was turned around to the west; a flash of light starting from the south shot across to the north; a wolf entered the city; an earthquake occurred; some of the citizens were killed by a thunderbolt; in Latin territory a subterranean tumult was distinctly heard: and the soothsayers, being anxious to produce a remedy, said that some spirit was angry with them because of some temples or sites not inhabited for holy purposes. Then Clodius substituted Cicero for Milo and attacked him vigorously in speeches because he had built upon the foundation of the house dedicated to Liberty; and once he went to it, with the apparent intention of razing it anew to the ground, though he did not do so, being prevented by Milo.

—21— Cicero was angry at such treatment and kept making complaints, and finally with Milo and some tribunes as attendants he ascended the Capitol and took down the tablets set up by Clodius to commemorate his exile. This time Clodius came up with his brother Gaius, a

prætor, and took them away from him, but later he watched for a time when Clodius was out of town, ascended the Capitol again, took them and carried them home. After this occurrence no quarter was shown on either side, but they abused and slandered each other as much as they could, without refraining from the basest means. One declared that the tribuneship of Clodius had been contrary to law and that therefore his deeds in office had no authority, and the other that Cicero's exile had been justly decreed and his restoration unlawfully voted. B. C. 56 (*a. u.* 698)

—22—

While they were contending, and Clodius was getting much the worst of it, Marcus Cato came upon the scene and made them equal. He had a grudge against Cicero and was likewise afraid that all his acts in Cyprus would be annulled, because he had been sent out under Clodius as tribune: hence he readily took sides with the latter. He was very proud of his deeds and anxious above all things that they should be confirmed. For Ptolemy, who at that time was master of the island, when he learned of the vote that had been passed, and neither dared to rise against the Romans nor could endure to live, deprived of that province, had taken his life by drinking poison.[1] Then the Cypriots, without reluctance, accepted Cato, expecting to be friends and allies of the Romans instead of slaves. It was not, however, of this that Cato made his chief boast; but because he had administered everything in the best possible manner, had collected slaves and large amounts

[1] This is a younger brother of that Ptolemy Auletes who was expelled from Egypt and subsequently restored (see chapter 55), and is the same one mentioned in Book Thirty-eight, chapter 30.

B. C. 56 (*a. u.* 698) of money from the royal treasury, yet had met with no reproach but had given account of everything unchallenged,— it was for this that he laid claim to valor no less than if he had conquered in some war. So many persons accepted bribes that he thought it more unusual for a man to despise money than to conquer the enemy.

—23— So at that time Cato for the reasons specified had some hope of a proper triumph, and the consuls in the senate proposed that a prætorship be given him, although by law it could not yet be his. He was not appointed (for he spoke against the measure himself), but obtained even greater renown from it. Clodius undertook to name the servants brought from Cyprus Clodians, because he himself had sent Cato there, but failed because the latter opposed it. So they received the title of Cyprians, although some of them wanted to be called Porcians; but Cato prevented this, too. Clodius took his opposition extremely ill and tried to pick flaws in his administration: he demanded accounts for the transactions, not because he could prove him guilty of any wrongdoing, but because nearly all of the documents had been destroyed by shipwreck and he might gain some prestige by following this line. Cæsar, also, although not present, was aiding Clodius at this time, and according to some sent him in letters the accusations brought against Cato. One of their attacks upon Cato consisted in the charge that he himself had persuaded the consuls (so they affirmed) to propose a prætorship for him, and that he had then

voluntarily put it by, in order not to appear to have missed it when he wanted it. B. C. 56 (*a. u.* 698)

So they kept up the conflict, and Pompey, too, encountered some trouble in the distribution of the grain. —24— Many slaves had been freed in anticipation of the event, of whom he wished to take a census in order that the grain delivery might take place with some decency and order. This, to be sure, he managed fairly easily through his own wisdom and because of the large supply of grain: but in seeking the consulship he found annoyances which likewise entailed a measure of censure for him. Clodius's behavior irritated him, but even more the fact that he was treated slightingly by the rest, whose superior he was: and he felt injured both on account of his reputation and on account of the hopes by reason of which while still a private citizen he had thought to be honored beyond them all. Sometimes he could bring himself to despise all this. At first when people began to speak ill of him he was annoyed, but after a time, when he came to consider carefully his own excellence and their baseness, he paid no further attention to them. The fact, however, that —25— Cæsar's influence had grown and the populace admired his achievements so much as to despatch ten men from the senate in recognition of the apparently absolute subjugation of the Gauls,[1] and that the people were so elated by consequent hopes as to vote him large sums of money was a thorn in Pompey's side. He attempted to persuade the consuls not to read Cæsar's letters but to conceal the facts for a very long time until the glory

1 This statement of Dio's appears to be erroneous. See Cicero, *Ad Familiares* I, 7, 10, and Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*, 22, 672.

B. C 56 (*a. u.* 698) of his deeds should of its own motion spread itself abroad, and further to send some one to relieve him even before the specified date. So jealous was he that he proceeded to disparage and abrogate all that he himself had effected with Cæsar's aid: he was displeased at the great and general praise bestowed upon the latter (whereby his own exploits were being overshadowed) and reproached the populace for paying little heed to himself and going frantic over Cæsar. Especially was he vexed to see that they remembered former achievements just so long as nothing occurred to divert them, that they turned with greatest readiness to each new event, even if it were inferior to something previous because they became tired of the usual and liked the novel, and that they overthrew all established glory by reason of envy, but helped to build up

—26— any new power by reason of their hopes. This was what caused his displeasure; and as he could not effect anything through the consuls and saw that Cæsar had passed beyond the need of keeping faith with him, he regarded the situation as grave. He held that there were two things that destroy friendship,— fear and envy,— and that these can only arise from rival glory and strength. As long as persons possess these last in equal shares, their friendship is firm, but when one or the other excels in the least degree, then the inferior party is jealous and hates the superior while the stronger despises and abuses the weaker: so, whichever way you take it, the one is vexed by his inferiority, the other is elated by his advantage, and they

come to strife and war in place of their former friendship. On the basis of some such calculations Pompey began to arm himself against Cæsar. And because he thought he could not easily alone overthrow him, he cultivated Crassus even more than before, that he might act with him. B. C. 56 (*a. u.* 698)

—27— When they had compared notes, they decided that it would be really impossible for them to accomplish anything as private citizens, but if they should get the consulship and divide the authority between them for rivalry against him, they would both be a match for him and quickly overcome him, being two against one. So they arranged an entire plan of dissimulation, to wit, that if any of their companions should urge them to the office, they should say they no longer cared to obtain the consulship: after this they put forth their best efforts to get it, in spite of the fact that they had formerly been friends with some of the other candidates. When they began to canvass for the office outside of the times directed by law and others made it plain that they would not allow them to be appointed (among these were the consuls themselves, for Marcellinus had some little influence), they brought it about that the elections should not be held that year (and to this end they employed Gaius Cato and some others), in order that an interrex might be chosen and they seek and secure the place in accordance with the laws. Now —28— this was done under some other pretext (as it was said, by reason of engagements made at a different time), but in reality by their own influence, for they openly showed dislike of those who opposed them. The sen-

B. C. 56 (*a. u.* 698)

ate, however, was violently enraged, and once while they were wrangling left the room. That was the end of the proceedings for the time being, and again when the same disturbance happened the senators voted to change their dress, as if for some calamity, and they paid no attention to Cato, who, because he gained nothing by speaking against the proposed step, rushed out of the gathering and called in any one he met in the market-place,[1] in order that no decision might be reached; for, if any person not a senator were within, they might not give their vote. But other tribunes were quick and prevented those invited from entering, and so this decree was passed, and it was also proposed that the senators should not be spectators at the festival then going on. When Cato opposed this measure, too, they rushed out in a body, and after changing their dress returned, hoping thus to frighten him. When even so he would not moderate his behavior, they all together proceeded to the Forum and brought to a state of sincere sorrow the multitude, who had come running to that place; Marcellinus was the speaker, and he lamented the present occurrences, while the rest listening wept and groaned, so that no one had a word to say against him. After doing this the senators entered the senate-house immediately, intending to vent their wrath

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upon those who were responsible. But Clodius had meantime jumped to the side of Pompey and espoused his cause again in the hope that if he should help him in securing the prize now at stake, he would make him entirely his friend. So he came before the populace in his ordinary garb, without making any change as

[1] Gap in the MS. supplied by Bekker's conjecture.

the decree required, and addressed a speech to them against Marcellinus and the rest. As great indignation at this act was shown by the senators, he abandoned the people in the midst of his speech and hastened to the senate, where he came near meeting his end. For the senate confronted him and prevented his going in, while at that moment he was surrounded by the knights and would have been torn limb from limb, had he not raised an outcry, calling upon the people for aid; whereupon many ran to the scene bringing fire and threatening to burn his oppressors along with the senate-house, if they should do him any harm. B. C. 56 (*a. u.* 698)

He, then, came within an ace of being killed. But Pompey, not alarmed at all by this, on one occasion rushed into the senatorial assembly, thwarting them as they were just about to vote, and prevented the measure from being carried. When Marcellinus after that publicly asked him whether he really desired to become consul, he in hope that the other might give ground admitted that he was a candidate, but said that he did not want the office so far as the just men were concerned, but that on account of the seditious he was exerting every influence to that end. So Pompey came out openly as his rival, and Crassus on being interrogated gave the same implication himself, not admitting the fact, to be sure, but not denying it, either: instead, he took, as usual, a middle course and said that he would do whatever was advantageous to the republic. In view of this situation Marcellinus and many others were terrified, as they observed their equipment and opposing array, and would no longer frequent the sen- —30—

B. C. 56 (*a. u.* 698) ate-house. As the number required by custom for passing any vote about the elections did not assemble, it was impossible to have any business at all about them brought forward, and the year thus passed away. However, the senators did not change their attire nor attend the festivals nor celebrate the feast of Jupiter on the Capitol nor go out to Albanum for the Feriæ Latinæ, held there for the second time by reason of something not rightly done. Instead, like persons in bondage and not possessing authority to choose officials or conduct any other public business they spent the rest of the year.

—31— B. C. 55 (*a. u.* 699) And after this Crassus and Pompey were appointed consuls by the interrex, as no one else of the earlier canvassers opposed them. Lucius Domitius, who contested the office up to the very last day of the year, started out from home for the assembly of the people just after dark, but when the boy that carried the torch in front of him was stabbed, he was frightened and went no farther. Hence, as no one else contested their election, and furthermore because of the action of Publius Crassus, who was a son of Marcus and then lieutenant under Cæsar, in bringing soldiers to Rome for this very purpose, they were easily chosen.

—32— When they had thus assumed the leadership of the State, they had the other offices given to such as were well disposed toward them and prevented Marcus Cato from being appointed prætor. They suspected that he would not submit to their régime and were unwilling to add any legal power to his outspoken opposition. The nomination of the prætors was made in peace, for

Cato did not see fit to offer any violence: in the matter of the curule ædiles, however, assassinations took place, so that Pompey was implicated in much bloodshed. The other officials, too,— those elected by the people, — they appointed to please themselves (for they controlled the elections), and they made friends with the other ædiles and most of the tribunes. Two tribunes, Gaius Ateius Capito and Publius Aquilius Gallus, would not come to terms with them. B. C. 55 (*a. u.* 699)

Accordingly, when the offices had been settled, they possessed the object of their strivings. They themselves made no mention of these matters before either the senate or the populace, but gravely pretended that they wanted nothing further. Gaius Trebonius, however, a tribune, presented a measure that to the one Syria and its environs be given to rule over for five years, and to the other the Hispaniæ, where there had recently been an uprising, for a similar period; also that they should employ as many soldiers as they might wish, both citizens and allies, and should make peace and war with whomsoever they pleased. Many, and especially the friends of Cæsar, took offence at this, because those men after obtaining provinces to govern were likely to keep Cæsar from holding his position for a much longer time; and therefore some prepared to speak against the measure. Then the consuls fearing that they might fail utterly of the projects they had in hand won over all such supporters on the condition of extending his leadership also for three[1] years more —33—

1 Suetonius says "five years" (Life of Cæsar, chapter 24), and Plutarch and Appian make a similar statement of the time. (Plutarch, Cæsar, chapter 21, and Pompey, chapters 51, 52. Appian, Civil War, II, 17.)

B. C. 55 (*a. u.* 699) (to follow the actual facts). However, they submitted no part of his case to the populace until their own business had been ratified. And the adherents of Cæsar, anticipated in this way, kept quiet, and the greater part of the rest, in bondage to fear and satisfied if even so
—34— they should save their lives, remained still. On the other hand, Cato and Favonius resisted all their schemes, having the two tribunes and others to help them, since in fighting few against many their frankness was of no avail. Favonius, who obtained from Trebonius only one hour for his speech in opposition, used it up in crying out at random about the distressing condition of the times. Cato received the right of employing two hours in his harangue and turned his efforts to censuring the immediate proposition and the whole situation, as he was wont, and so he exhausted his time before he had touched upon any of the revolutionary aspects of the matter. This was done not because he did not have the privilege of speaking also on that topic, but in order that he might be silenced by Trebonius while still appearing to have something more to say and thus obtain this additional grievance to bring up against him. For he well understood that had he employed the entire day, he was still sure to be unable to persuade them to vote anything that he wished. Hence, when bidden to be silent he did not stop immediately, but had to be pushed and dragged from the assemblage, whereupon he came back, and at last though consigned to prison he did not moderate his behavior.

—35— That day was so spent that the tribunes were unable

to speak any word at all. For in the meetings of the people where a measure was also under discussion, the right to speak was given to all the private citizens before those that held the offices, to the end, as it seemed, that none of them captivated beforehand by the opinion of a superior should dissimulate the thoughts that he had in mind, but should say what he thought with entire frankness. Hence Gallus, being afraid that some one might on the next day keep him from the Forum or do something worse still, went into the place of assembly directly after nightfall and passed the night there for the sake of the safety that the place afforded, and for the purpose of leaving there at dawn to join the populace outside. Trebonius, by shutting all the doors of the senate-house, caused this man to have spent the night and most of the day there in vain. Others occupied the site of the gathering by night and barred out Ateius, Cato, Favonius and the remainder of their followers. When Favonius and Ninnius got in somehow unobserved and Cato and Ateius climbed upon the shoulders of some of those standing around and being lifted up by them declared an omen directing the meeting to break up, the attendants of the tribunes drove them both out, wounded the rest who were with them and actually killed a few. B. C. 55 (*a. u.* 699)

After the law was in this way ratified and the people were already departing from the assembly Ateius took Gallus covered with blood (he had been struck in being forced out of the gathering), led him into the presence of those still on the spot, exhibited him to them, and by making all the comments that were natural, stirred —36—

B. C. 55 (*a. u.* 699) them mightily. The consuls were made aware of this and came quickly, having, indeed, been waiting somewhere near to see what was going on. As they had a considerable body-guard they intimidated the men, immediately called a meeting and passed the additional measures relating to Cæsar. The same persons tried to resist these, too, but were unable to accomplish anything.

—37— The consuls had this enactment passed, and next they laid heavier penalties upon such as bribed any persons, as if they themselves were any the less guilty because they had secured their office not by money but by force. They had even undertaken to curtail personal expenditures, which had gone to great lengths, although they themselves indulged in every kind of luxury and delicacy; they were prevented, however, by this very business of lawmaking. For Hortensius, one of the men fondest of expensive living, by reviewing the great size of the city and adverting with commendation to the costliness of their homes and their magnanimity toward others, persuaded them to give up their intention, for he could use their mode of life to champion his words. They respected his contention, and furthermore, because they shrank from appearing to debar others through any envy from rights that they themselves enjoyed, they voluntarily withdrew their motion.

—38— These were the same days in which Pompey dedicated the theatre wherein we take pride even at the present time. In it he provided an entertainment consisting of music and gymnastic contests, and in the

hippodrome a horse-race and the slaughter of many beasts of all kinds. Five hundred lions were used up in five days, and eighteen elephants fought against men in heavy armor. Some of these beasts were killed immediately and others much later. For some of them, contrary to Pompey's wish, were pitied by the people when they were wounded and ceased fighting and walked about with their trunks raised toward heaven. They lamented so bitterly as to give rise to the report that they did so not by accident, but were crying out upon the oaths in which they trusted when crossing over from Libya, and were calling upon Heaven to avenge them. For it is said that they would not set foot upon the ships before they received a pledge under oath from their leaders that they should verily suffer no harm: whether this is really so or otherwise, I know not. For some in time past have further declared that in addition to understanding the language of their native country they also comprehend what is going on in the sky, so that at the time of new moon, before that luminary comes within the gaze of men, they reach running water and there make a kind of purification of themselves. These are some of the things I have heard; I have heard also that this theatre was not erected by Pompey, but by one Demetrius, a freedman of his, with the money he had gained while making campaigns with the general. Wherefore he yielded the name of the structure most justly to his master, that he might not be ill spoken of for having, as his freedman, gathered money enough to suffice for so huge an expenditure.

B. C. 55 (*a. u.* 699)

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B. C. 55
(*a. u.* 699)

No doubt in this Pompey afforded the populace no little delight, but in making with Crassus the levies, according to their votes, he displeased them exceedingly. Then the majority repented of their course and praised Cato and the rest. So the latter group both on his account and because a certain lawsuit, nominally against their lieutenants but really against them and with reference to their acts had been instituted by some of the tribunes, dared indeed to commit no act of violence, but, together with the malcontents in the senate, changed their clothing as if for a calamity. They immediately, however, repented in regard to this costume and without waiting for any excuse went back to their accustomed dress. Now when the tribunes endeavored to abolish the levies and rescind the vote for the proposed campaigns, Pompey, for his part, showed no anger. He had sent out his lieutenants without delay and he himself was glad to remain where he was on the plea that he was prevented from going abroad, especially as he ought to be in Rome on account of his duties in the care of the grain; and his plan in that case was to let his officers subdue the Hispaniæ and himself manage the affairs at Rome and in the rest of Italy. Crassus, however, since neither of these considerations operated in his case, turned to force of arms. The tribunes, then, seeing that their boldness, being unarmed, was too weak to hinder any of his undertakings, in general kept silence. They announced many unusual portents, however, that applied to him, as if they could avoid including the public in their curse: at one time as he was offering on the Capitol

the customary prayers for his campaign they spread a report of omens and wonders, and again when he was setting out they called down many terrible curses upon him. Ateius even attempted to cast him into prison, but other tribunes resisted, and there was a conflict among them and a delay, in the midst of which Crassus left the pomerium. B. C. 55 (*a. u.* 699)

Now he, whether by chance or as a result of the curses, before long met with defeat. As for Cæsar, he, in the consulship of Marcellinus and Philippus, had made an expedition against the Veneti, who live near the ocean. They had seized some Roman soldiers sent out for grain and afterward detained the envoys who came to see about them, to the end that in exchange they might get back their own hostages. Cæsar, instead of giving these back, sent out different bodies of troops in various directions, some to waste the possessions of those who had joined the revolt and thus to prevent the two bands from aiding each other, and others to guard the possessions of those that were under treaty for fear they too might cause some disturbance: he himself meanwhile went straight against the Veneti. He constructed in the interior boats, which he heard were of advantage for the reflux tide of the ocean, and conveyed them down the river Liger, but in so doing used up almost the entire season to no purpose. Their cities, established in strong positions, were inaccessible, and the ocean surging around practically all of them rendered an infantry attack out of the question, and a naval attack equally so in the midst of the ebb and flow of the tide. Consequently Cæsar was in despair —40— B. C. 56 (*a. u.* 698)

B. C. 56 (*a. u.* 698) until Decimus Brutus came to him with swift ships from the Mediterranean. And he was inclined to think he would be unable to accomplish anything with those either, but the barbarians through contempt for the smallness and weakness of the cutters incurred defeat.

—41— For these boats, with a view to rapid progress, had been built rather light in the prevailing style of naval architecture among us, whereas those of the barbarians, because in the constant reflux of the ocean they often needed to rest on dry ground and to hold out against the succession of ebb and flow, surpassed them very much in both size and stoutness. For these reasons the barbarians, never having had any experience with such a fleet, in view of the appearance of the ships believed their effectiveness of no importance; and as soon as they were lying at anchor they set sail against them, thinking to sink them in a very short time by means of their boathooks. They were carried by an extremely powerful wind, for their sails were of leather and so received greedily the full force of the wind.

—42— Now Brutus for a time paid good heed to that fact and did not dare to sail out against them because of the number and size of the ships and the sweep of the wind and their impetus, but prepared to repel their attack near the land and to abandon the boats altogether. When, however, the wind suddenly fell, the waves were stilled, and the boats could no longer be propelled even with oars but because of their great heaviness stopped almost motionless, then he took courage and sailed to meet them. Falling upon them he wrought them many serious injuries with impunity, using both

flank and smashing tactics,[1] now ramming one of them, now backing water, in whatever way and as much as he liked, sometimes with many vessels against one and again with equal numbers opposed, occasionally even approaching safely with few against many. At whatever point he was superior to them, there he stuck to them closely, and some he sank by ripping them open, and others he boarded from all sides with his mariners for a hand to hand conflict, thus slaughtering many. If he found himself inferior at any place, he very easily retired, so that the advantage rested with him in any case. The barbarians did not use archery and had not provided themselves beforehand with stones, not expecting to have any need of them. Hence, if any one came into close quarters with them, they fought him off after a fashion, but with those that stood a little distance from them they knew not how to cope. So they were wounded and killed, some being unable to repel any one, and some of the boats were rammed and torn open, while others were set on fire and burned; still others were drawn off in tow, as if empty of men. The rest of the crews seeing this waited no longer: some killed themselves to avoid being captured alive and others leaped into the sea with the idea that from there they might board the hostile ships, or in any event not perish at the hands of the Romans. In earnestness and daring they were no whit inferior, but grieved ter-

B. C. 56 (*a. u.* 698)

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1 The two kinds of naval tactics mentioned here (*περίπλους* and *διέκπλους*) consist respectively (1) in describing a semi-circle and making a broadside attack with the purpose of ramming an opposing vessel, and (2) in dashing through the hostile ranks, breaking the oars of some ship and then returning to ram it when disabled. Both methods were employed in early Greek as well as in Roman warfare.

B. C. 56 (*a. u.* 698) ribly at being betrayed by the stationary qualities of their vessels. The Romans, to make sure that the wind when it sprang up again should not move the ships, applied from a distance long poles fitted with knives, by means of which they cut the ropes and split the sails. Through the circumstance that the enemy were compelled to fight a kind of land battle in their boats against a foe conducting a naval battle, great numbers perished there and all the survivors were captured. Of these Cæsar slew the most prominent and sold the rest.

—44— Next he made a campaign against the Morini and Menapii, their neighbors, expecting to terrify them by what he had already accomplished and capture them easily. He failed, however, to subdue any of them. They had no cities, living only in huts, and they conveyed their most valued treasures to the ruggedest parts of the mountains, so that they did the attacking parties of the Romans much more harm than they themselves suffered. Cæsar attempted by cutting down the forests to make his way into the very mountains, but renounced his plan on account of their size and the nearness of winter, and retired.

—45— While he was still in Venetia, Quintus Titurius Sabinus, his lieutenant, was despatched against the Unelli, whose leader was Viridovix. At first he was greatly terrified at their numbers and would have been satisfied if only the camp should be saved, but later he perceived that though this advantage made them bolder, they were not in reality dangerous, and he took courage. Most of the barbarians, in fact, in their threats make all sorts of terrible boasts that are without foundation.

Even so he did not dare to venture a passage of arms openly with them, for they kept him in position by mere numbers, but induced them recklessly to assault his rampart, though the site was on high ground. He did this by sending about evening, as a deserter, one of his allies who spoke their language, and persuaded them that Cæsar had met with reverses. Trusting this report they straightway started out heedlessly against the Romans (for they were gorged with food and drink), in the fear that they might flee before their arrival. Moreover, since their plans contemplated not allowing even the fire-priest[1] to be saved they brought B. C. 56 (*a. u.* 698)

[1] Dio has evidently imitated at this point a sentence in Herodotos, VIII, 6 (as shown by the phraseology), where it is remarked that "the Persians [at Artemisium] were minded not to let a single soul" of the Greeks escape. The expression is, in general, a proverbial one, applied to utter destruction, especially in warfare. Its source is Greek, and lies in the custom of the Spartans (see Xenophon, Polity of the Lacedæmonians, chapter 13, section 2), which required the presence in their army of a priest carrying fire kindled at the shrine of Zeus the Leader, in Sparta, this sacred fire being absolutely essential to the proper conduct of important sacrifices. Victors would naturally spare such a priest on account of his sacred character; he regularly possessed the inviolability attaching also to heralds and envoys: and the proverb that represents him as being slain is (as Suidas notes) an effective bit of epigrammatic exaggeration. Other references to this proverb may be found (by those interested) in Rawlinson's note on the above passage of Herodotos, in one of the scholia on the Phœnician Maidens of Euripides (verse 1377), in Sturz's Xenophontean Lexicon, in Stobaios's *Florilegium* (XLIV, 41, excerpt from Nicolaos Damascenos), in Zenobios's *Centuria* (V, 34), and finally in the dictionaries of Suidas and Hesychios.

The following slight variations as to the origin of the phrase are to be found in the above. The scholiast on Euripides states that in early times, before the trumpet was invented, it was customary for a torch-bearer to perform the duties of a trumpeter. Each of any two opposing armies would have one, and the two priests advancing in front of their respective armies would cast their torches into the intervening space and then be allowed to retire unmolested before the clash occurred. Zenobios, a gatherer of proverbs, uses the word "seer" instead of priest. That the saying was an extremely common one seems to be indicated by the rather naive definition of Hesychios:

Fire-Bearer. The man bearing fire. Also, the only man saved in war.

Of course, this may be simply the unskillful condensation of an authority.

B. C. 56 (*a. u.* 698) along chips and logs, carrying some and dragging others, with the evident intention of burning them alive. Thus they made their attack up-hill and came climbing up eagerly, meeting with no resistance. Sabinus did not move until the most of them were within his power. Then he charged down upon them from all sides at once, and terrifying those in front he dashed them all headlong down the hill, and while they were upset, tumbling over one another and the logs, he cut them down to such an extent that no one of them or of the others rose against him again. For the Gauls, who are unreasonably insatiate in all respects alike, know no limits in either their courage or their fear, but fall from the one into unthinkable cowardice and from the other into headstrong audacity.

—46— About the same period, Publius Crassus, too, son of Marcus Crassus, subjugated nearly all of Aquitania. The people are themselves Gauls, and dwell next to Celtica, and their territory extends straight along the Pyrenees to the ocean. Against these Crassus made his campaign, conquering the Sotiates in battle and capturing them by siege. He lost a few men, to be sure, by treachery in the course of a parley, but defended them vigorously in this very action. On seeing some others in a gathering with soldiers of Sertorius from Spain who carried on the war with more strategy than recklessness, believing that the Romans through lack of supplies would soon abandon the country, he pretended to be afraid of them. Though incurring their contempt he did not even so draw them into a conflict with him, but while they were calmly awaiting

developments he attacked them suddenly and unexpectedly. At the point where he met them he accomplished nothing, because the barbarians advanced and repelled him vigorously; but while their main force was there, he sent some men around to the other side of their camp, got possession of this, which was destitute of men, and passing through it took the fighters in the rear. In this way they were all annihilated, and the rest, all but a few, made terms without a murmur. B. C. 56 (*a. u.* 698)

—47— This was the work of the summer. While the Romans were in winter quarters on friendly ground the Tencteri and Usipetes, Celtic tribes, partly because forced out by the Suebi and partly because called upon by the Gauls, crossed the Rhine and invaded the country of the Treveri. Finding Cæsar there they became afraid and sent to him to make a truce, asking for land or at least the permission to take some. When they could obtain none, at first they promised voluntarily to return to their homes and requested an armistice. Later their young men, seeing a few horsemen of his approaching, despised them and altered their determination: thereupon they stopped their journey, harassed the small detachment, which would not await their attack, and elated over this success continued the war. B. C. 55 (*a. u.* 699)

Their elders, condemning their action, came to Cæsar even contrary to their advice and asked him to pardon them, laying the responsibility upon a few. He detained these emissaries with the assurance that he would give them an answer before long, set out against the other members of the tribe, who were in their tents, and came upon them as they were passing the noon hour and expecting no hostile demonstration, inasmuch —48—

B. C. 55 (*a. u.* 699) as the delegation was with him. Rushing into the tents[1] he found great numbers of infantrymen who did not have time even to pick up their weapons, and he cut them down near the wagons where they were disturbed by the presence of the women and the children scattered promiscuously about. The cavalry was absent at the time, and immediately, when the men learned of the occurrence, they set out to their native abodes and retired among the Sugambri. He sent after them and demanded their surrender, not because he expected that they would give themselves up to him (the men beyond the Rhine were not so afraid of the Romans as to listen to anything of that sort), but in order that on this excuse he might cross the stream itself. He himself was exceedingly anxious to do something that no one had previously equaled, and he expected to keep the Celts at a distance from the Gauls by invading the former's territory. When, therefore, the cavalry refused to give themselves up, and the Ubii, whose land was coterminal with the Sugambri and who were at variance with them, invoked his aid, he crossed the river by bridging it. But on finding that the Sugambri had betaken themselves into their strongholds and that the Suebi were gathering apparently to come to their aid, he retired within twenty days.

—49— The Rhine issues from the Celtic Alps, a little outside of Rhætia, and proceeding westward, with Gaul and its inhabitants on the left, it bounds the Celts on the right, and finally empties into the ocean. This has

[1] Reading αὐτάς (as Boissevain) in preference to αὐτούς ("upon them").

always, even till now, been considered the boundary, from which they came to the difference in names, since very anciently both the peoples dwelling on each side of the river were called Celts. B. C. 55 (*a. u.* 699)

Cæsar, then, first of Romans crossed the Rhine at this time, and later in the consulship of Pompey and Crassus he traversed the channel of Britain. This country is distant from the Belgic mainland, opposite the Morini, three hundred and fifty stades at the shortest computation,[1] and extends alongside the rest of Gaul and nearly all of Spain, reaching out into the sea. To the very first of the Greeks and Romans it was not even known; to their descendants it was a matter of dispute whether it was a continent or an island. And its history was written from both points of view by many who knew nothing about it, because they had not seen with their own eyes nor heard from the natives with their own ears, but indulged in guesses according as each had leisure or fondness for talk. As time went on, first under Agricola as proprætor and now under Severus as emperor, it has been clearly proven to be an island. —50—

To this land then, Cæsar, since he had won over the Morini and the rest of Gaul was quiet, desired to cross. He made the voyage with infantry by the most desirable course, but did not select the best landing-place. For the Britons, having ascertained in advance that he was sailing against them, had secured all the landings —51—

1 About sixty miles. It is interesting to compare here Cæsar's (probably less accurate) estimate of *thirty* miles in his Gallic War (V, 2, 3).

B. C. 55 (a. u. 699) on the main coast. Accordingly, he sailed around a kind of projecting headland and coasted along on the other side of it. There he disembarked in shoal water, conquered those who joined battle with him and got a footing on dry land before more numerous assistance could come, after which he repulsed their attack also. Not many of the barbarians fell, for they had chariot drivers, and being mounted easily escaped the Romans, whose cavalry had not yet arrived; but alarmed at the reports about them from the mainland and because they had dared to cross at all and had managed to set foot upon the land, they sent to Cæsar some of the Morini who were friends of theirs, to see about terms of peace. On this occasion he demanded hostages, —52— which they were willing to give. But as the Romans meanwhile began to encounter difficulties by reason of a storm which damaged their fleet that was present and also the one on the way, they changed their minds and though not attacking the invaders openly (for their camp was strongly guarded), they received some who had been sent out to bring in provisions on the assumption that the country was friendly, and destroyed them all, save a few, to whose rescue Cæsar came with speed. After that they assaulted the very camp of the invaders. Here they accomplished nothing, but fared badly; they would not, however, make terms until they had been often defeated. And Cæsar properly did not intend to make peace with them, but since the winter was approaching and he was not equipped with a sufficient force to continue fighting at that season,— moreover because his supplies had failed and the Gauls in

his absence had begun an uprising,— he somewhat unwillingly concluded a truce with them, demanding this time still more hostages, but obtaining only a few. B. C. 55 (*a. u.* 699)

So he sailed back to the mainland and put an end to the disturbances. From Britain he had won nothing for himself or for the City except the glory of having conducted an expedition against that land. But on this he prided himself greatly and the Romans at home magnified it to a remarkable degree. Seeing that the formerly unknown had become certain and the previously unheard of accessible, they regarded the hope arising from these facts as already realized and exulted over their expected achievements as if the latter were already within their grasp. —53—

Hence they voted to celebrate a thanksgiving for twenty days: but while that was taking place there was an uprising in Spain, which was consequently assigned to Pompey's care. Some tribes had revolted and obtained the help of the Vaccæi: while still unprepared they were conquered by Metellus Nepos, but as he was besieging Clunia they assailed him, proved themselves his superiors, and won back the city; at another time they were beaten, though without being enslaved or anything like it. In fact, they so far surpassed their opponents in numbers that Nepos was glad to remain quiet and not run any risks. —54—

About this same time Ptolemy, although the Romans had voted not to assist him and were even now highly indignant at the bribery he had instituted, was nevertheless restored and got back the kingdom. Pompey and Gabinius effected this. So much power did official —55—

B. C. 55 (*a. u.* 699) authority and abundance have as against the decrees of the people and the senate that when Pompey sent orders to Gabinius, then governor of Syria, the latter immediately put his army in motion. So the former out of kindness and the latter through corrupt influence restored the king contrary to the wish of the commonwealth, paying no heed either to it or to the utterances of the Sibyl. Gabinius was later brought to trial for this, but on account of Pompey's influence and the money at his command was not convicted. Public administration had so deteriorated among the Romans of that day that when some of the magistrates and jurymen received from him only a very little of the great bribes that he disbursed, they heeded no requirement of propriety, and furthermore instructed others to commit crimes for money, showing them that they could easily buy immunity from punishment. At this time, consequently, Gabinius was acquitted; but he was again brought to trial on some other charge,— chiefly that he had plundered more than a million from the province,— and was convicted. This was a matter of great surprise to him, seeing that by money he had freed himself from the former suit; but it was for that reason principally that he was condemned on these charges. It was also a surprise to Pompey, because previously he had, through his friends, rescued Gabinius even at a distance, but now while in the suburbs of the city and, as you might say, in the courtroom itself, he had accomplished nothing.

—56— This was the way of it. Gabinius had injured Syria

in many ways, even to the point of inflicting more damage upon the people than had the pirates, who were then in their prime. Still, he regarded all his gains from that source as mere trifles and was at one time planning and preparing to lead a campaign also against the Parthians and their wealth. Phraates had been treacherously murdered by his children, and Orodes having taken the kingdom in turn had expelled Mithridates his brother from Media, which he was governing. The latter took refuge with Gabinius and persuaded him to connive at his restoration. However, when Ptolemy came with Pompey's letter and promised that he would furnish large sums, both to him and the army, Gabinius abandoned the Parthian project and hastened to Egypt. This he did although the law forbade governors to enter any one's territory outside their own borders or to begin wars on their own responsibility, and although the people and the Sibyl had declared that the man should not be restored. But the only restraint these considerations exercised was to lead him to sell them for a higher price. He left in Syria Sisenna his son, a mere boy, and a very few soldiers with him, exposing the province to which he had been assigned more than ever to the pirates. He himself then reached Palestine, arrested Aristobulus, who had caused some trouble at Rome and escaped, sent him to Pompey, imposed tribute upon the Jews and thereafter invaded Egypt. B. C. 55 (*a. u.* 699)

Berenice was at this time ruling the Egyptians, and though she feared the Romans she accorded him no sat- —57—

B. C. 55 (*a. u.* 699) isfactory treatment. Instead, she sent for one Seleucus who purported to belong to the royal race that once had flourished in Syria, acknowledged him as her husband and made him sharer of the kingdom and of the war. When he was seen to be held in no esteem, she had him killed and joined to herself on the same terms Archelaus, son of that Archelaus who had deserted to Sulla; he was an energetic man living in Syria. Gabinius could, indeed, have stopped the evil in its beginning: he had arrested Archelaus, of whom he had been suspicious all along, and seemed likely, therefore, to have no further trouble. He was afraid, however, that this course might cause him to receive from Ptolemy less of the money that had been stipulated, on the assumption that he had done nothing of importance, and he hoped that he could exact even a larger amount in view of the cleverness and renown of Archelaus; moreover he received numerous other contributions from the prisoner himself and so voluntarily
—58— released him, pretending that he had escaped. Thus he reached Pelusium without meeting opposition, and while advancing from there with his army in two divisions he encountered and conquered the Egyptians on the same day, and after this vanquished them again on the river with his ships and also on land. For the Alexandrians are very apt to face everything boldly and to speak out whatever may occur to them, but for war and its terrors they are decidedly worthless. This is true in spite of the fact that in seditions, which occur among them in great numbers and of serious proportions, they always become involved in slaughter, set-

ting no value upon life as compared with the rivalry of the moment, but pursuing destruction in such quarrels as if it were a most necessary prize. So Gabinius conquered them, and after slaying Archelaus and many others he immediately gained control of all Egypt and delivered it over to Ptolemy. B. C. 55 (*a. u.* 699)

Now Ptolemy killed his daughter and the foremost and richest of the other citizens, because he had much need of money. Gabinius after restoring him in this —59— fashion sent no message home about what he had done, in order not to give them information against himself of his transgressions of the law. But it was not possible for a proceeding of such magnitude to be concealed. The people learned it directly, for the Syrians cried out loudly against Gabinius, especially since in his absence they were terribly abused by the pirates; and again the tax collectors, being unable to levy taxes on account of the marauders, were owing numerous sums. This enraged the populace: they passed resolutions and were ready to condemn him. Cicero attacked him vigorously and advised them to read again the Sibylline verses, expecting that there was contained in them some punishment, in case their injunctions should be transgressed. Pompey and Crassus were still consuls, —60— and the former acted as his own interests dictated, while the latter was for pleasing his colleague and also soon received money sent him by Gabinius. Thus they openly justified his conduct, calling Cicero among other names "exile," and would not put the question to a vote. When, however, they had ended their office, B. C. 54 (*a. u.* 700) and Lucius Domitius and Appius Claudius became

B. C. 54 (*a. u.* 700) their successors, once more many resolutions were published and the majority proved to be against Gabinius. Domitius was hostile to Pompey on account of the latter's canvass and because he had been appointed consul contrary to his wish. Claudius, although a relative of Pompey's, still wished to play the game of politics and indulge the people, and furthermore he expected to get bribes from Gabinius, if he should cause him any uneasiness. So both worked in every way against him. The following fact, also, militated strongly against him; that he had not received a certain lieutenant sent in advance by Crassus to succeed him in the office, but held fast to the position as if he had obtained an eternal sovereignty. They decided, therefore, that the verse of the Sibyl should be read, in spite of Pompey's opposi-
—61— tion. Meantime the Tiber, perhaps because excessive rains took place somewhere up the stream above the city, or because a violent wind from the sea beat back its outgoing tide, or still more probably, by the act of some Divinity, suddenly rose so high as to inundate all the lower levels in the city and to overwhelm much even of the higher ground. The houses, therefore, being constructed of brick, were soaked through and washed away, while all the cattle perished under water. And of the men all who did not take refuge betimes on very high points were caught, some in their dwellings, some on the streets, and lost their lives. The remaining houses, too (because the evil lasted for many days), became rotten and injured some persons at once and others afterward. The Romans, distressed at such calamities and expecting others worse because, as they

thought, Heaven had become angry with them for the restoration of Ptolemy, were urgent to put Gabinius to death even while absent, believing that they would be harmed less if they should destroy him with speed. So insistent were they that although nothing about punishment was found in the Sibylline oracles, still the senate passed a preliminary resolution that the governors and populace might accord him very bitter and harsh treatment. B. C. 54 (*a. u.* 700)

While this was going on, money sent ahead by Gabinius caused by its very presence a setback to his interests though he was not only absent but not even on his way home. And, indeed, he was placed by his conscience in such a wretched and miserable condition that he long delayed coming to Italy, and was conveyed to his house by night, and for a considerable number of days did not dare to appear outside of his house. Complaints were many and he had abundance of accusers. Accordingly, he was first tried for the restoration of Ptolemy, as his greatest offence. Practically the entire populace surged into the courthouse and often wished to tear him to pieces, particularly because Pompey was not present and Cicero accused him with fearful earnestness. Though this was their attitude, he was acquitted. For he himself, appreciating the gravity of the charges on which he was tried, expended vast sums of money, and the companions of Pompey and Cæsar very willingly aided him, declaring that a different time and different king were meant by the Sybil, and, most important of all, that no punishment for his deeds were recorded in her verses. —62—

—63— B. C. 54 (*a. u.* 700) The populace, therefore, came near killing the jurymen, but, when they escaped, turned their attention to the remaining complaints against him and caused him to be convicted at least on those. The men who were chosen by lot to pass judgment on the charges both feared the people and likewise obtained but little from Gabinius; knowing that his conduct in minor matters only was being investigated and expecting to win this time also he did not lay out much. Hence they condemned him, in spite of Pompey's proximity and Cicero's advocacy of his cause. Pompey had left town to attend to the grain, much of which had been ruined by the river, but set out with the intention of attending the first court,— for he was in Italy,— and, as he missed that, did not retire from the suburbs until the other was also finished. He had the people assemble outside the pomerium, since, as he held already the office of proconsul, he was not allowed to enter the town, and harangued them at length in behalf of Gabinius, reading to them a letter sent to him by Cæsar in the man's behalf. He even implored the jurymen, and not only prevented Cicero from accusing him again but actually persuaded him to plead for him; as a result the derogatory epithet of "deserter" became widely applied to the orator. However, he did Gabinius no good: the latter was at this time convicted and exiled, as stated, but was later restored by Cæsar.

—64— At this same time the wife of Pompey died, after giving birth to a baby girl. And whether by the arrange-

ment of Cæsar's friends and his or because there were some who wished on general principles to do them a favor, they caught up the body, as soon as she had received proper eulogies in the Forum, and buried it in the Campus Martius. The opposition of Domitius and his declaration (among others) that it was impious for any one to be buried in the sacred spot without some decree proved of no avail. B. C. 54 (*a. u.* 700)

At this season Gaius Pomptinus also celebrated the triumph over the Gauls. Up to that time, as no one granted him the right to hold it, he had remained outside the pomerium. And he would have missed it then, too, had not Servius Galba, who had made a campaign with him, granted as prætor secretly and just before dawn to certain persons the privilege of voting:—this, in spite of the fact that it is not permitted by law for any business to be transacted in the popular assembly before the first hour. For this reason some of the tribunes, who had been left out of the meeting, caused him trouble (at least, in the procession), so that there was some killing. —65—

DIO'S
ROMAN HISTORY
40

The following is contained in the Fortieth of Dio's Rome.

How Cæsar for the second time sailed across into Britain (chapters 1–3.)

How Cæsar turned back from Britain and again engaged in war with the Gauls (chapters 4–11).

How Crassus began to carry on war with the Parthians (chapters 12, 13).

About the Parthians (chapters 14, 15).

How Crassus was defeated by them and perished (chapters 16–30).

How Cæsar subjugated the whole of Transalpine Gaul (chapters 31–43).

How Milo killed Clodius and was condemned by the court (chapters 44–57).

How Cæsar and Pompey began to be at variance (chapters 58–66).

Duration of time, the remainder of the consulship of Domitius and Appius Claudius, together with four additional years, in which there were the following magistrates here enumerated.

Cn. Domitius M. F. Calvinus, M. Valerius || Messala.|| (B. C. 53 = a. u. 701.)

|| Cn. Pompeius || Cn. F. Magnus (III), Cæcilius Metellus Scipio Nasicæ F. (B. C. 52 = a. u. 702.)

Servius Sulpicius Q. F. Rufus, M. Claudius M. F. Marcellus. (B. C. 51 = a. u. 703.)

L. Æmilius M. F. Paulus, || C. Claudius C. F. Marcellus.|| (B. C. 50 = a. u. 704.)

These were the occurrences in Rome while the city —1— B. C. 54 (a. u. 700)
was passing through its seven hundredth year. In Gaul Cæsar during the year of those same consuls, Lucius Domitius and Appius Claudius, among other undertakings constructed ships of a style halfway between his own swift vessels and the native ships of burden, endeavoring to make them as light as possible and yet entirely seaworthy, and he left them on dry land to avoid injury. When the weather became fit for sailing, he crossed over again to Britain, giving as his excuse that the people of that country, thinking that he would never cross to them again because he had once retired empty-handed, had not sent all the hostages they had promised; the truth of the matter was that he vehemently coveted the island, so that he would have certainly found some other pretext, if this had not been in existence. He came to land at the same place as before, no one daring to oppose him because of the number of his ships and his approaching the shore at all points at once; thus he got possession of the harbor immediately. The barbarians for the reasons specified had not been —2— able to hinder his approach and being far more afraid than before, because he had come with a larger army, carried away all their most valued possessions into the most woody and overgrown portions of the neighboring country. After they had put them in safety by cutting down the surrounding wood and piling more upon it row after row until the whole looked like an entrenched

B. C. 54
(*a. u.* 700)

camp, they proceeded to annoy Roman foraging parties. Indeed, in one battle after being defeated on open ground they drew the invaders toward that spot in pursuit, and killed many of them. Soon after, as a storm had once more damaged the ships, the Britons sent for allies and set out against their naval arsenal itself, with Casuvellaunus, regarded as the foremost of the chiefs in the island, at their head. The Romans upon meeting them were at first thrown into confusion by the attack of their chariots, but later opened ranks, and by letting them pass through and striking the occupants obliquely as they drove by, made the battle

—3— equal. For the time being both parties remained where they were. At another meeting the barbarians proved superior to the infantry, but were damaged by the cavalry and withdrew to the Thames, where they encamped after planting stakes across the ford, some visible and some under water. But Cæsar by a powerful assault forced them to leave the palisade and later on by siege drove them from the fort, and others repulsed a party of theirs that attacked the harbor. They then became terrified and made terms, giving hostages and being rated for a yearly tribute.

—4— Under these circumstances Cæsar departed entirely from the island and left no body of troops behind in it. He believed that such a force would be in danger while passing the winter on a foreign shore and that it might be inconvenient for him to absent himself from Gaul for any considerable period: hence he was satisfied with his present achievements, in the fear that if he reached

for more, he might be deprived of these. It seemed that in this he had done rightly, as was, indeed, proved by what took place. For when he had gone to Italy, intending to winter there, the Gauls, though each separate nation contained many garrisons, still planned resistance and some of them openly revolted. So if this had happened while he was staying in Britain to finish the winter season, all the hither regions would have been a scene of confusion indeed. B. C. 54 (*a. u.* 700)

This war was begun by the Eburones, under Ambiorix as chief. They said the disturbance was due to their being oppressed by the presence of the Romans, who were commanded by Sabinus and Lucius Cotta, lieutenants. As a matter of fact they despised the garrison, thinking they would not prove competent to defend themselves and expecting that Cæsar would not speedily head an expedition against their tribe. They accordingly came upon the soldiers unawares, expecting to take the camp without striking a blow, and, when they failed of this, had recourse to deceit. Ambiorix after setting ambuscades in the most suitable spots came to the Romans for a parley and represented that he had taken part in the war against his will and was himself sorry. But against the others he advised them to be on their guard, for his compatriots would not obey him and were intending to attack the garrison at night. Consequently he made the suggestion to them that they should abandon Eburonia, because they would be in danger, if they stayed, and pass on as quickly as possible to where some of their comrades were winter- —5—

—6— B. C. 54 (*a. u.* 700) ing near by. The Romans were persuaded by this disclosure, especially as he had received many favors from Cæsar and seemed in this to be repaying him in kindness. They packed up their belongings with zeal just after nightfall and later[1] started out, but fell into the ambush set and suffered a terrible reverse. Cotta with many others perished immediately: Sabinus was sent for by Ambiorix under the pretext of saving him, for the Gallic leader was not on the ground and even then seemed faithful to him personally; on his arrival, however, Ambiorix seized him, stripped him of his arms and clothing, and then struck him down with his javelin, uttering boasts over him, one to this effect: "How can such creatures as you are have the idea of ruling a nation of our strength?" This was the fate that these men suffered. The rest managed to break through to the fortress from which they had set out, but when the barbarians assailed that, too, and they could neither repel them nor escape, they killed one another.

—7— After this event some other of the neighboring tribes revolted, among them the Nervii, though Quintus Cicero, a brother of Marcus Cicero and lieutenant of Cæsar, was wintering in their territory. Ambiorix added them to his force and began a conflict with Cicero. The contest was close, and after capturing some prisoners alive the chieftain tried to deceive him likewise, but being unable to do so resorted to siege. Before long by means of his large force and the experience

[1] The exact time, daybreak, is indicated in Cæsar's Gallic War, V, 31, 6.

which he had gained from the campaign that he made with the Romans, together with some detailed information that he obtained from the captives, he managed to enclose him with a palisade and ditch. There were battles, as natural in such operations,—many of them, —and far larger numbers of barbarians perished, because there were more of them. They, however, by reason of their abundant army were never in sight of destruction, whereas the Romans, not being many in the first place, kept continually growing fewer and were encompassed without difficulty. They were unable to —8— treat their wounds with success through lack of the necessary applications, and did not have a large supply of food, because they had been besieged unexpectedly. No one came to their aid, though many were wintering at no great distance, for the barbarians guarded the roads with care and all who were sent out they caught and slaughtered before the eyes of their friends. As they were therefore in danger of being captured, a Nervian who was friendly to them as the result of kindness shown and at this time was besieged with Cicero, presented them with a slave of his to send as a messenger through the lines. Because of his dress and his native speech he would be able to associate with the enemy as one of their number, without attracting notice, and after that he could depart. In this way Cæsar —9— learned of what was taking place (he had not yet gone to Italy but was still on the way), and, turning back, he took with him the soldiers in the winter establishments through which he passed, and pressed rapidly

B. C. 54 (*a. u.* 700)

B. C. 54 (*a. u.* 700) on. Meanwhile being afraid that Cicero in despair of assistance might suffer disaster or capitulate, he sent forward a horseman. He did not trust the servant of the Nervian, in spite of having received an actual proof of his good will: he was afraid that he might pity his countrymen and work him some great evil. So he sent a horseman of the allies who knew their dialect and had dressed himself in their garb. And in order that even he might not voluntarily or involuntarily reveal the secret he gave him no verbal message and wrote to Cicero in Greek all the injunctions that he wished to give, in order that even if the letter should be captured, it might still be incomprehensible to the barbarians and afford them no information. He had also the custom as a usual thing, when he was sending a secret order to any one, to write constantly the fourth letter beyond, instead of the proper one, so that the writing might be unintelligible to most persons. The horseman reached the camp of the Romans, but not being able to come close up to it he fastened the letter to a small javelin and hurled it into the enemy's ranks, fixing it purposely in a tower. Thus Cicero, on learning of the advent of

—10— Cæsar, took courage and held out more stubbornly. The barbarians for a long time knew nothing of the assistance he was bringing; he journeyed by night, lying by day in most obscure places, so as to fall upon them as far as possible unawares. At last from the unnatural cheerfulness of the besieged they suspected it and sent out scouts. Learning from them that Cæsar was at last drawing near they set out against him, thinking to attack him while off his guard. He received advance in-

formation of this movement and remained where he was that night, but just before dawn took up a strong position. There he encamped apparently with the utmost haste, for the purpose of appearing to have only a few followers, to have suffered from the journey, to fear their onset, and by this plan to draw them to the higher ground. And so it proved. Their contempt for him led them to charge up hill, and they met with such a severe defeat that they committed not another warlike act. B. C. 54 (*a. u.* 700)

—11— In this way both they and all the rest were at that time subdued; they did not, however, feel kindly toward the Romans. The Treveri, indeed, when Cæsar sent for the principal men[1] of each tribe and punished them, through fear that they, too, might be called upon to pay the penalty assumed again a hostile attitude, lending an attentive ear to the persuasions of Indutiomarus. They led some others who feared the same treatment to revolt and headed an expedition against Titus Labienus, who was among the Remi, but were annihilated in an unexpected sally made by the Romans.

—12— This was what took place in Gaul, and Cæsar wintered there so as to be able to keep strict control of affairs. Crassus, desiring for his part to accomplish something that would confer some glory and profit upon him, made a campaign against the Parthians, since after consideration he saw no such opportunity in Syria, where the people were quiet and the officers

[1] Compare Cæsar's Gallic War, V, 54, 1.

B. C. 54 (*a. u.* 700) who had formerly warred against the Romans were by reason of their impotency causing no disturbance. He had no complaint to bring against the Parthians nor had war been decreed, but he heard that they were exceeding wealthy and expected that Orodes would be easy to capture, because but newly established. Therefore he crossed the Euphrates and proceeded to traverse a considerable portion of Mesopotamia, devastating and ravaging the country. As his crossing was unexpected by the barbarians no strong guard had been placed at that point. Silaces, then governor of that region, was quickly defeated near Ichnai, a fortress so named, after contending with a few horsemen. He was wounded and retired to report personally to the king

—13— the Romans' invasion: Crassus quickly got possession of the garrisons and especially the Greek cities, among them one named Nicephorium. Many of the Macedonians and of the rest that fought for the Parthians were Greek colonists, oppressed by violence, and not unwillingly transferred their allegiance to the Romans, who, they strongly hoped, would be favorable to the Greeks. The inhabitants of Zenodotium, pretending a willingness to revolt, sent for some of the invaders, but when they were within the town cut them off and killed them, for which act they were driven from their homes. Outside of this Crassus for the time being neither inflicted nor received any serious harm. He certainly would have subdued the other regions beyond the Tigris, if he had followed up the advantage from his own attack and the barbarians' panic equally in all respects, and had he wintered furthermore where he was, keeping

a sharp lookout on their behavior. As it turned out, he captured only what he could seize by sudden assault and paid no heed to the rest nor to the people themselves, but wearied by his stay in Mesopotamia and longing for the indolence of Syria he afforded the Parthians time to prepare themselves and to injure the soldiers left behind in their country. B. C. 54 (*a. u.* 700)

This was the beginning that the Romans made of war against them. They dwell beyond the Tigris, possessing for the most part forts and garrisons, but also a few cities, among them Ctesiphon, in which there is a palace. Their stock was very likely in existence among the original barbarians and they had this same name even under the Persian rule. But at that time they inhabited only a small portion of the country and had not obtained any transmontane sovereignty. When the Persian kingdom had been destroyed and that of the Macedonians had reached its prime, and then the successors of Alexander had quarreled one with another, cutting off separate portions for their own and setting up individual monarchies, this land then first attained prominence under a certain Arsaces, from whom their succeeding rulers have received the title of Arsacidæ. By good fortune they acquired all the neighboring territory, kept control of Mesopotamia by means of satrapies, and finally advanced to so great glory and power as to fight against the Romans at that period and to be considered worthy antagonists up to the present time.[1] They are really formidable in warfare and possess the greater reputation, in spite of — 14 —

[1] cp. LXXX, 3.

B. C. 54 (*a. u.* 700) never having gained anything from the Romans and having parted with certain portions of their own domain, because they have not yet been enslaved, but even now carry wars against us to the end, whenever they
— 15 — get into conflicts. About their race and their country and the peculiarities of their customs many persons have spoken, and I have no intention of compiling an account. But it is fair to mention in what follows their equipment of arms, and the way they handle a war: the examination of these details properly concerns the present narrative, since it here needs to introduce them. The Parthians make no use of a shield, but their forces consist of mounted archers and pike-bearers, mostly in full armor. Their infantry is small, made up of the weaker persons; hence it may be said they are all archers. They practice from boyhood, and the sky and the country coöperate with them for two good ends. The latter, being for the most part level, is excellent for raising horses and very suitable for riding over with horses. Therefore even in war the people lead about whole droves so that they can use some horses at one place and others at another, can ride up suddenly from a distance and also retire to a distance speedily. The sky above them, too, which is very dry and contains not the least moisture, affords them perfect opportunity for archery, except in the winter. For that reason they make no campaigns in any direction during the winter season. But the rest of the year they are almost invincible in their own country and in any that has similar characteristics. By long custom they can

endure the sun, which is very scorching, and they have discovered many remedies for the scantiness and difficulty of a supply of drink,— a fact which is a help to them in repelling without difficulty the invaders of their land. Outside of this district and beyond the Euphrates they have once or twice exercised some sway by battles and sudden incursions, but to fight with any nation continuously, without stopping, is not in their power, when they encounter an entirely different condition of land and sky and have no supplies of either food or pay. B. C. 54 (*a. u.* 700)

Such is the Parthian state. Crassus, as has been stated, invaded Mesopotamia and Orodes sent envoys to him in Syria to censure him for the invasion and ask the causes of the war; he sent also Surena with an army to the captured and revolted sections. He himself had in mind to lead an expedition against Armenia, which had once belonged to Tigranes, in order that Artabazes, son of Tigranes, the king of the land at that time, should, through fear for his own domains, send no assistance to the Romans. Now Crassus said that he would tell him in Seleucia the causes of the war. (This is a city in Mesopotamia having even at the present day chiefly a Greek population.) And one of the Parthians, bringing down upon the palm of his left hand the fingers of the other, exclaimed: "More quickly will hair grow herein, than you will reach Seleucia." —16—

And when the winter set in,[1] in which Gnæus Cal- —17— B. C. 53 (*a. u.* 701)

[1] Verb supplied by Reiske.

B. C. 53 (*a. u.* 701) vinus and Valerius Messala became consuls, many portents occurred even in Rome itself. Owls and wolves were seen, prowling dogs did damage, some sacred statues exuded sweat and others were destroyed by lightning. The offices, partly through rivalry but chiefly by reason of birds and omens, were with difficulty filled at last in the seventh month. Those signs, however, gave no clear indication as to what the event would be. For affairs in the City were in turmoil, the Gauls had risen again, and, though the Romans knew it not as yet, they had broken into war against the Parthians: but to Crassus signs that were both evident and easy to interpret appeared as he was crossing the Euphrates opposite Zeugma.[2] That spot has been so called from the campaign of Alexander, because he
—18— crossed at this point. The omens were of the following nature. There is a small shrine and in it a golden eagle, which is found in all the legions that are on the register, and it never moves from the winter-quarters except the whole army goes forth on some errand. One man carries it on a long shaft, which ends in a sharp spike for the purpose of setting it firmly in the ground. Now of these so-called eagles one was unwilling to join him in his passage of the Euphrates at that time, but stuck fast in the earth as if planted until many took their places around it and pulled it out by force, so that it accompanied even involuntarily. But one of the large standards, that resemble sheets, with purple letters upon them to distinguish the division and its

2 "Zeugma" signifies a "fastening together" (of boats or other material) to make a bridge.

commander, turned about and fell from the bridge into the river. This happened in the midst of a violent wind. Then Crassus, who had the rest of equal length cut down, so as to be shorter and consequently steadier to carry, only increased the prodigies. In the very passage of the river so great a mist enshrouded the soldiers that they fell over one another and could see nothing of the enemy's country until they set foot upon it: and the sacrifices both for crossing and for landing proved very unfavorable. Meantime a great wind burst upon them, bolts of lightning fell, and the bridge, before they had all passed over, was destroyed. The occurrences were such that any one, even if extremely ignorant and uninstructed, would interpret them to mean that they would fare badly and not return. Hence there was great fear and dejection in the army. Crassus, trying to encourage them, said: "Be not alarmed, fellow soldiers, that the bridge has been destroyed nor think because of this that any disaster is portended. For I declare to you upon oath that I have decided to make my return march through Armenia." By this he would have emboldened them, had he not at the end added in a loud voice the words: "Be of good cheer: for none of you shall come back *this* way." When they heard this, the soldiers deemed that it, no less than the rest, had been a portent for them, and fell into greater discouragement; and so it was that they paid no heed to the remainder of his exhortation, in which he belittled the barbarian and glorified the Roman State, offered them money and announced prizes for valor.

B. C. 53 (*a. u.* 701)

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B. C. 53 (*a. u.* 701) Still, even so, they followed and no one said a word or committed an act to oppose him, partly by reason of the law, but further because they were terrified and could neither plan nor carry out any measures of safety. In all other respects, too, as if predestined to ruin by some Divinity, they deteriorated both in mind and body.

—20— Nevertheless, the greatest injury was done them by Abgarus of Osrhoene. He had pledged himself to peace with the Romans in the time of Pompey, but now chose the side of the barbarians. The same was done by Alchaudonius the Arabian, who always attached himself to the stronger party. The latter, however, revolted openly, and hence was not hard to guard against. Abgarus favored the Parthian cause, but pretended to be well disposed toward Crassus. He spent money for him unsparingly, learned all his plans (which he reported to the foe), and further, if any course was excellent for the Romans he tried to divert him from it, but if disadvantageous, to urge him to it. At last he was responsible for the following occurrence. Crassus was intending to advance to Seleucia by such a route as to reach there safely along the side of the Euphrates and on its stream, with his army and provisions. Accompanied by the people of that city, whom he hoped to win over easily, because they were Greeks, he could cross without difficulty to Ctesiphon. Abgarus caused him to give up this course, on the ground that it would take a long time, and persuaded him to assail Surena, because the latter was near and had only a few men.

Then, when he had arranged matters so that the invader should perish and the other should conquer (for he was continually in the company of Surena, on the pretext of spying), he led out the Romans, blinded by folly, to what he said was a victory in their very hands, and in the midst of the action joined the attack against them. —21— B. C. 53 (*a. u.* 701)

It happened like this. The Parthians confronted the Romans with most of their army hidden; the ground was uneven in spots and wooded. Crassus seeing them — not Crassus the commander, but the younger, who had come to his father from Gaul,— and despising them (supposing them to be alone), led out his cavalry and, as they turned purposely to flight, pursued them. In his eagerness for victory he was separated far from his phalanx, and was then caught in a trap and cut down. When this took place the Roman infantry did not turn back, but valiantly joined battle with the Parthians to avenge his death. They accomplished nothing worthy of themselves, however, because of the enemy's numbers and tactics, especially as they suffered from the plotting of Abgarus. If they decided to lock shields for the purpose of avoiding the arrows by the density of their array, the pike-bearers were upon them with a rush, would strike down some, and at least scatter the others: and if they stood apart, so as to turn these aside, they would be shot with arrows. —22—

Hereupon many died from fright at the very charge of the pike-bearers, and many hemmed in by the horsemen perished. Others were upset by the pikes or were carried off transfixed. The missiles falling thick upon

B. C. 53 (*a. u.* 701) them from all sides at once struck down many by an opportune blow, put many out of the battle, and caused annoyance to all. They flew into their eyes and pierced their hands and all the other parts of the body and, penetrating their armor, forced them to take off their protection and expose themselves to wounds each minute. Thus, while a man was guarding against arrows or pulling out one that had stuck fast he received more wounds, one upon another. Consequently it was not feasible for them to move, nor feasible to remain at rest. Neither course afforded them safety, and both were fraught with destruction, the one because it was out of their power, and the other because they were

—23— more easily wounded. This was what they suffered while they were fighting only against visible enemies. Abgarus did not immediately make his attempt upon them. When he, too, attacked, the Orshoeni themselves struck the Romans from behind in exposed places while they were facing in a different direction, and rendered them easier for the others to slaughter. For the Romans, altering their formation, so as to be facing them, put the Parthians behind them. They wheeled around again against the Parthians, then back again against the Orshoeni, then against the Parthians once more. Thrown into still greater confusion by this circumstance, because they were continually changing position this way and that and were forced to face the body that was wounding them at the time, many fell upon their own swords or were killed by their comrades. Finally they were shut up in so narrow a place, with

the enemy continually assaulting them from all sides at once, and compelled to protect their exposed parts by the shields of those who stood beside them, that they could no longer move. They could not even get a sure footing by reason of the number of corpses, but kept falling over them. The heat and thirst — it was midsummer and this action took place at noon — and the dust, of which all the barbarians raised as much as possible by riding around them, told fearfully upon the survivors, and many succumbed to these influences, even though unwounded. And they would have perished utterly, but for the fact that some of the pikes of the barbarians were bent and others were broken, while the bowstrings snapped under the constant shooting, the missiles were all discharged, every sword blunted, and, chief of all, that the men themselves grew weary of the slaughter. Under these conditions, then, when it grew night the assailants being obliged to ride off to a distance retired. They never encamp near even the weakest bodies, because they use no intrenchments and if any one comes upon them in the darkness, they are unable to deploy their cavalry or their archery to advantage. However, they captured no Roman alive at that time. Seeing them standing upright in their armor and perceiving that no one threw away any part of it or fled, they deemed that they still had some strength, and feared to lay hold of them.

B. C. 53 (*a. u.* 701)

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So Crassus and the rest, as many as could, set out for Carræ, kept faithful to them by the Romans that had stayed behind within the walls. Many of the wounded being unable to walk and lacking vehicles or even men

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B. C. 53 (*a. u.* 701) to carry them (for the survivors were glad of the mere chance to drag their own persons away) remained on the spot. Some of them died of their wounds or by making away with themselves, and others were captured the next day. Of the captives many perished on the road, as their physical strength gave out, and many later because they were unable to obtain proper care immediately. Crassus, in discouragement, believed he would be unable to hold out safely even in the city any longer, but planned flight at once. Since it was impossible for him to go out by day without being detected, he undertook to escape by night, but failed to secure secrecy, being betrayed by the moon, which was at its full. The Romans accordingly waited for moonless nights, and then starting out in darkness and a foreign land that was likewise hostile, they scattered in tremendous fear. Some were caught when it became day and lost their lives: others got safely away to Syria in the company of Cassius Longinus, the quæstor. Others, with Crassus himself, sought the mountains and pre-

—26— pared to escape through them into Armenia. Surena, learning this, was afraid that if they could reach any headquarters they might make war on him again, but still was unwilling to assail them on the higher ground, which was inaccessible to horses. As they were heavy-armed men, fighting from higher ground, and in a kind of frenzy, through despair, contending with them was not easy. So he sent to them, inviting them to submit to a truce, on condition of abandoning all territory east of the Euphrates. Crassus, nothing wavering, trusted

him. He was in the height of terror and distraught by his private misfortune and the public calamity as well; and because, further, he saw that the soldiers shrank from the journey (which they thought long and rough) and that they feared Orodes, he was unable to foresee anything that he ought. When he displayed acquiescence in the matter of the truce, Surena refused to conduct the ceremony through the agency of others, but in order to cut him off with only a few and seize him, he said that he wished to hold a conference with the commander personally. Thereupon they decided to meet each other in the space between the two armies with an equal number of men from both sides. Crassus descended to the level ground and Surena sent him a present of a horse, to make sure of his coming to him more quickly. While Crassus was thus delaying and planning what he should do, the barbarians took him forcibly and threw him on his horse. Meanwhile the Romans also laid hold of him, they came to blows, and for a time carried on an equal struggle; then aid came to the kidnapers, and they prevailed. The barbarians, who were in the plain and were prepared beforehand, were too quick for the Romans above to help their men. Crassus fell among the rest, whether he was slain by one of his own men to prevent his capture alive, or whether by the enemy because he was wounded anyway. This was his end. And the Parthians, as some say, poured gold into his mouth in mockery; for though a man of great wealth he was so eager for money as to pity those who could not support an en-

B. C. 53 (*a. u.* 701)

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B. C. 53 (*a. u.* 701) rolled legion from their own means, regarding them as poor men. Of the soldiers the majority escaped through the mountains to friendly territory, but a fraction fell into the hands of the enemy.

—28— B. C. 52 (*a. u.* 702) The Parthians at this time did not advance beyond the Euphrates, but won back the whole country east of it. Later they also (though not in any numbers) invaded Syria, because the province had neither general nor soldiers. The fact that there were not many of them enabled Cassius easily to effect their repulse. When at Carræ the soldiers through hatred of Crassus granted to Cassius absolute control of themselves, and the commander himself on account of the greatness of the disaster voluntarily allowed it, but Cassius would not accept it: now, however, he took charge of Syria perforce, for the time being and subsequently. For the barbarians would not keep away from it, but campaigned once more against them with a larger band and under the nominal leadership of one Pacorus by name, the son of Orodes, though under the real direction of Osaces (for the other was still a child). They came as far as Antioch, subduing the whole country before them. They had hopes of subjugating also what remained, since the Romans were not at hand with a force fit to cope with them, and the people were fretting under Roman rule but ready to turn to the invaders, who were neighbors and acquaintances.

—29— As they failed to take Antioch, where Cassius repulsed them severely and they were unable to institute any siege, they turned to Antigonea. The neighbor-

hood of the city was overgrown with wood and they were dismayed, not being able to march into it. They then formed a plan to cut down the trees and lay bare the whole place so that they might approach the town with boldness and safety. Finding themselves unable to do this, because the task was a great one and their time was spent in vain, while Cassius harassed those scattered about, they retired apparently with the intention of proceeding against some other position. Meanwhile Cassius set an ambush on the road along which they were to depart, and confronting them there with a few men he induced them to pursue, led them into the trap, and killed Osaces and others. Upon the latter's death Pacorus abandoned all of Syria and never invaded it again. B. C. 52 (*a. u.* 702)

He had scarcely retired when Bibulus arrived to govern Syria. His coming, to be sure, was in contravention of a decree intended to prevent rivalry for office, so productive of seditions, that no prætor nor consul, at once or at any time within four years, should go abroad to hold office. He administered the subject country in peace, and turned the Parthians against one another. Having won the friendship of Orondapates, a satrap, who had a grudge against Orodes, he persuaded him through messengers to set up Pacorus as king, and with him to conduct a campaign against the other. —30—

This war came to an end in the fourth year from the time when it had begun, and while Marcus Marcellus and Sulpicius Rufus were consuls. In that same period Cæsar by battle again gained control of Gallic affairs, B. C. 51 (*a. u.* 703) —31—

B. C. 51 (*a. u.* 703) which were in an unsettled state. He accomplished very much himself and some things through his lieutenants, of which I will state only the most important. Ambiorix won the confidence of the Treveri, who at

B. C. 54 (*a. u.* 700) this time were still smarting under the setback of Indutiomarus's death, raised a greater conspiracy in that quarter, and sent for a mercenary force from the Celtæ. Labienus wishing to join issue with them before this last contingent should be added to their number invaded the country of the Treveri in advance. The latter did not defend themselves, as they were awaiting reinforcements, but put a river between the two armies and remained quiet. Labienus then gathered his soldiers and addressed them in words of such a nature as were likely to alarm his own men and encourage the others: they must, he said, before the Celtæ repelled them, withdraw to Cæsar and safety; and he immediately gave the signal to pack up the baggage. Not much later he began actually to withdraw, expecting that that would occur which really did. The barbarians heard of his speech,— they took very good care in such matters and it was for just that reason that it had been delivered publicly,— and thought he was really afraid and truly taking to flight. Hence they eagerly crossed the river and started toward the Romans with spirit, as fast as each one could. So Labienus received their attack while they were scattered, and after terrifying the foremost easily routed the rest because of the action of the men in front. Then as they were fleeing in disorder, falling over one another and crowding toward the river, he killed many of them.

Not a few of them escaped even so, of whom Cæsar made no account, except of Ambiorix: this man by hurrying now one way and now another and doing much injury caused Cæsar trouble in seeking and pursuing him. Not being able to catch him by any device the Roman commander made an expedition against the Celtæ, alleging that they had wished to help the Treveri. On this occasion likewise he accomplished nothing, but retired rapidly through fear of the Suebi: he gained the reputation, however, of having crossed the Rhine again, and of the bridge he destroyed only the portions near the barbarians, constructing upon it a guard-house, as if he might at any time have a desire to cross. Then, in anger at the successful flight of Ambiorix, he delivered his country, though guilty of no rebellion, to any one who wished, to be plundered. He gave public notice of this in advance, that as many as possible might assemble, wherefore many Gauls and many Sugambri came for the plunder. It did not suffice the Sugambri, however, to make spoil of Gallic territory, but they attacked the Romans themselves. They watched until the Romans were absent getting provender and made an attempt upon their camp; but meanwhile the other soldiers, perceiving it, came to the rescue and killed a number of the assailants. Inspired with a fear of Cæsar by this encounter they hurriedly withdrew homeward: he inflicted no punishment upon any one of them because of the winter and the political disputes in Rome, but after dismissing the soldiers to their winter-quarters, went himself to Italy on the plea

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B. C. 53
(*a. u.* 701)

B. C. 53 (*a. u.* 701) of caring for Hither Gaul, but really in order that he might be located close to what was taking place in the city.

—33— B. C. 52 (*a. u.* 702) Meantime the Gauls made another outbreak. The Arverni under the leadership of Vercingetorix revolted, killed all the Romans they found in their country, and proceeding against the tribes in alliance with the foreigner bestowed favors upon such as were willing to join their revolt, and injured the rest. Cæsar, on ascertaining this, returned and found that they had invaded the Bituriges. He did not try to repel them, all his soldiers not being at hand as yet, but by invading the Arvernian country in his turn drew the enemy home again, whereupon, not deeming himself yet a

—34— match for them, he retired in good season. They accordingly went back to the Bituriges, captured Avaricum, a city of theirs, and in it maintained a resistance a long time, for the wall was hard to approach, being bordered on one side by almost trackless swamps and on the other by a river with a swift current. When, therefore, later they were besieged by the Romans, their great numbers made it easy for them to repel assaults, and they made sallies, inflicting great damage. Finally they burned over everything in the vicinity, not only fields and villages but also cities from which they thought assistance could come to the foe, and if anything was being brought to them from allies at a distance, they seized it for booty. Therefore the Romans, while appearing to besiege the city, really suffered the fate of besieged, until a furious rain and great wind

sprang up (the winter having already set in) during their attack on one point in the wall, which first drove the assailants back, making them seek shelter in their tents, and then confined the barbarians, too, in their houses. When they had gone from the battlements the Romans suddenly attacked again, while there were no men there: and first capturing a tower, before the enemy became aware of their presence, they then without difficulty got possession of the remaining works, plundered the whole city, and in anger at the siege and their hardship slew all the men. B. C. 52 (*a. u.* 702)

—35— After effecting this Cæsar conducted a campaign against their territory. The rest of the Arverni in view of the war being made upon them had gained possession in advance of the bridges which he had to cross; and he being in doubt as to how he should pass over, proceeded a considerable distance along the bank to see if he could find any place suitable for going over on foot through the water itself. Soon after he reached a woody and overshadowed spot, from which he sent forward the baggage-carriers and most of his army a long way, with line stretched out: he bade them go forward so that all his troops might appear to be in that one division. He himself with the strongest portion remained behind, cut down the wood, made rafts, and on them crossed the stream while the barbarians still had their attention fixed on those going along in front and calculated that Cæsar was among them. After this he called back the advance party by night, transferred them across in the same way, and conquered the country. The people fled in a body to Gergovia, carrying there all their most valued possessions, and Cæsar

B. C. 52 (*a. u.* 702) —36— had a great deal of toil to no purpose in besieging them. Their fort was on a strong hill and they had strengthened it greatly with walls; also the barbarians round about had seized all the high ground and were keeping guard over it, so that if they remained in position they could safely hold their own, and if they charged down they would gain the greater advantage. For Cæsar, not having any sure position to choose, was encamped in the plain and never knew beforehand what was going on: but the barbarians, higher up, could look down upon his camp and kept making opportune charges. If they ever advanced farther than was fitting and were beaten back, they quickly got within their own domain again; and the Romans in no way could come as near to the places as stones and javelins could be hurled. The time was in general spent uselessly: often when he assaulted the very height upon which their fortress was located, he would capture a certain portion of it so that he could wall it in and continue thence more easily his progress against the rest of it, but on the whole he met with reverses. He lost a number of his soldiers, and saw that the enemy could not be captured. Moreover, there was at this time an uprising among the Ædui, and while he was absent attending to them, the men left behind fared badly. All these considerations led Cæsar to raise the siege.

—37— The Ædui in the beginning abode by their agreements and sent him assistance, but later they made war rather involuntarily, being deceived by Litaviccus and others. He, having been unable by any other course to

persuade them to adopt a hostile attitude, managed to get the appointment of conveying some men to Cæsar to be the latter's allies. He started off as if to fulfill this mission, but sent ahead also some horsemen and bade some of them return and say that their companions and the rest of their men in the camp of the Romans had been arrested by the latter and put to death. Then he further excited the wrath of his soldiers by delivering a speech appropriate to the message. In this way the Ædui themselves rose and led others to revolt with them. Cæsar, as soon as he ascertained this, sent to them the Ædui whom he had and was thought to have slain, so that they might be seen by all to be alive, and followed on with his cavalry. On this occasion, then, they repented and made terms. The Romans were later, by reason of Cæsar's absence, defeated close to Gergovia and then entirely withdrew from that country; wherefore those who had caused the uprising and were always desirous of a change in politics feared that if they delayed the Romans might exact vengeance[1] from them, and consequently rebelled entirely. Members of their tribe who were campaigning with Cæsar, when they learned of this, asked him to allow them to return home, promising that they would arrange everything. Released on these conditions they came to Noviodunum where the Romans had deposited money and grain and many hostages, and with the coöperation of the natives destroyed the garrisons, who were not expecting hostility, and became

B. C. 52 (*a. u.* 702)

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1 A gap here is filled by following approximately Bekker's conjecture.

B. C. 52 (*a. u.* 702) masters of all of them. That city, because advantageous, they burned down, to prevent the Romans from making it a starting point for the war, and they next caused the remainder of the Ædui to revolt. Cæsar, therefore, attempted to march against them at once, but not being able, on account of the river Liger, he turned his attention to the Lingones. And not even there did he meet with success. Labienus, however, occupied the island in the Sequana river by conquering its defenders on the shore, and crossed over at many points at once, both down stream and up, in order that his troops might not be hindered by all crossing at one spot.

—39— Before this happened Vercingetorix, filled with contempt for Cæsar because of his reverses, had marched against the Allobroges. And he intercepted the Roman leader, who had meantime started out evidently to aid them, when he was in Sequania, and surrounded him but did him no damage: on the contrary he compelled the Romans to be brave through despair of safety, but he failed himself by reason of his numbers and audacity and was even defeated to a certain extent by the Celtæ that were allies of the Romans; for to their charges with unwearying bodies they added the strength of daring and so broke through the enclosing ranks. Having discovered this device Cæsar did not give ground, but shut up in Alesia such of the foe as
—40— fled, and besieged them. Now Vercingetorix at first, before the wall had entirely cut off his followers, had sent out the horsemen to get fodder for the horses (there being none on hand), and in order to let them

disperse, each to his native land, and bring thence provisions and assistance. As these delayed and food supplies began to fail the beleaguered party, he thrust out the children and the women and the most useless among the rest, vainly hoping that either the outcasts would be saved as booty by the Romans or else those left in the town might perhaps survive by enjoying for a longer time the supplies that would have belonged to their companions. But Cæsar to begin with had not sufficient himself to feed others. Thinking, therefore, that by their return he could make the deficiency of food seem more severe to the enemy (for he expected that the expelled would without doubt be received), he forced them all back. So these perished most miserably between the city and the camp, because neither party would receive them. The relief looked for from the horsemen and such others as they were conducting reached the barbarians before long, but it was then defeated[1] by the onset of the Romans in a cavalry battle. Thereupon the relief party tried by night to enter the city through the enclosing wall but was bitterly disappointed: for the Romans had made hidden pits in those roads which were used by horses and had fixed stakes in them, afterward making the whole surface resemble the surrounding country; thus horse and man, falling into them absolutely without warning, were mangled. These reinforcements did not, however, give up until, marshaled once more in battle array beside the very walls, they themselves and at the same time the men in the city who came out to fight had met with failure.

B. C. 52 (*a. u.* 702)

[1] Verb supplied by Oddey.

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B. C. 52
(*a. u.* 702)

Now Vercingetorix might have escaped, for he had not been captured and was unwounded, but he hoped, because he had once been on friendly terms with Cæsar, that he would obtain pardon from him. So he came to him without any announcement by herald, but appeared before him suddenly, as Cæsar was seated on a platform, and threw some that were present into alarm; he was first of all very tall, and in a suit of armor he made an extremely imposing figure. When quiet had been restored, he uttered not a word, but fell upon his knees and remained so, with clasped hands. This inspired many with pity at remembrance of his former fortune and at the distressing state in which he now appeared. But Cæsar reproached him in this very matter on which he most relied for ultimate safety, and by setting before him how he had repaid friendliness with the opposite treatment proved his offence to have been the more abominable. Therefore he did not pity him even for one moment, but immediately confined him in bonds, and later, after sending him to his triumph, put him to death.

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B. C. 51
(*a. u.* 703)

This was really a later occurrence. At the time previously mentioned he gained some of the survivors by capitulation and enslaved the rest, after conquering them in battle. The Belgæ, who live near by, put at their head Commius, an Atrebatian, and resisted for a great while. They fought two close cavalry battles and the third time in an infantry battle they showed themselves at first an equal match, but later, attacked unexpectedly in the rear by cavalry, they turned to flight. After this the remainder abandoned the camp

by night, and as they were passing through a wood set fire to it, leaving behind only the wagons, in order that the enemy might be delayed by these and by the fire, and they retire to safety. Their hopes, however, were not realized. The Romans, as soon as they perceived their flight, pursued them and on encountering the fire they extinguished part of it and hewed their way through the rest. Some even ran right through the flame, overtook the fugitives without warning and slaughtered great numbers. Thereafter some of them capitulated, but the Atrebatian, who escaped, would not keep quiet even after this experience. He undertook at one time to ambush Labienus, and after a defeat in battle was persuaded to hold a conference with him. Before any terms were made he was wounded by one of the Romans who surmised that it was not his real intention to make peace, but he escaped and again proved troublesome to them. At last, despairing of his project, he secured for his associates entire amnesty extending to all their people, and for himself, as some say, on condition of never appearing again within sight of any Roman. So the contending parties became reconciled and subsequently the rest, some voluntarily and others overcome in war, were subdued. Then Cæsar by garrisons and legal penalties and levies of money and assignment of tribute humbled some and tamed others.

B. C. 51 (*a. u.* 703)

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Thus this trouble came to an end in the consulship of Lucius Paulus and Gaius Marcellus. Cæsar in the interest of the Gauls and to see about the term allowed him for leadership had to leave Gaul and return to Rome. His office was about to terminate, the war had

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B. C. 50 (*a. u.* 704)

B. C. 50 (*a. u.* 704) ceased, and he had no longer any satisfactory excuse for not disbanding his troops and returning to private life. Affairs in the city at this time were in turmoil, Crassus was dead, and Pompey had again come to power, after being three times consul and having managed to get the government of Spain granted to him for five years more. The latter had no longer any bond of alliance with Cæsar, especially now that the child, who alone had kept them on friendly terms, had passed away. The returning general therefore was afraid that stripped of his soldiers he might fall into the power of Pompey and of his other enemies, and therefore did not dismiss them.

—45— B. C. 53 (*a. u.* 701) In these same years many tumults of a seditious character had arisen in the city, and especially in connection with the elections, so that it was fully six months before Calvinus and Messala could be appointed consuls. And not even then would they have been chosen, had not Quintus Pompeius Rufus, though the grandson of Sulla and serving as tribune, been cast into prison by the senate, whereupon the measure was voted by the rest who were anxious to commit some outrages, and the campaign against opposition was handed over to Pompey. Sometimes the birds had prevented elections, refusing to allow the offices to belong to interreges; above all the tribunes, by managing affairs in the city so that they instead of the prætors conducted games, hindered the remaining offices from being filled. This also accounts for Rufus having been confined in a cell. He later on brought Favonius the ædile

to the same place on some small charge, in order that he might have a companion in his disgrace. But all the tribunes introduced various obstructive pleas, proposing, among other things, to appoint military tribunes, so that more persons, as formerly, might come to office. When no one would heed them, they declared that Pompey, at all events, must be chosen dictator. By this pretext they secured a very long delay: for he was out of town, and of those on the spot there was no one who would venture to vote for the demand (for in remembrance of Sulla's cruelty they all hated that policy), nor yet venture to refuse to choose Pompey, on account of their fear of him. At last, quite late, he came himself, refused the dictatorship offered to him, and made preparation to have the consuls named. These likewise on account of the turmoil from assassinations did not appoint any successors, though they had laid aside their senatorial garb and in the dress of knights convened the senate as if on the occasion of some great calamity. They also passed a decree that no one,— either an ex-prætor or an ex-consul,— should assume foreign office until five years should have elapsed: this they did to see if people when it was no longer in any one's power to be immediately elected would cease their craze for office. For no moderation was being shown and there was no purity in their methods, but they vied with one another in expending great sums and fighting more than ever, so that once the consul Calvinus was wounded. Hence no consul nor prætor nor prefect of the city had any successor,

B. C. 53 (*a. u.* 701)

—46—

B. C. 52 (*a. u.* 702) but at the beginning of the year the Romans were absolutely without a government in these branches.

—47— Nothing good resulted from this, and among other things the market recurring every ninth day was held on the very first of January. This seemed to the Romans to have taken place not by accident, and being considered in the light of a portent it caused trepidation. The same feeling was increased when an owl was both seen and caught in the city, a statue exuded perspiration for three days, a flash darted from the south to the east, and many thunderbolts, many clods, stones, tiles and blood descended through the air. It seems to me that that decree passed the previous year, near the close, with regard to Serapis and Isis, was a portent equal to any: the senate decided to tear down their temples, which some private individuals had built. For they did not reverence these gods any long time and even when it became the fashion to render public devotion to them, they settled them outside the pomerium.

—48— Such being the state of things in the city, with no one in charge of affairs, murders occurred practically every day and they did not finish the elections, though they were eager for office and employed bribery and assassination on account of it. Milo, for instance, who was seeking the consulship, met Clodius on the Appian Way and at first simply wounded him: then, fearing he would attack him for what had been done, he slew him. He at once freed all the servants concerned in the business, and his hope was that he might be more easily acquitted of the murder, now that the man was

dead, than he would be for the wound in case he had survived. The people in the city heard of this about evening and were thrown into a terrible uproar: for to factional disturbances there was being added a starting-point for war and evils, and the middle class, even though they hated Clodius, yet on account of humanity and because on this excuse they hoped to get rid of Milo, showed displeasure. While they were in this frame of mind Rufus and Titus Munatius Plancus took hold of them and excited them to greater wrath. As tribunes they conveyed the body into the Forum just before dawn, placed it on the rostra, exhibited it to all, and spoke appropriate words with lamentations. So the populace, as a result of what it both saw and heard, was deeply stirred and paid no further heed to considerations of sanctity or things divine, but overthrew all the customs of burial and nearly burned down the whole city. The body of Clodius they picked up and carried into the senate-house, arranged it in due fashion, and then after heaping a pyre of benches burned both the corpse and the convention hall. They did this, therefore, not under the stress of such an impulse as often takes sudden hold of crowds, but of set purpose, so that on the ninth day they held the funeral feast in the Forum itself, with the senate-house still smouldering, and furthermore undertook to apply the torch to Milo's house. This last was not burned because many were defending it. Milo for a time, in great terror over the murder, was hidden not only by ordinary citizens but under the guard of knights and some senators. When this other act, however, occurred, he hoped that the wrath of the senate would

B. C. 52 (*a. u.* 702)

— 49 —

B. C. 52 (*a. u.* 702) pass over to the outrage of the opposing party. They had assembled late in the afternoon on the Palatine for this very purpose, and had voted that an interrex be chosen by show of hands and that he and the tribunes and Pompey, moreover, care for the guarding of the city, that it suffer no detriment. Milo, accordingly, made his appearance in public, and pressed his claims to the office as strongly as before, if not more strongly.

—50— As a consequence of this, conflicts and killings in plenty began again, so that the senate ratified the aforementioned measures, summoned Pompey, allowed him to make fresh levies, and changed their garments. Not long after his arrival they assembled under guard near his theatre outside the pomerium and resolved that the bones of Clodius should be taken up, and assigned the rebuilding of the senate-house to Faustus, son of Sulla. It was the Curia Hostilia which had been remodeled by Sulla. Wherefore they came to this decision about it and ordered that when repaired it should receive again the former's name. The city was in a fever of excitement about the magistrates who should rule it, some talking to the effect that Pompey ought to be chosen dictator and others that Cæsar should be elected consul. They were so determined to honor the latter for his achievements that they voted to offer sacrifices over them sixty[1] days. Fearing both of the men the rest of the senate and Bibulus, who was first to be asked and to declare his opinion, anticipated the onset of the masses by giving the consulship to

[1] Twenty days according to Cæsar's Gallic War (VII, 90). Reimar thinks "sixty" an error of the copyists.

Pompey to prevent his being named dictator, and to him alone in order that he might not have Cæsar as his colleague. This action of theirs was strange; it had been taken in no other case, and yet they seemed to have done well. For since he favored the masses less than Cæsar, they hoped to detach him from them altogether and to make him their own. This expectation was fulfilled. Elated by the novelty and unexpectedness of the honor, he no longer formed any plan to gratify the populace but was careful to do everything that pleased the senate. B. C. 52 (*a. u.* 702)

He did not, however, wish to hold office alone. Possessing the glory that lay in such a vote having been passed he was anxious to divert the envy that arose from it. Also he felt afraid that, as the field was vacant, Cæsar might be given him as colleague through the enthusiasm of the powerful classes and the populace alike. First of all, therefore, in order that his rival might not think he had been entirely neglected and therefore show some just displeasure, he arranged through the tribunes that he should be permitted even in absence to be a candidate for the office, when the proper time came according to law. Pompey himself then chose as assistant Quintus Scipio, who was his father-in-law and had incurred a charge of bribery. This man, by birth son of Nasica, had been transferred by the lot of succession to the family of Metellus Pius, and for that reason bore the latter's name. He had given his daughter in marriage to Pompey, and now received in turn from him the consulship and immunity from accusation. Very many had been examined in the complaint above mentioned, especially because the —51— —52—

B. C. 52 (*a. u.* 702) courts, by Pompey's laws, were more carefully constituted. He himself selected the entire list of names from which drawings for jurors had to be made, and he limited the number of advocates on each side, in order that the jurymen might not be confused and disturbed by the numbers of them. He ordered that the time allotted to the plaintiff be two hours, and to the defendant three. And what grieved many most of all, he revised the custom of eulogizers being presented by those on trial (for great numbers kept escaping the clutches of the law because commended by persons worthy of confidence); and he had a measure passed that such prisoners should in future be allowed no one whomsoever to eulogize them. These and other reforms he instituted in all the courts alike; and against those who practiced bribery for office he raised up as accusers those who had formerly been convicted of some such offence, thus offering the latter no small prize. For if any one secured the conviction of two men on charges equal to that against himself, or even on smaller charges, or if one man on a greater charge, he went scot free.

—53— Among many others who were thus convicted was Plautius Hypsæus, who had been a rival of Milo and of Scipio for the consulship. Though all three had been guilty of bribery he alone was condemned. Scipio was indicted, and by two persons at that, but was not tried, on account of Pompey: and Milo was not charged with this crime (for the murder formed a greater complaint against him), but being brought to trial on the latter charge he was convicted, as he was not able to use any violence. Pompey kept the city in general well

under guard and himself with armed soldiers entered the court. When some raised an outcry at this, he ordered the soldiers to drive them out of the Forum by striking them with the side, or the flat, of their swords. When they would not yield, but showed defiance as if the broadsides were being used for mere sport, some of them were wounded and killed. B. C. 52 (*a. u.* 702)

After this, the courts being convened in quiet, many were condemned on various charges, and, for the murder of Clodius, Milo among others though he had Cicero as a defender. That orator, seeing Pompey and the soldiers contrary to custom in the court, was alarmed and overwhelmed with dread, so that he did not deliver any of the speech he had prepared, but after saying a few words with effort in a half-dead voice, was glad to retire. This speech which is now supposed to have been delivered at that time in behalf of Milo he wrote some time later and at leisure, when he had recovered his courage. There is also the following story about it. When Milo, in banishment, made the acquaintance of the speech sent to him by Cicero, he wrote back saying that it was lucky for him those words had not been spoken in that form in the court; for he would not be eating such fine mullets in Massilia (where he was passing his exile), if any such defence had been made. This he wrote, not because he was pleased with his circumstances,— he made many ventures to secure his return,— but as a joke on Cicero, because after saying nothing important at the time of the defence he later both practiced and sent to him these fruitless words, as if they could now be of any service to him. —54—

—55—
B. C. 52
(*a. u.* 702)

In this way Milo was convicted; and so were Rufus and Plancus, as soon as they had finished their term of office, together with numerous others on account of the burning of the senate-house. Plancus was not even benefited by Pompey, who was so earnest in his behalf that he sent to the court a volume containing both a eulogy of the prisoner and a supplication for him. Marcus Cato, who was eligible to sit as a juryman, said he would not allow the eulogizer to destroy his own laws. But he got no opportunity to cast his vote; for Plancus rejected him, feeling sure that he would give his voice for condemnation: (by the laws of Pompey each of the parties to a suit was allowed to set aside five out of the number that were to judge him;) the other jurors, however, voted against him, especially as it did not seem right to them after they had condemned Rufus to acquit Plancus, who was on trial on the same charge. And when they saw Pompey coöperating with him, they showed the more zeal against him, for fear they might be thought to be absolute slaves of his rather than jurymen. It should be said that on this occasion, too, Cicero accused Plancus no better than he had defended Milo: for the appearance of the courtroom was the same, and Pompey in each case was planning and acting against him,— a circumstance that naturally led to a second collision between them.

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After attending to these matters Pompey revived the law about elections (which had fallen somewhat into disuse) commanding those who seek an office to present themselves without fail before the assembly, so that no one who is absent may be chosen. He also con-

firmed the ordinance, passed a short time previously, that those who had held office in the city should not be allotted to foreign governorships before five years had passed. He was not ashamed at this time to record such measures, although a little later he himself took Spain for five years more and granted Cæsar, whose friends were in a terrible state of irritation, the right to canvass for the consulship (as had been decreed), even in his absence. He amended the law to read that only those should be permitted to do it who were granted the privilege by name and without disguise; but of course this was no different from its not being prohibited at all, for men who had any influence were certainly going to manage to get the right voted to them. B. C. 52 (*a. u.* 702)

Such were the political acts of Pompey. Scipio without enacting any new laws abolished the measures emanating from Clodius, with regard to the censors. It looked as though he had done this out of favor to them since he restored to them the authority which they formerly had: but it turned out to be the opposite. For in view of the fact that there were many worthless men both in the equestrian and in the senatorial orders, so long as it had not been permitted them to expel any one, either accused or convicted, no fault was found with them on account of those whose names were not expunged. But when they got back their old power and were allowed to do this and to examine the life of each man separately, they had not the hardihood to come to an open break with many and did not wish to incur any censure for not expelling those guilty of improper —57—

B. C. 52 (*a. u.* 702) conduct, and for this reason no sensible person had any desire for the office any longer.

—58— This was the vote passed with regard to the censors. Cato on the whole did not wish any office, but seeing Cæsar and Pompey outgrowing the system of government, and surmising that they would either get control of affairs between themselves or would quarrel with each other and create a mighty strife, the victor in which would be sole ruler, he wished to overthrow them before they became antagonists, and hence sought the consulship to use it against them, because as a private citizen he was likely to wield no influence. His designs were guessed, however, by the adherents of the two men and he was not appointed, but instead Marcus Marcellus and Sulpicius Rufus were chosen, the one on account of his acquaintance with the law and the other for his ability in speaking. One special reason was that they, even if they did not employ bribes or violence, yet showed deference to all and were wont to exhort people frequently, whereas Cato was deferential to no one. He never again became a candidate for the office, saying that it was the duty of an upright man not to avoid the leadership of the commonwealth if any person wished him to enjoy it, nor yet to pursue

B. C. 51 (*a. u.* 703)

—59— it beyond the limits of propriety. Marcellus at once directed all his efforts to compass the downfall of Cæsar,—for he was of Pompey's party,—and among the many measures against him that he proposed was one to the effect that a successor to him should be sent before the appointed time. He was resisted by Sulpicius and some of the tribunes,—by the latter out of good will toward Cæsar. Sulpicius made common

cause with them and with the multitude, because he did not like the idea of a magistrate who had done no wrong being stopped in the middle of his term. Pompey was starting from the city with the avowed intention of leading an expedition into Spain, but he did not at this time even leave the bounds of Italy, and after assigning to his lieutenants the entire business abroad he himself kept close watch on the city. Now when he heard how things were going, he pretended that the plan of having Cæsar detached from his command did not please him either, but he arranged matters so that when Cæsar should have served out the time allowed him, an event not of the distant future, but due to occur the following year,— he should lay down his arms and return home to be a private citizen. In pursuance of this object he made Gaius Marcellus, a cousin of Marcus,[1] or a brother (both traditions are current), obtain the consulship, because although allied to Cæsar by marriage he was hostile to him; and he made Gaius Curio, who was also an oldtime foe of his rival, receive the tribuneship. B. C. 51 (*a. u.* 703)

Cæsar was on no account inclined to become a private citizen after so great a command and one of such long standing, and was afraid that he might fall into —60— B. C. 50 (*a. u.* 704)

[1] The words "of Marcus" were added by Leunclavius to make the statement of the sentence correspond with fact. Their omission would seem to be obviously due to haplography. The confusion about the relationship, which might well have arisen by Dio's time, is very possibly the consequence of the idiomatic Latin "frater patruelis" used by Suetonius (for instance) in chapter 29 of his Life of Cæsar. The two men were, in fact, first cousins. Again in Appian (Civil Wars, Book Two, chapter 26), we read of "Claudius Marcellus, cousin of the previous Marcus." Both had the gentile name Claudius, one being Marcus Claudius, and the other Gaius Claudius, Marcellus.

B. C. 50 (*a. u.* 704) the power of his enemies. Therefore he made preparations to stay in office in spite of them, collected additional soldiers, gathered money, manufactured arms, and conducted himself to please all. Meanwhile, desiring to settle matters at home somewhat beforehand, so as not to seem to be gaining all his ends by violence, but some by persuasion, he decided to effect a reconciliation with Curio. For the latter belonged to the family of the Curiones, had a keen intelligence, was eloquent, was greatly trusted by the populace and absolutely unsparing of money for all purposes by which he could either benefit himself or hoped to gain benefit for others. So, by buoying him up with many hopes and releasing him from all his debts which on account of his great expenditures were numerous, Cæsar attached him to himself. In view of the present importance of the objects for which he was working he did not spare money, since he could collect it from the people themselves, and he also promised various persons large sums, of which he was destined to give them not the smallest particle. He courted not only the free but the slaves who had any influence whatever with their masters, and as a result a number of the knights and the senators, too, joined his party.

—61— Thus Curio began to espouse Cæsar's cause; not immediately, however, did he begin to show open activity, because he was seeking an excuse of fair semblance and was trying to appear to have transferred his allegiance not willingly, but under compulsion. He also took into consideration that the more he should asso-

ciate with his patron's enemies in the guise of their friend, the more and the greater secrets of theirs he would learn. For these reasons he dissimulated for a very long time, and to prevent any suspicion of his having changed sides and not maintaining and representing still at this time an attitude of unqualified opposition to Cæsar as one of the leading spirits in the movement, he even made a public harangue against him, as a result of which he gained the tribuneship and prepared many unusual measures. Some bills he offered against the senate and its most powerful members, who were especially active in Pompey's behalf, not because he either wished or expected that any one of them would be passed, but in order that, as they did not accept them, so no measure might be passed against Cæsar (for many motions to his detriment were being offered by many persons), and that he himself might transfer his support on this excuse. After this, having used up considerable time at various occasions on various pretexts, not a single one of which met with favor, he pretended to be vexed and asked that another month be inserted for the legislation that resulted from his measures. This practice was followed at regular periods, established by custom, but not for any such reason as his, and he himself, being pontifex, understood that fact. Nevertheless he said that it ought to be done and made a fine show of forcing his fellow-priests. At last not being able to persuade them to assent to his proposal (of which he was very glad), he would not permit any other matter for this reason to be voted upon. On the contrary he already began

B. C. 50 (a. u. 704)

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B. C. 50 (*a. u.* 704) openly to justify Cæsar's actions, since, as he said, he was unable to accomplish anything against him, and brought forward every possible proposition which was sure of not being accepted. The chief of these was that all persons in arms must lay these down and disband their legions, or else they should not strip Cæsar of his weapons and expose him to the forces of his rivals. This he said, not because he wished Cæsar to do it, but because he well understood that Pompey would not yield obedience to it, and thus a plausible excuse was offered the former for not dismissing his soldiers.

—63— Pompey, accordingly, as he could effect nothing in any other way, proceeded without any further disguise to harsh measures and openly said and did everything against Cæsar. He failed, however, to accomplish aught. Cæsar had many followers, among them Lucius Paulus, colleague of Marcellus, and Lucius Piso, his father-in-law, who was censor. For at this time Appius Claudius and Piso (though the latter did not desire it), were made censors. So Piso on account of his relationship belonged to Cæsar, while Claudius opposed him, espousing Pompey's cause, yet quite involuntarily he rendered Cæsar very efficient aid. He expelled very many both of the knights and the senators, overpowering his colleague, and in this way made them all favor Cæsar's aspirations. Piso who on every account wished to avoid trouble and to maintain friendship with his son-in-law paid court to many people, being himself responsible for none of the above

acts, but he did not resist Claudius when he drove from the senate all the freedmen and numbers of the real nobility, among them Sallustius Crispus who wrote the History. When Curio, however, was about to have his name expunged, Piso, with the help of Paulus (whose kinsman he was), did beg him off. Consequently Claudius did not expel him but made public in the senate the opinion that he had of him, so that he, indignant, rent his clothes. Marcellus followed him, and thinking that the senate would pass some severe vote against Curio and, because of him, against Cæsar, brought forward propositions about him. Curio at first opposed any decision being rendered regarding him; but on coming to realize that of the majority of the senators then present some really were attached to Cæsar's cause and others thoroughly feared him, he allowed them to decide, saying incidentally only this: "I am conscious of doing what is best and most advantageous for my country: to you, however, I surrender both my body and soul to treat as you please." Marcellus accordingly accused him, thinking that he would certainly be convicted, and then when he was acquitted by the majority the accuser took it greatly to heart: rushing out of the assembly he came to Pompey, who was in the suburbs, and on his own responsibility, without the formality of a vote, gave him charge to keep guard over the city along with two legions of civilians. These soldiers were then present, having been collected in the following way and for the following purpose. Pompey before this, while he was still on friendly terms

B. C. 50 (*a. u.* 704)

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—65—

B. C. 50 (*a. u.* 704) with Cæsar, had given him one legion composed of those troops which according to the register belonged to him, inasmuch as he was not conducting any war and Cæsar had need of soldiers. When they fell out with each other, in his desire to get this back from him and to deprive him of yet another he delivered a speech, stating that Bibulus required soldiers against the Parthians; and in order that no new levies should be raised,— for the matter was urgent, he said, and they had an abundance of legions,— he got it voted that each of them, himself and Cæsar, must send one to him. Thereupon he failed to despatch any of those engaged in warfare under his own command, but ordered those whose business it was to demand that legion which he had given to Cæsar. So nominally both of them contributed, but in reality Cæsar alone sent the two. He knew what was being done, but complied with the demand, not wishing to incur the charge of disobedience, particularly because on this excuse he intended to raise in turn many more soldiers.

—66— These legions, therefore, were apparently made ready to be sent against the Parthians, but when there proved to be no need of them, (there was really no use to which they could be put,) Marcellus, fearing that they might be restored to Cæsar, at first declared that they must remain in Italy, and then, as I have said, gave them into Pompey's charge. These proceedings took place near the close of the year and were destined not to be in force for long, since they had been approved neither by the senate nor by the populace: ac-

cordingly, he brought over to Pompey's side Cornelius Lentulus and Gaius Claudius, who were to hold the consulship the next year, and caused them to issue the same commands. Since they were allowed to give out letters to men appointed to office and to perform even so early some other functions belonging to the highest post in the state before they assumed it, they believed that they had authority also in this matter. And Pompey, although he was very exact in all other details, nevertheless on account of his need of soldiers did not investigate this action at all, nor the sources from which he was getting them, nor in what way, but accepted them very gratefully. Yet no such result was accomplished as one would have expected to come from so great a piece of audacity: they merely displayed their enmity toward Cæsar, as a consequence of which they could not gather any further formidable equipment, and furnished to him a plausible excuse for retaining the troops that were with him. For Curio using the acts mentioned as his text delivered before the populace a violent arraignment both of the consuls and of Pompey, and when he had finished his term he at once set out to join Cæsar.

B. C. 50
(*a. u.* 704)

DIO'S
ROMAN HISTORY
41

The following is contained in the Forty-first of Dio's Rome.

How Cæsar came into Italy, and how Pompey, leaving it, sailed across to Macedonia (chapters 1–17).

How Cæsar subjugated Spain (chapters 18–37).

How Cæsar sailed across to Macedonia to encounter Pompey (chapters 38–46).

How Cæsar and Pompey fought at Dyrrachium (chapters 47–51).

How Cæsar conquered Pompey at Pharsalus (chapters 52–63).

Duration of time, two years, in which there were the following magistrates, here enumerated.

L. Cornelius P. F. Lentulus, C. Claudius M. F. Marcellus. (B. C. 49 = a. u. 705.)

C. Iulius C. F. Cæsar (II), P. Servilius P. F. Isauricus. (B. C. 48 = a. u. 706.)

This is what he (sc. Curio) did then: later he came —1— to Rome with a letter to the senate from Cæsar on the very first day of the month on which Cornelius Lentulus and Gaius Claudius entered upon office; and he would not give it to the consuls until they reached the senate-house, for fear that if they received it outside they might conceal it. Even as it was they waited a long time, not wishing to read it, but at last they were compelled by Quintus Cassius Longinus and Mark Antony, the tribunes, to make it public. Now Antony for the favor he did Cæsar at the time in this matter was destined to receive a great return and to be raised himself to heights of power. In the letter was contained a list of the benefits which Cæsar had conferred upon the commonwealth and a defence of the charges which were brought against him. He promised that he would disband his legions and give up his office if Pompey would also do the same: for while the latter bore arms, he said, it was not just for him to be compelled to part with his and so be exposed to his enemies. The vote on this proposition was taken not individu- —2— ally for fear that through having respect to others or some element of fear the senators might express the opposite of their true opinion; but it was done by their taking their stand on this side or on that of the senate-chamber. No one voted that Pompey should cease to bear arms (for he had his troops in the suburbs), but

B. C. 49 (*a. u.* 705)

B. C. 49 (*a. u.* 705) all, except one Marcus Cælius and Curio, who had carried his letter, decided that Cæsar must. About the tribunes I say nothing because no necessity was laid upon them to separate into two different groups; for they had authority to contribute their vote if they wished, or otherwise not. This, then, was the decision made, but Antony and Longinus did not allow any point in it to be ratified either on that day or the next.

—3— The rest, indignant at this, voted to change their garb, but through the intervention of the same men did not obtain ratification of this measure either. Their opinion, however, was recorded and the appropriate action followed: namely, all straightway left the senate-house, and after changing their clothes came in again and proceeded to deliberate about vengeance to be taken on the obstructionists. They, seeing this, at first resisted but later became afraid, especially when Lentulus advised them to get out of the way before the votes should be cast: hence after many remarks and protestations they set out with Curio and with Cælius to Cæsar, little heeding that they had been expelled from the senate. This was the determination reached at that time, and the care of the city was committed to the consuls and to the other magistrates, as had been the custom. Afterward the senators went outside the pomerium to Pompey himself, declared that there was a state of disorder, and gave to him both the money and soldiers. They voted that Cæsar should surrender his office to his successors and send away his legions by a given day, or else be considered an enemy, because acting contrary to the interests of the country.

When he was informed of this he came to Ariminum, —4— B. C. 49 (*a. u.* 705) then for the first time overstepping the confines of his own province, and after collecting his soldiers he bade Curio and the others who had come with him relate what had been done by them. After this was finished he inspirited them by adding such words as the occasion demanded. Next he set out and marched straight upon Rome itself, taking possession of all the intervening cities without a conflict, since the garrisons of some abandoned them by reason of weakness and others espoused his cause. Pompey, perceiving this, was frightened, especially when he learned all his intentions from Labienus. The latter had abandoned Cæsar and come as a deserter, and he announced all the latter's secrets to Pompey. One might feel surprise that after having always been honored by Cæsar in the highest degree, to the extent of governing all the legions beyond the Alps whenever their head was in Italy, he should have done this. The reason was that when he had clothed himself with wealth and fame he began to conduct himself more haughtily than his position warranted, and Cæsar, seeing that he put himself on the same level with his master, ceased to be so fond of him. As he could not endure this changed attitude and was at the same time afraid of suffering some harm, he transferred his allegiance.

Pompey as a result of what was told him about —5— Cæsar and because he had not yet prepared a force to cope with him changed his plans: for he saw that the dwellers in the city, yes, the members of the sedition themselves, even more than the others, shrank from the

B. C. 49 (*a. u.* 705) war through remembrance of the deeds of Marius and Sulla and wished to escape it in safety. Therefore he sent as envoys to Cæsar, Lucius Cæsar, a relative of his, and Lucius Roscius, a prætor,— both of them volunteering for the service,— to see if he could avoid his open attack and then make an agreement with him on some fair terms. The other replied to the same effect as in his letter, previously forwarded, and said also that he wished to converse with Pompey: but the people were displeased to hear this, fearing that some measures might be concerted against them. When, however, the envoys uttered many words in praise of Cæsar, and finally promised besides that no one should suffer any harm at his hands and that the legions should immediately be disbanded, they were pleased and sent the same envoys to him again, and besought both of the opposing leaders with shouts, calling upon them everywhere and always to lay down their arms at the

—6— same time. Pompey was frightened at this, knowing well that he would be far inferior to Cæsar if they should both have to depend on the clemency of the populace, and betook himself to Campania before the envoys returned, with the idea that there he could more easily make war. He also commanded the whole senate together with those who held the offices to accompany him, granting them permission by a decree of absence, and telling them in advance that whoever remained behind he should regard as equal and alike to those who were working against him. Furthermore he enjoined them to vote that all the public moneys and the votive offerings in the city be removed, hoping that from this

source he could gather a vast number of soldiers. For practically all the cities of Italy felt such friendliness for him that when a short time before they had heard he was dangerously ill, they vowed they would offer public sacrifices for his preservation. That this was a great and brilliant honor which they bestowed upon him no one could gainsay; there is no one in whose behalf such a vote has been passed, except those who later assumed absolute sovereignty: nevertheless he had not a sure ground of confidence that they would not abandon him under the influence of fear of a stronger power. The recommendation about the moneys and the votive offerings was allowed, but neither of them was touched; for having ascertained meanwhile that Cæsar's answer to the envoys had been anything but peaceful and that he also reproached them with having made some false statements about him, that his soldiers were many and bold and liable to do any kind of mischief (such reports, tending to greater terror, as are usually made about such matters), the senators became frightened and hastily took their departure before they could lay a finger on any of the objects. B. C. 49 (*a. u.* 705)

—7— For this reason their removal was equally in all other respects of a tumultous and confused appearance. The departing citizens, practically all of whom were the foremost men of the senate and of the knights and of the populace, nominally were setting out for war, but really were undergoing the experiences of captives. They were terribly distressed at being compelled to abandon their country and their pursuits there, and to

B. C. 49 (*a. u.* 705) consider foreign walls more native than their own. Such as removed with their entire household said farewell to the temples and their houses and their paternal threshold with the feeling that these would straightway become the property of their opponents: they themselves, not being ignorant of Pompey's intention, had the purpose, in case they should survive, of establishing themselves in Macedonia or Thrace. And those who left behind on the spot their children and wives and their other most valued possessions appeared to have some little hope of their country but really fared much worse than the others, since being sundered from their dearest treasures they exposed themselves to a double and most hostile fortune. For in delivering their closest interests to the power of their bitterest foes they were destined to play the coward and yet themselves encounter danger, to show zeal and yet to be deprived of what they prized: moreover they would find a friend in neither rival, but an enemy in both,—in Cæsar because they themselves did not remain behind, and in Pompey because they did not take the others with them. Hence they assumed a twofold attitude in their decisions, in their prayers, and in their hopes: with their bodies they were being drawn away from those nearest to them, and their souls they found cleft in twain.

—8— These were the feelings of the departing throng: and those left behind had to face a different, but equally unpleasant situation. Bereft of the association of their nearest relatives, deprived, as it were, of their guardians and far from able to defend them-

selves, exposed to the enemy and about to be subject to the authority of him who should make himself master of the city, they were themselves distressed by fear both of outrages and of murders as if they were already taking place. In view of these same possibilities such as were angry at the fugitives, because they themselves had been left in the lurch, cursed them for it, and those who condoned their action because of the necessity still felt consequent fears. The rest of the populace entire, even if they possessed not the least kinship with those departing, were nevertheless grieved at their fate, some expecting that their neighbors, and others that their comrades would go far away from them and do and suffer many unusual things. Most of all they bewailed their own lot, seeing the magistrates and the senate and all the rest who had any power,— they were not sure whether a single one of them would be left behind,— cast out of their country and away from them. They reflected how those men, had not many altogether dreadful calamities fastened themselves upon the State, would never have wished to flee, and they likened themselves, made destitute of allies, in every conceivable respect to orphaned children and widow women. Being the first to await the wrath and the lust of the oncoming foe, they remembered their former sufferings, some by experience and others by hearing it from the victims, all the outrages that Marius and Sulla had committed, and they therefore did not look to Cæsar for moderate treatment.[1] On

B. C. 49 (*a. u.* 705)

1 Small gaps occur in this sentence, filled by conjectures of Bekker and Reiske.

B. C. 49 (*a. u.* 705) the contrary, because his army was constituted very largely of barbarians, they expected that their misfortunes would be far more in number and more terrible than those of yore.

—9— Since, then, all of them were in this condition, and no one except those who appeared to be good friends of Cæsar made light of the situation, and even they, in consideration of the change of character to which most men are subject according to their circumstances, were not courageous enough to think that the source of their confidence was reliable, it is not easy to conceive how great confusion and how great grief prevailed at the departure of the consuls and those who set out with them. All night they made an uproar in packing up and going about, and toward dawn great sorrow fell upon them, induced by the action of the priests, who went about offering prayers on every side. They invoked the gods, showered kisses on the floors, enumerated how many times and from what perils they had survived, and lamented that they were leaving their country,— a venture they had never made before. Near the gates, too, there was much wailing. Some took fond leave at once of each other and of the city as if they were beholding them for the last time: others bewailed their own lot and joined their prayers to those of the departing: the larger number, on the ground that they were being betrayed, uttered maledictions. The whole population, even those that stayed behind, were there with all the women and all the children. Then the one group set out on their way and the other group escorted them. Some interposed delays and were detained by their acquaintances: others embraced

and clung to each other for a long time. Those that remained accompanied those setting out, calling after them and expressing their sympathy, while with invocations of Heaven they besought them to take them, too, or to remain at home themselves. Meanwhile there were shrill sounds of wailing over each one of the exiles, even from outsiders, and insatiate floods of tears. Hope for the best they were scarcely at all inclined to entertain in their condition; it was rather suffering which was expected, first by those who were left and subsequently by those who were departing. Any one that saw them would have guessed that two peoples and two cities were being made from one and that one was being driven out and was fleeing, whereas the other was being left to its fate and was being captured. B. C. 49 (*a. u.* 705)

Pompey thus left the city drawing many of the senators after him; some remained behind, either attached to Cæsar's cause or maintaining a neutral attitude toward both. He hastily raised levies from the cities, collected money, and sent garrisons to almost every point. Cæsar, when he learned this, did not hurry to Rome: it, he knew, was offered as a prize to the victors, and he said that he was not marching against that place as hostile to him but against his political opponents in its behalf. And he sent a letter throughout all Italy in which he summoned Pompey to a kind of trial, encouraged all to be of good cheer, bade them remain in their places, and made them many promises. He set out next against Corfinium, which, being occupied by Lucius Domitius, had not joined his adherents, and after conquering in battle a few who met him he shut up the rest in a state of siege. Pompey, inasmuch as these citi- —10—

B. C. 49 (*a. u.* 705)

zens were being besieged and many of the others were falling off to Cæsar, had no further hope of Italy but resolved to cross over into Macedonia, Greece, and Asia. He derived much encouragement from the remembrance of what he had achieved there and from the friendship of the people and the princes. (Spain was likewise devoted to him, but he could not reach it safely because Cæsar had possession of both the Gauls.) Moreover he calculated that if he should sail away, no one would pursue him on account of the lack of boats and on account of the winter,— the late autumn being far advanced,— and meanwhile he would at leisure amass both money and troops, much of them

—11— from subject and much from allied territory. With this design, therefore, he himself set out for Brundusium and bade Domitius abandon Corfinium and accompany him. In spite of the large force that Domitius had and the hopes he reposed in it — for he had courted the favor of the soldiers in every way and had won some of them by promises of land (having belonged to Sulla's veterans he had acquired a large amount in that reign) — he nevertheless obeyed orders. Meanwhile Pompey proceeded with his preparations to evacuate the country in safety: his associates learning this shrank from the journey abroad, because it seemed to them a flight, and attached themselves to Cæsar. So these joined the invader's army: but Domitius and the other senators after being censured by Cæsar for arraying themselves in opposition, were released and came to Pompey.

Cæsar now was anxious to join issue with him before he sailed away, to fight it out with him in Italy, and to overtake him while he was still at Brundusium; for since there were not sufficient boats for them, Pompey had sent forward the consuls and others, fearing that they might begin some rebellion if they stayed on the spot. Cæsar, seeing the difficulty of capturing the place, urged his opponent to accede to some agreement, assuring him that he should obtain both peace and friendship again. When Pompey made no further response than that he would communicate to the consuls what Cæsar said, the latter, inasmuch as they had decided to receive no citizen in arms for a conference, assaulted the city. Pompey repelled him for some days until the boats came back. Having meanwhile barricaded and obstructed with fortifications the roads leading to the harbor so that no one should attack him while sailing off, he then set sail by night. Thus he crossed over to Macedonia in safety and Brundusium was captured as well as two boats full of men. — 12 — B. C. 49 (*a. u.* 705)

Pompey accordingly deserted in this way his country and the rest of Italy, choosing and carrying out quite the opposite of his former course, when he sailed back to it from Asia; wherefore he obtained the reverse fortune and the reverse reputation. Formerly he broke up his legions at Brundusium, in order not to cause the citizens any solicitude, but now he was leading away through the town to fight against them other forces gathered from Italy. Whereas he had brought the wealth of the barbarians to Rome, he had now con- — 13 —

B. C. 49 (*a. u.* 705) veyed away from it all that he possibly could to other places. And of all those at home he was in despair, but purposed to use against his country foreigners and the allies once enslaved by him, and he put far more hope in them both of safety and of power than in those who had been benefited. Instead of the brilliance, therefore, which, acquired in those wars, had marked his arrival, he set out with humiliation as his portion in return for his fear of Cæsar: and instead of fame which he had had for exalting his country, he became most infamous for his desertion of her.

—14— At the very moment of coming to land at Dyrrachium he learned that he should not obtain a prosperous outcome. Thunderbolts destroyed soldiers even as the ships were approaching; spiders occupied the army standards; and after he had left the vessel serpents followed and obliterated his footprints. These were the portents which he encountered in person, but before the whole capital others had occurred both that year and a short time previously. For there is no doubt about the fact that in seditions the state is injured by both parties. Hence many wolves and owls were seen in the City itself and continual earthquakes with bellowings took place, fire shot down from the west to the east, and other fires burned both the temple of Quirinus and a second. The sun, too, suffered a total eclipse, and thunderbolts damaged a sceptre of Jupiter, a shield and a helmet of Mars that were votive offerings on the Capitol, and furthermore the tablets which contained the laws. Many animals brought forth crea-

tures outside of their own species, certain oracles purporting to be those of the Sibyl were made known, and some men becoming inspired practiced numerous divinations. No præfectus urbi was chosen for the Feriæ, as had been the custom, but the prætors, at least according to some accounts, performed all his duties; others say they did this only in the next year. If the former are right it happened twice; and the first season Perperna who had once been censor with Philippus died, being the last, as I stated, of all the senators who had been alive in his censorship. This event, too, seemed likely to cause political confusion. The people were, then, naturally disturbed at the portents, but as both sides thought and hoped that they could lay them all on their opponents, they offered no expiatory sacrifices. B. C. 49 (*a. u.* 705)

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Cæsar at this time did not even attempt to sail to Macedonia, because he was short of boats and had fears for Italy, dreading that the lieutenants of Pompey from Spain might assail and occupy it. He put Brundusium under guard for the purpose that no one of those departed should sail back again, and went to Rome. There the senate had been assembled for him outside the pomerium by Antony and Longinus: they, who had been expelled from it, now convened that body. He accordingly made a speech of some length and of a temperate character, so that they might experience good-will toward him at the present and feel an excellent hope for the future. And since he saw them displeased at what was going on and suspicious of the

B. C. 49 (*a. u.* 705) multitude of soldiers, he wished to encourage and to conciliate them somewhat, to the end that quiet might prevail in their quarter while he was conducting the war. Therefore he censured no one and delivered no threat against any person, but made an attack not without imprecations upon those who wished to war against citizens, and at last moved that ambassadors be sent immediately in behalf of peace and harmony to the

—16— consuls and to Pompey. He made these same statements also to the populace, when that body had likewise assembled outside the pomerium, and he sent for corn from the islands and promised each one of them seventy-five denarii. He hoped to tempt them with this bait. The men, however, reflected that those who are pursuing certain ends and those who have attained them do not think or act alike: at the start of their operations they make all the most delightful offers to such as can work against them in any way, but when they succeed in what they wish, they remember nothing at all about it and use against those very persons the power which they have received from them. They remembered also the behavior of Marius and Sulla,— how many kind things they had often told them, and then what treatment they had given them in return for their confidence,— and furthermore perceiving Cæsar's necessity and seeing that his armed followers were many and were everywhere in the city, they were unable either to trust or to be cheered by his words. On the contrary, as they had fresh in their memory the fear caused by former events, they suspected him also, particularly because the ambassadors apparently intended to initiate a reconciliation were chosen, to be

sure, but did not go out. Indeed, for even making mention of them once Piso, his father-in-law, was severely rebuked. The people, far from getting at that time the money which he had promised them, had to give him all the rest that remained in the public coffers for the support of his soldiers, whom they feared. Amid all these happenings, as being favorable, they wore the garb of peace, which they had not as yet put off. Lucius Metellus, a tribune, opposed the proposition about the money, and when his efforts proved ineffectual went to the treasury and kept watch of its doors. The soldiers, paying little heed to either his guarding or his outspokenness, cut through the bar,— for the consuls had the key, as if it were not possible for persons to use axes in place of it,— and carried out all the money. In fact, Cæsar's other projects also, as I have often stated, he both brought to vote and carried out in the same fashion, under the name of democracy,— the most of them being introduced by Antony,— but with the substance of despotism. Both men named their political rivals enemies of their country and declared that they themselves were fighting for the public interests, whereas each really ruined those interests and increased only his own private possessions. B. C. 49 (*a. u.* 705) —17—

After taking these steps Cæsar occupied Sardinia and Sicily without a battle, as the governors there at that time withdrew. Aristobulus he sent home to Palestine to accomplish something against Pompey. He also allowed the children of those proscribed by Sulla to canvass for office, and arranged everything else both in the city and in the rest of Italy to his own best —18—

B. C. 49 (*a. u.* 705) advantage, so far as circumstances permitted. Affairs at home he now committed to Antony's care and himself set out for Spain which distinctly chose to follow Pompey and caused him some uneasiness lest his rival should induce the Gallic countries to revolt. Meantime Cicero and other senators did not appear in Cæsar's sight, but retired to join Pompey, who, they believed, had more justice on his side and would conquer in the war. For the consuls before setting sail and Pompey using the authority of proconsul had ordered them all to accompany him to Thessalonica on the general ground that the capital was being held by certain enemies but that they themselves were the senate and would maintain the form of the government wherever they should be. For this reason most of the senators and the knights, some of them immediately and others later, and all the cities that were not subdued by Cæsar's arms, embraced his cause.

—19— The Massilians, however, alone of the peoples who dwell in Gaul, refused to coöperate with Cæsar, and would not receive him into their city, but made a noteworthy answer to him. They said they were allies of the Roman people and were favorably disposed toward both generals, and they could not go into details and were not competent to judge which of the two was in the wrong: consequently, in case of friendly overtures being made they would receive them both, they said, without their arms, but on a war basis neither of them. On being placed in a state of siege they repulsed Cæsar himself and held out for a very long time against Trebonius and Decimus Brutus, who subsequently besieged them. Cæsar contended stoutly for some time, think-

ing to capture them easily, and regarding it as ridiculous that after vanquishing Rome without a battle he was not received by the Massilians; but later, when their resistance proved stubborn, he committed them to the care of others and himself hastened to Spain. He had sent thither already Gaius Fabius, but fearing he would fail while contending by himself, he too began a campaign. Afranius and Petreius at this time had charge of affairs in the vicinity of the Iber and had posted a guard over the pass in the mountains, but chiefly they had gathered their forces in Ilerda, and there awaited the attackers. Fabius repulsed the hostile garrison at the Pyrenees but as he was crossing the river Sicoris they fell upon him suddenly and killed many of his men who were cut off. The bridge assisted them materially by breaking before all had crossed. When Cæsar came up not much later, he crossed the river by another bridge and challenged them to battle; but they did not dare to try conclusions with him for a very considerable number of days, and remained quietly encamped opposite him. Encouraged from this cause he undertook to seize the ground, a strong position, between their rampart and the city, with the intention of shutting them off from the walls. Afranius and his followers on perceiving this occupied it first, repulsed their assailants, and pursued them when they fled. Then when others came out against them from the fortress they first resisted, then yielded purposely, and so enticed the sallying party into positions which were favorable to themselves, where they slew many more of them. After this they took courage, attacked Cæsar's foraging parties and harassed the scattered

B. C. 49 (*a. u.* 705)

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B. C. 49 (*a. u.* 705) members. And on one occasion when some soldiers had crossed to the other side of the river and meantime a great storm had come up and the bridge which they had used was destroyed, they crossed over also by the other bridge, which was near the city, and annihilated them all, as no one was able to come to their assistance.

—21— Cæsar, when this continued to happen, fell into desperate straits: none of his allies rendered him assistance, for his opponents met and annihilated[1] them as fast as they heard that each one was approaching, and it was with difficulty that he managed to obtain provisions, inasmuch as he was in a hostile territory and unsuccessful in his operations. The Romans at home, when they ascertained it, renounced all hopes of him, and believing that he would survive but a short time longer fell off to Pompey. Some few senators and others set out to join the latter even so late as this. It happened just at this time that the Massilians were defeated in a naval battle by Brutus through the size of his ships and the strength of his marines, although they had Domitius as an ally and surpassed in their experience of naval affairs; they were subsequently shut in entirely. But for this nothing would have prevented Cæsar's projects from being ruined. As it was, however, the victory by preconcerted arrangement was announced to the Spaniards with so many embellishments that it led some of them to change and follow the fortunes of Cæsar. When he had obtained these

[1] Verb suggested by Xylander, Reiske, Bekker.

as adherents, he secured plenty of food, constructed bridges, harassed his opponents, and once intercepted suddenly a number of them who were wandering about the country and destroyed them. B. C. 49 (*a. u.* 705)

Afranius was disheartened at these results, and seeing that affairs in Ilerda were not safe or satisfactory for a prolonged delay, he determined to retire to the Iber and to the cities there. He set out on this journey by night, intending to escape the enemy's notice or at least get the start of them. His departure proved no secret, yet he was not immediately pursued, for Cæsar did not think it safe in the darkness to follow up with men who were strangers to the place an enemy that was well acquainted with the country. When, however, day dawned, he hastened forward and overtaking them in the middle of their journey he encompassed them suddenly on all sides from a distance; for he was much superior in numbers and found the bowl-shaped character of the country a help. He did not wish to come into close quarters with the enemy, partly because he was afraid that they might become frenzied and accomplish some desperate undertaking, and partly again because he hoped to win them over without conflict. This also took place. They tried to break through at many points, but were unable to do so anywhere: they were wearied from loss of sleep and from their march; they had no food, since, expecting to finish their journey the same day, they had brought none, and were not well supplied with water, for that region is notably waterless: for these reasons they surrendered them- —22—

B. C. 49 (*a. u.* 705) selves, on condition that they should not be maltreated nor compelled to join his expedition against Pompey.

—23— Cæsar kept each of his promises to them scrupulously. He killed not a single man captured in this war in spite of the fact that his foes had once, during a kind of truce, destroyed some of his own men who were in an unguarded position; and he did not force them to fight against Pompey, but released the most eminent and employed the rest as voluntary allies induced by the prospect of gains and honors. By this act he grew very greatly both in reputation and prosperity, and attached to his cause all the cities in Spain and all the soldiers who were in them (some of whom were in Bætica and others, quite a number, with Marcus Ter-

—24— entius Varro, the lieutenant). In taking charge of these and arranging their affairs he pursued his course as far as Gades, injuring no one except so far as a collection of money was concerned,— for of this he levied very large amounts. Many of the natives he honored both privately and publicly and to all the people of Gades he granted citizenship, in which the people of Rome later confirmed them. This kindness he did them in return for the vision of his dream at the time that he was quæstor there, wherein he seemed to have intercourse with his mother and had received the hope of sole rulership, as I have stated.[1] After this act he assigned that nation to Cassius Longinus because the latter was accustomed to the inhabitants from his quæstorship which he had served under Pompey. Cæsar

[1] Compare Book Thirty-seven, chapter 52.

himself proceeded by boat to Tarraco. Thence he advanced across the Pyrenees, but did not set up any trophy on their summits because he understood that not even Pompey was well spoken of for so doing; but he erected a great altar constructed of polished stones not far from his rival's trophies. B. C. 49 (*a. u.* 705)

—25— While this was going on the Massilians, as ships had again been sent them by Pompey, faced danger afresh. They were defeated, to be sure, on this occasion also, but held their ground even though they learned that Cæsar was already master of Spain. All attacks they vigorously repulsed and made a truce, pretendedly for the purpose of arranging terms with Cæsar, when he should come. Then they sent out Domitius secretly and wrought such havoc among the soldiers who had attacked them in the midst of the truce and by night, that these ventured to make no further attempts. With Cæsar, however, when he came himself, they made terms: he at that time deprived them of their arms, ships and money, and later of everything else except the name of freedom. To counterbalance this misfortune Phocæa, their mother city, was made independent by Pompey.

—26— At Placentia some soldiers mutinied and refused to accompany Cæsar longer, under the pretext that they were exhausted, but really because he did not allow them to plunder the country nor to do all the other things on which their minds were set; they were hoping to obtain anything whatever of him, inasmuch as he stood in such tremendous need of them. Yet he did

B. C. 49 (*a. u.* 705) not yield, but, with a view to being safe from them and in order that after listening to his address and seeing the persons punished they should feel no wish in any way to transgress the established rules, he called together both the mutinous body and the rest, and spoke as follows: —

—27— "Fellow soldiers, I desire to have your love, and still I should not choose on that account to participate in your errors. I am fond of you and should wish, as a father might for his children, that you should be preserved, be prosperous, and have a good repute. Do not think it is the duty of one who loves to assent to things which ought not to be done, and for which it is quite inevitable that dangers and ill-repute should fall to the lot of his beloved, but rather he must teach them the better way and keep them from the worse, both by advising and by disciplining them. You will recognize that I speak the truth if you do not estimate advantage with reference to the pleasure of the moment but instead with reference to what is continually beneficial, and if you will avoid thinking that gratifying your desires is more noble than restraining them. It is disgraceful to take pleasure temporarily in something of which you must later repent, and it is outrageous after conquering the enemy to be vanquished by some pleasure or other.

—28— "To what do the words I speak apply? To the fact that you have provisions in abundance,— I am going to speak right out with no disguise: you do get your pay in full and on time and you are always and every-

where supplied with plenty of food — that you endure no inglorious toil nor useless danger; furthermore that you gather many great prizes for your bravery and are rebuked little or not at all for your errors, and yet you do not see fit to be satisfied with these things. I am speaking not of all of you, for you are not all such men, but only to those who for their own gain are casting reproach on the rest. Most of you obey my orders very scrupulously and satisfactorily, abide by your ancestral customs, and in that way have acquired so much land and wealth and glory; some few, however, are attaching much disgrace and disrespect to all of us. Though I understood clearly before this that they were that sort of persons,— for there is none of your interests that I fail to notice,— still I pretended not to know it, thinking that they might become better if they believed they were not observed in some of their evil deeds and had the fear that if they ever presumed too far they might be punished for the guilt of which they were conscious. Since they, however, proceeding on the ground that they may do whatever they wish because they were not brought to book at the very start, are overbold and are trying to make the rest of you, who are guilty of no irregularity, likewise mutinous, it becomes necessary for me to devote some care to them and to give them my attention. In general, no society of men can preserve its unity and continue to exist, if the criminal element be not disciplined: if the part afflicted does not receive proper medicine, it causes all the rest, as in fleshly bodies, to be sick at the

B. C. 49 (*a. u.* 705)

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B. C. 49
(*a. u.* 705)

same time. And least of all in armies can discipline be relaxed, because when the wrongdoers have strength they become more daring and corrupt the excellent also by causing them to grow dejected and to believe that they will obtain no benefit from right behavior. Wherever the insolent element has the advantage, there inevitably the decent element has the worst of it: and wherever injustice is unpunished, there uprightness also goes without reward. What is there you could assert is doing right, if these men are doing no wrong? How could you logically desire to be honored, if these men do not endure their just punishment? Are you ignorant of the fact that if one class is freed from the fear of retribution and the other is deprived of the hope of prizes, no good is brought about, but only numberless ills? Hence if you really practice valor and excellence, you should detest these men as enemies. What is friendly is not distinguished from what is hostile by any characteristic of birth, but is determined by habits and actions, which if they are good can make the alien intimate, but if they are bad can alienate

—30— everything, even kindred. And you should speak in your own defence, because by the behavior of these few we must all inevitably fall into disrepute, even if we have done no wrong. Every one who is acquainted with our numbers and progress refers the errors of the few to us all; and thus though we do not share in their gains, we bear an equal share of their reproach. Who would not be indignant at hearing that we had the name of Romans, but did deeds of the Celtæ? Who would not lament the sight of Italy ravaged like Britain? Is it not outrageous for us to cease injuring the

possessions of the Gauls, because they are subdued, and then to devastate the property of dwellers south of the Alps, as if they were some Epirots, or Carthaginians, or Cimbi? Is it not disgraceful for us to give ourselves airs and say that we were the first of the Romans to cross the Rhine and to sail the ocean, and then to plunder our native land which is safe from harm at the hands of foes and to receive blame instead of praise, dishonor in place of honor, loss instead of gain, punishment instead of prizes? Do not think that —31— because you are in the army, that makes you stronger than the citizens at home. You are both Romans, and they like you both have been and will be soldiers. Nor yet again that because you have arms, it is permitted you to injure. The laws have more authority than you, and some day you will without fail lay down these weapons. Do not, again, rely on your numbers. Those capable of being wronged are, if they unite, more than you. And they will unite, if you do wrong. Do not, because you have conquered the barbarians, despise these citizens also, from whom you differ not the slightest either in birth or in education, in the matter of food or in customs. Instead, as is proper and advantageous for you, use no violence and wrong no one of them, but receive provisions from their willingness to provide, and accept rewards from their willing hands. In addi- —32— tion to what I have just said and other considerations that one might cite who should enter upon a long discussion of such questions, you must also take account of the following fact,— that we have come here now to assist our country under oppression and to ward off those that are harming her. If she were in no danger,

B. C. 49 (*a. u.* 705)

B. C. 49 (*a. u.* 705) we should neither have come into Italy with arms,— since it is unlawful,— nor should we have left unfinished the business of the Celts and Britons, when we might have subjugated those regions too. Then is it not remarkable if we who are here for vengeance upon the evildoers should show ourselves no less greedy of gain than they? Is it not inconceivable that when we have arrived to aid our country we should force her to require other allies against us? And yet I think my claims so much better warranted than Pompey's that I have often challenged him to a trial; and since he by reason of his guilty conscience has refused to have the questions peaceably decided, I hope by this act of his to attach to my cause all the allies and the entire people. But now, if we also shall take up a course similar to his, I shall not have any decent excuse to offer nor be able to charge my opponents with any unbecoming conduct. You must also look ahead very carefully to the justice of your cause. If you have this, the strength that arms afford is full of hope, but without it nothing remains sure, though for the moment a man may be successful.

—33— "That nature has ordained this most of you understand, and you fulfill all your duties without urging. That is why I have convened you,— to make you both witnesses and spectators of my words and acts. But you are not of such a character as some men I have been mentioning and therefore it is that you receive praise. Only some few of you observe how, in addition to working many injuries and paying no penalty at all for them hitherto, these malcontents are also threatening us. However, as a general principle, I do not think

it well for any ruler to be subdued by his subjects, nor do I believe that any safety could possibly result, if the class appointed to assist a person should attempt to overcome him. Consider what sort of order could exist in a house where those in the prime of youth should despise their elders, or what order in schools, if the students should pay no heed to their instructors? What health would there be for the sick, if those indisposed should not obey their physicians in all points, or what safety for the navigators if the sailors should turn a deaf ear to their pilots? It is by a natural law both necessary and salutary that the principle of ruling and again that of being ruled have been placed among men, and without them it is impossible for anything to continue to exist for ever so short a time. Now it belongs to him who is stationed over another both to think out and to command the requisite course, and to him who is made subservient to obey without questioning and to put the order into action. By this the sensible element is distinguished from the senseless and the understanding element from the ignorant in all matters. B. C. 49 (*a. u.* 705)

"Since these things are so I would never under compulsion assent to these brawlers nor give them my permission perforce. Why am I sprung from Æneas and Iulus, why have I been prætor, why consul, for what end have I led some of you out from home and gathered others later, for what end have I received and held the authority of a proconsul now for so long a time, if I am to be a slave to any one of you and conquered by any one of you here in Italy and near to Rome,— I, to whom you owe your subjection of the Gauls and your —34—

B. C. 49
(*a. u.* 705)

conquest of Britain? What should I fear or dread? That some one of you will kill me? Nay, but if you all had this mind, I would voluntarily choose to die rather than to give up the dignity of my position as leader or to abandon the attitude of mind befitting the head of an enterprise. For a far greater danger than the unjust death of one man confronts the city, if the soldiers shall become accustomed to issue orders to their generals and to take the justice of the law into

—35— their own hands. No one of them, however, has so much as made this threat: if he had, I am sure he would have been slain forthwith by the rest of you. But they are withdrawing from the campaign on the pretence of being wearied and are laying down their arms because (they say) they are worn out, and certainly if they do not obtain my consent to this wish of theirs, they will leave their ranks and go over to Pompey: some of them make this perfectly evident. Who would not be glad to be deprived of such men, and who would not pray that such soldiers might belong to his rival, seeing that they are not content with what is given and are not obedient to orders, but that simulating old age in the midst of youth and in strength simulating weakness they claim the right to lord it over their rulers and to tyrannize over their leaders? I had ten thousand times rather be reconciled with Pompey on any terms whatever or suffer any other conceivable fate than do anything unworthy of my native thought or of my own deliberate policy. Are you unaware that it is not sovereignty or gain that I desire and that I am not bent upon accomplishing anything absolutely, and at any cost, so that I would lie and flatter and fawn

upon people to this end? Will you give up, then, for these reasons the campaign, O what can I call you? Yet still it shall be not as you yourselves desire and say, but as is profitable for the commonwealth and for myself."

B. C. 49 (*a. u.* 705)

After this speech he distributed lots among them for the infliction of the death penalty, and the most audacious,— for these, as was previously arranged, drew the lots,— he condemned, and the rest he dismissed, saying he had no further need of them. And they repented of what they had done and were ready to renew the campaign.

—36—

While he was still on the way Marcus Æmilius Lepidus, the man who later became a member of the triumvirate, in his capacity of prætor took counsel with the people to elect Cæsar dictator and immediately moved his nomination, contrary to ancestral custom. The latter accepted the office as soon as he entered the city, but committed no act of terror while in it. On the contrary he granted a return to all the exiles except Milo, and filled the offices for the ensuing year: at that time they had chosen no one temporarily in place of the absentees, and whereas there was no ædile in town, the tribunes exercised all the functions pertaining to the ædileship: moreover he set up priests in the places of those who were lost (though not observing all the detailed ceremonies that were customary for them at such a juncture), and to the Gauls who live this side of the Alps and beyond the Po he gave citizenship because he had once governed them. After effecting this he resigned the name of dictator, for he had quite all the power and functions of the position constantly in his

B. C. 49 (*a. u.* 705) grasp. He employed the strength that is afforded by arms, and also got in addition a quasi-legal authority from the senate that was on the spot; for he was permitted to do with impunity whatever he might wish.

—37— Having obtained this he at once set aright an affair of great moment and necessity. The money lenders had exacted money quite relentlessly from some, who needed large funds on account of the political disputes and the wars. Many of the debtors by reason of the same events were not able, even if they wished it, to pay back anything; for they did not find it easy to sell anything or to borrow more. Hence the mutual dealings of the two classes were ofttimes marked by deceit and ofttimes by treachery, so that there was fear of the matter progressing till it became an incurable evil. Certain modifications in regard to interest had been made even before this by some of the tribunes, but since even so payment was not secured, but the one class kept forfeiting its securities and the other demanding the principal in money, Cæsar now came to the aid of both so far as he could. He ordered that securities should have a fixed valuation according to their worth, and to decide that point he assigned arbiters to be allotted to persons disputing any point.

—38— Since also many were said to possess large properties but to be concealing all their wealth, he forbade any one to have more than fifteen thousand denarii in silver or gold: this law, he alleged, he did not enact himself, but he was simply enforcing a measure some time previously introduced. His object was either that those who owed should make good some of their debt to the lenders and the rest lend to such as needed, or else that

the well-to-do might be clearly apparent and no one of them keep his property all together, for fear some political change might take place in his absence. When the populace, elated at this, asked that in addition to it rewards be offered to servants for information against their masters, he refused to add such a clause to the law and furthermore called down dire destruction upon himself if he should ever trust a slave speaking against his master. B. C. 49 (*a. u.* 705)

Cæsar after doing this and removing all the Capitoline offerings and others hastened to Brundusium toward the close of the year and before entering upon the consulship to which he had been elected. And as he was attending to the details of his departure a kite in the Forum let fall a sprig of laurel upon one of his companions. Later, while he was sacrificing to Fortuna, the bull escaped before being wounded, rushed out of the city, and coming to a kind of pond swam across it. As a consequence he continued his preparations with greater courage and especially because the soothsayers declared that destruction should be his if he remained at home, but if he crossed the sea salvation and victory. When he had gone, the boys in the city spontaneously divided into two classes, one side calling itself Pompeiians and the other Cæsarians, and they fought one another after a fashion without arms, and those conquered who used Cæsar's name. —39—

While such was the progress of events in Rome and in Spain, Marcus Octavius and Lucius Scribonius Libo by using Pompey's fleet expelled from Dalmatia Publius Cornelius Dolabella, who was there attending to Cæsar's interests. After this they shut up Gaius An- —40—

B. C. 49 (*a. u.* 705) tonius, who was desirous of aiding him, in a little islet and there, abandoned by the natives and oppressed by hunger, they captured him with all his force save a few; some of them had escaped in season to the mainland, and others who were sailing across on rafts and —41— were caught made away with themselves. Curio had meanwhile reduced Sicily without a battle; for Cato, the governor of it, being no match for him and not wishing idly to expose the cities to danger, withdrew beforehand to Pompey; afterward, however, the conqueror passed over to Africa and perished. At his approach by sea Lucius Cæsar abandoned the city of Aspis in which he merely happened to be staying, and Publius Attius Varus, then in charge of the affairs of that region, was defeated by him and lost many soldiers and a few cities. Juba, however, son of Hiempsus and king over the Numidians, esteemed the interests of Pompey as those of the people and the senate, and hated Curio both for this reason and because the latter when tribune had attempted to take away his kingdom from him and confiscate the land: therefore he vigorously prosecuted the war against him. He did not wait for him to invade his home country of Numidia but assailed him with something less than his entire force at the siege of Utica, for fear that the Roman, being previously informed, might retire; and he was rather more anxious to take vengeance on him than to repulse him. Accordingly, Juba sent forward a few men who reported that the king had departed in some other direction and to a distance: he himself followed after

these and did not miss the results he had hoped for. Before this Curio with the idea that his enemy was approaching had transferred his men to the camp near the sea and had framed an intention, in case he were hard pushed, of embarking on the ships and leaving Africa altogether. But when he ascertained that only a few men were arriving and these without Juba, he took courage and started out that very night as if to a victory waiting for him, and fearing only that they should escape him. In his advance he destroyed some of the van who were sleeping on the road and became much emboldened. Next, about dawn, he encountered the rest who had started out ahead from the camp; and without any delay, in spite of the fact that his soldiers were exhausted both by the march and by loss of sleep, he at once joined battle with them. At this juncture, while matters were at a standstill and they were fighting rather evenly, Juba suddenly appeared upon the scene and by his unexpected coming as well as by his numbers overwhelmed him. Curio and most of the others he killed on the spot by means of this surprise, and the rest he pursued as far as the ditch, after which he confined them to their ships and in the midst of the confusion got possession of large amounts of money and destroyed many men. Numbers of them perished when they seemed to have escaped, some being knocked down in the mêleé while boarding the boats, and others drowned while in the ships themselves by the overloading of the vessels. During these occurrences some being afraid they might suffer the same fate went over to

B. C. 49 (*a. u.* 705) — 42 —

B. C. 49 (*a. u.* 705) Varus expecting that their lives would be spared, but received no benefit from it. For Juba asserted that it was he who had conquered them and so slaughtered them all except a few. Thus Curio died after rendering most valuable assistance to Cæsar upon whom he had founded many hopes. Juba found honors at the hands of Pompey and the senators who were in Macedonia and was saluted as king: but on the part of Cæsar and those in the city he was censured and declared an enemy, while Bocchus and Bogud were named kings because they were hostile to him.

—43— B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706) The ensuing year the Romans had two sets of magistrates, contrary to custom, and a mighty conflict was engendered. The people of the city had chosen as consuls Cæsar and Publius Servilius, together with prætors, and everything else according to law: the party in Thessalonica had made no such preparations although they had by some accounts about two hundred of the senate and the consuls and had appropriated a small piece of land for divinations to the end that their proceedings might seem to take place under a certain form of law. Wherefore they regarded the people and the entire city as present there (the reason being that the consuls had not introduced the lex curiata), and they employed those same officials as formerly, only changing their names and calling some proconsuls, others proprætors, and others pro-quæstors. For they were very careful about ancestral customs even though they had raised their arms against their country and abandoned their native shores, and were anxious to per-

form all necessary acts not merely with a view to temporary demands or contrary to the exact wording of the ordinances. It is quite true that nominally these officials ruled the two parties, but in reality it was Pompey and Cæsar who were supreme, bearing, for the sake of good repute, the legal titles,— one that of consul and the other that of proconsul,— and doing not what the magistrates allowed but whatever they themselves pleased. B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706)

Under these conditions, with the government divided in twain, Pompey wintered in Thessalonica and did not keep a very careful guard of the coast. He did not think that Cæsar had yet arrived in Italy from Spain, and even if he were there he did not suspect that his rival, in winter, at least, would venture to cross the Ionian sea. Cæsar was in Brundusium, waiting for spring, but when he ascertained that Pompey was some distance off and that Epirus just opposite was rather heedlessly guarded, he seized the opportunity of the war to attack him while in a state of relaxation. When the winter was about half gone he set out with a portion of his army,— there were not enough ships to carry them all across at once,— escaped the attention of Marcus Bibulus to whom the guarding of the sea had been committed, and crossed to the so-called Ceraunian Headlands, a point in the confines of Epirus, near the opening of the Ionian gulf. Having reached there before it became noised abroad that he would sail at all, he despatched the ships to Brundusium for the rest: but Bibulus damaged them on the return voy- —44—

B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706) age and actually took some in tow, so that Cæsar learned by experience that he had enjoyed a more fortunate than prudent voyage.

—45— During this delay, therefore, he acquired Oricum and Apollonia and other points there which had been abandoned by Pompey's garrisons. This "Corinthian Apollonia" is well situated as regards the land and as regards the sea, and excellently in respect to rivers. What I have remarked, however, above all else is that a huge fire issues from the ground near the Aöus river and neither spreads to any extent over the surrounding land nor sets on fire that very place where it is located nor even makes the ground dry and brittle, but leaves the grass and trees flourishing very near it. In pouring rains it increases and rises high. For this reason it is called Nymphæum[1] and affords a kind of oracle. You take a grain of incense and after making whatever prayer you wish throw it carrying the prayer. At this the fire, if your wish is to be fulfilled, receives it very readily and in case the grain falls somewhere outside, darts forward, snatches it up and consumes it. But if the wish is not to be fulfilled, the fire does not go to it, and if it is carried into the flame, the latter recedes and flees before it. These two actions it performs in this way in all matters save those of death and marriage: about these two it is not granted any one to learn anything whatever from it.

—46— Such is the nature of this marvel. Now as Antony, to whom had been assigned the duty of conveying those

[1] I. e., "Temple" or "Place of the Nymphs."

that remained at Brundusium, proved slow, and no message came about them on account of the winter and of Bibulus, Cæsar suspected that they had adopted a neutral attitude and were watching the course of events, as often happens in political disputes. Wishing, therefore, to sail himself to Italy, and alone, he embarked on a small boat as some one else, saying that he had been sent by Cæsar; and he forced the captain, although there was a wind, to set sail. When, however, they were away from land, the gale came sweeping violently down upon them and the billows rocked them terribly, so that the captain not even under compulsion dared any longer sail on, but undertook to return even without his passenger's consent. Then the latter revealed himself, as if by this act he should stop the storm, and said, "Be of good cheer: you carry Cæsar." Such a disposition and such a hope he had, either accidentally or as the result of some oracle, that he felt a secure trust in safety even contrary to the appearance of things. Nevertheless, he did not get across, but after struggling for a long time in vain sailed back. B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706)

After this he encamped opposite Pompey, near Apsus. The latter as soon as he had heard of his rival's advent had made no delay, but hoping to quell him easily before he secured the presence of the rest who were with Antony, he marched in haste and in some force toward Apollonia. Cæsar advanced to meet him as far as the river, thinking that even as he was he would prove a match for the troops then approaching: —47—

B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706) but when he learned that he was actually far inferior in numbers, he halted. In order that this action should not seem due to fear, and he not be thought to be opening the war, he submitted some conciliatory proposals to the opposing body and continued his abode in that place. Pompey, knowing this, wished to try conclusions with him as soon as possible and for this reason undertook to cross the river. But the bridge on receiving the weight broke down and some of the advance guard, being isolated, perished. Then he desisted in dejection that he had failed in his first recourse to hostile action. Meanwhile Antony had arrived, and Pompey

—48— in fear retired to Dyrrachium. While Bibulus lived, Cæsar's lieutenant had not dared even to set out from Brundusium, so close was the guard kept over it. But when that officer, worn out by hard work, had died and Libo succeeded him as admiral, Antony despised him and set sail with the evident intention of forcing the passage. Driven back to land he repelled the other's vigorous attack upon him and later, when Libo was anxious to disembark somewhere, he allowed him to find anchorage nowhere near that part of the mainland. The admiral being in need of anchorage and water, since the little island in front of the harbor, which was the only place he could approach, is destitute of water and harbor alike, sailed off to some distant point where he was likely to find both in abundance. In this way Antony was enabled to set sail, and later when the foe attempted to assail them on the high seas he suffered no damage at his hands: a violent storm came up which prevented the attack, but caused injuries to both sides.

—49— When the soldiers had come safely across, Pompey,

as I have said, retired to Dyrrachium, and Cæsar followed him, encouraged by the fact that he had survived his previous experiences with the number of followers he now had. Dyrrachium is situated in the land formerly belonging to the tribe of Illyrians called Parthini, but now and even at that time regarded as a part of Macedonia; and it is very favorably placed, whether it be the Epidamnus of the Corcyræans or some other. Those who record this fact also refer its founding and its name to a hero Dyrrachus. The other authorities have declared that the place was renamed by the Romans with reference to the difficulties of the rocky shore, because the term Epidamnus has in the Latin tongue the meaning "loss," and so seemed to be very ill-omened for their crossing over to it. B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706)

Pompey after taking refuge in this Dyrrachium built a camp outside the city and surrounded it with deep ditches and stout palisades. Cæsar encamped over against it and made assaults, in the hope of shortly capturing the palisades by the number of his soldiers: when, however, he was repulsed, he attempted to wall it off. While he was at that work, Pompey fortified some points by stakes, cut off others by a wall, and fortified still others with a ditch, establishing towers and guards on the high places, so as to render the circuit of the encompassing wall necessarily infinite and to render an approach impossible to the foe, even if they conquered. There were meanwhile many battles between them, but brief ones, in which now one party, now the other, was victorious or beaten, so that a few were killed on both sides alike. Upon Dyrrachium itself Cæsar made an attempt by night, between the —50—

B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706) marshes and the sea, in the expectation that it would be betrayed by its defenders., He passed inside the narrows, but at that point was attacked by many in front and many behind, who were conveyed along the shore in boats and suddenly fell upon him; thus he lost numerous men and very nearly perished himself. After this occurrence Pompey took courage and concerted a plan for a night assault upon the circumvallation; as he was unexpected he captured a portion of it by storm and caused a great slaughter among the men encamped near it.

— 51 — Cæsar in view of this event and because the grain had failed him,— the entire sea and land in the vicinity being hostile,— and because for this reason some had deserted, feared that he might either be overcome while watching his adversary or be abandoned by his other followers. Therefore he leveled all the works that had been constructed, destroyed also all the parallel walls, and thereupon made a sudden start and set out for Thessaly. During this same time that Dyrrachium was being besieged Lucius Cassius Longinus and Gnæus Domitius Calvinus had been sent by him into Macedonia and into Thessaly. Longinus was disastrously defeated by Scipio and by Sadalus, a Thracian; Calvinus was repulsed from Macedonia by Faustus, but on receiving accessions from the Locrians and Ætolians he invaded Thessaly with these troops, and after being ambushed and then again laying counter-ambuscades conquered Scipio in battle, and by that act gained a few cities. Thither, accordingly, Cæsar hastened,

thinking that by combining with these officers he could more easily get an abundance of food and continue the prosecution of the war. When no one would receive him, because he had had bad luck, he reluctantly held aloof from the larger settlements, but assaulted Gomphi, a little city of Thessaly, took it, killed many and plundered all its inhabitants in order that by this act he might inspire the rest with terror. Metropolis, at any rate, another town, would have no conflict with him but forthwith capitulated without a struggle: and as he did no harm to its citizens he more easily won over some other places by his display of equal readiness in opposite contingencies. B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706)

So he became strong again. Pompey did not institute an immediate pursuit, for his antagonist had withdrawn suddenly by night and had hastily crossed the Genusus river: however, he was strongly inclined to think that he had subdued him completely. Consequently he assumed the name of imperator, though he made no boast of it and did not even wind laurel about his fasces, disliking to show such exultation over the downfall of citizens. Consistently with this same attitude he neither sailed to Italy himself nor sent any others there, though he might easily have reduced the whole peninsula. As regards a fleet he was absolute master, for he had five hundred swift ships and could touch at many points at once: and the sentiment of that country was not opposed to him, nor, if it had been ever so hostile, could the people have been a match for him in war. But he wished to remain at a distance, so —52—

B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706) as to get the reputation of fighting for his land, and did not see fit to cause any fear to the persons who were then in Rome. Hence he made no attempt on Italy, not even sending to the government any despatch about his successes. But after this he set out against Cæsar and came to Thessaly.

—53— As they lay opposite each other the appearance of the camps bore, indeed, some resemblance of war, but the use of arms was suspended as in time of peace. As they reviewed the greatness of the danger and foresaw the obscurity and uncertainty of the issue, and still stood in some awe of their common ancestry and kinship, they were led to delay. Meanwhile they exchanged propositions about friendship and appeared to some likely to become reconciled without accomplishing anything. This was due to the fact that they were both reaching out for supreme dominion and were influenced by a great deal of native ambition and a great deal of acquired rivalry,— for men can least endure to be outdone by their equals and intimates; they were not willing to make any concessions to each other, since each felt that he might win, nor could they feel any confidence, if they did come to terms, that they would not be always yearning for the advantage and

—54— fall into strife again over complete control. In temper they differed from each other to this extent,— that Pompey desired to be second to no man and Cæsar to be first of all, and the former was anxious to be honored by willing subjects and to preside over and be loved by a people fully consenting, whereas the latter cared

not at all if he ruled over an unwilling nation and issued orders to men that hated him, and bestowed the honors with his own hand upon himself. The deeds, however, through which they hoped to accomplish all that they wished, were perforce common to both alike. For it was impossible that either one of them should succeed without fighting against his countrymen, leading foreigners against kindred, obtaining much money by unjust pillage, and killing unlawfully many of his dearest associates. Hence, even though they differed in their desires, yet in their acts, by which they hoped to fulfill those desires, they were alike. Consequently they would not yield to each other on any point, in spite of the many just grounds that they alleged, and finally came into collision. B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706)

The struggle proved a mighty one, and resembled no other conflict. The leaders believed themselves to be the most skilled in all matters of warfare and clearly the most distinguished not only of the Romans but also of the remainder of mankind then in existence. They had practiced those pursuits from boyhood, had constantly been connected with them, had exhibited deeds worthy of note, had been conspicuous for great valor and great good fortune, and were therefore most worthy of commanding and most worthy of victory. As to forces, Cæsar had the largest and the most genuinely Roman portion of the citizen-army and the most warlike men from the rest of Italy, from Spain, and the whole of Gaul and the islands that he had conquered: Pompey had attracted many from —55—

B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706) the senatorial and the equestrian order and from the regular enrollment and had gathered a vast number from subject and pacified peoples and kings. Aside from Pharnaces and Orodes,— the latter, indeed, although an enemy because of his having killed the Crassi, he tried to win over,— all the rest who had ever had even the smallest dealings with Pompey gave him money and either sent or led auxiliaries. The Parthian king promised to be his ally if he should take Syria: but as he did not get it, the prince did not help him. While Pompey decidedly excelled in numbers, Cæsar's followers were equal to them in strength, and so, the advantage being even, they just balanced each other and were equally prepared for danger.

—56— In these circumstances and by the very cause and purpose of the war a most notable struggle took place. The city of Rome and the entire dominion over it, even then great and mighty, lay before them as a prize: it was clear to all that it would become the slave of him who conquered. When they reflected on this fact and furthermore recalled their former deeds,— Pompey, Africa and Sertorius and Mithridates and Tigranes and the sea: Cæsar, Gaul and Spain and the Rhine and Britain,— they were excited to frenzy, thinking that they were facing danger for those conquests too, and each was eager to acquire the other's glory. For the renown of the vanquished no less than his other possessions becomes the property of the victors. The greater and more powerful the antagonist that a man —57— overthrows, to the greater heights is he raised. There-

fore they delivered to the soldiers also many exhortations, but very much alike on both sides, saying all that is fitting to be mentioned on such occasions with reference both to the immediate nature of the danger and to its future results. As they both came from the same state and were talking to the same subjects and calling each other tyrants and themselves liberators from tyranny, they had nothing of different kinds to say, but stated that it would be the lot of the one party to die, of the other to be preserved, of the one party to be captives, of the other to enjoy the master's lot, to possess everything or to be deprived of everything, to suffer or to inflict a most terrible fate. After giving some such exhortations to the citizens and furthermore leading the subject and allied contingents into hopes for the better and fears for the worse, they hurled at each other kinsmen, sharers of the same tent, those who had eaten together, those who had drunk together. Why should any one then lament the fate of others involved, when those very men, who were all these things to each other, and had shared many secret words, many similar exploits, who had once been concerned in a marriage and loved the same child, one as a father, the other as grandfather, nevertheless fought? All the ties that nature by mingling their blood had created, they now, directed by insatiate lust of power, hastened to break, tear, and cleave asunder. Because of them Rome was forced to encounter danger for herself against herself, and though victor to be worsted.

B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706)

Such was the struggle in which they joined. They —58—

B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706) did not, however, immediately come to close quarters. Sprung from the same country and from the same hearth, with almost identical weapons and similar formation, each side shrank from beginning the battle, shrank from slaying any one. There was great silence, then, and dejection on the part of both; no one went forward nor moved at all: but with heads bowed they stood motionless, as if devoid of life. Cæsar and Pompey, therefore, fearing that if they remained quiet any longer their animosity might be dulled or they might even become reconciled, hurriedly commanded the trumpeters to blow the signal and the men to raise the war cry in unison. Both orders were obeyed, but the contestants were so far from being imbued with courage, that at the similar sound of the trumpeter's call and at their own outcry in the same language, they felt their affinity and were impressed with their kinship, —59— and so fell into tears and wailing. At length the allied troops began the battle, and the rest joined in combat, fairly beside themselves at what they were doing. Those whose part in the conflict was a distant one were less sensible of the horror; they threw, shot, hurled javelins, discharged slings, without knowing whom they hit: but the heavy-armed and the cavalry had a fearful experience, as they were close to each other and could even speak a little back and forth; at the same moment they would recognize their vis-a-vis and would wound him, would call to him and slaughter him, would remember their country and despoil the slain. These were the actions and the sufferings of the Romans and

the rest from Italy who were joined with them in the campaign, wherever they happened upon each other. Many sent messages home through their very destroyers. The subject force fought both zealously and unflinchingly, showing much alertness as once for their own freedom, so now to secure the slavery of the Romans; they wanted, since they were inferior to them at all points, to have them as fellow-slaves. B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706)

It was a very great battle and full of diverse incidents, partly for the reasons mentioned and partly on account of the numbers and the variety of the armaments. There were vast bodies of heavy-armed soldiers, vast bodies of cavalry, others that were archers and still others that were slingers, so that they occupied the whole plain and when scattered often fought with their own men, because similarly arrayed, and often promiscuously with others. Pompey surpassed in his body of horse and archers; hence they surrounded troops from a distance, employed sudden assaults, and after throwing them into confusion retired; then again and still again they would attack them, changing now to this side and now to that. The Cæsarians were on their guard against this, and by deploying their ranks always managed to face those assailing them, and when they came into close quarters with them readily laid hold of both men and horses in the contest; light-armed infantry had, in fact, been drawn up with their cavalry for this very purpose. And all this took place, as I said, not in one spot but in many places at once, scattered all about; and with some contending from a dis- —60—

B. C. 48
(*a. u.* 706)

tance and others fighting at close quarters, this body smiting its opponents and that group getting struck, one detachment fleeing, and a second pursuing, many infantry battles and many cavalry battles as well were to be seen. Under these conditions many unexpected things happened. One man having routed another was himself turned to flight, and another who had forced a man out of line was in turn attacked by him. One soldier who had struck another was himself wounded, and a second, who had fallen, killed the enemy who stood over him. Many died without being wounded, and many when half dead caused more slaughter. Some exulted and sang the pæan, while others were grieved and lamented, so that all places were filled with cries and groans. The majority were thrown into confusion by this fact, for the mass of words which were unintelligible to them, because belonging to different nations and languages, alarmed them greatly, and those who could understand one another suffered a calamity many times worse; in addition to their private misfortunes they saw and heard at the same time those of near neighbors.

—61— At last, after they had struggled evenly for a very long space of time and many on both sides alike had fallen or been wounded, Pompey, since the larger part of his army was Asiatic and untrained, was defeated, even as had been made clear to him before the action. Thunderbolts had fallen into his camp, a fire had appeared in the air over Cæsar's ditch and then fell upon his own, bees had swarmed upon his military stan-

dards, and many of the victims after being led up close to the very altar had run away. And so far did the effects of that contest extend to the rest of mankind that on the very day of the battle collisions of armies and the clash of arms occurred in many places: in Pergamum a kind of noise of drums and cymbals rose from the temple of Dionysus and spread throughout the city; in Tralles a palm tree grew up in the temple of Victory and the goddess herself turned about toward an image of Cæsar located beside her; in Syria two young men (as they seemed) announced the result of the battle and vanished; and in Patavium, which now belongs to Italy but was then still a part of Gaul, certain birds not only brought news of it but even acted it out to some extent, for one Gaius Cornelius drew from them accurate information of all that had taken place, and narrated it to the bystanders. These things happened separately on that very same day and were naturally distrusted at the time; but when news was brought of the engagement, astonishment was felt. B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706)

Of Pompey's followers who were not destroyed on the spot some fled whithersoever they could, and others changed their allegiance. Those of them who were soldiers of the line Cæsar enrolled among his own troops, exhibiting no resentment. Of the senators and knights all those whom he had captured before and pitied he killed, unless his friends begged some of them off; for he allowed each of these on this occasion to save one man. The rest who had then for the first time fought against him he released, saying: "Those have not —63—

B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706) wronged me who have advanced the interests of Pompey, their friend, and had received no benefit from me." This same attitude he adopted toward the potentates and peoples who joined his cause. He pardoned them all, bearing in mind that he himself was acquainted with none or almost none of them, whereas from his rival they had previously obtained many favors. These he praised far more than such as had previously received some kindness from Pompey but in the midst of dangers had left him in the lurch: the former he could reasonably expect would be favorably disposed to him also, but as to the latter, no matter how anxious they seemed to be to please him in anything, he believed that inasmuch as they had betrayed a friend in this crisis they would not spare him either on occasion. A proof of his feeling is that he spared Sadalus the Thracian and Deiotarus the Gaul, who had been in the battle, and Tarcondimotus, who was ruler of a portion of Cilicia and had very greatly assisted Cæsar's opponent in the way of ships. What need is there of listing the rest who sent auxiliaries, to all of whom he granted pardon and merely exacted money from them? He did them no other damage and took from them nothing else, though many had frequently received great gifts from Pompey, some long ago and some just at that time. A certain portion of Armenia that had belonged to Deiotarus he did give to Ariobarzanes, king of Cappadocia, yet in this he did not injure Deiotarus at all, but rather conferred an additional favor upon him. He did not sunder the territory from

—63—

his domains, but after occupying all of Armenia before occupied by Pharnaces he bestowed one part of it upon Ariobarzanes and another part upon Deiotarus. Pharnaces made a plea that he had not assisted Pompey and therefore, in view of his behavior, deserved to obtain pardon: Cæsar, however, gave him no satisfactory response, and furthermore reproached him with the very fact that he had proved himself base and impious toward his benefactor. Such humaneness and uprightness did he afterward show in every case to all those who had fought against him. Moreover, all the letters that were found filed away in Pompey's chests which convicted any persons of good-will toward the latter or ill-will toward himself he neither read nor had copied but burned them immediately, in order not to be forced by what was in them to take severe measures; and for this reason if no other any one ought to hate the men that plotted against him. This is not a mere random remark, but may serve to call attention to the fact that Marcus Brutus Cæpio, who afterward killed him, was captured by him and preserved from harm.

B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706)

DIO'S
ROMAN HISTORY
42

The following is contained in the Forty-second of Dio's Rome.

How Pompey, defeated in Thessaly, took to flight and perished in Egypt (chapters 1–5).

How Cæsar, following Pompey, came into Egypt (chapters 6–16).

How the news about Cæsar and Pompey was announced at Rome, and what decrees were passed in honor of Cæsar (chapters 17–20).

How in the absence of Cæsar the population of Rome revolted (chapters 21–33).

How Cæsar fought and subdued the Egyptians and showered favors upon Cleopatra (chapters 34–44).

How Cæsar conquered Pharnaces (chapters 45–48).

How Cæsar returned to Rome and reconciled the interests there (chapters 49–55).

How Cæsar led an expedition into Africa (chapters 56–58).

Duration of time, the remainder of the consulship of Julius Cæsar (II) and Publius Servilius Isauricus, together with one additional year, in which there were the following magistrates here enumerated.

C. Iulius C. F. Cæsar, Dictator (II), M. Antonius M. F., Master of Horse, and the two consuls C. Fufius C. F. Calenus and P. Vatinius P. F. (B. C. 47 = a. u. 707.)

—1—
B. C. 48
(*a. u.* 706)

The general nature of the battle has, accordingly, been described. As a result of it Pompey straightway despaired of all his undertakings and no longer made any account of his own valor or of the number of his remaining soldiers or of the fact that Fortune often restores the vanquished in the shortest space of time; yet in former times he had always possessed the greatest cheerfulness and the greatest hopefulness on all occasions of failure. The reason for this was that in the cases just mentioned he had usually been evenly matched with the foe and hence had not discounted a victory in advance; but by reflecting beforehand on the dual possibilities of the outcome of the engagement, while he was still coolheaded and before being involved in any alarm, he had not neglected to prepare for the worst. In this way he had not been compelled to yield to disasters and was able with ease to renew the conflict: but this time as he had expected to far surpass Cæsar he had foreseen nothing. For instance, he had not put the camp in proper condition nor provided a refuge for himself if defeated. And whereas he might have delayed action and so have conquered without a battle,— for his army kept increasing every day and he had abundant provisions because he was in a country for the most part friendly and because he was lord of the sea,— nevertheless, whether of his own accord and thinking he would conquer in any event, or because he was forced by his associates, he brought on an engage-

B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706)

ment. Consequently as soon as he was defeated he was terribly alarmed and had no opportune plan or sure hope ready to enable him to face the danger anew. Whenever any event befalls a man unexpectedly and most contrary to what seemed reasonable, it humbles his mind and drives out the faculty of calculation, so that he becomes the poorest and weakest judge of what must be done. Calculation cannot live in the midst of fears; if it occupies the ground first, it thrusts them out very effectively, but if it be a second comer, it gets the worst of the encounter.

—2— Hence Pompey, also, having considered none of the chances beforehand, was found naked and defenceless, whereas, had anything been foreseen, he might, perhaps, without trouble have quickly recovered all his losses. Large numbers of the combatants had survived and he had other forces that were considerable. Above all, he had gotten into his possession large amounts of money and was master of the entire sea, and the cities both there and in Asia were fond of him even in his misfortune. But, as it turned out, since he had fared so ill where he felt most encouraged, in the temporary seizure of fear he made no use of any one of these resources, but left the fortifications at once and fled with a few companions toward Larissa. He did not enter the city although the Larissæans invited him, because he feared that by so doing he might incur some blame. Bidding them make terms with the victor, he himself took provisions, embarked on the sea, and sailed away to Lesbos on a merchantman, to his

wife Cornelia and his son Sextus. After taking charge of them he did not even enter Mitylene but started for Egypt, hoping to secure an alliance with Ptolemy, the king of that country. This was the son of that Ptolemy who, through the agency of Gabinius, had received back the kingdom at his hands, and he had as an acknowledgment of that service sent a fleet to Pompey's assistance. I have heard that Pompey thought also of fleeing to the Parthians, but I cannot credit the report. For that race so hated all the Romans ever since Crassus had led his expedition against them, and Pompey especially, because related to him, that they imprisoned his envoy who came with a request for aid, though he was a senator. And Pompey would have never endured in his misfortune to become a suppliant of a most hostile nation for what he had failed to obtain while enjoying success. However,— he proceeded to Egypt for the reasons mentioned, and after coasting along the shore as far as Cilicia went across from there to Pelusium, where Ptolemy, just then engaged in a war with his sister Cleopatra, was encamped. Bringing the ships to anchor he sent some men to remind the prince of the favor shown his father and to ask that he be permitted to land on definite and secure conditions: he did not venture to disembark before obtaining some guarantee of safety. Ptolemy made him no answer, for he was still a mere child, but some of the Egyptians and Lucius Septimius, a Roman who had made campaigns with Pompey but was a relative of Gabinius and had been left behind by him to keep guard

B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706)

—3—

B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706) over Ptolemy, came in the guise of friends: for all that they impiously plotted against him and by their act brought guilt upon themselves and all Egypt. They themselves perished not long after and the Egyptians for their part were first delivered to be slaves of Cleopatra (this they particularly disliked) and later were

—4— enrolled among the Roman subjects. Now at this time Septimius and Achillas, the commander-in-chief, and others who were with them declared they would readily receive Pompey,— to the end, of course, that he might be the more easily deceived and ensnared. Some of them sent on his messengers ahead, bidding them be of good cheer, and the natives themselves next embarked on some small boats and sailed out to him. After many friendly greetings they begged him to come over to their vessels, saying that by reason of its size and the shallow water a trireme could not closely approach their land and that they were very eager to see Pompey himself more quickly. He thereupon changed ships, although all his fellow voyagers urged him not to do it, trusting in his hosts and saying merely:

> "Whoever to a tyrant wends his way,
> His slave is he, e'en though his steps be free." [1]

[1] This couplet is from an unknown play of Sophocles, according to both Plutarch and Appian. Plutarch, in his extant works, cites it three times (Life of Pompey, chapter 78; Sayings of Kings and Emperors, p. 204E; How a Young Man Ought to Hear Poems, chapter 12). In the last of these passages he tells how Zeno by a slight change in the words alters the lines to an opposite meaning which better expresses his own sentiments. Diogenes Laertius (II, 8) relates a similar incident. Plutarch says that Pompey quoted the verses in speaking to his wife and son, but Appian (Civil Wars, H, 85) that he repeated them to himself.

The verses will be found as No. 789 of the Incertarum Fabularum Fragmenta in Nauck's *Tragici Græci*.

Now when they drew near the land, fearing that if he even met Ptolemy he might be saved, by the king himself or by the Romans who dwelt with him or by the Egyptians, who regarded him with great affection, they killed him before sailing into harbor. He said not a word and uttered no complaint, but as soon as he perceived their plot and recognized that he would not be able to ward them off nor escape, he veiled his face. B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706)

Such was the end of the famous Pompey the Great, wherein once more the weakness and the strange fortune of the human race are proved. He was no whit deficient in foresight, but was deceived by having been always absolutely secure against any force of harmful potency. He had won many unexpected victories in Africa, and many in Asia and Europe, both by land and by sea ever since boyhood; and was now in the fifty-eighth year of his age defeated without good reason. He who had subdued the entire Roman sea perished on it: and whereas he had once, as the story goes, been master of a thousand ships, he was destroyed in a tiny boat near Egypt and really by that same Ptolemy whose father he had once restored from exile to that land and to his kingdom. The man whom at that time Roman soldiers were still guarding, soldiers left behind by Gabinius as a favor to Pompey and on account of the hatred felt by the Egyptians for the young prince's father, seemed now to have put him to death by the hands of those Romans and those Egyptians. Pompey, who was previously considered the dominant figure among the Romans so that he even —5—

B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706) had the nickname of *Agamemnon,* was now slain like any of the lowest of the Egyptians themselves, near Mount Casius and on the anniversary of the day on which he had celebrated a triumph over Mithridates and the pirates. Even in this point, therefore, there was nothing similar in the two parts of his career. Of yore on that day he had experienced the most brilliant success, whereas he now suffered the most grievous fate: again, following a certain oracle he had been suspicious of all the citizens named Cassius, but instead of being the object of a plot by any man called Cassius he died and was buried beside the mountain that had this name. Of his fellow voyagers some were captured at once, while others fled, among them his wife and child. The former under a safe conduct came later safely to Rome: the latter, Sextus, proceeded to Africa to his brother Gnæus; these are the names by which they are distinguished, since they both bore the appellation Pompey.

—6— Cæsar, when he had attended to pressing demands after the battle and had assigned to certain others Greece and the remainder of that region to win over and administer, himself pursued after Pompey. He hurried forward as far as Asia in quest of news about him, and there waited for a time since no one knew which way he had sailed. Everything turned out favorably for him: for instance, while crossing the Hellespont in a kind of ferryboat, he met Pompey's fleet sailing with Lucius Cassius in command, but so far from suffering any harm at their hands he terrified them and won them to his side. Next, meeting with no resistance any longer he took possession of the rest of that

district and regulated its affairs, levying a money contribution, as I said, but otherwise doing no one any harm and even conferring benefits on all, so far as was possible. He did away with the taxgatherers, who abused the people most cruelly, and he converted the product of the taxes into a payment of tribute. B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706)

Meanwhile, learning that Pompey was sailing to Egypt, he was afraid that his rival by occupying it in advance might again acquire strength, and he set out with all speed. Him he found no longer alive. Then with a few followers he sailed far in advance of the others to Alexandria itself before Ptolemy came from Pelusium. On discovering that the people of the city were in a tumult over Pompey's death he did not at once venture to disembark, but put out to sea and waited till he saw the head and finger-ring of the murdered man, sent him by Ptolemy. Thereupon he approached the land with some courage: the multitude, however, showed irritation at the sight of his lictors and he was glad to make his escape into the palace. Some of his soldiers had their weapons taken from them, and the rest accordingly put to sea again until all the ships had reached harbor. Cæsar at the sight of Pompey's head wept and lamented bitterly, calling him countryman and son-in-law, and enumerating all the kindnesses they had shown each other. He said that he owed no reward to the murderers, but heaped reproaches upon them, and the head he commanded to be adorned and after proper preparation to be buried. For this he received praise, but for his pretences he was made a laughing stock. He had from the outset been thoroughly set upon dominion; he had always —7— —8—

B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706) hated Pompey as his antagonist and adversary; besides all his other measures against him he had brought on this war with no other purpose than to secure his rival's ruin and his own leadership; he had but now been hurrying to Egypt with no other end in view than to overthrow him completely if he should still be alive: yet he feigned to miss his presence and made a show of vexation over his destruction.

—9— Under the belief that now that Pompey was out of the way there was no longer any spot left that was hostile to him, he spent some time in Egypt collecting money and adjudicating the differences between Ptolemy and Cleopatra. Meanwhile other wars were being prepared for him. Egypt revolted, and Pharnaces had begun, just as soon as he learned that Pompey and Cæsar were at variance, to lay claim to his ancestral domain: he hoped that they would consume much time in their disputes and use up their own powers upon each other. He was at this time still clinging to the districts mentioned, partly because he had once asserted his claim and partly because he understood that Cæsar was far off; and he had occupied many points in advance. Meanwhile Cato and Scipio and the rest who were of the same mind with them set on foot in Africa a war that was both a civil and a foreign conflict.

—10— It was this way. Cato had been left behind at Dyrrachium by Pompey to keep an eye upon reinforcements from Italy, in case any one should cross, and to repress the Parthini in case they should cause any disturbance. At first he carried on war with the latter, but after Pompey's defeat he abandoned Epirus and proceeding to Corcyra with those of the same mind as

himself he there received the men who escaped from the battle and the rest who had the same interests. Cicero and a few other senators had set out for Rome at once: but the majority, together with Labienus and Afranius, since they had no hope in Cæsar,— the one because he had deserted, the other because after having been pardoned by him he had again made war on him,— went to Cato, put him at their head and continued the war. Their number was later increased by the addition of Octavius. The latter after sailing into the Ionian sea and arresting Gaius Antonius conquered several places but could not take Salonæ though he besieged it for a very long time. Having Gabinius to assist them they repulsed him vigorously and finally along with the women made a sortie which was eminently successful. The women with hair let down and robed in black garments took torches, and after arraying themselves wholly in the most terrifying manner assaulted the besieging camp at midnight: they threw the outposts, who thought they were spirits, into panic and then from all sides at once hurled the fire within the palisade and following on themselves slew many in confusion and many who were asleep, occupied the place without delay, and captured at the first approach the harbor in which Octavius was lying. They were not, however, left at peace. He escaped them somehow, gathered a force again, and after defeating them in battle invested their city. Meanwhile Gabinius died of sickness and he gained control of the whole sea in that vicinity, and by making descents upon the land did the inhabitants much harm. This lasted until the battle near Pharsalus, after which his soldiers at the onset

B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706)

—11—

B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706) of a contingent from Brundusium changed sides without even making a resistance. Then, destitute of allies, he retired to Corcyra.

—12— Gnæus Pompey first sailed about with the Egyptian fleet and overran Epirus, so-called, almost capturing Oricum. The commander of the place, Marcus Acilius,[1] had blocked up the entrance to the harbor by boats crammed with stones and about the mouth of it had raised towers on both sides, on the land, and on ships of burden. Pompey, however, had submarine divers scatter the stones that were in the vessels and when the latter had been lightened he dragged them out of the way, freed the passage, and next, after putting heavy-armed troops ashore on each half of the breakwater, he sailed in. He burned all the boats and most of the city and would have captured the rest of it, had he not been wounded and caused the Egyptians to fear that he might die. After receiving medical attendance he no longer assailed Oricum but journeyed about pillaging various places and once vainly made an attempt upon Brundusium itself, as some others had done. This was his occupation for awhile. When his father had been defeated and the Egyptians on receipt of the news sailed home, he betook himself to Cato. And his ex-

—13— ample was followed by Gaius Cassius, who had done very great mischief both in Italy and in Sicily and had overcome a number of opponents in many battles by sea and by land.

Many simultaneously took refuge with Cato because they saw that he excelled them in uprightness, and he, using them as comrades in struggle and counselors for

[1] *M. Acilius Caninus.*

all matters, sailed to the Peloponnesus with the apparent intention of occupying it, for he had not yet heard that Pompey was dead. He did seize Patræ and there received among other accessions Petreius and Pompey's son-in-law[1] Faustus. Subsequently Quintus Fufius Calenus led an expedition against them, whereupon they set sail, and coming to Cyrene there learned of the death of Pompey. Their views were now no longer harmonious: Cato, loathing the thought of Cæsar's sovereignty, and some others in despair of getting pardon from him, sailed to Africa with the army, added Scipio to their number, and were as active as possible against Cæsar; the majority scattered, and some of them retired to make their peace as each one best might, while the rest, among them Gaius Cassius, went to Cæsar forthwith and received assurance of safety. B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706)

Calenus had been sent by Cæsar into Greece before the battle, and he captured among other places the Peiræus, owing to its being unwalled. Athens (although he did a great deal of damage to its territory) he was unable to take before the defeat of Pompey. The inhabitants then capitulated voluntarily and Cæsar without resentment released them altogether, making only this remark, that in spite of their many offences they were saved by the dead. This speech signified that it was on account of their ancestors and on account of the latter's glory and excellence that he spared them. Accordingly Athens and most of the rest of Greece then at once made terms with him: but the Megarians in —14—

[1] In the MS. some corruption has jumbled these names together. The correct interpretation was furnished by Xylander and Leunclavius.

B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706) spite of this resisted and were captured only at a considerably later date, partly by force and partly by treachery. Wherefore a great slaughter of the people was instituted and the survivors sold. Calenus had so acted that he might seem to have taken a merited vengeance upon them. But since he feared that the city might perish utterly, he sold the dwellers in the first place to their relatives, and in the second place for a very small sum, so that they might regain their freedom.

After these achievements Cæsar marched upon Patræ and occupied it easily, as he had frightened out Cato
—15— and his followers in advance. While these various troubles were being settled, there was an uprising in Spain, although the country was at peace. The Spaniards were at the time subject to many abuses from Quintus Longinus, and at first some few banded together to kill him. He was wounded but escaped, and after that proceeded to wrong them a great deal more. Then a number of Cordubasians and a number of soldiers who had formerly belonged to the Pompeian party rose against him, putting at their head Marcus Marcellus Æserninus, the quæstor. He did not accept their appointment with his whole heart, but seeing the uncertainty of events and admitting that they might turn out either way, he straddled the issue. All that he said or did was of a neutral character, so that whether Cæsar or Pompey should prevail he would seem to have fought for the cause of either one. He favored Pompey by receiving those who transferred their allegiance to him and by fighting against Longinus, who declared he was on Cæsar's side: at the

same time he did a kindness to Cæsar because he assumed charge of the soldiers when (as he would say) Longinus was guilty of certain irregularities, and kept these men for him, while not allowing their commander to be alienated. And when the soldiers inscribed the name of Pompey on their shields he erased it so that he might by this act offer to the one man the deeds done by the arms and to the other their reputed ownership, and by laying claim to one thing or the other as done in behalf of the victor and by referring the opposite to necessity or to different persons he might continue safe. Consequently, although he had the opportunity of overthrowing Longinus altogether by mere numbers, he refused, but while extending his actions over considerable time in the display and preparation of what he desired, he put the responsibility for doubtful measures upon other persons. Therefore both in his setbacks and the advantages he gained he could make the plea that he was acting equally in behalf of the same person: the setbacks he might have planned himself or might not, and for the advantages others might or might not be responsible. He continued in this way until Cæsar conquered, when, having incurred the victor's wrath, he was temporarily banished, but was later brought back from exile and honored. Longinus, however, being denounced by the Spaniards in an embassy, was deprived of his office and while on his way home perished near the mouth of the Iber.

B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706)

—16—

These events took place abroad. The population of Rome while the interests of Cæsar and Pompey were in a doubtful and vacillating state all professedly espoused the cause of Cæsar, influenced by his troops that

—17—

B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706) were in their midst and by his colleague Servilius. Whenever a victory of his was reported, they rejoiced, and whenever a reverse, they grieved,— some really, some pretendedly in each case. For there were many spies prowling about and eavesdroppers, observing what was being said and done on such occasions. Privately the talk and actions of those who detested Cæsar and preferred Pompey's side were the very opposite of their public expressions. Hence, whereas both parties made a show of receiving any and all news as favorable to their hopes, they in fact regarded it sometimes with fear and sometimes with boldness, and inasmuch as many diverse rumors would often be going the rounds on the same day and in the same hour their position was a most trying one. In the briefest space of time they were pleased, were grieved, grew bold,

—18— grew fearful. When the battle of Pharsalus was reported they were long incredulous. Cæsar sent no despatch to the government, hesitating to appear to be rejoicing publicly over such a victory, for which reason also he celebrated no triumph: and again, there seemed little likelihood of its being true, in view of the relative equipment of the two forces and the hopes entertained. When at last they gave the story credence, they took down the images of Pompey and of Sulla that stood upon the rostra, but did nothing further at that time. A large number did not wish to do even that, and an equally large number fearing that Pompey might renew the strife regarded this as quite enough for Cæsar and expected that it would be a fairly simple matter to placate Pompey on account of it. Moreover, when he died, they would not believe this news till late, and

until they saw his signet that had been sent. (On this were carved three trophies, as on that of Sulla.) But when he appeared to be really dead, at last they openly praised the winner and abused the loser and proposed that everything in the world which they could devise be given to Cæsar. In the course of it all there was a great rivalry among practically all of the foremost men, who were eager to outdo one another in fawning upon him and voting pleasing measures. By their shouts and by their gestures all of them as if Cæsar were present and looking on showed the very greatest zeal and deemed that in return for it they would get immediately,— as if they were doing it to please him at all and not from necessity,— the one an office, another a priesthood, and a third some pecuniary reward. I shall omit those honors which had either been voted to some others previously,— images, crowns, front seats, and things of that kind,— or were novel and proposed now for the first time, which were not also confirmed by Cæsar: for I fear that I might become wearisome, were I to enumerate them all. This same plan I shall adopt in my later narrations, adhering the more strictly to it, as the honors proposed grew more in number and more universal. Only such as had some special and extraordinary importance and were then confirmed will be set down. They granted him, then, permission to do whatever he liked to those who had favored Pompey's cause; it could not be said that he had not already received this right from himself, but it was intended that he might seem to be acting with some show of legal authority. They appointed him lord of wars and peace (using the confederates in Af-

B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706)
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B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706)

rica as a pretext) in regard to all mankind, even though he should make no communication on the subject to the people or the senate. This was also naturally in his power before, inasmuch as he had so large a force; and the wars he had fought he had undertaken himself in nearly every case: nevertheless, because they wished still to appear to be free and independent citizens, they voted him these rights and everything else which it was in his power to have even against their will. He received the privilege of being consul for five consecutive years and of being chosen dictator not for six months but for an entire year, and could assume the tribunician authority practically for life. He was enabled to sit with the tribunes upon the same benches and to be reckoned with them for other purposes,— a right commonly accorded to no one. All the elections except those of the people were put in his hands and for this reason they were delayed till after his arrival and were carried on only toward the close of the year.[1] The governorships in subject territory the citizens themselves of course allotted to the consuls, but they voted that Cæsar might give them to the prætors without the casting of lots: for they had gone back to consuls and prætors again contrary to their decrees. And another practice which had the sanction of custom, indeed, but in the corruption of the times might justly be deemed a cause of hatred and resentment, formed the matter of one of their resolutions. Cæsar had at that time heard not a word of the mere inception of the war against Juba and against the Romans who had fought

[1] The year 47, in which Cæsar came to Rome, is here meant, or else Dio has made an error.

on his side, and yet they assigned a triumph for him to hold, as if he had been victor. B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706)

In this way these votes and ratifications took place. —21— Cæsar entered upon the dictatorship at once, though he was outside Italy, and chose Antony, who had not yet been prætor, as his master of the horse: and the consul proposed his name, although the augurs most strongly opposed him with the declaration that no one was allowed to be master of the horse for more than six months. They incurred, however, a great deal of laughter for this,— deciding that Cæsar should be chosen dictator for a year contrary to all ancestral precedent, and then splitting hairs about the master of the horse. Marcus Cælius[1] actually perished because —22— he dared to break the laws laid down by Cæsar regarding loans of money, as if their propounder was defeated and ruined, and because he had therefore stirred up to strife Rome and Campania. He had been very prominent in carrying out Cæsar's wishes, for which reason moreover he had been appointed prætor; but he became angry because he had not also been made prætor urbanus, and because his colleague Trebonius had been preferred before him for this office, not by lot as had been the custom, but by Cæsar's choice. Hence he opposed his colleague in everything and would not let him perform any of the duties that belonged to him. He would not consent to his executing judgments according to Cæsar's laws, and furthermore gave notice to such as owed any sum that he would assist them against the money-lenders, and to all who dwelt in

[1] *M. Cœlius Rufus.*

B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706) other peoples' houses that he would release them from payment of rent. Having by this course won the attachment of many he set upon Trebonius with their aid and would have killed him, had he not managed to change his robe and escape in the crowd. After this failure Cælius privately issued a law in which he gave
—23— to all the use of houses free and annulled debts. Servilius consequently sent for some soldiers who chanced to be going by on the way to Gaul and after convening the senate under their protection he presented a proposition about the matter in hand. No ratification was reached, since the tribunes prevented it, but the sense of the meeting was recorded and Servilius then ordered the court officers to take down the offending tablets. When Cælius drove them away and acted in a disorderly manner toward the consul himself, they convened again, still protected by the soldiers, and delivered to Servilius the "care of the city," a phrase I have often used previously in regard to it. After this he would not permit Cælius, even in his capacity as prætor, to do anything, but assigned the duties pertaining to his office to some other prætor, debarred him from the senate, dragged him from the rostra in the midst of
—24— some vociferation, and broke to pieces his chair. Of course Cælius was violently angry at him for each of these acts, but since Servilius had a rather respectable body of troops in town he was afraid that he might suffer chastisement, and therefore decided to set out for Campania to join Milo, who was instituting a kind of rebellion. The latter, when it proved that he was the only one of the exiles not restored by Cæsar, had

come to Italy, where he gathered a number of men, some in want of a livelihood and others fearing some punishment, and ravaged the country, assailing Capua and other cities. It was to him that Cælius wished to betake himself, in order that with his aid he might do Cæsar all possible harm. He was watched, however, and could not leave the city openly; and he did not venture to escape secretly because (among other motives) he hoped to accomplish a great deal more by possessing the attire and the title of prætor. At last, therefore, he approached the consul and obtained from him leave of absence, saying that he wished to proceed to Cæsar. The other, though he suspected his intention, still allowed him to do this, particularly because he was very insistent, invoking Cæsar's name and pretending that he was eager to submit his defence. Servilius sent a tribune with him, so that if he should attempt any rebellious conduct he might be prevented. When they got to Campania, and found that Milo after a defeat near Capua had taken refuge in the Tifatine mountain, and Cælius would go no farther, the tribune was alarmed and wished to bring him back home. Servilius, learning of this in advance, declared war upon Milo in the senate and gave orders that Cælius (who must be prevented from stirring up any confusion) should remain in the suburbs. However, he did not keep him under strict surveillance, because the man was a prætor. Thus Cælius made his escape and hastened to Milo: and he would certainly have aroused some sedition, had he found him alive. As it proved, Milo had been driven from Campania and had perished in Apulia: Cælius therefore went to Bruttium, presum-

B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706)

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B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706) ably to form some league in that district, and there he perished before doing anything important; for the persons who favored Cæsar banded together and killed him.

—26— So these men died, but that did not bring quiet to Rome. On the contrary, many dreadful events took place, as, indeed, omens indicated beforehand. Among other things that happened toward the end of that year bees settled on the Capitol beside the statue of Hercules. At the time sacrifices to Isis chanced to be going on and the soothsayers gave their opinion to the effect that the precincts of that goddess and of Serapis should be razed to the ground, as of yore. In the course of demolition a small shrine of Bellona had unwittingly been taken down, and in it were found jars

B. C. 47 (*a. u.* 707) full of human flesh. The following year a violent earthquake occurred, an owl was seen, thunderbolts descended upon the Capitol and upon the temple of the so-called Public Fortune and into the gardens of Cæsar, where a horse of considerable value was destroyed by them, and the temple of Fortune opened of its own accord. In addition to this, blood issuing from a bake-shop flowed to another temple of Fortune, whose statue on account of the fact that the goddess necessarily oversees and can fathom everything that is before us as well as behind and does not forget from what beginnings any great man came they had set up and named in a way not easy for Greeks to describe.[1]

[1] This is one of some twenty different phases (listed in Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, p. 212) under which the goddess was worshipped. (See also Roscher I, col. 1513.) The appropriate Latin title was *Fortuna Respiciens*, and it certainly had a Greek equivalent (*Τύχη ἐπιστρεφομένη* in Plutarch, *de fortuna Romanorum*, c. 10) which it seems strange that Dio should not have known. Moreover, our historian

Also some infants were born holding their left hands to their heads, so that whereas no good was looked for from the other signs, from this especially an uprising of inferiors against superiors was both foretold by the soothsayers and accepted by the people as true. B. C. 47 (*a. u.* 707)

These portents so revealed by supernatural power disturbed them; and their fear was augmented by the very appearance of the city, which had been strange and unaccustomed at the beginning of the month and thereafter for a long time. There was as yet no consul or prætor, and Antony, in so far as his costume went (which was the *toga laticlavia*) and his lictors, of whom he had only six, and his convening the senate, furnished some semblance of democracy: but the sword with which he was girded, and the throng of soldiers that accompanied him, and his actions themselves most of all indicated the existence of one sole ruler. Many robberies, outrages, and murders took place. And not only were the existing conditions most distressing to the Romans, but they dreaded a far greater number of more terrible acts from Cæsar. For when the master of the horse never laid aside his sword even at the festivals, who would not have been suspicious of the dictator himself? (At the most of these festivals An- —27—

has apparently given a wrong interpretation of the name, since *respicio* in Latin, when used of the gods, commonly means to "look favorably upon." In Plautus's *Captivi* (verse 834) there is a play on the word *respice* involving the goddess, and in his *Asinaria* (verse 716) mention is made of a closely related divinity, Fortuna Obsequens. Cicero (*de legibus*, II, 11, 28), in enumerating the divinities that merit human worship, includes "Fortuna, quæ est vel Huius diei — nam valet in omnis dies — vel Respiciens ad opem ferendam, vel Fors, in quo incerti casus significantur magis" . . . The name Fortuna Respiciens has also come to light in at least three inscriptions.

B. C. 47 (*a. u.* 707) tony presided at the orders of Cæsar. Some few the tribunes also had in charge.) If any persons stopped to think of his magnanimity, which had led him to spare many that had opposed him in battle, nevertheless, seeing that men who had gained an office did not stick to the same principles as guided them in striving for it, they therefore expected that he too would change his —28— tactics. They felt aggrieved and discussed the matter with one another at length,— those at least who were safe in so doing, for they could not make everybody a companion with impunity. Many who would seem to be good friends and others who were relatives were liable to slander them, perverting some statements, and telling downright lies on other points. This was a cause of the greatest discomfort to the rest who were not equally safe, because, being able neither to lament nor to share their views with others they could not in any way get rid of their thoughts. Communication with those similarly afflicted lightened their burden somewhat, and the man who could safely utter and hear in return what the citizens were undergoing became easier. But distrust of such as were not of like habits with themselves confined their dissatisfaction within their minds and inflamed them the more, as they could not tell their secret[1] nor obtain any relief. In addition to keeping their sufferings shut up within they were compelled to praise and admire their treatment, as also to celebrate festivals, perform sacrifices, and appear happy in it all.

—29— This was the condition of the Romans in the City at that time. And, as if it were not sufficient for them

[1] This is the phrase commonly supplied to explain a palpable corruption in the MS.

to be abused by Antony, Lucius Trebellius and Publius Cornelius Dolabella, tribunes, began a factional disturbance. The latter fought on the side of the debtors, to which category he belonged, and had therefore changed his legal standing from patrician to plebeian, to get the tribuneship. The former said he represented the nobles, but none the less published edicts and had recourse to murders. This, too, naturally resulted in a great disturbance and many weapons were everywhere in evidence, although the senators had commanded that no changes should be made before Cæsar's arrival in the city, and Antony that no private individual in the city should carry arms. As they paid no attention themselves, however, to these orders, but resorted to all kinds of measures against each other and against the men just mentioned, there arose a third dispute between Antony and the senate. In order to have it thought that that body had allowed him weapons and the authority that resulted from them (which he had been overready to usurp) he got the privilege of keeping soldiers within the wall and of helping the tribunes in maintaining a guard over the city. After this Antony did whatever he desired with a kind of legal right, and Dolabella and Trebellius were nominally guilty of violence: but their effrontery and resources led them to resist both each other and him as if they too had received some position of command from the senate. Meanwhile Antony learned that the legions which Cæsar after the battle had sent ahead into Italy, as if to indicate that he would follow them, were engaged in doubtful proceedings; and in fear of some insurrection from that quarter he turned over the charge of the

B. C. 47 (*a. u.* 707)

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B. C. 47 (*a. u.* 707) city to Lucius Cæsar, appointing him præfectus urbi, an office never before conferred by a master of the horse. He himself set out to the soldiers. The tribunes that were at variance with the two despised Lucius because of his advanced age and inflicted many outrages upon one another and on the rest until they learned that Cæsar, having settled the affairs of Egypt, had started for Rome. They were carrying on the quarrel under the assumption that he would never return again but be killed somewhere abroad by the Egyptians, as, indeed, they kept hearing. When his coming was reported they moderated their conduct for a time, but as soon as he set out against Pharnaces —31— they relapsed into factional differences once more. Antony was unable to restrain them, and finding that his opposition to Dolabella was obnoxious to the populace he at first joined his party and brought charges against Trebellius,— one being to the effect that he was appropriating the soldiers to his own use. Later, when he perceived that he was not esteemed at all by the multitude, which was attached only to Dolabella, he became vexed and changed sides. He was especially influenced in this course by the fact that while not sharing popular favor with the plebeian leader he received the greatest share of blame from the senators. So nominally he adopted a neutral attitude toward both, but really in secret he chose the cause of Trebellius, and coöperated with him among other ways by allowing him to obtain soldiers. From this time on he made himself a spectator and director of their contests; and they fought, seized in turn the most advantageous points in the city, and entered upon a career of killing

and burning, so that on one occasion the holy vessels were carried by the virgins out of the temple of Vesta. Once more the senators voted that the master of the horse should guard the city still more scrupulously, and practically the entire town was filled with soldiers. Yet there was no respite. Dolabella in despair of obtaining any pardon from Cæsar desired to accomplish some great evil and then perish,— with the idea that he would forever have renown for this act. So many men in the past have become infatuated with basest deeds for the mere sake of fame! Under this influence he too wrought universal disturbance, promising even that on a certain specified day he would enact his laws in regard to debts and house-rents. On receipt of these announcements the crowd erected barricades around the Forum, setting up wooden towers at some points, and put itself in readiness to cope with any force that might oppose it. At that, Antony brought down from the Capitol about dawn a large body of soldiers, cut down the tablets of the laws and hurled some offenders who still continued to be unruly from the cliffs of the Capitol itself. B. C. 47 (*a. u.* 707) —32—

However, this did not stop the factional disputes. Instead, the greater the number of those who perished, the more did the survivors raise a tumult, thinking that Cæsar had got involved in a very great and difficult war. And they did not cease until suddenly he himself appeared before them. Then they became quiet even if unwilling. Some of them were expecting to suffer every conceivable ill fate, for there was talk against them all through the city, and some made one charge and others another: but Cæsar at this juncture also —33—

B. C. 47 (*a. u.* 707) pursued his usual method. He accepted their attitude of the moment as satisfactory and did not concern himself with their past conduct: he spared them all, and some of them (including Dolabella) he honored. To the latter he owed some kindness, which he did not see fit to forget. For in place of overlooking that favor because he had been wronged, he pardoned him in consideration of the benefit received, and besides bringing him to other honors Cæsar not long after appointed him consul, though he had not yet served as prætor.

—34— These were the events which were brought about in Rome by Cæsar's absence. The reasons why he was so long in coming there and did not arrive immediately

B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706) after Pompey's death are as follows. The Egyptians were discontented at the levies of money and highly indignant because not even their temples were left untouched. They are the most excessively religious people on earth and wage wars even against one another on account of their beliefs, since their worship is not a unified system, but different branches of it are diametrically opposed one to another. As a result, then, of their vexation at this and their further fear that they might be surrendered to Cleopatra, who had great influence with Cæsar, they commenced a disturbance. For a time the princess had urged her claim against her brother through others who were in Cæsar's presence, but as soon as she discovered his disposition (which was very susceptible, so that he indulged in amours with a very great number of women at different stages of his travels), she sent word to him that she was being betrayed by her friends and asked that she be allowed to plead her case in person. She was a woman

of surpassing beauty, especially conspicuous at that time because in the prime of youth, with a most delicious voice and a knowledge of how to make herself agreeable to every one. Being brilliant to look upon and to listen to, with the power to subjugate even a cold natured or elderly person, she thought that she might prove exactly to Cæsar's tastes and reposed in her beauty all her claims to advancement. She begged therefore for access to his presence, and on obtaining permission adorned and beautified herself so as to appear before him in the most striking and pitiable guise. When she had perfected these devices she entered the city from her habitation outside, and by night without Ptolemy's knowledge went into the palace. Cæsar upon seeing her and hearing her speak a few words was forthwith so completely captivated that he at once, before dawn, sent for Ptolemy and tried to reconcile them, acting as an advocate for the same woman whose judge he had previously assumed to be. For this reason and because the sight of his sister within the royal dwelling was so unexpected, the boy was filled with wrath and rushed out among the people crying out that he had been betrayed, and at last he tore the diadem from his head and cast it down. In the mighty tumult which thereupon arose Cæsar's soldiers seized the prince who had caused the commotion; but the Egyptian mob was in upheaval. They assaulted the palace by land and sea together and would have taken it without difficulty (for the Romans had no force present sufficient to cope with the foreigners, because the latter had been regarded as friends) but for the fact that Cæsar, alarmed, came

B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706)

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B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706) out before them and standing in a safe place promised to do for them whatsoever they wished. Then he entered an assembly of theirs and producing Ptolemy and Cleopatra read their father's will, in which it was directed that they should live together according to the customs of the Egyptians and rule in common, and that the Roman people should exercise a guardianship over them. When he had done this and had added that it belonged to him as dictator, holding all the power of the people, to have an oversight of the children and to fulfill the father's wishes, he bestowed upon them both the kingdom and granted Cyprus to Arsinoë and Ptolemy the Younger, a sister and a brother of theirs. So great fear possessed him that he not only laid hold on none of the Egyptian domain, but actually gave the inhabitants in addition some of what was his.

—36— By this action they were calmed temporarily, but not long after they raised a rebellion which reached the dignity of war. Potheinos, a eunuch who had taken a prominent part in urging the Egyptians on, who was also charged with the management of Ptolemy's funds, was afraid that he might some time pay the penalty for his behavior. Therefore he sent secretly to Achillas who was at this time still near Pelusium and by frightening him and inspiring him at the same time with hopes he made him his associate, and next won over also all the rest who bore arms. To all of them alike it seemed a shame to be ruled by a woman: for they suspected that Cæsar on the occasion mentioned had given the kingdom to both of the children merely to quiet the people, and that in the course of time he

would offer it to Cleopatra alone. Also they thought themselves a match for the army he then had present. Some started immediately for Alexandria where they busied themselves with their project. Cæsar when he learned this was afraid of their numbers and daring, and sent some men to Achillas not in his own but in Ptolemy's name, bidding him keep the peace. But he, understanding that this was not the child's command, but Cæsar's, so far from giving it any attention was filled with contempt for the sender, believing him afraid. Then he called his soldiers together and by haranguing them at length in favor of Ptolemy and against Cæsar and Cleopatra he finally so incensed them against the messengers, though they were Egyptians, that they defiled themselves with their murder and accepted the necessity of a war without quarter. Cæsar, when the news was brought him, summoned his soldiers from Syria, put a ditch around the palace and the other buildings near it, and fortified it with a wall reaching to the sea. Meanwhile Achillas had arrived on the scene with his regular followers and with the Romans left behind by Gabinius and Septimius to keep guard over Ptolemy: these as a result of their stay there had changed their character and were attached to the local party. Thus he immediately won over the larger part of the Alexandrians and made himself master of the most advantageous positions. After this many battles between the two armies occurred both by day and at night and many places were set on fire, and among others the docks and the storehouses both of grain and of books were burned,— the volumes being, as is reported, of the greatest number and excellence.

B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706)

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B C. 48 (*a. u.* 706) Achillas commanded the mainland, with the exception of what Cæsar had walled off, and the latter the sea,—except the harbor. Cæsar, indeed, was victorious in a sea-fight, and when the Egyptians consequently, fearing that he would sail into their harbor, had filled up the entrance all except a narrow passage, he cut off that outlet also by sinking freight ships full of stones; so they were unable to stir, no matter how much they might desire to sail out. After this achievement provisions, and among other things water, were brought in more easily. Achillas had deprived them of the city water supply by cutting the pipes.

— 39 — While these events were taking place one Ganymedes, a eunuch, abducted Arsinoë, as she was not very well guarded, and led her out to the people. They declared her queen and proceeded to prosecute the war more vigorously, inasmuch as they now had a representative of the race of the Ptolemies. Cæsar, therefore, in fear that Potheinos might kidnap Ptolemy, put the former to death and guarded the latter strictly without any further dissimulation. This contributed to incense the Egyptians still more, to whose party numbers were added daily, whereas the Roman soldiers from Syria were not yet on the scene. Cæsar was anxious to bring the people to a condition of peace, and so he had Ptolemy take his stand on a high place from which they could hear his voice and bade him say to them that he was unharmed and was averse to warfare. He urged them to peaceful measures and promised that he would arrange the details for them. Now if he had talked thus to them of his own accord, he could have

persuaded them to become reconciled; but as it was, they suspected that it was all prearranged by Cæsar, and they would not yield. B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706)

As time went on a dispute arose among the followers of Arsinoë, and Ganymedes prevailed upon her to put Achillas to death, on the ground that he wished to betray the fleet. When this had been done he assumed command of the soldiers and gathered all the boats that were in the river and the lake, besides constructing others. All of them he conveyed through the canals to the sea, where he attacked the Romans while off their guard, burned some of their freight ships to the water's edge and towed others away. Then he cleared out the entrance to the harbor and by lying in wait for vessels there he caused the foreigners great annoyance. One day Cæsar noticed them behaving carelessly, by reason of their supremacy, and suddenly sailed into the harbor, where he burned a number of boats, and disembarking on Pharos slew the inhabitants of the island. When the Egyptians on the mainland saw that, they came to their aid over the bridges and after killing many of the Romans in their turn they hurled the remainder back to their boats. While these fugitives were forcing their way into them at any point and in crowds, Cæsar, besides many others, fell into the sea. And he would have perished miserably weighed down by his robes and pelted by the Egyptians — his garments, being purple, offered a good mark — had he not thrown off the incumbrances and then succeeded in swimming out somewhere to a skiff, which he boarded. In this way he —40—

B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706) was saved without wetting one of the documents of which he held up a large number in his left hand as he swam. His clothing the Egyptians took and hung upon the trophy which they set up to commemorate this rout, as if they had as good as captured the man himself. They also kept a close watch upon the landings (for the legions which had been sent from Syria were now near at hand) and did the Romans much injury. Cæsar could ward off in a way the attack of those who assailed him in the direction of Libya: but near the mouth of the Nile they deceived many of his men by using signal fires as if they too were Romans, and captured them, so that the rest no longer ventured to coast along until Tiberius Claudius Nero at length sailed up the river itself, conquered the foe in battle, and rendered the approach less terrifying to his own

—41— followers. Meanwhile Mithridates, named the Pergamenian, undertook to ascend with his ships the mouth of the Nile opposite Pelusium; but when the Egyptians barred his entrance with their boats he betook himself by night to the canal, hauled the ships over into it (it was one that does not open into the sea), and through it sailed up into the Nile. After that he suddenly began from the sea and the river at once a conflict with the vessels that were guarding the mouth and broke up their blockade, whereupon he assaulted Pelusium with both his infantry and his force of ships, and took it. Advancing then to Alexandria he learned that a certain Dioscorides was going to confront them, and he ambushed and annihilated him.

—42— The Egyptians on receiving the news would not end

the war even under these conditions; yet they were irritated at the sovereignty of the eunuch and the woman and thought if they could put Ptolemy at their head, they would be superior to the Romans. So then, finding themselves unable to seize him by any kind of violence because he was skillfully guarded, they pretended that they were worn out by disasters and desired peace; and they sent to Cæsar a herald to ask for Ptolemy, to the end that they might consult with him about the terms on which they would make a truce. Cæsar thought that they had in very truth changed front, especially since he heard that they were cowardly and fickle and perceived that at this time they were terrified in the face of their defeats. And in order not to be regarded as hindering peace, even if they were devising some trick, he said that he approved their request, and sent them Ptolemy. He saw no tower of strength in the lad in view of his youth and ignorance, and hoped that the Egyptians would either become reconciled with him on what terms he wished or else would better deserve the waging of war and subjugation, so that there might be some reasonable excuse for delivering them to Cleopatra. He had no idea of being defeated by them, particularly since his force had been augmented. The Egyptians, when they secured the child, had not a thought for peace but straightway set out against Mithridates as if they were sure to accomplish some great achievement in the name and by the family of Ptolemy. They cut him off near the lake, between the river and the

B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706)

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B. C. 48 (*a. u.* 706) marshes, and raised a great clamor. Cæsar through fear of being ambushed did not pursue them but at night he set sail as if he were hurrying to some outlet of the Nile and kindled an enormous fire on each vessel so that it might be thought that he was going a very long distance in this direction. He started at first, then, to sail away, but afterward extinguished the glare, returned and passed alongside the city to the peninsula on the Libyan side, where he landed; there he disembarked the soldiers, went around the lake, and fell upon the Egyptians unexpectedly about dawn. They were so startled on the instant that they sent a herald to him for terms, but, when he would not receive their entreaty, a fierce battle subsequently took place in which he was victorious and slew great numbers of the enemy. Some fled hastily to cross the river and perished in it, together with Ptolemy.

—44— B. C. 47 (*a. u.* 707) In this way Cæsar overcame Egypt. He did not, however, make it subject to the Romans, but bestowed it upon Cleopatra, for whose sake he had waged the conflict. Yet, being afraid that the Egyptians might rebel again because they were delivered to a woman to rule them and that the Romans for this reason and because the woman was his companion might be angry, he commanded her to make her other brother partner of her habitation, and gave the kingdom to both of them,— at least nominally. In reality Cleopatra alone was to hold all the power. For her husband was still a child and in view of Cæsar's favor there was nothing that she could not do. Hence her living with her

brother and sharing the sovereignty with him was a mere pretence which she accepted, whereas she actually ruled alone and spent her life in Cæsar's company. B. C. 47 (*a. u.* 707)

She would have detained him even longer in Egypt —45— or else would have at once set out with him for Rome, had not Pharnaces drawn Cæsar most unwillingly from Afric's shores and hindered him from hurrying to Italy. This man was a son of Mithridates and ruled the Cimmerian Bosporus, as has been stated: it was his desire to win back again all his ancestral kingdom, and so he revolted just at the time of the quarrel between Cæsar and Pompey, and, as the Romans had at that time found business with one another and afterward were detained in Egypt, he got possession of Colchis without effort and, in the absence of Deiotarus, subjugated all of Armenia and some cities of Cappadocia and Pontus that were attached to the district of Bithynia. While he was thus engaged Cæsar him- —46— self did not stir,— Egypt was not yet settled and he had some hope of overcoming the man through others —but he sent Gnæus Domitius Calvinus, assigning him charge of Asia and . . .[1] legions. This officer added to his force Deiotarus and Ariobarzanes and marched straight against Pharnaces, who was in Nicopolis,— a city he had previously occupied. Indeed, he felt contempt for the barbarian, because the latter in terror of his presence was ready to agree to an armistice looking to an embassy, and so he would not conclude a truce with him, but attacked him and was defeated.

1 It seems probable that a few words have fallen out of the original narrative at this point. Such is the opinion of both Dindorf and Hoelzl.

B. C. 47 (*a. u.* 707) After that he had to retire to Asia, since he was no match for his conqueror, and winter was approaching. Pharnaces, greatly elated, joined to his cause nearly all of Pontus, captured Amisus, though it held out against him a long time, plundered the city and put to the sword all the young men in it. He then hastened into Bithynia and Asia with the same hopes as his father had harbored. Meanwhile, learning that Asander whom he had left as governor of the Bosporus had revolted, he no longer advanced any farther. For Asander, as soon as the advance of Pharnaces to a point distant from his own position was reported to him and it seemed likely that even if he should temporarily escape his observation with the greatest success, he would still not get out of it well later, rose against him, so as to do a favor to the Romans and to receive the government of the Bos-
—47— porus from them. This was the news on hearing which Pharnaces started against him, but the venture was in vain. For on ascertaining that Cæsar was on the way and was hurrying into Armenia Pharnaces turned back and met him there near Zela. Now that Ptolemy was dead and Domitius vanquished Cæsar had decided that delay in Egypt was neither fitting nor profitable for him, but set out from there and by using great speed reached Armenia. The barbarian, alarmed and fearing his quickness much more than his army, sent messengers to him before he drew near, making frequent propositions to see if in any way on any terms he could compromise the existing situation

and escape. One of the principal pleas that he presented was that he had not coöperated with Pompey, and by this he hoped that he might induce the Roman general to grant a truce, particularly since the latter was anxious to hasten to Italy and Africa; and once he was gone he, Pharnaces, could easily wage war again. Cæsar suspected this, and the first and second sets of envoys he treated with great kindness in order that he might fall upon the foe in a state quite unguarded, through hopes of peace: when the third deputation came he began to reproach him, one of his grounds of censure being that he had deserted Pompey, his benefactor. Then without delay, that very day and just as he was, Cæsar marched forward and attacked him as soon as he came up to him; for a little while some confusion was caused by the cavalry and the scythe-bearing chariots, but after that he conquered the Asiatics with his heavy-armed soldiers. Pharnaces escaped to the sea and later forced his way into Bosporus, where Asander shut him up and killed him. B. C. 47 (*a. u.* 707)

—48— Cæsar took great pride in the victory,— more, indeed, than in any other, in spite of the fact that it had not been very glorious,— because on the same day and at one and the same hour he had come to the enemy, had seen him, and had conquered him. All the spoils, though of great magnitude, he bestowed upon the soldiers, and he set up a trophy to offset one which Mithridates had raised to commemorate the defeat of Triarius.[1] He did not dare to take down that of the barbarians because it had been dedicated

1 Compare Book Thirty-six, chapters 12 and 13.

B. C. 47 (*a. u.* 707) to the gods of war, but by the erection of his own he overshadowed and to a certain extent demolished the other. Next he gained possession of all the region belonging to the Romans and those bound to them by oath which Pharnaces had ravaged, and restored it to the individuals who had been dispossessed, except a portion of Armenia, which he granted to Ariobarzanes. The people of Amisus he rewarded with freedom, and to Mithridates the Pergamenian he gave a tetrarchy in Galatia with the name of kingdom and allowed him to wage war against Asander, so that by conquering him, because he had proved base toward his friend, Mithridates might get Bosporus also.

—49— After accomplishing this and bidding Domitius arrange the rest he came to Bithynia and from there to Greece, whence he sailed for Italy, collecting all the way great sums of money from everybody, and upon every pretext, just as before. On the one hand he levied all that individuals had promised in advance to Pompey, and on the other he asked for still more from outside sources, bringing some accusation against the places to justify his act. All votive offerings of Heracles at Tyre he removed, because the people had received the wife and child of Pompey when they were fleeing. Many golden crowns, also, commemorative of victories, he took from potentates and kings. This he did not out of malice but because his expenditures were on a vast scale and because he was intending to lay out still more upon his legions, his triumph, and everything else that could add to his

brilliance. Briefly, he showed himself a money-getter, declaring that there were two things which created and protected and augmented sovereignties,— soldiers and money; and that these two were dependent upon each other. By proper support armies were kept together, and this support was gathered by the use of arms: and if either the one or the other were lacking, the second of them would be overthrown at the same time. B. C. 47 (*a. u.* 707)

These were ever his ideas and this his talk upon such matters. Now it was to Italy he hurried and not to Africa, although the latter region had been made hostile to him, because he learned of the disturbances in the City and feared that they might get beyond his control. However, as I said, he did no harm to any one, except that there too he gathered large sums of money, partly in the shape of crowns and statues and the like which he received as gifts, and partly by borrowing not only from individual citizens but also from cities. This name (of borrowing) he applied to levies of money for which there was no other reasonable excuse; his exactions from his creditors were none the less unjustified and acts of violence, since he never intended to pay these loans. What he said was that he had spent his private possessions for the public good and it was for that reason he was borrowing. Wherefore, when the multitude demanded that there should be an annulment of debts, he would not do it, saying: "I too am heavily involved." He was easily seen to be wresting away the property of others by —50—

B. C. 47 (*a. u.* 707) his position of supremacy, and for this his companions as well as others disliked him. These men had bought considerable of the confiscated property, in some cases for more than its real value, in the hope of retaining it free of charge, but found themselves compelled to pay the full price.

—51— To such persons he paid no attention. However, to a certain extent he did court the favor of the people as individuals. To the majority he allowed the interest they were owing, an act by which he had incurred the enmity of Pompey, and he released them from all rent for one year, up to the sum of five hundred denarii; furthermore he raised the valuations on goods in which it was allowable according to law for loans to be paid to their value at the time of payment, and this after having considerably lowered the price for the populace on all confiscated property. By these acts he gained the attachment of the people; and he won the affection of the members of his party and those who had fought for him also. For upon the senators he bestowed priesthoods and offices,— some which lasted for the rest of that year and some which extended to the following season. In order to reward a larger number he appointed ten prætors for the next year and more than the customary number of priests. To the pontifices and the augurs, of whom he was one, and to the so-called Fifteen he added one each, although he really wished to take all the priesthoods himself, as had been decreed. To the knights in his army and to the centurions and subordi-

nate officers he gave among other rights the important privilege of choosing some of their own number for the senate to fill the places of those who had perished. B. C. 47 (*a. u.* 707)

The unrest of the troops, however, made trouble for him. They had expected to obtain great things, and finding their rewards not less, to be sure, than their deserts, but inferior to their expectations, they raised an outcry. The most of them were in Campania, being destined to sail on ahead to Africa. These nearly killed Sallust, who had been appointed prætor so as to recover his senatorial office, and when escaping them he set out for Rome to lay before Cæsar what was being done, a number followed him, sparing no one on their way, and killed among others whom they met two senators. Cæsar as soon as he heard of their approach wished to send his guard against them, but fearing that it too might join the uprising he remained quiet until they reached the suburbs. While they waited there he sent to them and enquired what wish or what need had brought them. Upon their replying that they would tell him face to face he allowed them to enter the city unarmed, save as to their swords; these they were regularly accustomed to wear in the city, and they would not have submitted to laying them aside at this time. They insisted a great deal upon the toils and dangers they had undergone and said a great deal about what they had hoped and what they declared they deserved to obtain. Next they asked to be released from service and were very clamorous on this point, not because they wished to return to private life,— —52— —53—

B. C. 47 (*a. u.* 707) they were far from anxious for this since they had long become accustomed to the gains from warfare — but because they thought they would scare Cæsar in this way and accomplish anything whatever, since his projected invasion of Africa was close at hand. He, however, made no reply at all to their earlier statements, but said merely: "Quirites,[1] what you say is right: you are weary and worn out with wounds," and then at once disbanded them all as if he had no further need of them, promising that he would give the rewards in full to such as had served the appointed time. At these words they were struck with alarm both at his attitude in general and because he had called them *Quirites* and not soldiers; and humiliated, in fear of suffering some calamity, they changed their stand, and addressed him with many entreaties and offers, promising that they would join his expedition as volunteers and would carry the war through for him by themselves. When they had reached this stage and one of their leaders also, either on his own impulse or as a favor to Cæsar, had said a few words and presented a few petitions in their behalf, the dictator answered: "I release both you who are here present and all the rest whose years of service have expired. I really have no further need of you. Yet even so I will pay you the rewards, that no one may say that I after using you in dangers later showed myself ungrateful, even though you were unwilling to join my campaign while perfectly strong in body and able in other respects to

[1] *I. e.*, "Citizens."

prosecute a war." This he said for effect, for they were quite indispensable to him. He then assigned them all land from the public holdings and from his own, settling them in different places, and separating them considerable distances from one another, to the end that they should not inspire their neighbors with terror nor (dwelling apart) be ready for insurrection. Of the money that was owing them, large amounts of which he had promised to give them at practically every levy, he offered to discharge a part immediately and to supply the remainder with interest in the near future. When he had said this and so enthralled them that they showed no sign of boldness but expressed their gratitude, he added: "You have all that is due you from me, and I will compel no one of you to endure campaigns any longer. If, however, any one wishes of his own accord to help me subjugate what remains, I will gladly receive him." Hearing this they were overjoyed, and all alike were anxious to join the new expedition. Cæsar put aside the turbulent spirits among them, not all, but as many as were moderately well acquainted with farming and so could make a living,— and the rest he used. This he did also in the case of the rest of his soldiers. Those who were overbold and able to cause some great evil he took away from Italy in order that they might not raise an insurrection by being left behind there; and in Africa he was glad to employ different men on different pretexts, for while he was making away with his opponents through their work, he at the same time got rid of them. Though he

—54—
B. C. 47
(*a. u.* 707)

—55—

B. C. 47 (*a. u.* 707) was the kindliest of men and most frequently did favors of various sorts for his soldiers and others, he bitterly hated those given to uprisings and punished them with extreme severity.

This he did in that year in which he ruled as dictator really for the second time and the consuls were said to be Calenus and Vatinius, appointed near the close —56— of the season. He next crossed over into Africa, although winter had set in. And he had no little success when, somewhat later, he made an unlooked for attack on his opponents. On all occasions he accomplished a great deal by his rapidity and the unexpectedness of his expeditions, so that if any one should try to study out what it was that made him so superior to his contemporaries in warfare, he would find by careful comparison that there was nothing more striking than these two characteristics. Africa had not been friendly to Cæsar formerly, but after Curio's death it became entirely hostile. Affairs were in the hands of Varus and Juba, and furthermore Cato, Scipio, and their followers had taken refuge there simultaneously, as I have stated. After this they made common cause in the war, trained the land forces, and making descents by sea upon Sicily and Sardinia they harassed the cities and brought back ships from which they obtained[1] arms and iron besides, which alone they lacked. Finally they reached such a condition of readiness and disposition that, as no army opposed them and Cæsar delayed in Egypt and the capital, they despatched Pompey to Spain. On learning

[1] Xylander and Leunclavius supply this necessary word, lacking in the MS.

that the peninsula was in revolt they thought that the people would readily receive him as being the son of Pompey the Great; and while he made preparations to occupy Spain in a short time and set out from there to the capital, the others were getting ready to make the voyage to Italy. At the start they experienced a slight delay, due to a dispute between Varus and Scipio about the leadership because the former had held sway for a longer time in these regions, and also Juba, elated by his victory, demanded that he should have first place. But Scipio and Cato reached an agreement, as being far in advance of them all, the former in esteem, the latter in understanding, and won over the rest, persuading them to entrust everything to Scipio. Cato, who might have led the forces on equal terms with him or even alone, refused, first because he thought it a most injurious course in the actual state of affairs, and second, because he was inferior to the other in political renown. For he saw that in military matters the principle of preference to ex-magistrates as a matter of course had especial force, and therefore he willingly yielded him the command and furthermore delivered to him the troops that he had brought there. After this Cato made a request for Utica, which was suspected of favoring Cæsar's cause and had come near having its citizens removed by the others on this account, and he received it to guard; and the whole country and sea in that vicinity was entrusted to his garrisons. The rest Scipio commanded as dictator. His very name was a source of strength to those who sided with him, since by some strange, unreasonable hope they believed that no Scipio could meet with misfortune in Africa.

B. C. 47 (*a. u.* 707)

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—58—
B. C. 47
(*a. u.* 707)

Cæsar, when he learned this and saw that his own soldiers also were persuaded that it was so and were consequently afraid, took with him as an aid a man of the family of the Scipios who bore that name (he was otherwise known as Salvito[1]) and then made the voyage to Adrymetum, since the neighborhood of Utica was strictly guarded. His unexpected crossing in the winter enabled him to escape detection. When he had left his ship an accident happened to him which, even if some disaster was portended by Heaven, he nevertheless turned to a good omen. Just as he was setting foot on land he slipped, and the soldiers seeing him fall on his face were disheartened and in their chagrin raised an outcry; but he never lost his presence of mind, and stretching out his hands as if he had fallen on purpose he embraced and kissed repeatedly the land, and cried with a shout: "I have thee, Africa!" His next move was an assault upon Adrymetum, from which he was repulsed and moreover driven violently out of his camp. Then he transferred his position to another city called Ruspina, and being received by the inhabitants set up his winter quarters there and made it the base for subsequent warfare.

[1] Compare Plutarch, Life of Cæsar, chapter 52, and Suetonius, Life of Cæsar, chapter 59.

DIO'S
ROMAN HISTORY
43

The following is contained in the Forty-third of Dio's Rome:

How Cæsar conquered Scipio and Juba (chapters 1–8).

How the Romans got possession of Numidia (chapter 9).

How Cato slew himself (chapters 10–13).

How Cæsar returned to Rome and celebrated his triumph and settled what business remained (chapters 14–21).

How the Forum of Cæsar and the Temple of Venus were consecrated (chapters 22–25).

How Cæsar arranged the year in its present fashion (chapters 26, 27).

How Cæsar conquered in Spain Gnæus Pompey the son of Pompey (chapters 28–45).

How for the first time consuls were appointed for not an entire year (chapters 46–48).

How Carthage and Corinth received colonies (chapters 49, 50).

How the Ædiles Cereales were appointed (chapter 51).

Duration of time, three years, in which there were the following magistrates here enumerated.

C. Iulius C. f. Cæsar, Dictator (III), with Æmilius Lepidus, Master of Horse, and Consul (III) with Æmilius Lepidus Cos. (B. C. 46 = a. u. 708.)

C. Iulius Cæsar, Dictator (IV), with Æmilius Lepidus, Master of Horse; also Consul (IV) alone. (B. C. 45 = a. u. 709.)

C. Iulius Cæsar, Dictator (V), with Æmilius Lepidus, Master of Horse, and Consul (V) with M. Antonius Cos. (B. C. 44 = a. u. 710.)

Such were his adventures at this time. The following year he became both dictator and consul at the same time (it was the third occasion on which he had filled each of the two offices), and Lepidus became his colleague in both instances. When he had been named dictator by Lepidus the first time, he had sent him immediately after the prætorship into Hither Spain; and when he returned he had honored him with triumphal celebrations though Lepidus had conquered no foes nor so much as fought with any,— the excuse being that he had been at the scene of the exploits of Longinus and of Marcellus. Yet he sent home nothing (if you want the facts) except what money he had plundered from the allies. Cæsar besides exalting Lepidus with these honors chose him subsequently as his colleague in both the positions mentioned. —1— B. C. 46 (*a. u.* 708)

Now while they were still in office, the populace of Rome became excited by prodigies. There was a wolf seen in the city, and a pig that save for its feet resembled an elephant was brought forth. In Africa, too, Petreius and Labienus who had observed that Cæsar had gone out to villages after grain, by means of the Nomads drove his cavalry, that had not yet thoroughly recovered strength from its sea-voyage, in upon the infantry; and while as a result the force was in utter confusion, they killed many of the soldiers at close quarters. They would have cut down all the rest besides, who had crowded together on a bit of high —2—

B. C. 46
(*a. u.* 708)

ground, had they not been severely wounded. Even as it was, by this deed they alarmed Cæsar considerably. When he stopped to consider how he had been tripped by a few, while expecting, too, that Scipio and Juba would arrive directly with all their powers, as they had been reported, he was decidedly in a dilemma, and did not know what course to adopt. He was not yet able to bring the war to a satisfactory conclusion; he saw, furthermore, that to stay in the same place was difficult because of the lack of subsistence even if the foe should keep away from his troops, and that to retire was impossible, with the enemy pressing upon him both by land and by sea. Consequently he was in a state of dejection.

—3— He was still in this situation when one Publius Sittius (if we ought to call it him, and not the Divine Power) brought at one stroke salvation and victory. This man had been exiled from Italy, and had taken along some fellow-exiles: after crossing over into Mauritania he collected a band and was general under Bocchus. Though he had no benefit from Cæsar to start with, and although in general he was not known to him, he undertook to share in the war and to help him to overcome the existing difficulty. Accordingly he bore no direct aid to Cæsar himself, for he heard that the latter was at a distance and thought that his own assistance (for he had no large body of troops) would prove of small value to him. It was Juba whom he watched start out on his expedition, and then he invaded Numidia, which along with Gætulia (likewise a part of

Juba's dominion) he harried so completely that the king gave up the project before him and turned back in the midst of his journey with most of his army; some of it he had sent off to Scipio. This fact made it as evident as one could wish that if Juba had also come up, Cæsar would never have withstood the two. He did not so much as venture to join issue with Scipio alone at once, because he stood in terrible dread of the elephants (among other things), partly on account of their fighting abilities, but still more because they were forever throwing his cavalry into confusion. Therefore, —4— while keeping as strict a watch over the camp as he could, Cæsar sent to Italy for soldiers and elephants. He did not count on the latter for any considerable military achievement (since there were not many of them) but intended that the horses, by becoming accustomed to the sight and sound of them, should learn for the future not to fear at all those belonging to the enemy. B. C. 46 (*a. u.* 708)

Meanwhile, also, the Gætulians came over to his side, with some others of the neighboring tribes. The latter's reasons for this step were, first,— the persuasion of the Gætuli, who, they heard, had been greatly honored, and second, the fact that they remembered Marius, who was a relative of Cæsar. When this had occurred, and his auxiliaries from Italy in spite of delay and danger caused by bad weather and hostile agents had nevertheless accomplished the passage, he did not rest a moment. On the contrary he was eager for the conflict, looking to annihilate Scipio in advance of Juba's arrival, and moved forward against him in

B. C. 46 (*a. u.* 708) the direction of a city called Uzitta, where he took up his quarters on a certain crest overlooking both the city and the enemy's camp, having first dislodged those who were holding it. Soon after this he chased Scipio, who had attacked him, away from this higher ground, and by charging down behind him with his cavalry did some damage.

This position accordingly he held and fortified; and he took another on the other side of the city by dislodging Labienus from it; after which he walled off the entire town. For Scipio, fearing lest his own power be spent too soon, would no longer risk a battle with Cæsar, but sent for Juba. And when the latter repeatedly failed to obey his summons he (Scipio) promised to relinquish to him all the rights that the Romans had in Africa. At that, Juba appointed others to have charge of the operations against Sittius, and once more started out himself against Cæsar.

—5— While this was going on Cæsar tried in every way to draw Scipio into close quarters. Baffled in this, he made friendly overtures to the latter's soldiers, and distributed among them brief pamphlets, in which he promised to the native that he would preserve his possessions unharmed, and to the Roman that he would grant immunity and the honors which he owed to his own followers. Scipio in like manner undertook to circulate both offers and pamphlets among the opposite party, with a view to making some of them his own: however, he was unable to induce any of them to change sides. Not that some of them would not have

chosen his cause by preference, if any announcement similar to Cæsar's had been made: their failure to do so was due to the fact that he promised them nothing in the way of a prize, but merely urged them to liberate the Roman people and the senate. And so, inasmuch as he chose a respectable proposition instead of something which would advantage them in the needs of the moment, he failed to gain the allegiance of a single one. B. C. 46 (*a. u.* 708)

While Scipio alone was in the camp, matters progressed as just described, but when Juba also came up, the scene was changed. For these two both tried to provoke their opponents to battle and harassed them when they showed unwillingness to contend; moreover by their cavalry they kept inflicting serious damage upon any who were scattered at a distance. But Cæsar was not for getting into close quarters with them if he could help it. He stuck to his circumvallation, kept seizing provender as was convenient, and sent after other forces from home. When at last these reached him with much difficulty — (for they were not all together, but kept gathering gradually, since they lacked boats in which to cross in a body) — still, when in the course of time they did reach him and he had added them to his army, he took courage again; so much so, that he led out against the foe, and drew up his men in front of the trenches. Seeing this his opponents marshaled themselves in turn, but did not join issue with Cæsar's troops. This continued for several days. For aside from cavalry skirmishes of limited extent after —6—

B. C. 46 (*a. u.* 708) which they would invariably retire, neither side risked any important movement.

—7— Accordingly Cæsar, who bethought himself that because of the nature of the land he could not force them to come into close quarters unless they chose, started toward Thapsus, in order that either they might come to the help of the city and so engage his forces, or, if they neglected it, he might capture the place. Now Thapsus is situated on a kind of peninsula, with the sea on one side and a marsh stretching along on the other: between them lies a narrow, swampy isthmus so that one has access to the town from two directions by an extremely narrow road running along both sides of the marsh close to the surf. On his way toward this city Cæsar, when he had come within these narrow approaches, proceeded to dig ditches and to erect palisades. And the others made no trouble for him (for they were not his match), but Scipio and Juba undertook to wall off in turn the neck of the isthmus, where it comes to an end near the mainland, dividing it into two portions by means of palisades and ditches.

—8— They were still at work, and accomplishing a great deal every day (for in order that they might build the wall across more quickly they had assigned the elephants to that portion along which a ditch had not yet been dug and on that account was somewhat accessible to the enemy, while on the remaining defences all were working), when Cæsar suddenly attacked the others, the followers of Scipio, and with slings and arrows from a distance threw the elephants into thorough con-

fusion. As they retreated he not only followed them up, but unexpectedly reaching the workers he routed them, too. When they fled into the redoubt, he dashed in with them and captured it without a blow. B. C. 46 (*a. u.* 708)

Juba, seeing this, was so startled and terrified, that he ventured neither to come into close quarters with any one, nor even to keep the camp properly guarded, but fled incontinently homeward. So then, when no one would receive him, chiefly because Sittius had conquered all antagonists beforehand, he renounced all chances of safety, and with Petreius, who likewise had no hope of amnesty, in single conflict fought and died.

—9—

Cæsar, immediately after Juba's flight, captured the palisade and wrought a vast slaughter among all those that met his troops: he spared not even those who would change to his side. Next, meeting with no opposition, he brought the rest of the cities to terms; the Nomads whom he acquired he reduced to a state of submission, and delivered to Sallust nominally to rule, but really to harry and plunder. This officer certainly did receive many bribes and make many confiscations, so that accusations were even preferred and he bore the stigma of the deepest disgrace, inasmuch as after writing such treatises as he had, and making many bitter remarks about those who enjoyed the fruits of others' labor, he did not practice what he preached. Wherefore, no matter how full permission was given him by Cæsar, yet in his History the man himself had chiseled his own code of principles deep, as upon a tablet.

B. C. 46
(*a. u.* 708)

Such was the course which events took. Now as for these tribes in Libya, the region surrounding Carthage (which we call also Africa) received the title of Old, because it had been long ago subjugated, whereas the region of the Nomads was called New, because it had been newly captured. Scipio, who had fled from the battle, chancing upon a boat set sail for Spain and Pompey. He was cast ashore, however, upon Mauritania, and through fear of Sittius made way with himself.

— 10 —

Cato, since many had sought refuge with him, was at first preparing to take a hand in affairs and to offer a certain amount of resistance to Cæsar. But the men of Utica were not in the beginning hostile to Cæsar, and now, seeing him victorious, would not listen to Cato. This made the members of the senate and the knights who were present afraid of arrest at their hands, and they took counsel for flight. Cato himself decided neither to war against Cæsar — indeed, he lacked the power,— nor to give himself up. This was not through any fear: he understood well enough that Cæsar would have been very ready to spare him for the sake of that reputation for humaneness: but it was because he was passionately in love with freedom, and would not brook defeat in aught at the hands of any man, and regarded pity emanating from Cæsar as more hateful than death.

He called together those of the citizens who were present, enquired whither each one of them had determined to proceed, sent them forth with supplies for the journey, and bade his son betake himself to Cæsar.

To the youth's interrogation, "Why then do you also not do so?" he replied: — "I, brought up in freedom, with the right of free speech, can not in my old age change and learn slavery instead; but you, who were both born and brought up under such a régime, you ought to serve the deity that presides over your fortunes." B. C. 46 (*a. u.* 708)

—11— When he had done this, after sending to the people of Utica an account of his administration and returning to them the surplus funds, as well as whatever else of theirs he had, he was filled with a desire to depart previous to Cæsar's arrival. He did not undertake any such project by day (for his son and others surrounding him kept him under surveillance), but when evening was come he slipped a tiny dagger secretly under his pillow, and asked for Plato's book on the Soul,[1] which he had written out. This he did either endeavoring to divert the company from the suspicion that he had any sinister plan in mind, in order to render himself as free from scrutiny as possible, or else in the wish to obtain some little consolation in respect to death from the reading of it. When he had read the work through, as it drew on toward midnight, he stealthily drew out the dagger, and smote himself upon the belly. He would have immediately died from loss of blood, had he not by falling from the low couch made a noise and aroused those sleeping in the antechamber. Thereupon his son and some others who rushed in duly put back his bowels into his belly again,

[1] Better known as the *Phædo.*

B. C. 46 (*a. u.* 708) and brought medical attendance for him. Then they took away the dagger and locked the doors, that he might obtain sleep,— for they had no idea of his perishing in any other way. But he, having thrust his hands into the wound and broken the stitches of it, expired.

Thus Cato, who had proved himself both the most democratic and the strongest willed of his contemporaries acquired a great glory even from his very death, so that he obtained the commemorative title "of Utica," both because he had died, as described, in that city, and because he was publicly buried by the

— 12 — people. Cæsar declared that with him he was angry, because Cato had grudged him the distinction attaching to the preservation of such a man, but released his son and most of the rest, as was his custom: for some came over to him immediately of their own volition, and others later, so as to approach him after time should have somewhat blurred his memory. So these escaped, but Afranius and Faustus would not come to him of their own free will, for they felt sure of destruction. They fled to Mauritania, where they were captured by Sittius. Cæsar put them to death without a trial, on the ground that they were captives for a second time.[1] And in the case of Lucius Cæsar,

[1] The Greek word representing "for a second time" is not in the MS., but is supplied with the best of reason by Schenkl and also Cobet (see Mnemosyne N. S. X, p. 196). It was Cæsar's regular custom to spare any who were taken captive for the first time, but invariably to put them to death if they were again caught opposing him in arms. References in Dio are numerous: Compare Book 41, chapter 62; Book 43, chapter 17; Book 44, chapter 45; Book 44, chapter 46. The same rule for the treatment of captives finds mention also in the Life of Cæsar by Suetonius, chapter 75.

though the man was related to him and came a voluntary suppliant, nevertheless, since he had fought against him straight through, he at first bade him stand trial so that the conqueror might seem to have some legal right on his side in condemning him: later Cæsar shrank from killing him by his own vote, and put it off for the time, but afterward did slay him secretly. Even among his own followers those that did not suit him he sacrificed without compunction to the opposing side in some cases, and in others by prearrangement caused them to perish in the actual conflicts, through the agency of their own comrades, for, as I have said, he did not take measures openly against all those that had troubled him, but any that he could not prosecute on some substantial charge he quietly put out of the way in some obscure fashion. And yet at that time he burned without reading all the papers that were found in the private chests of Scipio, and of the men who had fought against him he preserved many for their own sakes, and many also on account of their friends. For, as has been said, he allowed each of his fellow-soldiers and companions to ask the life of one man. He would have preserved Cato, too. For he had conceived such an admiration for him that when Cicero subsequently wrote an encomium of Cato he was no whit vexed,— although Cicero had likewise warred against him,— but merely wrote a short treatise which he entitled Anticato.

B. C. 46 (*a. u.* 708)

—13—

Cæsar after these events at once and before crossing into Italy disencumbered himself of the more

—14—

B. C. 46 (*a. u.* 708) elderly among his soldiers for fear they might revolt again. He arranged the other matters in Africa just as rapidly as was feasible and sailed as far as Sardinia with all his fleet. From that point he sent the discarded troops in the company of Gaius Didius into Spain against Pompey, and himself returned to Rome, priding himself chiefly upon the brilliance of his achievements but also to some extent upon the decrees of the senate. For they had decreed that offerings should be made for his victory during forty days, and they had granted him leave to celebrate the previously accorded triumph upon white horses and with such lictors as were then in his company, with as many others as he had employed in his first dictatorship, and all the rest, besides, that he had in his second. Further, they elected him superintendent of every man's conduct (for some such name was given him, as if the title of censor were not worthy of him), for three years, and dictator for ten in succession. They moreover voted that he should sit in the senate upon the sella curulis with the acting consuls, and should always state his opinion first, that he should give the signal in all the horse-races, and that he should have the appointment of the officers and whatever else formerly the people were accustomd to assign. And they resolved that a representation of his chariot be set on the Capitol opposite Jupiter, that upon an image of the inhabited world a bronze figure of Cæsar be mounted, holding a written statement to the effect that he was a demi-god, and that his name be inscribed upon

the Capitol, in place of that of Catulus, on the ground that he had finished the temple, in the course of the construction of which he had undertaken to call Catulus to account. These are the only measures I have recorded, not because they were also the only ones voted, — for a vast number of things was proposed and of course ratified,— but because he disregarded the rest, whereas these he accepted. B. C. 46 (*a. u.* 708)

Now that they had been settled, he entered Rome, where he saw that the inhabitants were afraid of his power and suspicious of his designs as a result of which they expected to suffer many terrible evils such as had taken place before. Seeing also that on this account excessive honors had been accorded him, through flattery but not through good-will, he began to encourage the Romans and to inspire them with hope by the following speech delivered in the senate: —15—

" Let none of you, Conscript Fathers, expect that I shall make any harsh proclamation or perform any cruel act merely because I have conquered and am able to say whatever I may please without being called to account, and to do with authority whatever I may choose. It is true that Marius and Cinna and Sulla and all the rest, so to speak, who ever subdued their adversaries, in their initial undertakings said and did much that was humane, principally as a result of which they converted to their side some whose alliance, or at least whose refraining from hostilities, they enjoyed; and then after conquering and becoming masters of the ends they sought, they adopted a course of behavior

B. C. 46 (*a. u.* 708) diametrically opposed to their former stand both in word and in deed. Let no one, however, for any such reason assume that this same policy will be mine. I have not associated with you in former time under a disguise, possessing in reality some different nature, only to become emboldened in security now because that is possible: nor have I been so excited or beclouded by my great good fortune as to desire also to play the tyrant over you. Both of these afflictions, or rather the second, seems to have befallen those men whom I mentioned. No, I am in nature the same sort of a man as you have always found me:—why should I go into details and become burdensome by a praise of self? — I should not think of treating Fortune so shabbily, but the more I have enjoyed her favors, the better will I use her in every respect. I have been anxious to secure so great power and to rise to such a height as to chastise all active foes and admonish all those disaffected for no other reason than that I might be able to play a brave part without
—16— danger, and to obtain prosperity with fame. It is not, besides, in general either noble or just for a man to be convicted of adopting that course for which he had rebuked those who differed from him in opinion: nor should I ever be satisfied to be compared with them through my imitation of their deeds, and to differ merely by the reputation of my complete victory. For who ought to benefit people more and more abundantly than he who has the greatest power. Who ought to err less than he who is the strongest? Who

should use the gifts of Heaven more sensibly than he who has received the greatest from that source? Who ought to handle present blessings more uprightly than he who has the most of them and is most afraid of their being lost? Good fortune, joined with temperance, continues: and authority, if it maintains moderation, preserves all that has been gained. Above all, as is seldom the case with those persons that succeed without virtue, they make it possible for rulers while alive to be loved unfeignedly, and when dead to receive genuine praise. But the man who without restraint absolutely applies his power to everything finds for himself neither real good-will nor certain safety, but though accorded a false flattery in public [is secretly cursed].[1] For the whole world, besides those who associate with him most, both suspect and fear a ruler who is not master of his own authority. B. C. 46 (*a. u.* 708)

"Again, these words that I have spoken are no mere quibbles, and I have tried to make you understand that they have not fallen into my head for ostentation or by mere chance on the present occasion: on the contrary, from the outset I realized that this course was both suitable and advantageous for me; that is why I both think and speak thus. Consequently you may be not only of good courage with reference to the present, but hopeful as regards the future, reflecting (if you think I used any pretence), that I would not be deferring my projects, but would have made them known this very day. —17—

1 The last three words of this sentence are not found in the MS., but as a correlative clause of contrast is evidently needed to complete the sense, this, or something similar, is supplied by most editors.

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"However, I was never otherwise minded in times past, as my works themselves, indeed, doubtless prove, and now I shall feel far more eagerness with all order and decency not,— forbid it, Jupiter!— not to be your master, but your head man, not your tyrant, but your leader. In the matter of accomplishing for you everything else that must be done, I will be both consul and dictator, but in the matter of injuring any one, a private citizen. That possibility I do not think should be even mentioned. Why should I put any one of you to death, who have done me no harm, when I destroyed none of my adversaries, even if with the utmost zeal they had taken[1] part with various enemies against me, but I took pity on all those that had withstood me but once, saving many alive of those that fought on the opposing side a second time? How should I bear malice toward any, seeing that without reading or making excerpts I immediately burned all the documents that were found among the private papers both in Pompey's and in Scipio's tents? So then, let us, Conscript Fathers, boldly unite our interests, forgetting all past events as brought to pass simply by some supernatural Force, and beginning to love each the other without suspicion as though we were some new citizens. In this way you may behave yourselves toward me as toward a father, enjoying the forethought and solicitude which I shall give you and fearing no vexation, and I may have charge of you as of children, praying that all noblest deeds may be ever accomplished by your exertions, and enduring perforce

[1] Reading *συνήραντο* with Bekker and Reiske in place of MS. *προσήραντο*.

human limitations, exalting the excellent by fitting honors and correcting the rest so far as is feasible. B. C. 46 (*a. u.* 708)

"Another point — do not fear the soldiers nor regard them in any other light than as guardians of my dominion, which is at the same time yours: that they should be maintained is inevitable, for many reasons, but they will be maintained for your benefit, not against you; they will be content with what is given them and think well of the givers. For this reason larger taxes than is customary have been levied, in order that the opposition might be made submissive and the victorious element, receiving sufficient support, might not become an opposition. Of course I have received no private gain from these funds, seeing that I have expended for you all that I possessed, including much that I had borrowed. No, you can see that a part has been expended on the wars, and the rest has been kept safe for you: it will serve to adorn the city and administer the other governmental departments. I have, then, taken upon my own shoulders the odium of the levy, whereas you will all enjoy its advantages in common, in the campaigns as well as elsewhere. We are in need of arms at every moment, since without them it is impossible for us, who inhabit so great a city and hold so extensive an empire, to live safely: now the surplus of money will be a mighty assistance in this matter. However, let none of you suspect that I shall harass any man who is rich or establish any new taxes: I shall be satisfied with the present collections and be more anxious to help make some contribution to you than to wrong any one for his money." — 18 —

B. C. 46 (*a. u.* 708) By such statements in the senate and afterward before the people Cæsar relieved them to some extent of their fears, but was not able to persuade them entirely to be of good courage until he corroborated his declarations by his deeds.

—19— After this he conducted subsequent proceedings in a brilliant manner, as was fitting in honor of so many and such decisive victories. He celebrated triumphs over the Gauls, for Egypt, for Pharnaces and for Juba, in four sections, on four separate days. Most of it doubtless delighted the spectators, but the sight of Arsinoë of Egypt — he had brought her along among the captives — and the horde of lictors and the symbols of triumph taken from citizens who had fallen in Africa displeased them exceedingly. The lictors, on account of their numbers, appeared to them a most outrageous multitude, since never before had they beheld so many at one time: and the sight of Arsinoë, a woman and once called queen, in chains (a spectacle which had never yet been offered, in Rome at least), aroused very great pity, and in consequence on this excuse they incidentally lamented their personal misfortunes. She, to be sure, was released out of consideration for her brothers, but others including Vercingetorix were put to death.

—20— The people, accordingly, were disagreeably affected by these sights that I have mentioned, and yet they deemed them very few considering the multitude of the captives and the magnitude of Cæsar's accomplishments. This, as well as the fact that he endured very

goodnaturedly the army's outspoken comments,[1] led them to admire him extremely. For they made sport of those of their own number appointed to the senate by him and all the other failings of which he was accused:[2] most of all they jested about his love for Cleopatra and his sojourn at the court of Nicomedes, ruler of Bithynia, inasmuch as he had once been at his court when a lad; indeed, they even declared that Cæsar had enslaved[3] the Gauls, but Nicomedes Cæsar. Finally, on the top of all the rest they all together with a shout declared that if you do well, you will be punished, but if ill you shall rule.[4] This was meant by them to signify that if Cæsar should restore self-gov- B. C. 46 (*a. u.* 708)

1 These blatherskite jests formed a part of the ritual of the triumph, for the purpose of averting the possible jealousy of Heaven. Compare, in general, the interesting description of a triumph given in Fragment 23 (volume VI).

2 Reading ἠτιάζετο (Cobet's preference).

3 Cæsar's conduct during his stay with Nicomedes (with embellishments) was thrown in his teeth repeatedly during his career. According to Suetonius (Life of Cæsar, chapter 49) the soldiers sang scurrilous verses, as follows:

> Gallias Cæsar subegit, Nicomedes Cæsarem.
> Ecce Cæsar nunc triumphat qui subegit Gallias,
> Nicomedes non triumphat qui subegit Cæsarem.

Dio undoubtedly had these verses before him, in either Suetonius or some other work, but seems to have been too slow-witted to appreciate the *double entendre* in *subegit*, which may signify voluptuary as well as military prowess. Hence, though he might have turned the expression exactly by ὑπηγάγετο, he contented himself with the prosaic ἐδουλώσατο.

4 This remark (as Cobet pointed out) is evidently a perversion of an old nursery jingle (nenia):

> *Si male faxis vapulabis, si bene faxis rex eris.*

And another form of it is found in Horace, Epistles (I, 1, 59–60):

> *at pueri ludentes 'rex eris' aiunt*
> *'si recte facies.'*

The soldiers simply changed the position of *male* and *bene* in the line above cited.

B. C. 46 (*a. u.* 708) ernment to the people — which they regarded as just — and stand trial for the acts he had committed outside the laws, he would even undergo punishment; whereas, if he should cleave to his power,— which they deemed the course of an unjust person,— he would continue sole ruler. As for him, however, he was not displeased at their saying this: on the contrary he was quite delighted that by such frankness toward him they showed a belief that he would never be angry at it,— except in so far as their abuse concerned his association with Nicomedes. At this he was decidedly irritated and evidently pained: he attempted to defend himself, denying with an oath that the case was such, and after that he incurred the further penalty of laughter.

— 21 — Now on the first day of the festival of victory a portent far from good fell to his lot. The axle of the triumphal chariot was crushed just opposite the very temple of Fortune built by Lucullus, so that he had to complete the rest of the course in another. On this occasion, too, he climbed up the stairs of the Capitol on his knees, without noticing at all either the chariot which he had dedicated to Jupiter, or the image of the inhabited world lying beneath his feet, or the inscription upon it: later on, however, he erased from that inscription the name demi-god.

After this triumphal celebration he entertained the populace splendidly, giving them grain beyond the regular measure and olive oil. Also, to the multitude which received the present of grain he assigned the

seventy-five denarii which he had promised in advance, and twenty-five more, but to the soldiers five hundred in one sum. Yet he was not merely ostentatious: in most respects he was very exact; for instance, since the throng receiving doles of grain had for a very long period been growing not by lawful methods of increase but in such ways as are common in popular tumults, he investigated the matter and erased half of their names at one time. B. C. 46 (*a. u.* 708)

The first days of the fête he passed as was customary: on the last day, after they had finished dinner, he entered his own forum wearing fancy sandals and garlanded with all sorts of flowers; thence he proceeded homeward with the entire populace, so to speak, alongside escorting him, while many elephants carried torches. He had himself adorned the forum called after him, and it is distinctly more beautiful than the Roman (Forum); yet it had increased the reputation of the other so that that was called the Great Forum. This forum which he had constructed and the temple of Venus, looked upon as the founder of his race, he dedicated at this very time. In honor of them he instituted many contests of all kinds. He furnished with benches a kind of hunting-theatre, which from the fact that it had seats all around without a canopy was called an amphitheatre. Here in honor of his daughter he had animals killed and contests between men in armor; but whoever should care to write down their number would doubtless render his narrative tedious besides falling into errors; for —22—

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all such things are regularly exaggerated by boasting. I shall accordingly pass over this, and be silent on the other like events that subsequently took place, — unless, of course, it should seem to me thoroughly necessary to mention some particular point,— but I will give an account of the so-called camelopard, because it was then for the first time introduced into Rome by Cæsar and exhibited to all. This animal is in general a camel, except that it has sets of legs not of equal length. That is, its hind legs are shorter. Beginning from the rump its back grows gradually higher, appearing as if it would ascend indefinitely, until the most of its body reaching its loftiest point is supported on the front legs, while the neck stretches up to an unusual height. It has skin spotted like a leopard, and for this reason bears the name common to both animals. Such is the appearance of this beast.

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As for the men, he not only pitted one against another in the Forum, as had been customary, but he also in the hippodrome brought them together in companies, horsemen against horsemen, fighters on foot against similar contestants, and others that were a match for one another indiscriminately. Some even, forty in number, fought from elephants. Finally he produced a naval battle, not on the sea nor on the lake but on land. He hollowed out a certain tract on the Campus Martius and by letting water into it introduced ships. In all the contests the captives and those condemned to death took part. Some even of the knights, and,— not to mention others,— a son of

a man who had been prætor fought in single combat. Indeed, a senator named Fulvius Sepinus[1] desired to contend in full armor, but was prevented; for Cæsar had expressed a fervent wish that that should never take place, though he did permit the knights to contend. The patrician children went through the so-called Troy equestrian exercise according to ancient custom, and the young men who were their peers vied with one another in chariots. B. C. 46 (*a. u.* 708)

Still, it must be said he was blamed for the great number of those who were slain, on the ground that he had not himself become satiated with slaughter and was further exhibiting to the populace symbols of their own miseries; and much more so because he had expended on all that array countless sums. A clamor in consequence was raised against him for two reasons,—that he had collected most of the funds unjustly, and that he had used them up for such purposes. —24—

And by mentioning one feature of his extravagance of that time I shall thereby give an inkling of all the rest. In order that the sun might not annoy any of the spectators he had curtains stretched over them made of silk, according to some accounts. Now this product of the loom is a device of barbarian luxury and from them has come down even to us to satisfy the excessive daintiness of veritable women. The civilians perforce held their peace at such acts, but the soldiers raised an outcry, not because they cared about the money recklessly squandered but because they did not

1 Possibly, Boissevain thinks, this is a corruption for the *Furius Leptinus* mentioned by Suetonius, Life of Cæsar, chapter 39.

B. C. 46 (*a. u.* 708) themselves get what was appropriated to those displays. In fact they did not cease from confusion till Cæsar suddenly coming upon them with his own hand seized one man and delivered him up to punishment. This person was executed for the reasons stated, and two other men were slaughtered as a kind of piece of ritual. The true cause I am unable to state, inasmuch as the Sibyl made no utterance and there was no other similar oracle, but at any rate they were sacrificed in the Campus Martius by the pontifices and the priest of Mars, and their heads were set up near the palace.

—25— While Cæsar was thus engaged he was also enacting many laws, passing over most of which I shall mention only those most deserving attention. The courts he entrusted to the senators and the knights alone so that the purest element of the population, so far as was possible, might always preside: formerly some of the common people had also joined with them in rendering decisions. The expenditures, moreover, of men of means which had been rendered enormous by their licentiousness he not only controlled by law but put a strong check upon them by practical measures. There was, on account of the numbers of warriors that had perished, a dangerous scarcity of population, as was proved both from the censuses (which he attended to, among other things, as if he were censor) and from actual observation. consequently he offered prizes for large families of children. Again, because he himself as a result of ruling the Gauls many years in succession had been attracted into a desire for dominion and had by it increased the equipment of his force, he limited by law the term of ex-prætors to one year, and that of ex-con-

suls to two consecutive years, and enacted in general that no one should be allowed to hold any office for a longer time. B. C. 46 (*a. u.* 708)

After the passage of these laws he also established in their present fashion the days of the year (which were not definitely settled among the people, since even at that time they regulated their months according to the movements of the moon) by adding sixty-seven days, all that were necessary to bring the year out even. In the past some have declared that even more were interpolated, but the truth is as I have stated it. He got this improvement from his stay in Alexandria, save in so far as those people calculate their months as of thirty days each, afterward annexing the five days to the entire year as a whole, whereas Cæsar distributed among seven months these five along with two other days that he took away from one month.[1] The one day, however, which is made up of four parts Cæsar introduced every fourth year, so as to have the annual seasons no longer differ at all except in the slightest degree. In fourteen hundred and sixty-one years there is need of only one (additional) intercalary day.[2] —26—

1 At present seven scattered months have thirty-one days. Cæsar, when he took the Alexandrian month of thirty days as his standard, found the same discrepancy of five days as did the Egyptians. Besides these he lopped two more days off one particular month, then spread his remainder of seven through the year.

2 I follow in this sentence the reading of all the older texts as well as Boissevain's. Only Dindorf and Melber omit *καὶ τετραχοσίοις*, making the number of years 1061. The usual figuring, 1461, has pertinence: this number is just four times 365¼ and was recognized as an Egyptian year-cycle.

As to the facts, however, Sturz points out (note 139 to Book 43) that after the elapse of fourteen hundred and sixty-one years eleven days must be subtracted instead of one day added. Pope Gregory XIII ascertained this when in A. D. 1582 he summoned Aloysius and Antonius Lilius to advise him in regard to the calendar. (Boissée also refers here to Ideler, *Manuel de Chronologie*, II, 119ff.)

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All these and other undertakings which he was planning for the common weal he accomplished not by independent declaration nor by independent cogitation, but he communicated everything in every instance to the heads of the senate, sometimes even to the entire body. And to this practice most of all was due the fact that even when he passed some rather harsh measures, he still succeeded in pleasing them. For these actions he received praise; but inasmuch as he had some of the tribunes bring back many of those that stayed away from court, and allowed those who were convicted of bribery in office on actual proof to live in Italy, and furthermore numbered once more among the senate some who were not worthy of it, many murmurings of all sorts arose against him. Yet the greatest censure he incurred from all through his passion for Cleopatra, — not the passion he had displayed in Egypt (that was mere hearsay), but in Rome itself. For she had come to the city with her husband and settled in Cæsar's own house, so that he too derived an ill repute from both of them. It caused him no anxiety, however; on the contrary he enrolled them among the friends and allies of the Roman people.

—28—

Meanwhile he was learning in detail all that Pompey was doing in Spain. Thinking him not hard to vanquish, he at first despatched his fleet from Sardinia against him, but later sent on also the army that was available by list, evidently intending to conduct the entire war through his representatives. But when he ascertained that Pompey was progressing mightily and

that those sent were not sufficient to fight against him, he finally himself went out to join the expedition, entrusting the city to Lepidus and certain ædiles,— eight as some think, or six as is more commonly believed. B. C. 46 (*a. u.* 708)

The legions in Spain had rebelled during the period of command of Longinus and Marcellus and some of the cities had revolted; upon the removal of Longinus (Trebonius becoming his successor) they kept quiet for a few days: after that through fear of vengeance from Cæsar they secretly sent ambassadors to Scipio expressing a wish to transfer their allegiance. He despatched to them among others Gnæus Pompey. The latter being close to the Gymnasian[1] islands took possession of them without a battle, save Ebusus: this one he brought over with difficulty, and then falling sick delayed there together with his soldiers. As he was late in returning, the soldiers in Spain, who had learned that Scipio was dead and Didius had set sail against them, in their fear of being annihilated before Pompey came failed to wait for him; but putting at their head Titus Quintius Scapula and Quintus Aponius, Roman knights, they drove out Trebonius and led the whole Bætic nation to revolt at the same time. They had gone thus far when Pompey, recovering from his illness, arrived by sea at the mainland opposite. He immediately won over several cities without resistance, for they were vexed at the commands of their rulers and besides had no little hope in him because of the memory of his —29— —30—

[1] The name of these islands is spelled both *Gymnasiæ and Gymnesiæ*, and they are also called *Baleares* and *Pityusæ*. Cp. the end of IX, 10, in the transcript of Zonaras (Volume I).

B. C. 46 (*a. u.* 708) father: Carthage,[1] which was unwilling to come to terms, he besieged. The followers of Scapula on hearing this went there and chose him general with full powers, after which they adhered most closely to him and showed the most violent zeal, regarding his successes as the successes of each individual and his disasters as their own. Consequently they were strong for both reasons, striving to obtain the successes and to avoid the disasters.

For Pompey, too, did what all are accustomed to do in the midst of such tumults and revolutions and especially after some of the Allobroges had deserted, whom Juba had taken alive in a war against Curio and had given him, there was nothing that he did not grant the rest both by word and deed.

They accordingly became more zealous in his behalf, and a number of the opposing side, particularly all who had served under Afranius, came over to him. Then there were those who came to him from Africa, among others his brother Sextus, and Varus, and Labienus with his fleet. Therefore, elated by the multitude of his army and their zeal he proceeded fearlessly through the country, gaining some cities of their own accord, some against their will, and seemed to surpass even his
—31— father in power. For though Cæsar had generals in Spain,— Quintus Fabius Maximus and Quintus Pedius, they did not think themselves a match for him, but remained quiet themselves, while they sent in haste for their chief.

[1] This is of course New Carthage (Karthago Nova), the Spanish colony of the African city.

For a time matters went on so: but when a few of the men sent in advance from Rome had reached there, and Cæsar's arrival was looked for, Pompey became frightened; and thinking that he was not strong enough to gain the mastery of all Spain, he did not wait for a reverse before changing his mind, but immediately, before testing the temper of his adversaries, retired into Bætica. The sea, moreover, straightway became hostile to him, and Varus was beaten in a naval battle near Carteia by Didius: indeed, had he not escaped to the land and sunk anchors side by side at the mouth of the harbor, upon which the foremost pursuers struck as on a reef, the whole fleet would have perished. All the country at that point except the city Ulia was an ally of Pompey's: this town, which had refused to submit to him, he proceeded to besiege. B. C. 46 (*a. u.* 708)

Meanwhile Cæsar, too, with a few men suddenly came up unexpectedly not only to Pompey's followers, but even to his own soldiers. He had employed such speed in the passage that he was seen both by his adherents and by his opponents before news was brought that he was actually in Spain. Now Cæsar hoped from this very fact and his mere presence to alarm Pompey in general, and to draw him from the siege; that was why most of the army had been left behind on the road. —32—

But Pompey, thinking that one man was not much superior to another and quite confident in his own strength, was not seriously startled at the other's arrival, but continued to besiege the city and kept making assaults just as before. Hence Cæsar stationed there a

B. C. 46
(*a. u.* 708)

few soldiers from among the first-comers and himself started for Corduba, partly because he hoped to take it by treachery, but chiefly because he expected to attract Pompey through fear for it away from Ulia. And so it turned out. For at first Pompey left a portion of his army in position, went to Corduba and strengthened it, and as Cæsar did not withstand his troops, put his brother Sextus in charge of it. However, he failed to accomplish anything at Ulia: on the contrary, when a certain tower had fallen, and that not shaken down by his own men but broken down by the crowd that was making a defence from it, some few who rushed in did not come off well; and Cæsar approaching lent assistance secretly by night to the citizens, and himself again made an expedition against Corduba, putting it under siege in turn: then at last did Pompey withdraw entirely from Ulia and hastened to the other town with his entire army,— a movement not destitute of results. For Cæsar, learning of this in advance, had retired, as he happened to be sick. Afterward when he had recovered and had taken charge of the additional troops who accompanied him he was compelled to carry on warfare even in the winter. Housed in miserable little tents they were suffering distress and running short of food. Cæsar was at that time serving as dictator, and some time late, near the close of the war, he was appointed consul, when Lepidus, who was master of the horse, convoked the people for this purpose. He, Lepidus, had become master of the horse at that time, having given himself, while still in the consulship, that additional title contrary to ancestral traditions.

—33—

Cæsar, accordingly, compelled as I have said to carry on warfare even in winter did not try to attack Corduba — it was strongly guarded — but turned his attention to Ategua, a city in which he had learned that there was an abundance of grain. Although it was strong, he hoped by the size of his army and the sudden terror of his appearance to alarm the inhabitants and capture it. In a short time he had palisaded it off and dug a ditch round about. Pompey, encouraged by the nature of the country and thinking that Cæsar because of the winter would not besiege the place to any great extent, paid no heed and did not try at first to repel the assailants, since he was unwilling to injure his own soldiers in the cold. Later on, when the town had been walled off and Cæsar was in position before it, he grew afraid and came with assistance. He fell in with the pickets suddenly one misty night and killed a number of them. The ungeneraled condition of the inhabitants he ameliorated by sending to them Munatius Flaccus. The latter had contrived the following scheme to get inside. He went alone by night to some of the guards as if appointed by Cæsar to visit the sentries, asked and learned the pass-word:— he was not known, of course, and would never have been suspected by the separate contingents of being anything but a friend when he acted in this manner: — then he left these men and went around to the other side of the circumvallation where he met some other guards and gave them the pass-word: after that he pretended that his mission was to betray the city, and so went inside through the

B. C. 46 (*a. u.* 708)

— 34 —

B. C. 46 (*a. u.* 708) midst of the soldiers with their consent and actually under their escort. He could not, however, save the place. In addition to other setbacks there was one occasion when the citizens hurled fire upon the engines and palisades of the Romans, yet did no damage to them worth mentioning; but they themselves by reason of a violent wind which just then began to blow toward them from the opposite side fared ill: for their buildings were set afire and many persons perished from the stones and missiles, not being able to see any distance ahead of them for the smoke. After this disaster, as their land was continually ravaged, and every now and then a portion of their wall would fall, undermined, they began to riot. Flaccus first conferred with Cæsar by herald on the basis of pardon for himself and followers: later he failed of this owing to his resolution not to surrender his arms, but the rest of the natives subsequently sent ambassadors and submitted to the terms imposed upon each.

—35— The capture of that city did not fail of its influence upon the other peoples, but many themselves after sending envoys espoused Cæsar's cause, and many received him on his approach or his lieutenants. Pompey, in consequence, at a loss which way to turn, at first made frequent changes of base, wandering about now in one and now in another part of the country: later on he became afraid that as a result of this very behavior the rest of his adherents would also leave him in the lurch, and chose to hazard all, although Heaven beforehand indicated his defeat very clearly. To be

sure, the drops of sweat that fell from sacred statues and the confused noises of the legions, and the many animals born which proved to be perversions of the proper type, and the torches darting from sunrise to the sunset region — (all these signs then met together in Spain at one time) — gave no clear manifestation to which of the two combatants they were revealing the future. But the eagles of his legions shook their wings and cast forth the golden thunderbolts which some of them held in their talons: thus they would hurl disaster directly at Pompey before flying off to Cæsar. . . . For a different force . . . Heaven, and he held it in slight esteem, and so into war . . . settled down to battle.[1] B. C. 46 (*a. u.* 708)

Both had in addition to their citizen and mercenary troops many of the natives and many Moors. For Bocchus[2] had sent his sons to Pompey and Bogud in person accompanied Cæsar's force. Still, the contest turned out to be like a struggle of the Romans themselves, not of any other nations. Cæsar's soldiers de- —36—

1 At the close of this chapter there are undoubtedly certain gaps in the MS., as Dindorf discerned. In the Tauchnitz stereotyped edition, which usually insists upon wresting some sense from such passages either by conjecture or by emendation, the following sentence appears: "But Pompey made light of these supernatural effects, and the war shrank to the compass of a battle." Boissevain (with a suggestion by Kuiper) reads: *ἀλλ᾽ ἦγε γὰρ τὸ δαιμόνιον, ἔν τε ὀλιγωρίᾳ αὐτὸ ἐποιήσατο καὶ ἐς πόλιν Μοῦνδαν πρὸς μάχην δὴ κατέστη.* This would mean: "But Heaven, which he had slighted, led his steps, and he took up his quarters in a city called Munda preparatory to battle."

2 Mommsen in his Roman History (third German edition, p. 627, note 1), remarks that Dio must have confused the son of Bocchus with the son of Massinissa, Arabio, who certainly did align himself with the Pompeian party (Appian, Civil Wars, IV, 54). All other evidence, outside of this one passage, shows the two kings to have been steadfastly loyal to Cæsar, behavior which brought them tangible profit in the shape of enlargement of their domains.

B. C. 46 (*a. u.* 708) rived courage from their numbers and experience and above all from their leader's presence and so were anxious to be done with the war and its attendant miseries. Pompey's men were inferior in these respects, but, strong through their despair of safety, should they fail to conquer, continued zealous.[1] Inasmuch as the majority of them had been captured with Afranius and Varro, had been spared, and delivered afterward to Longinus, from whom they had revolted, they had no hope of safety if they were beaten, and as a result of this were drawn toward desperation, feeling that they needed to be of good cheer at that particular time or else perish utterly. So the armies came together and began the battle. They had no longer any dread of each other, since they had been so many times opposed in arms, and for that reason required no urg-

—37— ing. In the course of the engagement the allied forces on both sides quickly were routed and fled; but the main bodies struggled in close combat to the utmost in their resistance of each other. Not a man of them would yield. They remained in position, wreaking slaughter and being slain, as if each separate man was to be responsible to all the rest as well for the outcome of victory or defeat. Consequently they were not concerned to see how their allies were battling but set to work as if they alone were engaged. Neither sound of pæan nor groan was to be heard from any one of them: both sides limited their shouts to "Strike! Kill!", while their acts easily outran their speech. Cæsar and Pompey, who saw this from horseback on certain ele-

[1] I. e., they were in arms against Cæsar a second time. Compare the note on chapter 12.

vated positions, felt little inclination to either hope or despair, but torn with doubts were equally distressed by confidence and fear. The battle was so nearly balanced that they suffered tortures at the sight, straining to spy out some advantage, and quivering lest they descry some setback. Their souls were filled with prayers for success and against misfortune, and with alternating strength and fear. In fact, not being able to endure it long, they leaped from their horses and joined the combat. Apparently they preferred a participation involving personal exertion and danger rather than tension of spirit, and each hoped by associating in the fight to turn the scale somehow in favor of his own soldiers. Or, if they failed of that, they were content to meet death, side by side with them. B. C. 46 (*a. u.* 708)

—38—

The generals, then, took part in the battle themselves. This movement, however, resulted in no advantage to either army. On the contrary,— when the men saw their chiefs sharing their danger, a far greater disregard for their own death and eagerness for the destruction of their opponents seized both alike. Accordingly neither side for the moment turned to flight: matched in determination, they found their persons matched in power. All would have perished, or else at nightfall they would have parted with honors even, had not Bogud, who was somewhere outside the press, made an advance upon Pompey's camp, whereupon Labienus, seeing it, left his station to proceed against him. Pompey's men, interpreting this as flight, lost heart. Later they doubtless learned the truth but could no longer retrieve their position. Some escaped to the city, some to the fortification. The latter body vigorously fought

B. C. 46 (*a. u.* 708) off attacks and fell only when surrounded, while the former for a long time kept the wall safe, so that it was not captured till all of them had perished in sallies. So great was the total loss of Romans on both sides that the victors, at a loss how to wall in the city to prevent any running away in the night, actually heaped up the bodies of the dead around it.

—39— Cæsar, having thus conquered, took Corduba at once. Sextus had retired from his path, and the natives, although their slaves, who had purposely been made free, offered resistance, came over to his side. He slew those under arms and obtained money by the sale of the rest. The same course he adopted with those that held Hispalis, who at first, pretending to be willing, had accepted a garrison from him, but later massacred the soldiers that had come there, and entered upon a course of warfare. In his expedition against them his rather careless conduct of the siege caused them some hope of being able to escape. So then he allowed them to come outside the wall, where he ambushed and destroyed them, and in this way captured the town, which was soon destitute of male defenders. Next he acquired and levied money upon Munda and the other places, some that were unwilling with great slaughter and others of their own accord. He did not even spare the offerings to Hercules, consecrated in Gades, and he detached special precincts from some towns and laid an added tribute upon others. This was his course toward those who had opposed him; but to those who displayed any good-will toward him he granted lands and free-

dom from taxation, to some, moreover, citizenship, and to others the right to be considered Roman colonies; he did not, however, grant these favors for nothing. B. C. 46 (*a. u.* 708)

—40— While Cæsar was thus occupied, Pompey, who had escaped in the rout, reached the sea, intending to use the fleet that lay at anchor in Carteia, but found that it had espoused the victor's cause. He endeavored to embark in a boat, expecting to obtain safety thereby. In the course of the attempt, however, he was roughly handled and in dejection came to land again, where, taking some men that had assembled, he set out for the interior. Pompey himself met defeat at the hands of Cæsennius[1] Lento, with whom he fell in: he took refuge in a wood, and was there killed. Didius, ignorant of the event, while wandering about to join him met some other enemies and perished.

—41— Cæsar, too, would doubtless have chosen to fall there, at the hands of those who were still resisting and in the glory of war, in preference to the fate he met not long after, to be cut down in his own land and in the senate, at the hands of his best friends. For this was the last war he carried through successfully, and this the last victory that he won in spite of the fact that there was no project so great that he did not hope to accomplish it. In this belief he was strengthened not only by other reasons but most of all because from a palm that stood on the site of the battle a shoot grew out immediately after the victory.

1 This name is spelled *Cæsonius* in Florus's Epitome of Livy's Thirteenth Book (= Florus II, 13, 86) and also in Orosius's Narratives for the Discomfiture of Pagans (VI, 16, 9), but appears with the same form as here in Cicero's Philippics, XII, 9, 23.

B. C. 46 (*a. u.* 708) And I will not assert that this had no bearing in some direction; it was, however, no longer for him, but for his sister's grandson, Octavius: the latter made the expedition with him, and was destined to shine forth brightly from his toils and dangers. As Cæsar did not know this, hoping that many great additional successes would fall to his own lot he acted in no moderate fashion, but was filled with loftiness as if

—42— immortal. Though it was no foreign nation he had conquered, but a great mass of citizens that he had destroyed, he not only personally directed the triumph, incidentally regaling the entire populace again, as if in honor of some common blessing, but also allowed Quintus Fabius and Quintus Pedius to hold a festival.[1] Yet they had merely been his lieutenants and had achieved no individual success. Naturally some laughter was caused by this, as well as by the fact that he used wooden instead of ivory instruments, and representations of certain actions, and other such triumphal apparatus. Nevertheless, most brilliant triple fêtes and triple processions of the Romans were held in connection with those very things, and furthermore a hallowed period of fifty days was observed. The Parilia[2] was honored by a perpetual horse-race, yet

[1] The MS. has only "Fabius and Quintus." Mommsen supplies their entire names from chapter 31 of this book.

[2] This was originally a festival of Pales-Palatua, and information regarding its introduction is intercepted by remote antiquity. In historical times we find it celebrated as the commemoration of the founding of Rome, because Pales-Palatua was a divinity closely connected with the Palatine, where the city first stood. From Hadrian's time on special brilliance attached to the occasion, and if was dignified by the epithet "Roman" (Athenæus). As late as the fifth century it was still known as "the birthday of the city of Rome." Both forms, *Parilia* and *Palilia* occur. (Mentioned also in Book Forty-five, chapter 6.)

not at all because the city had been founded on that day, but because the news of Cæsar's victory had arrived the day before, toward evening. B. C. 46 (*a. u.* 708)

Such was his gift to Rome. For himself he wore the triumphal garb, by decree, in all assemblages and was adorned with the laurel crown always and everywhere alike. The excuse that he gave for it was that his forehead was bald; and this had some show of reason from the very fact that at the time, though well past youth, he still bestowed attention on his appearance. He showed among all men his pride in rather foppish clothing, and the footwear which he used later on was sometimes high and of a reddish color, after the style of the kings who had once lived in Alba, for he assumed that he was related to them on account of Iulus. To Venus he was, in general, devoted body and soul and he was anxious to persuade everybody that he had received from her a kind of bloom of youth. Accordingly he used also to carry about a carven image of her in full armor and he made her name his watchword in almost all the greatest dangers. The looseness of his girdle[1] Sulla had looked askance at, insomuch that he wished to kill him, and declared to those who begged him off: "Well, I will grant him to you, but do you be on your guard, without fail, against this ill-girt fellow." Cicero could not comprehend it, but even in the moment of defeat said: "I should never have expected one so ill-girt to conquer Pompey." —43—

1 Licentiousness and general laxity of morals.

—44—
B. C. 46
(*a. u.* 708)

This I have written by way of digression from my story, so that no one might be ignorant of the stories about Cæsar.— In honor of the victory the senate passed all of those decrees that I have mentioned, and further called him "liberator", inscribed it in the records, and publicly voted for a temple of Liberty. To him first and for the first time, they then applied, as a term of special significance, the title "imperator," — not merely according to ancient custom any longer, as others besides Cæsar had often been saluted as a result of wars, nor even as those who have received some independent command or other authority were called, but, in short, it was this title which is now granted to those who hold successively the supreme power. And so great an excess of flattery did they employ as even to vote that his children and grandchildren should be so called, though he had no child and was already an old man. From him this title has come down to all subsequent imperatores, as something peculiar to their office, even as in Cæsar's case. The ancient custom has not, however, been thereby overthrown. Each of the two titles exists. Consequently they are invested with it a second time, when they gain some such victory as has been mentioned. Those who are imperatores in the limited sense use the appellation once, as they do others, and indeed before others: whatever rulers in addition accomplish in war any deed worthy of it acquire also the name handed down by ancient custom, so that a man is termed imperator a second and a third time,

and oftener, as frequently as he can bestow it upon himself. B. C. 46 (*a. u.* 708)

These privileges they granted then to Cæsar, as well as a house, so that he might live in state-property, and a special period of festival whenever any victory took place and whenever there were sacrifices for it, even if he had not been with the expedition nor in general had any hand in the achievement.[1] Still, —45— those measures, even if they seemed to them immoderate and out of the usual order, were not, so far, undemocratic. But they passed the following decrees besides, by which they declared him sovereign out and out. They offered him the magistracies, even those belonging to the people, and elected him consul for ten years, as they previously had dictator. They ordered that he alone should have soldiers, and alone administer the public funds, so that no one else was allowed to employ either of them, save whom he might permit. And they commanded at that time that an ivory statue of him, but later that a whole chariot should be escorted at the horse-races along with the likenesses of the gods. Another image they set up in the temple of Quirinus with the inscription: "to the invincible god", and another on the Capitol beside the former kings of Rome. It occurs to me really to marvel at the coincidence: there were eight such images — seven to the kings, and an eighth to the Brutus that overthrew the Tarquins — besides this one, when they

[1] The last clause of this chapter as it appears in the MS. is evidently corrupt. The reading adopted is that of Madvig, modified by Melber.

B. C. 46 (*a. u.* 708) set up the statue of Cæsar; and it was from this cause chiefly that Marcus Brutus was stirred to conspire against him.

—46— These were the measures that were ratified because of victory,— I am not mentioning all, but as many as have seemed to me notable,— not on one day, but just as it happened, one at one time, another at another. Some of them Cæsar began to render operative, and of others he intended to make use in the future, no matter how much he put aside some of them. Now the office of consul he took up immediately, even before entering the city, but did not hold it continuously. B. C. 45 (*a. u.* 709) When he got to Rome he renounced it, delivering it to Quintus Fabius and Gaius Trebonius. When Fabius on the last day of his consulship died, he straightway chose instead of him another, Gaius Caninius Rebilus for the remaining hours. Then for the first time, contrary to precedent, it became possible for the same man to hold that office neither annually, nor for all the time left in the same year, but while living to withdraw from it without compulsion from either ancestral custom or any accusation, and for another one to take his place. In the second place the circumstances were unique, because Caninius at once was appointed consul, and ceased to serve. On this, Cicero jestingly said that the consul had displayed so great bravery and prudence in office, as never to fall asleep in it for the briefest moment. So from that period on the same persons no longer (save a few in olden times), served as consul through the entire year, but just as it happened,— some for more time, some for less, some for months, others for days,

— since now no one serves with any one else, as a rule, for a whole year or for a longer period than two months. In general we do not differ from our ancestors, but the naming of the years for purposes of enumeration falls to those who are consuls at the start. Accordingly I shall in most cases name those officials closely connected with events, but to secure perfect clearness with regard to what is done from time to time I shall mention also those first to serve, even if they make no contribution to the undertakings in question. B. C. 45 (*a. u.* 709)

Whereas the consuls were thus disposed of, the remaining magistrates were nominally elected by the plebs and by the populace, in accord with ancient customs (for Cæsar would not accept the appointment of them), but really by him, and without the casting of lots they were sent out among the provinces. As for number, all were the same as before, except that thirteen prætors and forty quæstors were appointed. For, since he had made many promises to many people, he had no other way to redeem them, and that accounts for his actions. Furthermore he enrolled a vast number in the senate, making no distinction, whether a man were a soldier, or a child of one enslaved, so that the sum of them grew to nine hundred: and he enrolled many among the patricians and among the ex-consuls or such as had held some office. When some were tried for bribery and convicted he released them, so that he was charged with bribe-taking himself. This report was strengthened by the fact that —47—

B. C. 45 (*a. u.* 709) he also exposed[1] in the market all the public lands, not only the profane, but also the consecrated lots, and auctioned off the majority of them. Nevertheless to some persons he granted ample gifts in the form of money or the sale of lands; and to a certain Lucius Basilus[2] he allowed no rulership of a province, though the latter was prætor, but bestowed a large amount of money in place of it, so that Basilus became notorious both in this matter and because when insulted in the course of his prætorship by Cæsar he stood his ground.[3]

All this suited those citizens who were making or expecting to make corrupt gain, since they reverenced no element of the public weal in comparison with bettering themselves by such acts. But all the rest took it greatly to heart, and had much to say about it to intimates and also (as many as felt safe in so doing) in outspoken public conversation and the publication of anonymous pamphlets.

— 48 — Not only were those measures carried out that year, but two of the ædiles took charge of the municipal government, since no quæstor had been elected. For just as once formerly, so now in the absence of Cæsar, the ædiles managed all the city affairs, in conjunction with Lepidus as master of the horse. Although they were censured for employing lictors and magisterial garb and chair precisely like the master of the horse, they got off by citing a certain law, which allowed all those

[1] Verb supplied (to fill MS. gap) by R. Stephanus and Leunclavius.
[2] *L. Minucius Basilus.*
[3] Reading, with Boissevain, ἀντεχαρτέρησε.

receiving any office from a dictator to make use of such things. The business of administration, changed from that time for the reasons I have mentioned, was no longer invariably laid upon the quæstors, but was finally assigned to ex-prætors. Two of the ædiles managed at that time the public treasures, and one of them, by provision of Cæsar, superintended the Ludi Apollinares. The ædiles of the populace directed the Megalesia, by decree. A certain prefect, appointed during the Feriæ, himself chose a successor on the last day, and the latter another: this had never happened before, nor did it happen again. B. C. 45 (*a. u.* 709)

The next year after these events during which Cæsar was at once dictator for the fifth time, taking Lepidus as master of the horse, and consul for the fifth time, choosing Antony as colleague, sixteen prætors were in power — this custom indeed has remained[1] for many years — and the rostra, which was formerly in the center of the Forum, was moved back to its present position: also the images of Sulla and of Pompey were restored to it. For this Cæsar received praise, and again because he put upon Antony both the glory of the deed and credit for the inscription on the image. Being anxious to build a theatre, as Pompey had done, he laid the first foundations, but did not finish it. Augustus later completed it and named it for his nephew, Marcus Marcellus. But Cæsar was blamed for tearing down the dwellings and temples on the site, and likewise because he burned up the statues,— — 49 — B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710)

1 A gap in the MS.— Verb conjectured by Bekker on the analogy of a passage in chapter 53.

B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710) all of wood, save a few,— and because on finding considerable treasures of money he appropriated them all.

—50— In addition, he introduced laws and extended the pomerium, his behavior in these and other matters resembling that of Sulla. Cæsar, however, removed the ban from the survivors of those that had warred against him, granting them immunity with fair and equal terms; he promoted them to office; to the wives of the slain he restored their dowries, and to their children granted a share in the property, thus putting mightily to shame Sulla's blood-guiltiness; so that he himself enjoyed a great repute not alone for bravery, but also for uprightness, though it is generally difficult for the same man to be eminent in peace as well as in war. This was a source of pride to him, as was the fact that he had raised again Carthage and Corinth. To be sure, there were many other cities in and outside of Italy, some of which he had built afresh, and some which he had newly founded. Others, however, had done that: it remained for him to restore, in memory of their former inhabitants, Corinth and Carthage, ancient, brilliant, conspicuous, ruined cities: one of them he declared a Roman colony, and colonized, and the other he honored with its ancient titles, bearing no grudge for the enmity of their peoples toward places that had never harmed them.

—51— And they, even as they had once been demolished together, now revived together and bade fair to flourish once again. But while Cæsar was so engaged, a longing came over all the Romans alike to avenge Crassus and those that perished with him: there was

some hope then, if ever, of subjugating the Parthians. The command of the war they unanimously voted to Cæsar, and made ample provision for it. They arranged, among other details, that he should have a larger number of assistants, and that the city should neither be without officials in his absence, nor by attempting to choose some on its own responsibility fall into factions: also that such magistrates should be appointed in advance for three years (this was the length of time they thought necessary for the campaign). However, they did not designate them all beforehand. Nominally Cæsar was to choose half of them, having a certain legal right to do this, but really he chose the whole number. For the first year, as previously, forty quæstors were elected, and then for the first time two patrician ædiles and four from the people. Of the latter two have their title from Ceres, — a custom which, then introduced, has remained to the present day. Prætors were nominated to the number of eleven. It is not on this, however, that I desire to lay emphasis (for they had formerly been as many), but on the fact that among them was chosen Publius Ventidius. He was originally from Picenum, as has been remarked, and fought against Rome when her allies were alienated. He was captured by Pompeius Strabo,[1] and in the latter's triumph marched in chains. Later he was released; some time after he was enrolled in the senate, and was now appointed prætor by Cæsar; by degrees he advanced to such prominence as to conquer the Parthians and hold a triumph over them.

B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710)

[1] The father of Pompey the Great.

B. C. 44
(*a. u.* 710)

All those who were to hold office the first year after that were appointed in advance, but for the second year the consuls and tribunes only: and no one got any closer than this to being nominated for the third year. Cæsar himself intended to be dictator both years, and designated Octavius in advance as master of the horse for the second, though he was at that time a mere lad. For the time being, while this was going on, Cæsar appointed Dolabella consul in his own stead, leaving Antony to finish the year out in office. To Lepidus he assigned Gallia Narbonensis with the adjoining portions of Spain, and made two men masters of horse in their place, each separately. Owing, as he did, favors to many persons he repaid them by such appointments as these and by priesthoods, adding one to the "Quindecimviri", and three others to the "Septemviri," as they were called.

DIO'S
ROMAN HISTORY
44

The following is contained in the Forty-fourth of Dio's Rome.

About the decrees passed in honor of Cæsar (chapters 1–11).

About the conspiracy formed against him (chapters 12–18).

How Cæsar was murdered (chapters 19–22).

How a decree was passed that the people should not bear malice against one another (chapters 23–34).

About the burial of Cæsar and the oration delivered over him (chapters 35–53).

Duration of time, to the end of the 5th dictatorship of Julius Cæsar, held in company with Æmilius Lepidus as Master of the Horse, and to the end of his 5th consulship, shared with Marcus Antonius. (B. C. 44 = a. u. 710).

This Cæsar did as a preliminary step to making a —1— B. C. 44 (a. u. 710)
campaign against the Parthians, but a baleful frenzy which fell upon certain men through jealousy of his onward progress and hatred of his being esteemed above others caused the death of the leader by unlawful means, while it added a new name to the annals of infamy; it scattered decrees to the winds and brought upon the Romans seditions again and civil wars after a state of harmony. They declared that they had proved themselves both destroyers of Cæsar and liberators of the people, but in fact their plot against him was one of fiendish malice, and they threw the city into disorder when at last it possessed a stable government. Democracy has a fair appearing name —2—
which conveys the impression of bringing equal rights to all from equal laws, but its results are seen not to agree at all with its title. Monarchy, on the contrary, strikes the ear unpleasantly, but is a very excellent government to live under. It is easier to find one single excellent man than many, and if even this seems to some a difficult feat, it is quite inevitable that the other proposition be acknowledged to be impossible; for the acquirement of virtue is not a characteristic of the majority of men. And again, even though one reprobate should obtain supreme power, yet he is preferable to a multitude of such persons, as the history of the Greeks and barbarians and of the Romans themselves proves. For successes have always been

B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710) greater and more in number in the case both of cities and of individuals under kings than under popular rule, and disasters do not happen so easily in monarchies as in ochlocracies. In cases where a democracy has flourished anywhere, it has nevertheless reached its prime during a short period when the people had neither size nor strength that abuses should spring up among them from good fortune or jealousies from ambition. For a city so large as this, ruling the finest and the greatest part of the known world, containing men of many and diverse natures, holding many huge fortunes, occupied with every imaginable pursuit, enjoying every imaginable fortune, both individually and collectively,— for such a city to practice moderation under a democracy is impossible, and still more is it impossible for the people, unless moderation prevails, to be harmonious. If Marcus Brutus and Gaius Cassius had stopped to think this over they would never have killed the city's head and protector nor have made themselves the cause of countless ills both to their own persons and to all the rest of mankind then existing.

—3— It happened as follows, and his death was due to the cause I shall presently describe. He had not aroused dislike without any definite justification, except in so far as it was the senators themselves who had by the novelty and excess of their honors sent his mind soaring; and then, after filling him with conceit, they found fault with his prerogatives and spread injurious reports to the effect that he was glad to accept them and behaved more haughtily as a result of them. It is true that sometimes Cæsar erred

by accepting some of the honors voted him and believing that he really deserved them, yet most blameworthy are those who, after beginning to reward him as he deserved, led him on and made him liable to censure by the measures that they voted. He neither dared to thrust them all aside, for fear of being thought contemptuous, nor could he be safe when he accepted them. Excess in honors and praises renders conceited even the most modest, especially if such rewards appear to have been given with sincerity. The privileges that were granted him (in addition to all those mentioned) were of the following number and kinds. They will be stated all together, even if they were not all moved or ratified at one time. First, then, they voted that he should always appear even in the city itself wearing the triumphal garb and should sit in his chair of state everywhere except at festivals. At that time he got the right to be seen on the tribune's benches and in company with those who were successively tribunes. And they gave him the right to offer the so-called *spolia opima* at the temple of Jupiter Feretrius, as if he had slain some hostile general with his own hand, and to have lictors that always carried laurel, and after the Feriæ Latinæ to ride from Albanum to the city mounted on a charger. In addition to these remarkable privileges they named him father of his country, stamped his image on the coinage, voted to celebrate his birthday by public sacrifice, ordered that there be some statue of him in the cities and all the temples of Rome, and they set on the rostra two, one representing him as the savior of the citizens and the other as the rescuer of the city

B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710)

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B. C. 44
(*a. u.* 710)

from siege, along with the crowns customary for such achievements. They also passed a resolution to build a temple of Concordia Nova, on the ground that through his efforts they enjoyed peace, and to celebrate an annual festival in her honor. When he had accepted these, they assigned to him the charge of filling the Pontine marshes, cutting a canal through the Peloponnesian isthmus, and constructing a new senate-house, since that of Hostilius although repaired had been demolished. The reason given for that action was that a temple of Good Fortune might be built there, which Lepidus, indeed, while master of the horse had completed: but the real intention was that the name of Sulla should not be preserved in it and that another senate-house, newly constructed, might be named the Julian, just as they had called the month in which he was born July, and one of the tribes (selected by lot) the Julian. And Cæsar himself, they voted, should be sole censor for life and enjoy the immunities bestowed upon the tribunes, so that if any one should outrage him by deed or word, that man should be an outlaw and involved in the curse, and further that his son, should he beget or adopt one, was to be appointed high priest. As he seemed to like this, a gilded chair was granted him, and a garb that once the kings had used and a body-guard of knights and senators: furthermore they decided that prayers should be made for him publicly every year, that they would swear by his Fortune and that all the deeds he was yet to do should receive confirmation. Next they bestowed upon him a quinquennial festival, as to a hero, and managers of sacred rites for the festival of naked boys

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in Pan's honor,[1] constituting a third priestly college which they called the Julian, and on the occasion of all combats in armor one special day of his own each time both in Rome and the rest of Italy. When he showed himself pleased at this, too, then they voted that his gilded chair and crown set with precious gems and overlaid with gold should be carried into the theatre on an equal footing with those of the gods, and that on the occasion of the horse-races his chariot should be brought in. And finally they addressed him outright as Julian Jupiter and ordered a temple to be consecrated to him and to his Clemency, electing Antony as their priest like some Dialis. B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710)

At the same time with these measures they passed another which well indicated their disposition. It gave him the right to place his tomb within the pomerium; and the decrees regarding this matter they inscribed with gold letters on silver tablets and deposited beneath the feet of the Capitoline Jupiter, thus pointing out to him very clearly that he was a man. When they began to honor him it was with the idea that he would be reasonably modest; but as they went on and saw that he was delighted at what they voted,— he accepted all but a very few of their gifts,— various men kept at different times proposing various greater marks of esteem, all in excess, some as an act of extreme flattery toward him, and others as one of sarcastic ridicule. Actually some dared to suggest permitting him to have inter- —7—

[1] In other words, the *Lupercalia*. The two other colleges of Lupercales to which allusion is made were known as the Quintilian and the Fabian.

B. C. 44
(*a. u.* 710)

course with as many women[1] as he liked, because even at this time, though fifty years old, he still had numerous mistresses. Others, and the majority, followed the course mentioned because they wished to make him envied and disliked as quickly as possible, that he might the sooner perish. Of course precisely that happened, though Cæsar took courage on account of these very measures to believe that he would never be plotted against by the men who had voted him such honors, nor by any one else, because they would prevent it; and in consequence from this time he dispensed with a bodyguard. Nominally he accepted the privilege of being watched over by the senators and knights and thus did away with his previous guardians. Once on a single day they had passed in his honor an unusually large number of decrees of especially important character, that had been voted unanimously by all the rest except Cassius and a few others, who became notorious for this action: yet they suffered no harm, a fact which conspicuously displayed their ruler's clemency. So, then, they approached him as he was sitting in the forepart of the temple of Venus with the intention of announcing to him in a body their decisions; — such business they transacted in his absence, in order to have the appearance of doing it not under compulsion but voluntarily. And either by some Heaven-sent fatuity or through excess of joy he received them sitting, an act which aroused so great indignation among them all, not only senators but all the rest, that it afforded

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[1] Compare Suetonius (Life of Cæsar), chapter 52.

his slayers one of their chief excuses for their plot against him. Some who subsequently tried to defend him said that owing to diarrhœa he could not control the movement of his bowels and had remained where he was in order to avoid a flux. B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710)

They were not able, however, to persuade the majority, since not long after this he arose and walked home without assistance; hence most men suspected him of being inflated with pride and hated him for his supercilious behavior, when it was they themselves who had made him disdainful by the extreme nature of their honors. After this occurrence suspicion was increased by the fact that somewhat later he submitted to being made dictator for life.

—9— When he had reached this point, the conduct of the men plotting against him became no longer doubtful, and in order to embitter even his best friends against him they did their best to traduce the man and finally called him "king,"— a name which was often heard in their consultations. When he refused the title and rebuked in a way those that so saluted him, yet did nothing by which he could be thought to be really displeased at it, they secretly adorned his statue, which stood on the rostra, with a diadem. And when Gaius Epidius Marullus and Lucius Cæsetius Flavus, tribunes, took it down, he became thoroughly angry, although they uttered no insulting word and furthermore spoke well of him before the people as not desiring anything of the sort. —10— At this time, though vexed, he remained quiet; subsequently, however, when he was riding in from Albanum, some men again called him king,

B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710) and he said that his name was not king but Cæsar: then when those tribunes brought suit against the first man that termed him king, he no longer restrained his wrath but showed evident irritation, as if these officials were actually aiming at the stability of his government. For the moment he took no revenge upon them: later, when they issued public notice to the effect that they found themselves not at liberty to speak freely and without molestation for the public good, he appeared exceedingly angry and brought them into the senate-house, where he accused them and put their conduct to the vote. He did not put them to death, though some declared them worthy of that penalty, but first having removed them from the tribuneship through the motion of Helvius Cinna, their colleague, he erased their names from the senate. Some were pleased at this, or pretended to be, on the ground that they would have no need to incur danger by free speech, and keeping out of politics they viewed events as from a watch tower. Cæsar, however, received an ill name from this fact, too, that whereas he should have hated those that applied to him the name of king, he let them go and found fault instead with the tribunes.

—11— Something else that happened not long after these events proved still more clearly that while pretendedly he shunned the title, in reality he desired to assume it. When he had entered the Forum at the festival of the Lupercalia, at which naked boys competed, and was sitting on the rostra in his golden chair adorned with the royal apparel and conspicuous by his crown wrought of gold, Antony with his fellow priests saluted him as king

and surrounding his brows with a diadem said: "The people gives this to you through my hands." He answered that Jupiter alone was king of the Romans and sent the diadem to him to the Capitol, yet he was not angry and caused it to be inscribed in the records that the royalty presented to him by the people through the consul he had refused to receive. It was accordingly suspected that this had been done by some prearranged plan and that he was anxious for the name but wished to be somehow compelled to take it, and the consequent hatred against him was intense. After this certain men at the elections proposed those tribunes previously mentioned for the office of consul, and approaching Marcus Brutus and such other persons as were of high spirit attempted privately to persuade them and incited them to action publicly. They scattered broadcast many letters (taking the fullest advantage of his having the same name as the great Brutus who overthrew the Tarquins), declaring that he was not truly that man's descendant: for *he* had put to death both his sons, the only ones he had, when they were mere lads, and was left no offspring surviving. This attitude was, however, a mere ruse on the part of the majority, adopted in order that being in family akin to that famous man he might be induced to undertake similar deeds. They kept continually invoking him, crying out "Brutus, Brutus!", and adding further: "We need a Brutus." Finally on the statue of the early Brutus they wrote "Would that thou wert living," and upon their contemporary's platform (he was

B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710)

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B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710) prætor at the time) "Brutus, thou sleepest," and "Thou art not Brutus."

—13— These incidents persuaded him, especially as he had displayed hostility to Cæsar from the start, to attack the leader, who had nevertheless shown himself later his benefactor. He was also influenced by the fact that he was, as I stated, both nephew and son-in-law of Cato of Utica so-called. And his wife Portia was the only woman, as they say, who had knowledge of the plot. She encountered him in the midst of his meditation upon these very matters and enquired in what he was so absorbed. When he made no answer, she suspected that she was distrusted on account of physical weakness, for fear she should reveal something even unwillingly under torture; hence she performed a noteworthy deed. She secretly inflicted a deep wound in her thigh to test herself and see if she could endure painful treatment. And when she found herself not overdistressed, she despised the wound, and came to him and said: "You, my husband, though you trusted that my spirit would not utter a secret, nevertheless were distrustful of my body, and you acted in accordance with human reason. But I have found that I can make even it keep silence." Having said this she disclosed her thigh and after making known the reason for what she had done, said: "Tell me boldly now all that you are concealing, for to make me speak fire, lashes, and goads shall alike be powerless. I was not born that kind of woman. Therefore if you shall still distrust me, it is better for me to die than live. If such be the case,

let no one think me longer the daughter of Cato or your wife." Hearing this Brutus marveled; and he no longer hid anything from her but felt strengthened himself and related to her the whole story. After this he obtained as an associate also Gaius Cassius, who had himself been preserved by Cæsar and moreover honored with a prætorship; he was the husband of Brutus's sister. Next they proceeded to gather those who were of the same mind as themselves, and these proved to be not few in number. There is no need of my giving a list of most of the names, for I might thus become wearisome, but I cannot omit Trebonius and Decimus Brutus, whom they also named Junius and Albinus. For these joined in the plot against Cæsar though they also had been greatly benefited by him,— Decimus having been appointed consul for the second year and assigned to Hither Gaul. B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710)

They came very near being detected by reason of the number of those concerned and by their delay. Cæsar, however, would not receive any information about such an undertaking and punished very severely those who brought any news of the kind. Still, they stood in awe of him and put the matter off, fearing that although he had no guard they might be killed by the persons surrounding him at various times; and thus they ran the risk of being discovered and perishing. Indeed, they would have suffered this fate, had they not been forced even against their will to hasten the plot. A report went abroad, true or false after the manner of reports, that the so-called fifteen priests were declaring —15—

B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710) that the Sibyl had said the Parthians should never be captured in any other way than by a king, and the people were consequently preparing to propose that this title be granted to Cæsar. The conspirators believed this to be true, and because a vote would be demanded of the officials, among whom were Brutus and Cassius, owing to the seriousness of the measure, they felt that they neither dared to oppose it nor could submit to keep silent, and so hurried on the consummation of the plot before any business connected with the measure could come up.

—16— It had been decided by them to make the attempt in the senate, for they thought that there Cæsar would least expect to be harmed in any way and would so fall an easier victim, while they would possess opportunity coupled with security by having their swords instead of documents brought in in boxes, and that the rest being unarmed would be unable to make any resistance. In case any one should be so rash, they expected at least that the gladiators, many of whom they had previously stationed in Pompey's Theatre under the pretext that they were to practice with arms, would assist them. These were to lie in wait there in a certain room of the peristyle. The conspirators, when the appointed day had come, gathered in the senate-hall at dawn and

—17— called for Cæsar. As for him, he was warned of the plot in advance by the soothsayers, and was warned also by dreams. The night before he was slain his wife had a vision of their house fallen in ruins, her husband wounded by some men and taking refuge in her bosom,

and of Cæsar being raised aloft upon the clouds and grasping the hand of Jupiter. Moreover omens not few nor indistinct crossed his path. The arms of Mars, at that time deposited at his house by virtue of his position as high priest and by ancestral custom, made a great noise at night, and the doors of the chamber where he slept opened of their own accord. The sacrifices which he offered because of these occurrences indicated nothing favorable and the birds with which he practiced divination forbade him to leave the house. After his assassination, finally, some recalled a weighty incident in connection with his gilded chair,— that the servant, as Cæsar was slow in coming, carried it out of the senate, thinking that he would have no further need of it. B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710)

Cæsar for this reason was so long in coming that the conspirators feared there might be a postponement (a rumor circulated, indeed, that he would remain at home that day), and their plot thus fall through and they themselves be detected. Therefore they sent Decimus Brutus, as one appearing to be a devoted friend, to secure his attendance. This man made light of Cæsar's scruples and by adding that the senate was extremely anxious to behold him, persuaded him to go forward. At this an image of his which he kept set up in the vestibule fell of its own accord and was shattered to pieces. He ought then to have changed his purpose, but instead he paid no attention to this and would not listen to some one who was giving him information of the plot. He received from him a little roll in which all the —18—

B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710) preparations made for the attack had been accurately inscribed, but did not read it, thinking that it was some other not very pressing matter. In brief, he was so confident that to the soothsayer who had warned him to beware of that day he said jokingly: "Where are your prophecies? Don't you see that the day over which you were all of a tremble is here and I am alive?" And the other, they say, answered only this: "Yes, it is here, but not yet gone."

—19— Now when he finally reached the senate Trebonius delayed Antony somewhere at a distance outside. They had planned to kill both him and Lepidus. But fearing that they might be ill spoken of as a result of the number of those destroyed, and that it might be said that they had slain Cæsar to gain power and not to free the city, as they pretended, they did not wish Antony even to be present at his slaughter. As for Lepidus, he had set out on a campaign and was in the suburbs. Antony was held by Trebonius in conversation. Meanwhile the rest in a body surrounded Cæsar (he was as easy of access and ready to be addressed as any one could have wished), and some talked among themselves, while others presented petitions to him, so that suspicion might be as far from his mind as possible. When the right moment came, one of them approached him as if to express his thanks for some favor or other and pulled his cloak from his shoulder; for this, according to the agreement, served to the conspirators as a signal raised. Thereupon they attacked him from many sides at once and wounded him to death, so that by reason of

their numbers Cæsar was unable to say or do anything, but veiling his face was slain with many wounds. This is the truest account. In times past some have made a declaration like this, that to Brutus who struck him severely he said: "Thou, too, my child?" B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710)

A great outcry naturally arose from all the rest who —20— were inside and who were standing nearby outside at the suddenness of the event and because they were not acquainted with the slayers, their numbers, or their intention; and all were thrown into confusion, believing themselves in danger; so they themselves started in flight by whatever way each man could, and they alarmed those who met them by saying nothing definite, but merely shouting out these words: "Run, bolt doors! Run, bolt doors!" The rest, taking it up from one another as each one echoed the cries, filled the city with lamentations, and they burst into shops and houses to hide themselves. Yet the assassins hurried just as they were to the Forum, indicating both by their gestures and their shouts not to be afraid. At the same time that they said this they called continuously for Cicero: but the crowd did not believe that they were sincere, and was not easily calmed. Late in the day at last they gradually began to take courage and became quiet, as no one was killed or arrested. When they met —21— in the assembly the assassins had much to say against Cæsar and much in favor of the democracy, and they bade the people take courage and not expect any harm. They had killed him, they declared, not to secure power or any other advantage, but in order that they might be

B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710) free and independent and be governed rightly. By speaking such words they calmed the majority, especially since they injured no one. Fearing for all that that somebody might concert measures against them the conspirators ascended the Capitoline with the avowed intention of offering prayer to the gods, and there they spent the day and night. And at evening they were joined by some of the other prominent men who had not shared in the plot, but were anxious, when they saw the perpetrators praised, to secure the glory of it, as well as the prizes which those concerned expected. With great justice the affair happened to turn out the opposite way: they did not secure any reputation for the deed because they had not been partakers of it in any way, but they shared the danger which fell upon the ones who committed it just as much as if they themselves had been the plotters.

—22— Seeing this, Dolabella likewise did not see fit to keep quiet, but entered upon the consular office though it did not yet belong to him, and after a short speech to the people on the situation ascended the Capitol. While affairs were in this condition Lepidus, learning what had taken place, by night occupied the Forum with his soldiers and at dawn delivered a speech against the assassins. Antony immediately after Cæsar's death had fled, casting away his robe of office in order to escape notice, and had concealed himself through the night. When, however, he ascertained that the assassins were on the Capitol and Lepidus in the Forum, he assembled the senate in the precinct of Tellus and brought forward the business of the hour for deliberation. Some said one thing, some another, as each of

them thought about it: Cicero, whose advice they followed, spoke to this effect: — B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710)

"On every occasion I think no one ought to say anything merely for the sake of winning favor or to show his spite, but to reveal just what the man in each case thinks to be the best. We demand that those who are prætors or consuls shall do everything from upright motives, and if they make any errors we demand an account from them even if their slip was accidental; and it will be unbearable if in debates, where we are complete masters of our own opinion, we shall abandon the common welfare with a view to private advantage. For this reason, Conscript Fathers, I have always thought that I ought to advise you on all matters with simplicity and justice, but especially under the present circumstances, when, if without being overcaptious we come to an agreement, we shall be preserved ourselves and enable all the rest to survive, but if we wish to examine everything minutely, I fear ill fortune — but at the very opening of my address I do not wish to say anything displeasing. Formerly, not very long ago, those who had arms usually also got control of the government and consequently issued orders to you as to the subjects on which you must deliberate, but you could not look forward and see what it was proper for them to do. But now practically all conditions are so favorably placed that the matter is in your hands and the responsibility rests upon you; and from your own selves you may obtain either concord and with it liberty, or seditions and civil wars again and a master at the close of them. —23— —24—

B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710) Whatever you decide to-day all the rest will follow. This being the state of the case as I see it, I declare that you ought to abandon your mutual enmities or jealousies or whatever name should be applied to them, and return to that ancient condition of peace and friendship and harmony. For you should remember this, if nothing else, that so long as we enjoyed that kind of government, we acquired lands, fortunes, glory and allies, but ever since we were led into abusing one another, so far from growing better we have become decidedly worse off. I am so firmly convinced that nothing else at present could save the city that if we do not to-day, at once, with all possible speed, adopt some policy, we shall never be able to regain our position.

—25— "Notice carefully that I am speaking only the truth, of which you may convince yourselves if you regard present conditions and then consider our position in old times. Do you not see what is taking place,— that the populace is again being divided and torn asunder and that, some choosing this side, and some that, they have already fallen into two parties and two camps, that the one side has taken timely possession of the Capitol as if they feared the Gauls or somebody, and the other side with headquarters in the Forum is preparing to besiege them and so behaving like Carthaginians, and not as though they too were Romans? Do you not hear that though formerly citizens often differed, even to the extent of occupying the Aventine once, and the Capitol, and some of them the Sacred

Mount, as often as they were reconciled one with another on equal terms (or by yielding but a small point) they at once stopped hating one another, to live the rest of their lives in such peace and harmony that in common they carried through successfully many great wars? As often, on the other hand, as they had recourse to murders and assassinations, the one side deceived by the justification of defending themselves against the encroachments of the other, and the other side by an ambition to appear to be inferior to none, no good ever came of it. Why need I waste time by repeating to you, who know them equally well, the names of Valerius, Horatius, Saturninus, Glaucia, the Gracchi? With such examples before you, not of foreign origin but native to this land, do not hesitate to strive after the right course and guard against the wrong. Having from the events of history received a proof of the outcome of the situation on which you are deliberating, regard my exhortation no longer as mere words but believe that the welfare of the community is at stake this instant. Do not for any doubtful theory cast away the certainty of hope, but trusting to a reliable pledge secure in advance a sure result for your calculations. B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710)

"It is in your power, if you receive this evidence that I mentioned from your own land and your own ancestors, to decide rightly. And this is why I did not wish to cite instances from abroad, though I might have mentioned countless of them. One instance, nevertheless, I will offer from the best and most ancient —26—

B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710)

city from which our fathers did not disdain to introduce certain laws; for it would be a disgrace for us, who so far surpass the Athenians in strength and sense, to deliberate less well than they. They were once — of course you all know this — at variance, and as a result were overcome in war by the Lacedæmonians and endured a tyranny of the more powerful citizens; and they did not obtain a respite from evils until they made a compact and agreement to forget their past injuries, though many and severe, and never to allow a single reproach because of them or to bear malice against any one. Now when they had attained such a degree of wisdom, they not only ceased enduring tyrannies and seditions, but flourished in every way, regaining their city, laying claim to the sovereignty of the Greeks, and finally becoming powerful enough to decide frequently on the preservation or destruction both of the Lacedæmonians themselves and of the Thebans. Now notice, that if those men who seized Phyle and came home from the Peiræus had chosen to take vengeance on the city party for wrongs suffered, they would, to be sure, have seemed to have performed a justifiable action, but they would have undergone, as well as have caused, many evils. Just as they exceeded their hopes by defeating their foes, they might perhaps themselves have been in turn

—27— unexpectedly worsted. In such matters there is nothing sure, and one does not necessarily gain the mastery as a result of being strong, but vast numbers who were confident have failed and vast numbers who were look-

ing to defeat somebody have perished before they could strike. The party that is overreached in any transaction is not bound to be fortunate just because it is wronged, nor is the party which has the greater power bound to be successful just because it surpasses, but both are equally subservient to human uncertainty and the mutability of fortune, and the issue they secure is often not in accordance with the favorable prognostications of the one side, but proves to be what the other actually dared not expect. As a result of this, and of intense rivalry (for man is strongly given when wronged or believing himself wronged to become beyond measure bold) many are on many occasions inspired to undergo dangers even beyond their strength, with the determination to conquer or at least not to perish utterly without having shed some blood. So it is that partly conquering and partly defeated, sometimes gaining the mastery over others and again falling prostrate themselves, some are altogether annihilated and others gain a Cadmean victory, as it is called, and at a time when the knowledge can avail them nothing they perceive that their plans were ill drawn. B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710)

" That this is so you also have learned by experience. Consider, Marius for some time had power in seditions; then he was driven out, collected a force, and accomplished what you know. Likewise Sulla — not to speak of Cinna or Strabo or the rest who intervene — influential at first, then subdued, then making himself ruler, authorized every possible terrible severity. —28—

B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710) After that Lepidus, evidently with the intention of following in their footsteps, instituted a kind of sedition of his own and stirred nearly the whole of Italy. When we at last got rid of him too, remember what we suffered from Sertorius and from the exiles with him. What did Pompey, what did this Cæsar himself do? — not to mention here Catiline or Clodius. Did they not at first fight against each other, and that in spite of their relationship, and then fill full of countless evils not only our own city or even the rest of Italy, but practically the entire world? Well, after Pompey's death and that great destruction of the citizens, did any quiet appear? Whence could it? By no means. Africa knows, Spain knows the multitudes who perished in each of those lands. What then? Did we have peace after this? How is it possible, when Cæsar himself lies slain in this fashion, the Capitol is occupied, all through the Forum arms are seen,

— 29 — and throughout the city fear exists? In this way, when men begin a seditious career and seek ever to repay violence with violence and inflict vengeance without care for propriety, without care for human limitations, but according to their desires and the power that arms give them, there necessarily arises in each such case a kind of circle of ills, and alternate requitals of outrages take place. The fortunate party abounds in insolence and sets no limits to the advantage it may take, and the party that is crushed, if it does not perish immediately, rages at the disaster and is eager to take vengeance on the oppressor, until it sate its wrath. Then the remainder of the mul-

titude, even if it has not been previously involved in the transactions, now through pity of the beaten and envy of the victorious side, coöperates with the former, fearing that it may suffer the same evils as the down-trodden element and hoping that it may win the same success as the force temporarily in the ascendant. Thus the portion of the citizens that is not concerned is brought into the dispute and one class takes the evil up against another, through pretence of avenging the side which is for the moment at a disadvantage, as if they were repelling a regular, everyday danger; and individually they free themselves from it, but they ruin the community in every way. Do you not see how much time we have lost in fighting one another, how many great evils we have endured meanwhile, and, what is worse than that, inflicted? And who could count the vast mass of money of which we have stripped our allies and robbed the gods, which furthermore we have contributed ourselves from what we did not possess, and then expended it against one another? Or who could number the mass of men that have been lost, not only of ordinary persons (that is beyond computation) but of knights and senators, each one of whom was able in foreign wars to preserve the whole city by his life and death? How many Curtii, how many Decii, Fabii, Gracchi, Marcelli, Scipiones have been killed? Not, by Jupiter, to repel Samnites or Latins or Spaniards or Carthaginians, but only to perish themselves in the end. And for those under arms who died, no matter how deep sorrow one might

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feel for them, there is less reason to lament. They entered the battles as volunteers, if it is proper to call volunteers men compelled by fear, and they met even if an unjust at least a brave death, in an equal struggle; and in the hope that they might even survive and conquer they fell without grieving. But how might one mourn as they deserve those who were pitiably destroyed in their houses, in the roads, in the Forum, in the senate-chamber even, on the Capitol even, by violence — not only men but also women, not only those in their prime, but also old men and children? And after subjecting one another to so many of these reprisals of such a nature as all our enemies put together never inflicted upon us (nor were we ever the authors of anything similar to them), so far from loathing such acts and manfully wishing to have done with them, we rejoice and hold festivals and term those who are guilty of them benefactors. Honestly, I cannot deem this life that we have been leading human; it is rather that of wild beasts which are consumed by one another.

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"For what is definitely past, however, why should we lament further? We cannot now prevent its having happened. Let us fix our attention upon the future. That is, indeed, the reason why I have been mentioning former events, not for the purpose of giving a list of national calamities which ought never to have occurred, but that by exhibiting them I might persuade you to preserve at least what is left. This is the only benefit one can derive from evils,— to guard

against ever again enduring anything similar. This is most within your power at the present moment, while the danger is just beginning, while not many have yet united, and those who are unruly have gained no advantage over one another nor suffered any setback, so that by hope of superiority or anger at inferiority they are led to enter danger heedlessly and contrary to their own interests. Still, in this great work you will be successful without undergoing any toil or danger, without spending money or ordering murders, but simply by voting just this, that no malice shall be borne on the part of any. Even if any errors —32— have been committed by certain persons, this is not a time to enquire carefully into them, nor to convict, nor to punish. You are not at the moment sitting in judgment over any one, that you should need to search out what is just with absolute accuracy, but you are deliberating about the situation that has arisen and how the excitement may in the safest way be allayed. This is something we could not bring about, unless we should overlook some few things, as we are wont to do in the case of children. When dealing with them we do not take all matters carefully into account, and many things we of necessity overlook. For venial sins it is not right to chastise them remorselessly, but rather to admonish them gently. And now, since we are not only named fathers of all the people in common, but are in reality such, let us not enter into a discussion of all the fine points, lest we all incur ruin; for anybody could find much fault with Cæsar him-

B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710)

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self so that he would seem to have been justly slain, or again might bring heavy charges against those that killed him, so that they would be thought to deserve punishment. But such action is for men who are anxious to arouse seditions again. It is the task of those who deliberate rightly not to cause their own hurt by meting out exact justice, but to win preservation by a use at the same time of clemency. Accordingly, think of this that has happened as if it had been a kind of hail storm or deluge that had taken place and give it to forgetfulness. Now, if never before, gain a knowledge of one another, since you are countrymen and citizens and relatives, and secure harmony.

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"Now, that none of you may suspect that I wish to grant any indulgence to Cæsar's assassins to prevent their paying the penalty, just because I was once a member of Pompey's party, I will state one fact to you. I think that all of you are firmly of the opinion that I have never adopted an attitude of friendship or hostility toward any one for purely personal reasons, but it was always for your sake and for the public freedom and harmony that I hated the one class and loved the other. For this reason I will pass over the rest that might be said, and make merely a brief statement to you. I am so far from doing this that I mentioned and not looking out for the public safety, that I affirm the others, too, should be granted immunity for their high-handed acts, contrary to established law, in Cæsar's lifetime, and they ought to keep the honors, offices, and gifts which they received

from him, though I am not pleased with some of them. I should not advise you to do or to grant anything further of the kind: but since it has been done, I think you ought not to be troubled overmuch about any of these matters. For what loss so far-reaching could you sustain if A or B holds something that he has obtained outside of just channels and contrary to his deserts as the benefit you could attain by not causing fear or disturbance to men who were formerly of influence? B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710)

"This is what I have to say for the present, in the face of pressing need. When feeling has subsided, let us then consider any remaining subjects of discussion."

—34— Cicero by the foregoing speech persuaded the senate to vote that no one should bear malice against any one else. While this was being done the assassins also promised the soldiers that they would not undo any of Cæsar's acts. They perceived that the military was mightily ill at ease for fear it should be deprived of what he had given it, and so they made haste, before the senate reached any decision whatever, to anticipate the others' wishes. Next they invited those who were present there down below to come within hearing distance, and conversed with them on matters of importance; as a result of the conference they sent down a letter to the Forum announcing that they would take nothing away from anybody nor do harm in other ways, and that the validity of all acts of Cæsar was confirmed. They also urged a state of

B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710) harmony, binding themselves by the strongest oaths that they would be honest in everything. When, therefore, the decisions of the senate also were made known, the soldiers no longer held to Lepidus nor did the others have any fear of him, but hastened to become reconciled,— chiefly at the instance of Antony,— quite contrary to his intention. Lepidus, making a pretence of vengeance upon Cæsar, was anxious to institute a revolution and as he had legions at his command he expected that he would succeed to his position as ruler and gain the mastery; these were his motives in endeavoring to further a conflict. Antony, as he perceived his rival's favorable situation and had not himself any force at his back, did not dare to adopt any revolutionary measures for the time being, and furthermore he persuaded Lepidus (to prevent his becoming greater) to bow to the will of the majority. So they came to terms on the conditions that had been voted, but those on the Capitol would not come down till they had secured the son of Lepidus and the son of Antony to treat as hostages; then Brutus descended to Lepidus, to whom he was related, and Cassius to Antony, being assured of safety. While dining together they naturally, at such a juncture, discussed a variety of topics and Antony asked Cassius: "Have you perhaps got some kind of dagger under your arm even now?" To which he answered: "Yes, and a big one, if you too should desire to play the tyrant."

—35— This was the way things went at that time. No damage was inflicted or expected, and the majority were

glad to be rid of Cæsar's rule, some of them even conceiving the idea of casting his body out unburied. The conspirators well pleased did not undertake any further superfluous tasks and were called " liberators " and " tyrranicides." Later his will was read and the people learned that he had made Octavius his son and heir and had left Antony, Decimus, and some of the other assassins to be the young man's guardians and inheritors of the property in case it should not come to him, and furthermore that he had directed various bequests to be given to different persons, and to the city the gardens along the Tiber, as well as thirty denarii (according to the record of Octavius himself) or seventy-five according to some others, to each of the citizens. This news caused an upheaval and Antony fanned the flames of their resentment by bringing the body most inconsiderately[1] into the Forum and exposing it covered with blood as it was and with gaping wounds. There he delivered over it a speech, in every way beautiful and brilliant but not suited to the state of the public mind at that time. His words were about as follows: — B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710)

" If this man had died as a private citizen, Quirites, and I had happened to be a private citizen, I should not have needed many words nor have rehearsed all his achievements, but after making a few remarks about his family, his education, and his character, and possibly mentioning some of his services to the state, I should have been satisfied and should have refrained —36—

[1] It is here, with this word, that one of the two most important manuscripts of Dio (the codex Venetus or Marcianus 395) begins.

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from becoming wearisome to those not related to him. But since this man has perished while holding the highest position among you and I have received and hold the second, it is requisite that I should deliver a twofold address, one as the man set down as his heir and the other in my capacity as magistrate. I must not omit anything that ought to be said but speak what the whole people would have chanted with one tongue if they could have obtained one voice. I am well aware that it is difficult to hit your precise sentiments. Especially is it no easy task to treat matters of such magnitude,— what speech could equal the greatness of the deeds? — and you, whose minds are insatiable because of the facts that you know already, will not prove lenient judges of my efforts. If the speech were being made among men ignorant of the subject, it would be very easy to content them, for they would be startled by such great deeds: but as the matter stands, through your familiarity with the events, it is inevitable that everything that shall be said will be thought less than the reality. Outsiders, even if through jealousy they should distrust it, yet for that very reason must deem each statement they hear strong enough: but your gathering, influenced by good-will, must inevitably prove impossible to satisfy. You yourselves have profited most by Cæsar's virtues and you demand his praises not half-heartedly, as if he were no relation, but out of deep affection as one of your very own. I shall strive therefore to meet your wishes to the fullest extent, and I feel sure that you will not criticise too closely my

command of words or conception of the subject, but will, out of your kindness of heart, make up whatever is lacking in that respect. B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710)

" I shall speak first about his lineage, though not because it is very brilliant. Yet this too has considerable bearing on the nature of excellence, that a man should have become good not through force of circumstances but by inherent power. Those not born of noble parents may disguise themselves as honest men but may also some day be convicted of their base origin by innate qualities. Those, however, who possess the seed of honesty, descending through a long line of ancestors, cannot possibly help having an excellence which is of spontaneous growth and permanent. Still, I do not now praise Cæsar chiefly because he was sprung from many noble men of recent times and kings and gods of ancient days, but because in the first place he was a kinsman of our whole city,— we were founded by the men that were his ancestors,— and secondly because he not only confirmed the renown of his forefathers who were believed by virtue to have attained divinity, but actually increased it; if any person disputed formerly the possibility of Æneas ever having been born of Venus, he may now believe it. The gods in past times have been reported as possessing some unworthy children, but no one could deem this man unworthy to have had gods for his ancestors. Æneas himself became king, as likewise some of his descendants. This man proved himself so much superior to them that whereas they were monarchs of Lavinium and Alba, he refused —37—

B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710) to become king of Rome; and whereas they laid the foundation of our city, he raised it to such heights that among other services he established colonies greater than the cities over which they ruled.

—38— "Such, then, is the state of his family. That he passed through a childhood and education corresponding to the dignity of his noble birth how could one feel better assured than by the certain proofs that his deeds afford? When a man possesses conspicuously a body that is most enduring and a soul that is most steadfast in the face of all contingencies alike of peace and war, is it not inevitable that he must have been reared in the best possible way? And I tell you it is difficult for any man surpassingly beautiful to show himself most enduring, and difficult for one who is strong in body to attain greatest prudence, but most difficult of all for the same man to shine both in words and in deeds. Now this man — I speak among men who know the facts, so that I shall not falsify in the least degree, for I should be caught in the very act, nor heap up exaggerated praises, for then I should obtain the opposite results of what I wish. If I do anything of the kind, I shall be suspected with the utmost justice of braggadocio, and it will be thought that I am making his excellence less than the reputation which already exists in your own minds. Every utterance delivered under such conditions, in case it admits even the smallest amount of falsehood, not only bestows no praise on its subject but defeats its own ends. The knowledge of the hearers, not agreeing with the fictitious declaration, takes

refuge in truth, where it quickly finds satisfaction and learns as well what the statement ought to have been; and then, comparing the two, detects the difference. Stating only the truth, therefore, I affirm that this Cæsar was at the same time most able in body and most amiable in spirit. He enjoyed a wonderful natural talent and had been scrupulously trained in every kind of education, which always enabled him (not unnaturally) to comprehend everything that was needed with the greatest keenness, to interpret the need most plausibly, and to arrange and administer matters most prudently. No shifting of a favorable situation could come upon him so suddenly as to catch him off his guard, nor did a secret delay, no matter how long the postponement, escape his notice. He decided always with regard to every crisis before he came in contact with it, and was prepared beforehand for every contingency that could happen to him. He understood well how to discern sharply what was concealed, to dissimulate what was evident in such a way as to inspire confidence, to pretend to know what was obscure, to conceal what he knew, to adapt occasions to one another and to give an account of them, and furthermore to accomplish and cover successfully in detail the ground of every enterprise. A proof of this is that in his private affairs he showed himself at once an excellent manager and very liberal, being careful to keep permanently what he inherited, but lavish in spending with an unsparing hand what he gained, and for all his relatives, except the most impious, he possessed a strong affection. He

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B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710) did not neglect any of them in misfortune, nor did he envy them in good fortune, but he helped the latter to increase their previous property and made up the deficiencies for the former, giving some money, some lands, some offices, some priesthoods. Again, he was wonderfully attached to his friends and other associates. He never scorned or insulted any one of them, but while courteous to all alike he rewarded many times over those who assisted him in any project and won the devotion of the rest by benefits, not bowing to any one of brilliant position, nor humiliating any one who was bettering himself, but as if he himself were being exalted through all their successes and acquiring strength and adornment he took delight in making the largest number equal with himself. While he behaved thus toward his friends and acquaintances, he did not show himself cruel or inexorable even to his enemies, but many of those who had come into collision with him personally he let off scotfree, and many who had actually made war against him he released, giving some of them honors and offices. To this degree was he in every way inclined to right conduct, and not only had no baseness in his own making, but would not believe that it was found in anybody else.

—40— "Since I have reached these statements, I will begin to speak about his public services. If he had lived a quiet existence, perhaps his excellence would never have come to light; but as it was, by being raised to the highest position and becoming the greatest not only of his contemporaries but of all the rest who had ever wielded any influence, he displayed it more conspicuously. For nearly all his predecessors this supreme

authority had served only to reveal their defects, but him it made more luminous: through the greatness of his excellence he undertook correspondingly great deeds, and was found to be a match for them; he alone of men after obtaining for himself so great good fortune as a result of true worth neither disgraced it nor treated it wantonly. The brilliant successes which he regularly achieved on his campaigns and the highmindedness he showed in everyday duties I shall pass over, although they are so great that for any other man they would constitute sufficient praise: but in view of the distinction of his subsequent deeds, I shall seem to be dealing with small matters, if I rehearse them all with exactness. I shall only mention his achievements while ruling over you. Even all of these, however, I shall not relate with minute scrupulousness. I could not possibly give them adequate treatment, and I should cause you excessive weariness, particularly since you already know them. B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710)

"First of all, this man was prætor in Spain, and finding it secretly hostile did not allow the inhabitants under the protection of the name of peace to develop into foes, nor chose to spend the period of his governorship in quiet rather than to effect what was for the advantage of the nation; hence, since they would not agree to alter their sentiments, he brought them to their senses without their consent, and in doing so so far surpassed the men who had previously won glory against them as keeping a thing is more difficult than acquiring it, and reducing men to a condition where they can never again become rebellious is more profitable than rendering them subject in the first place, —41—

B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710) while their power is still undiminished. That is the reason that you voted him a triumph for this and gave him at once the office of consul. As a result of your decree it became most plainly evident that he had waged that war not for his own desires or glory, but was preparing for the future. The celebration of the triumph he waived on account of pressing business, and after thanking you for the honor he was satisfied with merely that to secure his glory, and entered upon —42— the consulship. Now all his administrative acts in this city during the discharge of that office would be verily countless to name. And as soon as he had left it and been sent to conduct war against the Gauls, notice how many and how great were his achievements there. So far from causing grievances to the allies he even went to their assistance, because he was not suspicious at all of them and further saw that they were wronged. But his foes, both those dwelling near the friendly tribes, and all the rest that inhabited Gaul he subjugated, acquiring at one time vast stretches of territory and at another unnumbered cities of which we knew not even the names before. All this, moreover, he accomplished so quickly, though he had received neither a competent force nor sufficient money from you, that before any of you knew that he was at war he had conquered; and he settled affairs on such a firm basis and[1] . . ., that as a result Celtica and Britain felt his footstep. And now is that Gaul enslaved which sent against us the Ambrones and the Cimbri, and is entirely cultivated like Italy itself. Ships traverse not only the Rhone or

[1] Most editors have gotten over the difficulty of this "and" in the MS. by omitting it. Dindorf, however, believed it to indicate a real gap.

the Arar, but the Mosa, the Liger, the very Rhine, and the very ocean. Places of which we had not even heard the titles to lead us to think that they existed were likewise subdued for us: the formerly unknown he made accessible, the formerly unexplored navigable by his greatness of purpose and greatness of accomplishment. And had not certain persons out of envy formed a faction against him, or rather us, and forced him to return here before the proper time, he would certainly have subdued Britain entire together with the remaining islands surrounding it and all of Celtica to the Arctic Ocean, so that we should have had as borders not land or people for the future, but air and the outer sea. For these reasons you also, seeing the greatness of his mind and his deeds and good fortune, assigned him the right to hold office a very long time,— a privilege which, from the hour that we became a democracy has belonged to no other man,— I mean holding the leadership during eight whole years in succession. This shows that you thought him to be really winning all those conquests for you and never entertained the suspicion that he would strengthen himself to your hurt.

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"No, you desired that he should spend in those regions as long a time as possible. He was prevented, however, by those who regarded the government as no longer a public but their own private possession, from subjugating the remaining countries, and you were kept from becoming lords of them all; these men, making an ill use of the opportunity given them by his being occupied, ventured upon many impious projects, so that you came to require his aid. Therefore abandoning the victories within his grasp he quickly brought you assist-

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B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710) ance, freed all Italy from the dangers in which it had become involved, and furthermore won back Spain which had been estranged. Then he saw Pompey, who had abandoned his fatherland and was setting up a kingdom of his own in Macedonia, transferring thither all your possessions, equipping your subjects against you, and using against you money of your own. So at first he wished to persuade Pompey somehow to stop and change his course and receive the greatest pledges that he should again attain a fair and equal position with him; and he sent to him both privately and publicly. When, however, he found himself unable in any way to effect this, but Pompey burst all restraints, even the relationship that had existed between himself and Cæsar, and chose to fight against you, then at last he was compelled to begin a civil war. And what need is there of telling how daringly he sailed against him in spite of the winter, or how boldly he assailed him, though Pompey held all the strong positions there, or how bravely he vanquished him though much inferior in number of soldiers? If a man wished to examine each feature in detail, he might show the renowned Pompey to have been a child, so completely was he outgeneraled at every point.

—45— "But this I will omit, for Cæsar himself likewise never took any pride in it, but he accepted it as a dispensation of destiny, repugnant to him personally. When Heaven had most justly decided the issue of the battle, what man of those then captured for the first time did he put to death? Whom, rather, did he not honor, not alone senators or knights or citizens in general, but also allies

and subjects? No one of them either died a violent death, or was made defendant in court, no individual, no king, no tribe, no city. On the contrary, some arrayed themselves on his side, and others at least obtained immunity with honor, so that then all lamented the men that had been lost. Such exceeding humanity did he show, that he praised those who had coöperated with Pompey and allowed them to keep everything the latter had given them, but hated Pharnaces and Orodes, because though friends of the vanquished they had not assisted him. It was chiefly for this reason that he not long after waged war on Pharnaces, and was preparing to conduct a campaign against Orodes. He certainly [would have spared] even [Pompey himself if] he had captured him alive.[1] A proof of this is that he did not pursue him at once, but allowed him to flee at his leisure. Also he was grieved to hear of Pompey's death and did not praise his murderers, but put them to death for it soon after, and even destroyed besides Ptolemy himself, though a child, because he had allowed his benefactor to perish. B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710)

"How after this he brought Egypt to terms and how much money he conveyed to you from there it would be superfluous to relate. And when he made his campaign against Pharnaces, who already held considerable of Pontus and Armenia, he was on the same day reported to the rebel as approaching him, was seen confronting him, engaged in conflict with him, and conquered him. —46—

1 The words in brackets are Reiske's conjecture for filling the gap in the MS. Other editors use slightly different phraseology of like purport.

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This better than anything else established the truth of the assertion that he had not become weaker in Alexandria and had not delayed there out of voluptuousness. For how could he have won that victory so easily without employing a great store of insight and great force? When now Pharnaces had fled he was preparing to conduct a campaign at once against the Parthian, but as certain quarrels were taking place there he withdrew rather unwillingly, but settled this dispute, too, so that no one would believe there had been a disturbance. Not a soul was killed or exiled or even dishonored in any way as a result of that trouble, not because many might not justly have been punished, but because he thought it right while destroying enemies unsparingly to preserve citizens, even if they were poor stuff. Therefore by his bravery he overcame foreigners in war, but out of his humanity kept unharmed the seditious citizens, although many of them by their acts had often shown themselves unworthy of this favor. This same policy he followed again both in Africa and in Spain, releasing all who had not before been captured and been made recipients of his mercy. To grant their lives invariably to such as frequently plotted against him he deemed folly, not humanity. On the other hand, he thought it quite the duty of a manly man to pardon opponents on the occasion of their first errors and not to keep an inexorable anger, yes, and to assign honors to them, but if they clung to their original course, to get rid of them. Yet why did I say this? Many of them also he preserved by allowing all his associates and those who had helped him conquer to save, one each, the life of a captive.

"Moreover, that he did all this from inherent excellence and not from pretence or to gather any advantage, as others in large numbers have displayed humaneness, the greatest evidence is that everywhere and under all circumstances he showed himself the same: anger did not brutalize him nor good fortune corrupt him; power did not alter, nor authority change him. Yet it is very difficult when tested in so many enterprises of such a scope and following one another in quick succession at a time when one has been successful in some, is still engaged in conducting others, and only suspects the existence of others, to prove equally efficient on all occasions and to refrain from wishing to do anything harsh or frightful, if not out of vengeance for the past, at least as a measure of safeguard for the future. This, then, is enough to prove his excellence. He was so truly a scion of gods that he understood but one thing, to save those that could be saved. But if you want more evidence, it lies in this, that he took care to have those who warred against him chastised by no other hands than his own, and that he won back those who in former times had slipped away. He had amnesty granted to all who had been followers of Lepidus and Sertorius, and next arranged that safety should be afforded all the survivors among those proscribed by Sulla; somewhat later he brought them home from exile and bestowed honors and offices upon the children of all who had been slain by that tyrant. Greatest of all, he burned absolutely every one of the letters containing secret information that was found in the tent of either Pompey or Scipio, not reading or noticing any portion of them, in order that no one else might derive

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from them the power to play the rogue. That this was not only what he said, but what he did, his acts show clearly. No one as a result of those letters was even frightened, let alone suffering any great calamity. And no one knows those who escaped this danger except the men themselves. This is most astonishing and has nothing to surpass it, that they were spared before being accused, and saved before encountering danger, and that not even he who saved their lives learned who it was he pitied.

—48— "For these and all his other acts of lawmaking and reconstruction, great in themselves, but likely to be deemed small in comparison with those others into which one cannot enter minutely, you loved him as a father and cherished him as a benefactor, you glorified him with such honors as you bestowed on no one else and desired him to be continual head of the city and of the whole domain. You did not dispute at all about titles, but applied them all to him as being still less than his merits, with the purpose that whatever was lacking in each one of them of what was considered a proper expression of the most complete honor and authority might be made up by what the rest contributed. Therefore, as regards the gods he was appointed high priest, as regards us consul, as regards the soldiers imperator, and as regards the enemy dictator. But why do I enumerate these details, when in one phrase you called him father of his country,— not to mention the rest of his titles?

—49— "Yet this father, this high priest, this inviolable be-

ing, hero, god, is dead, alas, dead not by the violence of some disease, nor exhausted by old age, nor wounded abroad somewhere in some war, nor snatched away irresistibly by some supernatural force: but plotted against here within the walls — the man that safely led an army into Britain; ambushed in this city — the man who had increased its circuit; struck down in the senate-house — the man that had reared another such edifice at his own charge; unarmed the brave warrior; defenceless the promoter of peace; the judge beside the court of justice; the governor beside the seat of government; at the hands of the citizens — he whom none of the enemy had been able to kill even when he fell into the sea; at the hands of his comrades — he who had often taken pity on them. Where, Cæsar, was your humaneness, where your inviolability, where the laws? You enacted many laws to prevent any one's being killed by personal foes, yet see how mercilessly your friends killed you, and now slain you lie before us in that Forum through which you often crowned led triumphal marches, wounded unto death you have been cast down upon that rostra from which you often addressed the people. Woe for the blood-bespattered locks of gray, alas for the rent robe, which you assumed, it seems, only to the end that you might be slain in it!" B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710)

At this deliverance of Antony's the throng was at first excited, then enraged, and finally so inflamed with passion that they sought his murderers and reproached the senators besides, because the former had killed —50—

B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710) and the latter had beheld without protest the death of a man in whose behalf they had voted to offer yearly prayers, by whose Health and Fortune they took oaths, and whom they had made sacrosanct equally with the tribunes. Then, seizing his body, some wished to convey it to the room in which he had been slaughtered, and others to the Capitol and to burn it there: but being prevented by the soldiers, who feared that the theatres and temples would be burned to the ground at the same time, they placed it upon a pyre there in the Forum, just as they were. Even under these circumstances many of the surrounding buildings would have been destroyed, had not the soldiers presented an obstacle, and some of the bolder spirits the consuls forced over the cliffs of the Capitol. For all that the remainder did not cease their disturbance, but rushed to the houses of the murderers, and during the excitement they killed without reason Helvius Cinna, a tribune, and some others; this man had not only not plotted against Cæsar, but was one of his most devoted friends. Their error was due to the fact that Cornelius —51— Cinna the prætor had a share in the attack. After this the consuls forbade any one outside the ranks of soldiers to carry arms. They accordingly refrained from assassinations, but set up a kind of altar on the site of the pyre—his bones the freedmen had previously taken up and deposited in the ancestral tomb—and undertook to sacrifice upon it and offer victims to Cæsar, as to a god. This the consuls overturned and punished some who showed displeasure at the act, also publishing a

law that no one should ever again be dictator. In fact they invoked curses and proclaimed death as the penalty upon any man who should propose or support such a measure, and furthermore they fined the present malcontents directly. In making this provision for the future they seemed to assume that the shamefulness of the deeds consisted in the names, whereas these occurrences really arose from the supremacy of arms and the character of each individual, and degraded the titles of authority in whatever capacity exercised. For the time being they despatched immediately to the colonies such as held allotments of land previously assigned by Cæsar; this was from fear that they might cause some disturbance. Of Cæsar's slayers they sent out some, who had obtained governorships, to the provinces, and the rest to various different places on one pretext or another: and these persons were honored by many persons as benefactors. B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710)

In this way Cæsar disappeared from the scene. Inasmuch as he had been slain in Pompey's edifice and near his statue which at that time stood there, he seemed in a way to have afforded his rival his revenge; and this idea gained ground from the fact that tremendous thunder and a furious rain occurred. In the midst of that excitement there also took place the following incident, not unworthy of mention. One Gaius Casca, a tribune, seeing that Cinna had perished as a result of his name being similar to the praetor's, and fearing that he too might be killed, because Publius Servilius Casca was one of the tribunes and also one of the assas- —52—

B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710) sins, issued a book which showed that they had in common only one and the same name and pointed out their difference of disposition. Neither of them suffered any harm (for Servilius was strongly guarded) and Gaius won some consideration, so that he is remembered by this act.

—53— These were the proceedings, at that time, of the consuls and the rest. Dolabella was invested with his office by Antony, who feared that he might cause a sedition, although he was at first not disposed to take such action, on the ground that Dolabella had not yet the right to it. When, however, the excitement subsided, and Antony himself was charged with investigating the acts of Cæsar's administration and carrying out all the latter's behests, he no longer kept within bounds. As soon as he had got hold of the dead man's documents, he made many erasures, and many substitutions,—inserting laws as well as other matter. Moreover, he deprived some of money and offices, which in turn he gave to others, pretending that in so doing he was carrying out Cæsar's directions. Next he made many seizures on the spot, and collected large sums of money from individuals, peoples and kings, selling to some land, to others liberty, to others citizenships, to others exemption from taxes. This was done in spite of the fact that the senate at first had voted that no tablet should be set up on account of any contract that Cæsar had made (all such transactions were inscribed on bronze tablets), and later, when Antony persisted, declaring that many urgent matters had been provided for by his chief, it

had ordered that all the foremost citizens should join in passing upon them. He, however, paid no attention to this, and had an utter contempt for Octavius, who as a stripling and inexperienced in business had declined the inheritance because it was troublesome and hard to manage: and Antony himself, assuming to be the heir not only of the property but also of the supremacy of Cæsar, managed everything. One of his acts was to restore some exiles. And since Lepidus had great power and caused him considerable fear, he gave his daughter in marriage to this leader's son and made arrangements to have the latter appointed high priest, so as to prevent any meddling with enterprises which he had on foot. In order to carry out this plan with greater ease, he diverted the choice of high priest from the people back to the priests, and in company with the latter he consecrated him, performing few or none of the accustomed rites, though he might have secured the priesthood for himself. B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710)

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